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Introduction

D o u  g J. Swanson, Dallas's popular crime novelist, contends that while Dal­
las lacks a "stunning natural backdrop"—no ocean, no forest, no desert, no 
mountains—it nonetheless possesses an "outsized quality" that distin­
guishes it from other cities. As Swanson observes, everyone has "some idea" 
or image of Dallas: "It might be the city that killed Kennedy, it might be the 
TV show, it might be the Dallas Cowboys. But [people] have heard about 
it."1 
For some, Dallas is notable for its politics and civic leadership. Journalists 
and other commentators, for instance, made much of the city's far-right 
politics and oligarchical Dallas Citizens Council at the time of the Kennedy 
assassination. In 1912, the city won acclaim for its energetic boosterism and 
reform tradition. Others, meanwhile, have condemned Dallas's rabid anti­
union tradition. "Big D" 's rejection of federal urban renewal in the 1950s 
and 1960s has been cited at times to further support arguments about the 
city's distinctiveness by underscoring its fierce independence. To local citi­
zens, of course, Dallas has always been unique: many like to believe that 
Dallas had no natural reason to exist, and credit the city's spectacular 
growth and prosperity to the "Dallas Spirit." 
Although I acknowledge that Dallas has some unique characteristics and 
experiences, I have started this book from a different assumption. I am in­
terested in "using" Dallas to understand better the changing nature of po­
litics and planning in urban America during the twentieth century. Dallas is 
hardly typical of all cities, but it is closely tied to dominant business leader­
ship and the "good government" and planning movements characteristic of 
that era.2 Southern and western cities often enthusiastically and selectively 
embraced aspects of both these movements as strategies to help them de­
velop still faster. Dallas also participated in the larger public discourse 
about cities characteristic of the time. Indeed, this work builds on the 
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scholarship of able historians like Roy Lubove and M. Christine Boyer, who 
have discovered a marked agreement at particular times about the nature of 
the municipality that appeared to know no geographical bounds. These 
shared assumptions did not mean unanimity about dealing with specific 
needs of cities, or the end to partisan politics. Rather, a broad-based 
agreement on the nature of the city provided a context for real disagree­
ments, since both sides started from a common perception of the nature of 
reality.3 
This book stems from my interest in understanding how changing con­
ceptions of the city—what it was or could be—relate to different urban poli­
cies and programs over time. Although the literature of urban history has 
expanded at an impressive rate in recent decades, much of it has centered on 
issues of race, class, and gender in explaining the development of the city. 
Historians also pay special attention to the role of social forces in shaping 
urban development, as well as their influences on the thoughts and actions 
of the historical actors.4 These are all valuable contributions, but such efforts 
have largely discouraged scholars from investigating the city from a more 
humanistic approach, emphasizing not social forces but human perception.5 
Studies examining the development of urban policy have stressed the impor­
tance of real events in shaping responses and have neglected to investigate 
the relationship between the perception of reality that city builders brought 
to the city and its problems and the actual response to those urban problems. 
Little effort has been made to examine the writings of city builders or the 
structure of their organizations in order to understand their basic assump­
tions about the nature of the city. 
One reason for the neglect of city leaders' public writings and statements 
is the historian's suspicion that true motives cannot be drawn from such ma­
terial. This is true at some level. However, to dismiss the public discourse 
that these leaders participate in, or to neglect the committees they work 
through, is a grievous error that makes it difficult for us to understand im­
portant assumptions about the city and its needs. When this neglect is com­
bined with the search for villains in the story of urban development, the re­
sult is bad history. Civic leaders are often portrayed as being motivated only 
by greed, and their involvement in urban affairs as nothing but a way to at­
tain selfish goals. Structural innovation, if it redistributes power or influence 
in a way that adversely affects minorities or the poor, is dismissed as nothing 
more than a conspiracy to deprive citizens of their due.6 Little effort is made 
to relate these actions to the urban context in which they occurred. By con­
text, I mean the basic assumptions about the way the city worked, and the 
notions about what cities should become.7 
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On one level, the absence of this urban context is not surprising because 
we live in a time in which the city is not often thought of as a true social/cul-
tural unit. Cities are seen today as part of larger, fragmented metropolitan 
areas and seem to provide little more than settings for various groups and 
neighborhoods to pursue their own needs and concerns. There appears to be 
little thought given to the needs of the city as a whole. As a result, we take 
this idea of the city into our scholarship, and we fail to understand that in 
earlier times the city really was seen as a unit, and urban citizenship empha­
sized not just rights but also responsibilities to the city. Ideas about the na­
ture of the city change just as clearly as the physical form of the city changes, 
although the relationship between the two is not always clear-cut, as some 
have supposed. Traditionally, historians have suggested that urban changes 
influence conceptions about the city,8 but this book starts from the opposite 
premise—that the way we think about the city ultimately affects the way we 
respond to its reality. 
For the City as a Whole, then, is an attempt to understand the actions of 
urban problem solvers by linking their definition of and responses to those 
problems to their perception of what the city was or could become. In it, I 
argue that for much of the first half of the century, civic leaders and govern­
ment officials, among others, conceptualized the city as an important physi­
cal, economic, social, and cultural unit affecting individual behavior, and 
thus they employed a strategy that emphasized the precedence of the needs 
of the city as a whole over the wants of particular populations, neighbor­
hoods, or other special interest groups.9 
We now live in a drastically different urban world. Few embrace the no­
tion that one's place determines one's actions and identity. And today, repre­
sentation of the diverse urban constituency is deemed more important than 
government efficiency, businesslike government, and professional expertise, 
goals characteristic of the earlier period. Indeed, the latter qualities now are 
viewed with suspicion, even disdain. Urban politicians today seem much 
more concerned with promoting programs to address the needs of minori­
ties, neighborhoods, or special interest groups than developing policy for the 
city as a whole. One modern commentator has even questioned whether 
there is such a thing as an urban agenda today.10 
This book, then, focuses on an era between 1900 and 1955, when public 
discourse emphasized the city as a whole as opposed to the "needs" of its in­
dividual inhabitants. It attempts to understand better a past that seems im­
possibly different from our own era's stress on rights and privileges. This 
study should not be misunderstood as a nostalgic look back at a "golden 
era" of government and community in urban America, for the first half of 
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the twentieth century clearly was not that. Despite a rhetoric that constantly 
referred to the city as a whole, not all urban citizens received equal treat­
ment: blacks, Mexicans, and the poor in Dallas did not benefit from local 
government to the same degree that downtown businessmen did. And effi­
ciency and coordination, two catchwords of the era, did not resolve all ur­
ban problems. What this study attempts to do is explore the era on its own 
terms. I argue that changing assumptions about what the city is, or should 
be, affect how problems are defined and how solutions are devised and re­
sponded to by civic leaders. If one conceptualizes the city as a real civic entity 
of inextricably linked parts, functions, and residents, one will respond to its 
problems differently than if one defines the city as nothing more than a set­
ting for individuals to pursue their wants and desires. My contention is that 
changing priorities in public policy can best be understood by linking them 
to changing definitions of the city. 
Toward this end, For the City as a Whole explores the fluid patterns of re­
sponse to cities in the twentieth century. The book focuses on the words and 
activities of white business and professional civic leaders in Dallas, with spe­
cial emphasis on the period between 1919 and 1955, when a new involve­
ment in comprehensive planning and council-manager government sug­
gested a different way of thinking about the city and urban problem solving 
than what had been practiced before or after this era. By the 1960s both 
movements were on the defensive as definitions of good planning, good gov­
ernment, and the public interest changed. The book also examines an earlier 
city-as-a-whole approach from around the turn of the century that lacked 
the comprehensiveness of the later period. 
Traditional interpretations of council-manager government and compre­
hensive planning emphasize how they grew out of a search for order by the 
emerging business and professional classes in response to an industrializing 
urban society, and how they shortchanged much of the city's population ow­
ing to their failure to provide adequate representation of the citizens' view­
points in governing and planning the city.111 offer an alternative to this ex­
planation by suggesting that changing ideas about the nature of the city 
helped shape a response to the city that resulted in comprehensive planning 
and council-manager government, while later notions about the nature of 
cities aided the decline of council-manager government and comprehensive 
planning. Evidence of this transformation can be found not only in the 
changing public discourse about cities but in the varying organizational 
structure of civic improvement bodies. In my view, a public discourse that 
goes from emphasizing the needs of the city to the needs of the city's resi­
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dents helps explain the loss of popularity of these forms of planning and gov­
ernmental structure. In addition, I wish to explore how civic leaders used the 
rhetoric of "the city as a whole" to maintain support for their agenda of city 
building during the twentieth century. This book, then, sets out to examine 
the public discourse and actions of civic leaders in order to explore shifting 
definitions of the basic needs of the city and metropolis. It seeks to reveal 
how these perceptions influenced public behavior and helped shape the way 
leaders defined problems. As a result, this study closely examines the orga­
nizational structures of planning and good-government efforts, and pays 
special attention to the words of civic leaders and their newspapers, to un­
derstand better how they mirrored certain assumptions about Dallas as a so­
cial system. 
At a time when it is unfashionable to study the actions of elite leaders, this 
book may be perceived as a curious relic of past historical interest. But since 
the words and actions of the city's business-civic leadership largely shaped 
the public discourse, a study of public discourse demands that one examine 
the public statements of the civic elite. They owned the leading newspapers, 
chaired the major civic committees, and held the largest financial stake in the 
cities. My attention to them in this book should not be seen as an attempt to 
defend their actions; rather, it is my effort to understand them by placing 
them in context. Interpretations that simply dismiss them as selfish and 
"bad" do not do justice to the historical record. Like their nineteenth-
century counterparts, the business leaders I write about in this book saw 
themselves as city builders as well as businessmen and found little conflict 
between the two roles. Indeed, social scientist Stephen L. Elkin, who has 
written about the Dallas power elite, has argued that those leaders were not 
for "political arrangements that would further their particular interests on 
an individual basis." Rather, they wanted to establish "a set of rules, within 
which city growth would occur," for Dallas businessmen clearly understood 
that such growth would benefit their economic concerns too.12 Blaine 
Brownell has gone even further than a simple economic interpretation 
of urban leadership. After studying the civic-commercial elite in Atlanta, 
Memphis, and New Orleans, he concluded, "To attribute the conceptions of 
the urban commercial community held by this elite solely to economic con­
cerns or to the defense of free enterprise capitalism would be a grievous 
error."13 
The "outsized" quality of Dallas made it an inviting choice for my study 
of a city's civic leadership, for Dallas reflects in exaggerated form some im­
portant tendencies of twentieth-century urban America. Also, when I began 
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this study no scholarly treatment of Dallas's twentieth-century history ex­
isted, and I thought this often-discussed city needed one. Finally, as a Yankee 
outsider, I discovered that Dallas at some level shared much with Cincin­
nati, a northern industrial city about which I had just written. The similari­
ties made me question Dallas's so-called uniqueness and helped shape the 
conceptual framework of this book. 
Founded in 1841, Dallas did not enter its period of rapid and significant 
urban growth until the twentieth century. Because of its newness, unlike 
more established urban centers in the East, Dallas seemed less rooted in tra­
dition and probably more open to current movements—particularly if they 
were seen as a means for promoting additional growth and stability. This 
study in "symptomatic history" acknowledges the uniqueness of the Dallas 
experience, but uses it to understand broader trends in the urban Southwest 
and the United States in general, trends that I see more closely tied to the tim­
ing of urbanization rather than regional influence.14 
Indeed, this book takes exception to scholars who argue that regions like 
the South leave such an indelible mark on their cities that they create a 
unique typology of urban form, unable to meet the claims generally associ­
ated with urbanization.15 It is true that Dallas's southern setting, with its 
cotton crop and racist notions, clearly proved influential in the city's devel­
opment. But what distinguished the city's most prominent city builders was 
their commitment to do just that—create a great city—and their decisions 
and actions were made in that context rather than simply in the context of 
their geographic setting. It was mostly the culture of urban boosterism, 
then, rather than southern culture, that shaped the actions of the city's civic 
leaders, which helps explain, for instance, why such leaders—not only in 
Dallas but also in Atlanta, Richmond, and other southern cities—demon-
strated more flexibility on the race issue than the majority of southerners 
during this time.16 This also helps clarify why some of the most vocal criti­
cism of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s came from white southern urban lead­
ers. They understood that the Klan's message of intolerance and hate threat­
ened the welfare of the city as a whole, not just African Americans or Roman 
Catholics. The culture of urban boosterism also explains the tendency of 
southern city leaders to turn to the federal government for help for social 
problems more often than their rural counterparts. Not that southern urban 
leaders were free from racism or political conservatism, but their urban aspi­
rations shaped the nature of that conservatism and racism surely as much as 
their southernness shaped the nature of their cities. To divorce southern 
civic leaders from their commitment to promote urban development does a 
disservice to the historical record. Key decisions in Dallas about how to pro­
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mote that growth were as much influenced by the national discourse on cit-
ies—from better government to planning—as they were influenced by the 
southern setting. 
The book is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces readers to 
Dallas at the turn of the century and traces the first effort to improve the city 
through planning and governmental reform. It focuses on the development 
of the Kessler Plan and the city commission government to show how these 
solutions reflect a special notion of the city that emphasizes a particular rela­
tion of the city's parts to its whole. Chapter 2 explains how the earlier plan­
ning and governmental reforms became discredited and were replaced by an 
approach emphasizing new ideas about the nature of the city as a whole. 
Special attention is given to the movements leading to the Ulrickson Report 
and council-manager government. 
Chapter 3 evaluates the early years of government under the new council-
manager structure and assesses the impact that the Citizens Charter Associ­
ation (CCA) had on the functioning of that new government. In addition, it 
demonstrates how the CCA reflected a new emphasis on the need for public 
officials to focus on the city as a whole. The chapter also examines the cam­
paign rhetoric of the CCA to reveal the good government group's explana­
tion of why it promoted the best approach for governing the city as a whole. 
Chapter 4 traces problems faced by the reform government, explores the rea­
sons for the defeat of the CCA in both 1935 and 1937, and evaluates the gov­
ernment that then took over. In addition, it discusses the city's actions dur­
ing its giant Centennial Exposition for the state of Texas. Chapter 5 traces 
the reuniting of the city's business leadership under the Dallas Citizens 
Council and examines that group's early programs for the city as a whole. It 
gives special attention to the Master Plan of 1943-45 and to the civic leader-
ship's response to the opportunities offered to the city during World War II. 
The book's sixth chapter looks at the impact of the civic leadership's city-
as-a-whole vision on African Americans, Mexican Americans, and labor in 
the city. The chapter also recounts how civic leaders addressed the city's 
black housing crisis during the 1930s and documents the significance of the 
Progressive Voters League, a black voting organization formed in that de­
cade. Finally, the chapter analyzes the way that the city-as-a-whole strategy 
limited the civic leadership's response to the real problems faced by Dallas 
labor. Chapter 7 traces postwar problems and the political activities associ­
ated with those difficulties. It surveys not only the selling of CCA candidates 
but also the successful city bond campaigns during these years. Additional 
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emphasis is given to the postwar black housing crisis in South Dallas and the 
comprehensive response to it. The chapter also examines the controversy 
over the future of Love Airport. The eighth and final chapter investigates the 
changing public discourse in the 1950s, tracing this development by looking 
at the transformation of politics and planning in Dallas between 1955 and 
1965. Finally, an epilogue explores how the new urban discourse helped rad­
ically change the nature of council-manager government and city planning 
in Dallas. 
This book is written at a time when Dallas and other major cities are ex­
periencing great turmoil and political unrest. Older citizens of Dallas used 
to the "Dallas Spirit" of cooperation and unity shudder over the apparent 
breakdown and fragmentation of government and the confrontational pub­
lic discourse. The politics of race and neighborhood have replaced the poli­
tics of "the city as a whole," not only in Dallas but throughout metropolitan 
America. The system of government and planning that helped energize the 
city's rapid growth and development has been condemned for its failures 
and abuses. Public demonstrations and protests have replaced the tradi­
tional Dallas methods of behind-the-scenes negotiation. The answers that 
seemed so right in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s now are condemned by many 
as horribly wrong—indeed, even the questions now are different. 
Unfortunately, while the particulars of Dallas's experience may be 
unique, Big D exhibits patterns that are all too familiar to those versed in 
contemporary urban America. This book hopes to contribute new historical 
perspective to allow the reader to discern how we got to where we are today 
by suggesting the role played by changing intellectual constructs of the city 
and the public interest. Although this book will not solve the problems of to­
day, it seeks to produce a better understanding between the various conflict­
ing factions and to remind all its readers that urban problem solving is 
closely tied to how we perceive the nature of the city. It also attempts to res­
urrect interest in the city-as-a-whole approach to urban problem solving, 
fully cognizant that the city is only truly healthy when all citizens are pro­
vided opportunity to develop their skills and pursue their dreams. If the 
book does anything to promote dialogue that results in a new city wide per­
spective on the problems of our cities, then it will have proved a success. 
The First City-as-a-Whole Strategy: 
Dallas atthe Turn of the Century 

Dallas leaders at the turn of this century identified and responded to urban 
problems in much the same way that leaders from other cities—much larger 
cities—approached their problems. Even though the Dallas population in 
1900 of 42,638 resembled the size of New York City in the 1790s, New Or­
leans in the late 1820s, or Louisville in the 1850s, Dallas leaders' response to 
urban problems in 1900 imitated the approach taken by these cities in 1900, 
not the approach they took when they were the size of Dallas. An interest in 
a more ordered environment, as well as an effective and responsive govern­
ment, typified the new concerns of urban leaders around 1900, no matter if 
their cities contained 40,000 or 400,000 residents. 
This North Texas city, situated amid rich cotton land along the mean­
dering Trinity River, wanted to become more than merely a major cotton 
processor. By 1900 the city had emerged as a commercial, financial, and 
transportation center with visions of rapid industrialization. The city's hin­
terland clearly influenced the nature of its manufacturers, who produced 
harnesses and saddles for horses and clothing for farmers and ranchers, and 
provided packing houses, a flour mill, and a cotton gin for nearby farmers. 
The city also boasted a piano factory and a brewery. The third-largest city 
in Texas at the time, Dallas had become the business, agricultural, and en­
tertainment hub of a 250,000-square mile region including North and West 
Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. That was not enough for Dallas boosters, 
who had visions of making their city the metropolis of the entire Southwest.1 
The city's physical appearance in 1900 did not suggest that grand vision, 
however. A ten-block stretch of downtown's Main Street provided the city's 
only asphalt-paved thoroughfare, although it did have twenty miles of mac­
adamized streets and a little more than twelve miles of bois d'arc—blocked 
roads. Downtown streets, laid out in a crazy-quilt pattern, snarled traffic.2 
The depression of the 1890s had stalled the erection of taller downtown 
buildings, and the city's insufficient housing supply resulted in some Dal­
lasites living in tents. The muddy and foul-smelling Trinity River bottoms 
bordering the city's west end remained a sanctuary for wildlife, with vicious 
animals still appearing in the city at night. Recent annexations during the 
previous decade had allowed the city to expand to 9 A square miles, but an 
effort in 1899 to take in the flourishing suburb of Oak Cliff, on the west side 
of the Trinity River, failed by sixty votes. That decision would be reversed 
four years later when Oak Cliff finally agreed to merge with its larger neigh­
bor (see map I).3 
Dallas became preoccupied during this time with the need for strong and 
effective governmental leadership and an ability to "get things done" for the 
entire city. In addition, civic leaders seemed particularly concerned about 
11 
12 • PART ONE 
Dallas City Limits, 1900 
Dallas City Limits, 1915 
Map 1 Dallas in 1900 and 1915 
improving the city's physical environment. Much has been written about 
this focus on order and efficiency in urban America at this time, but students 
of government and planning have done little to explain the common as­
sumptions about the city and its needs. Indeed, few historians of these two 
movements have linked them to the turn-of-the-century perception of the 
city as a system.4 
Urban activists during this era focused on a variety of problems adversely 
affecting the city. Tenement housing, inadequate play spaces for children, 
corrupt government, and insufficient physical infrastructure represent just 
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some of the problems they identified. These problems, the argument went, 
affected the welfare of the entire city and needed special attention from 
those capable of solving the specific problem. As a result, turn-of-the-
century civic improvement treated the city as a system of functionally differ­
entiated parts and needs. These parts and needs were interdependent in the 
sense that the malfunction of one disrupted the whole, but such a malfunc­
tion did not necessarily adversely affect the other parts. Nor were the needs 
or parts of the city equal. People argued over which parts ranked as more im­
portant than others. In addition, these parts were of two kinds. Some of 
them were seen as systems (sewers, parkways, and parks) that consisted of 
differentiated elements. The parts within a system were seen as interrelated 
in the above fashion (treatable separately) and the systems were seen as in­
terrelated in the same way. 
There was a concern for coordination in the treatment of these systems 
for the city as a whole, however, something that seemed to be missing at the 
time. The first "comprehensive" plans associated with the city beautiful 
movement dealt with a variety of public projects and attempted to coordi­
nate them so that the park plan, for example, would not conflict with the 
street plan or the public transportation plan. The city commission form of 
government popular in the early twentieth century also reflects this empha­
sis on a systems approach to problem solving by structuring government in 
a way that produced commissioners of finance, water, public improvements, 
streets and bridges, and sanitation. 
The growing emphasis on a more coordinated and effective treatment of 
urban problems fueled discontent in cities that failed to see such coordina­
tion under way. In Dallas, the local government's lack of attention to the 
city's physical needs, particularly its streets, resulted in a movement to 
change the structure of its governing body, which ultimately produced com­
mission government. It also led to the city's first "comprehensive" planning 
movement, one that focused only on developing and coordinating public 
projects. Although the city's Kessler Plan and city commission government 
appeared as responses to the turn-of-the-century perception of problems, 
such solutions would be viewed as inadequate by the end of World War I, 
when civic leaders embraced a new type of comprehensive approach to the 
city.5 
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JDalias in the 1890s, like cities throughout the United States at this time, had 
neither effective administrative nor adequate planning capabilities. Civic 
leaders in Dallas, having come to identify these shortcomings as problems 
threatening the welfare of the city, set out to improve the very structure of lo­
cal government. Critics of civic government particularly emphasized the 
city's fragmented nature and the inability of its officials to get things done: 
no one seemed to be in charge, and local government appeared unable to 
meet the needs of the city as a whole. Civic activists also argued over who 
should rule and debated the virtues of direct election, as opposed to appoint­
ment, of government officials. 
During the 1890s Dallas citizens made regular trips to Austin to secure 
new city charters, or to revise the one currently in force. Unhappy with the 
charter of 1889, civic leaders sought a new city charter in 1897.1 Under the 
old charter Dallas was governed by a twenty-four-member, ward-elected 
city council (each ward being represented by two members) and a weak 
mayor, along with a popularly elected chief of police, assessor, tax collector, 
and city judge. The new charter modified both the structure of the govern­
ment and the ability of that government to act. Written when Dallas was still 
feeling the damaging effects of the Panic of 1893, the charter decreased the 
pay of government officials and reduced the city's borrowing ability. Con­
cerned with the need for more effective leadership on the school board, the 
new charter also provided for a popularly elected president of that body, and 
it gave the city more power to regulate and control public utilities.2 
Despite these changes, civic leaders sought and secured still another city 
charter two years later. The Charter of 1899 provided for a twelve-member 
city council—eight aldermen elected on a ward basis and four selected at 
large (although these four had to live in separate districts). As had previous 
charters, the 1899 charter identified the mayor as the chief executive of the 
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city but limited his administrative powers. The mayor did have a veto that 
could be overridden only by a two-thirds vote of council, but the charter 
gave council the management and control of the city's finances as well as ap­
pointive powers. In addition to council, the mayor also shared power with 
nine other elected officials.3 
The addition of a board of commissioners made up of the mayor and two 
governor appointees—a police commissioner and a fire commissioner— 
proved the most important as well as most controversial aspect of the 1899 
charter. The charter also designated the mayor as commissioner of public 
improvements. Together, the three commissioners would control and super­
vise the police and fire departments of Dallas; they would also oversee all 
public improvements over $500 and have the final say in the granting of fran­
chises. Council could override the actions of the board of commissioners 
only by a two-thirds vote.4 In reality such a commission, although created to 
bring more responsive government to the city, simply added another layer of 
government to one already made up of several "semi-independent" depart­
ments. The result, according to the Dallas Morning News, was a system 
wherein each of these departments "makes [its] own rules and regulations, 
[its] budgets and expenditures, engages [its] own employees and does all 
presumably without much concern as to the doings of the other departments 
or as to any general policy for the well-being of the city as a whole."5 
Despite the three-man commission's special powers over fire and police 
protection and public improvements, widespread dissatisfaction with the 
ill-equipped, poorly administered fire and police departments joined the dis­
may over the city's horrible streets as the major impetus for charter reform. 
Such dissatisfaction with city government was felt throughout the nation at 
this time, resulting in the formation of the National Municipal League in 
1894, an organization that traced its origins to the National Conference for 
Good City Government, held in Philadelphia on January 25 and 26,1894. 
The league proposed to better cities by calling attention to their needs, pro­
moting good government organizations, and encouraging the election of 
men of "trained ability and proved integrity for all municipal positions." In 
addition, the league promised to "promote the thorough investigation and 
discussion of the conditions and details of civic administration, and of meth­
ods for selecting and appointing officials in American cities, and of laws and 
ordinances relating to such subjects." Finally, the league planned to hold 
conferences and provide literature "to advance the cause of Good City Gov-
ernment."6 
Although the turn-of-the-century government reform movement is tradi­
tionally portrayed as an attempt by upper-class professional and business 
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groups to take political power from lower classes and assert more control 
over municipal government, the motives for charter reform were more com­
plex than this. It was not only wealthy capitalists who expressed unhappi­
ness with Dallas's government at that time.7 The city's most prominent so­
cialist, George Clifton Edwards, believed the charter of 1899 prevented 
Dallas from addressing important civic needs such as adequate water and 
sewage service. Others disapproved of the existing charter because they 
claimed it fostered local patronage and enhanced the special influence of 
land developers and utilities on city council.8 
As early as 1902, at the urging of Charles G. Morgan, alderman from the 
Sixth Ward, Mayor Ben Cabell appointed a committee to examine charter 
reform that would place government "upon a proper business basis to be 
conducted solely as a proper business institution." The News reported that 
the sentiment for charter reform "appeared unanimous in council." Morgan 
proposed that the city adopt the experimental commission form of govern­
ment employed by Galveston shortly after a hurricane and tidal wave hit the 
island in 1900. That government consisted of four commissioners and a 
mayor, and these five officials were delegated both legislative and executive 
powers. Commissioners of finance, waterworks, public works, and police 
would "direct, control, manage and supervise all matters pertaining to the 
operation, maintenance, repair, improvement and management of their de­
partments." The mayor would "control and manage all matters not under 
the control of the four commissioners." Under the new system, subordinate 
officials would be appointed by commissioners, rather than being elected by 
the public, and commissioners could fire those officials if they failed to fulfill 
their duties. This approach to government, with clear lines of accountabil­
ity, would produce a government developed along "business principles," ac­
cording to Morgan, who further claimed that "the dire lack of a system in 
the city government and the woeful disregard of all business principles 
caused a waste in the expenditures of public money of at least $100,000 per 
annum."9 
Several days later Henry D. Lindsley, a prominent civic leader, voiced sup­
port for the commission form of government, arguing that it would provide 
an "economical, progressive and strictly business administration." He con­
tinued: "It is not necessary for one to be a part of our government to realize 
the bulky and unwieldy methods [italics mine] which now encumber our ad­
ministration and the serious handicaps which they occasion." Lindsley 
warned that the officials should be well selected and "required to give their 
entire time and thought to the interests of Dallas."10 
The city's leading business organization, the Commercial Club, also 
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endorsed charter reform and established its own committee to investigate 
revisions. The organization, founded in 1893, called on its members to par­
ticipate in municipal affairs and promote urban development rather than 
merely their own business interests. As a result, club members regularly se­
lected candidates to run for council and often saw them elected. The club's 
three-member charter committee suggested that, unlike in Galveston's char­
ter, all five commissioners in Dallas be elected, although that idea did not 
meet with the approval of the club's general membership.11 Those who pro­
posed that the governor should appoint some of the city commissioners be­
lieved that such a government would be able and willing to address the city's 
most immediate needs more effectively than a popularly elected commis­
sion. All Commercial Club members, however, shared a desire for better lo­
cal government. At a December meeting with city council, they heard Alder­
man Morgan echo this same concern. Morgan warned that city government 
desperately needed more money, especially to improve its streets, which 
were only getting "worse and worse." But in order to secure money, Morgan 
argued, the city needed "to increase the confidence in the official family." 
The public questioned the current government's effectiveness not because of 
its personnel but because of a government structure that "shifted responsi­
bility . . . around in four or five different channels, and made it very difficult 
to assign accountability." City council and the Commercial Club worked to­
gether to establish four subcommittees that would investigate a variety of 
possible charter issues, including "a system for improving the streets and 
sidewalks" of Dallas, school betterment, annexation procedures, and debt 
limit, as well as government structure.12 
The city suffered from too many unpaved streets and from serious drain­
age problems as well. Dallas had far fewer paved streets than other cities in 
part because of judicial decisions on the homestead provision found in the 
state constitution. Until 1897, the costs of paving streets had been shared be­
tween the city and the residents whose land would be improved. Property 
owners paid two-thirds of the cost, while the city contributed the remaining 
third. When a majority of citizens in a block agreed to pay for the paving of 
the street, the city would proceed to pay its share of the costs of macadamiz­
ing the street.13 However, a state court ruled in 1897 that assessments were 
not taxes within the meaning of the state constitution, and because the 
homestead provision declared homes exempt from forced sale for payment 
of debts except for taxes due,14 the court found that the city could not pro­
ceed with the forced sale of residential property if that household failed to 
pay its assessment. As a result, the situation obligated the city either to pay 
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for the entire costs of street improvements or to rely on the good faith of city 
residents to fulfill their obligations. Either way, this limited the number of 
streets that could be completed.15 Citizens of course could have approved 
bonds for better streets, but as Morgan argued, limited public confidence 
in local government prevented this. The homestead clause thus created an 
additional burden for local government, perhaps explaining why citizens 
turned to governmental reform to improve their streets. Only after the cre­
ation of a more trustworthy government would Dallas taxpayers approve 
the necessary bond package for paved streets. 
Toward that end, the News, another proponent of improving the city's 
streets and physical appearance, ran a series of articles, beginning on August 
21,1903, on the commission form of government in Galveston. According to 
the News, Galveston's government before the natural disaster had been po­
liticized, inefficient, and lacking in "definiteness of responsibility." In just 
two years, the new government had changed all that, bringing the city busi­
nesslike, efficient government that practiced fiscal responsibility.16 
Since the constitutionality of that government remained in doubt—par-
ticularly the provision that the governor appoint several of the commission-
ers—civic leaders in Dallas decided not to proceed further with the idea un­
til the court ruled on the legality of Galveston's government. Promoters of 
commission government in Dallas wanted to include the appointive aspect 
of the Galveston commission in their own new charter.17 During this delay, 
enthusiasm for the commission form of government seemed to wane. For­
mer mayor John H. Taylor, who warned against such a radical changeover 
to the commission form of government, asked, "Is not there more danger in 
tinkering with the charter?"18 The ruling of the state's criminal court on 
March 25, 1903, further dampened enthusiasm for commission govern­
ment. The court denied the constitutionality of the Galveston government 
because the governor had appointed several of the commissioners—the very 
thing that had made the Galveston charter particularly attractive to numer­
ous business leaders in Dallas. Meanwhile, local officials' involvement in 
annexing nearby Oak Cliff, a large suburban enclave just southwest of Dal­
las across the Trinity River, became the primary focus of government at this 
time (see map I).19 
Dallas government continued, then, to function under a council-mayor 
system of government that relied on committees. By 1905 council divided re­
sponsibilities among those committees, with the five most important being 
finance, water, public improvements, streets and bridges, and sanitation.20 
According to the News, "The bulk of the actual business is done in commit­
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tee work and it is here that the councilman earns his $10 per month and wins 
whatever prestige he may have."21 When demands for committee work sur­
passed the time necessary to deal with these needs, council turned to inde­
pendent bodies for help. 
One such instance occurred on April 26, 1905, when Dallas officials se­
cured a new charter amendment creating a board of park commissioners 
to oversee the operation of the city's underdeveloped park system.22 The 
amendment allowed the mayor to appoint four members to two-year terms 
and to serve as the fifth member and president of the board. Because manag­
ing the city's two parks had become too time-consuming, the council turned 
this responsibility over to the new board, which devised its own budget and 
developed and administered an agenda independent of council, although 
council did allocate funds for an annual budget. Just as they did in creating 
the Board of Commissioners, state legislators here responded to local de­
mands for a more effective government; but the act of establishing a new, vir­
tually independent body to manage the city's parks further diffused local of­
ficials' power and responsibility to manage the whole city.23 
Enthusiasm for the city commission form of government reappeared in 
Dallas after one of the city's chief rivals, Houston, adopted that form of gov­
ernment in 1905. The revived interest eventually led local officials to hold a 
referendum on whether Dallas should adopt the commission form of gov­
ernment. Improving the city's streets continued as a primary impetus for the 
good government movement. The News questioned 288 businessmen at the 
end of 1905 about what they viewed as most necessary for the city's advance­
ment. Overwhelmingly, the respondents singled out the need for improved 
streets and sidewalks. Several days after the News printed the results of 
those interviews, it called for "a complete reorganization of municipal gov­
ernment" as a first step in improving the city's streets and sidewalks." Local 
government had failed to adequately address these needs, the News specu­
lated, because of a "defect in the system," including "conflict in authority 
and diffusion of responsibility" leading to "avoidance of responsibility." As 
a result, "None save for an officer of marked force of character can accom­
plish much," the News concluded in dismay, adding that "there is a conve­
nient refuge for the officer who does nothing."24 
The city commission form of government would remedy this problem, 
the News prophesied, providing a charter "strong in authority, with powers 
centralized and plainly defined, and with responsibility so clearly fixed that 
there shall be no escape from it." Under the commission form of govern­
ment, "every citizen will know exactly which commissioner is responsible 
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for any failure in the government and can hold him accountable, which of 
course will lessen the probability of failures." The Dallas Times Herald also 
endorsed the movement, calling the commission form of government a 
"people's government, run on business principles."25 
Shortly before the referendum on April 3,1906, the News reported on the 
commission government in Galveston and Houston. Houstonians quoted in 
these articles emphasized how the new government labored "for the city," as 
opposed to the old aldermanic form of government where elected officials 
"worked for their respective wards."26 Dallas citizens who bothered to vote 
agreed with the call for commission government. Although only 3,660 citi­
zens of the 7,000 voters who turned out for the municipal election even voted 
on the proposal to change the city's government, those who did vote en­
dorsed it by more than 2 to I.27 
After the referendum, council agreed by a vote of 6 to 5 to have a citizens' 
charter convention, and it called for the election of delegates from the city's 
wards to attend the meeting. The creation of the charter convention became 
controversial with the election of Harvard-educated Socialist George Clif­
ton Edwards from the Seventh Ward. Several council members refused to 
participate in the convention because of Edward's presence. Others objected 
to some of the proposals coming out of the convention. Although delegates 
used the recently created Houston commission charter as its model, they 
made modifications to it and adopted provisions for the recall of commis­
sioners. They also required that each of the four commissioners should come 
from the four different sections of the city. These provisions, supported by 
delegates with ties to neighborhood improvement associations, displeased 
the News and much of the business community. As a result, city council de­
cided to write its own charter, and on November 20,1906, met with the Dal­
las Commercial Club to begin work on the new document. Though council 
claimed there was no conflict or rivalry with the charter convention, its ac­
tions of allowing only the Commercial Club to participate in its meetings 
suggested otherwise.28 
For the next several months, both bodies wrote a charter to submit to the 
state legislature for passage. On March 4,1907, many of the city's most pow­
erful civic leaders formed the Citizens Association of Dallas to lobby for the 
council's version of the charter and to select the "right" type of commission­
ers once the state approved the charter. Unhappy about the influence of the 
Dallas Trades Assembly and about the socialist Edwards in the charter con­
vention, the city's business community formed this new organization in 
hopes of having their own charter adopted. About 1,000 businessmen (most 
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of them conservative) attended the association's first public meeting on 
March 8. They heard Lindsley caution that the concentration of power nec­
essary to make the commission government work demanded the selection of 
men "who had reputations to sustain and were willing to sacrifice."29 This 
organization clearly wanted to determine who served as commissioners, no 
matter what version of the charter state legislators adopted. Meanwhile, the 
document from the citizens' charter convention included a recall provision, 
something the News labeled as a "socialistic fad." It also mandated an 
eight-hour workday for city employees and called for franchises to be lim­
ited to twenty years instead of the businessmen's proposal of fifty years.30 
Both groups took their charter proposals to the state legislature in Aus­
tin. There, lawmakers adopted a compromise document that included the 
eight-hour provision and provided for a referendum on the recall, but which 
also reflected the concerns of the business community. Of its 133 pages, the 
charter devoted 35 to street and sidewalk paving. Other provisions of the 
document gave the city better control over public utilities and saloons. 
Of course, commission government proved to be the most publicized as­
pect of the new charter. On paper, this document appeared to respond to the 
needs of the entire city. Section 1 of article 3 specified the focus of power in 
the new government when it declared, "All powers conferred on the city 
shall, unless otherwise provided in this charter, be exercised by a Mayor and 
four Commissioners, who together shall be known and designated as the 
Board of Commissioners, all of whom shall be elected by qualified voters of 
the city at large and shall devote their entire time to the service of the city."31 
After the election, the commission would designate specific assignments to 
its members. One would become police and fire commissioner; another 
would be named commissioner of streets and public property; a third would 
serve as waterworks and sewage commissioner; while the fourth would be 
known as commissioner of finance and revenue. The mayor, who would be 
paid $4,000 per year (compared to the other commissioners' salaries of 
$3,000), acted as ex officio president of the board of commissioners and be­
came the chief executive officer of the city. He nominated all appointive of­
ficers to the city except the auditor. The charter specifically charged the 
mayor with overseeing the fulfillment of franchise requirements and all con­
tracts. The mayor also had power to suspend acts of the board of commis­
sioners for seven days by veto, including a line veto on appropriations ordi­
nances, but it could be overridden after the seven days by a majority vote of 
the commission. 
Unlike some commission forms of government, the Dallas plan did pro­
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vide for a relatively strong mayor. But unlike the aldermanic form of gov­
ernment Dallas had been working under, the new charter assigned specific 
responsibility over discrete administrative functions of the city to each com­
missioner. According to the charter, "Said Commissioners shall perform all 
of the executive duties of the respective departments to which they may be 
designed, as above provided, but said board, as a whole, shall have supervi­
sion of and be responsible for the administration of each of said departments 
[italics mine]." Coupled with the commission's responsibility to legislate, 
the city appeared to have a government capable of managing the needs of 
the city.32 
In many ways Dallas's adoption of the city commission form of gov­
ernment marks the culmination in the city's search for accountability and 
centralized authority.33 As growing expectations about the obligations of 
government occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century, the old 
ways of governing no longer seemed appropriate.34 In response to the need 
for more decisive government, officials created new governing bodies. Dal­
las saw the establishment of commissions to deal with water needs, parks, 
public safety, public works, and utilities. These were piecemeal responses, 
however. Not until 1907, when the state legislature approved Dallas's city 
commission government, did the city gain a structure allowing officials to 
govern the city as a whole. 
Even though the immediate issue responsible for the change may have 
been the inability of the government to respond adequately to the demand 
for improved infrastructure and city services, assumptions about the nature 
of the city also appeared to influence the decision. Implicit in these notions 
about the city was the suggestion that the health of the city rested with the 
health of its parts. If not adequately treated, a dysfunctional part (or func­
tion) could adversely affect the entire city. The old government, according to 
this view, failed to meet the needs of this urban system because of the limita­
tions in the ward-based, aldermanic-weak-mayor form of government. 
Such a government encouraged parochialism and promoted administrative 
confusion, according to commission supporters, the very barriers to contin­
ued rapid urban growth. Although the charter of 1899 was an attempt to 
remedy these administrative shortcomings, it had failed. Only a government 
able to respond to the needs of the city and willing to delegate specific ad­
ministrative responsibilities would provide the necessary government for an 
ambitious city. Incumbent alderman C. A. Gill, acknowledging the short­
comings of the old system, concluded, "The people have had enough of the 
alderman system of government. It must be one entire city."35 
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Structural change alone did not satisfy the city's business leaders. They 
also wanted better men tofill the new government posts. As a result, the Citi­
zens Association (CA) continued to function in Dallas—now as a body to 
select the "right kind of men." During its first public meeting on March 8, 
1907, CA president Henry D. Lindsley promised the CA slate would bring 
"efficiency and economy to city government and promote good streets, an 
adequate water supply, efficient police and fire services while more closely 
supervising expenditures." Such rhetoric helped secure support from much 
of the business community as well as the middle class and enabled the CA to 
sweep the city's initial commission election on May 22,1907.36 
Civic leaders during this time not only worked to change a diffused gov­
ernment to a more centralized one, but they also seemed intent on coordi­
nating the city's physical development through centralized planning. The 
city had experimented with piecemeal planning since 1899 when local citi­
zens established the Cleaner Dallas League to improve surface sanitation. 
Several years later civic leaders created the Civic Improvement League, af­
filiated with the American League for Civic Improvement. It focused on bet­
tering the city's streets and adding more parks, in addition to promoting li­
braries, museums, sanitation, trees, streets and sidewalks, and other means 
"to make Dallas a beautiful place to live." "Cleanliness and order" occupied 
much of the Civic Improvement League's agenda.37 These groups, domi­
nated by downtown business men, practiced some level of planning, as did 
the city's neighborhood improvement societies. There were eleven of these 
associations in Dallas by the first decade of the twentieth century, one such 
being the East Dallas Improvement Association, established by residents in 
1906. The association focused on ways of improving that neighborhood by 
securing better streets, sidewalks, and streetcar service. Other neighbor­
hood associations pursued similar agendas and provided a primitive plan­
ning function for their neighborhoods.38 
By 1910 these fragmented and uncoordinated efforts at planning ap­
peared inadequate, and a new movement emerged to develop more central­
ized planning. Newspaperman George B. Dealey of the Dallas Morning 
News, whom planner John Nolen would later call "the father of planning in 
the southwest," led the movement. He convinced the chamber of commerce 
to organize the Dallas City Plan and Improvement League and throw its sup­
port to city planning. George Dealey and the News had also played a critical 
role in the city commission movement. Dealey clearly stands as one of the 
most remarkable civic leaders in Dallas history. 
Born in 1859 in Manchester, England, George Bannerman Dealey immi­
grated to Galveston, Texas, with his parents at age eleven. Four years later, 
Managing the City • 25 
Dealey started working for the Galveston News as an office boy. He arrived 
in Dallas in 1885 as the business manager of the Dallas News, established as 
a branch of the Galveston News. From that position in 1899, he initiated a 
movement to improve the city's filthy conditions and helped form the 
Cleaner Dallas League. Soon, Dealey emerged as a "dynamic city leader" in 
Dallas. By 1902 he also wielded even more power with the News, including 
control of the editorial page, having been promoted to "Manager of All De­
partments." Four years later he assumed the vice presidency of the News.39 
Dealey's paper played a major role in the commission government cam­
paign after he decided officials under the current structure simply could not 
meet the physical needs of the city. His role in the city's planning movement, 
another strategy to better manage the city, was even stronger. Just as he had 
wanted a "cohesive" government that would recognize the welfare of all 
people in the community, he now wanted planning to promote a more cohe­
sive physical city. Toward that end, Dealey corresponded with J. Horace 
McFarland, head of the American Civic Association, and became versed in 
the importance of city planning. By 1910 he initiated an all-out campaign for 
city planning in Dallas using the News and the newly formed chamber of 
commerce. During January of that year he started reprinting in the News ar­
ticles about planning from American City and Survey magazines. He also 
converted Chamber of Commerce president L. O. Daniel and secretary John 
R. Babcock into planning enthusiasts.40 A day after the chamber officials 
had asked J. Horace McFarland to come to Dallas to speak about planning, 
the News editorialized, "It is evident that the idea of planning. . . has taken 
root in the minds of the progressive people of the town." For the News, plan­
ning was "in effect merely a matter of getting the most out of our civic ener-
gies."41 And that seemed important for this ambitious southern city. Ac­
cording to one Dallasite, the city had failed to keep up with Memphis, 
Nashville, Atlanta, or Birmingham when it came to street paving, sewers, or 
waterworks. Planning offered a way for a city to get its money's worth while 
developing its infrastructure.42 
McFarland spoke at a gathering organized by the chamber on February 
25, 1910. In his speech, entitled "A Crusade Against Ugliness," he argued 
that the city beautiful was the city practical and suggested that planning 
would bring about better streets and better homes. At that meeting, cham­
ber president L. O. Daniel appointed thirty-eight "prominent" citizens to a 
new organization called the Dallas City Plan and Improvement Commit­
tee (DCPIC). He asked that committee to "obtain for the city of Dallas a 
comprehensive and thorough city plan."43 Toward that end, the committee 
invited one of the nation's leading planners, George Kessler, to come and 
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speak to civic leaders. It also organized itself into nine subcommittees that 
would gather information and provide publicity for the planning move-
ment.44 Cooperating with the city commissioners and the park board, the 
DCPIC became a major actor in the city's planning movement. 
Dallas civic leaders like Dealey had not acted in a vacuum; they turned to 
planning as that movement gained increased visibility in the early twentieth 
century. Although there are several different interpretations for the emer­
gence of planning at this time, the important point is that leaders like Dealey 
looked outside the city for help in responding to the city's perceived needs. 
At an early stage, Dealey had turned to McFarland and the American Civic 
Association for assistance. That group, according to City Beautiful author­
ity William H. Wilson, "gave organizational expression to the City Beautiful 
movement and served as an important clearinghouse for planning and other 
city beautiful measures."45 It convinced leaders that city planning rightly 
concentrated attention on the needs of the city and provided a more effective 
way of meeting those needs than before. The News best reflected that senti­
ment when it commented, "The mere existence of such a plan, the mere fix­
ing of purposes will generate an energy and enthusiasm that will make the 
work to be done by the citizens quicker and easier than they image."46 
The DCPIC's push for planning culminated on May 25,1910, when the 
city commissioners announced they had agreed to pay George Kessler 
$5,000 for one year to develop a city plan for Dallas. In typical booster fash­
ion the News called the decision to hire Kessler an "epochal event" in the 
city's history.47 Born in Frankenhausen, Germany, in 1862, Kessler came to 
America with his parents shortly after the end of the Civil War. Although he 
spent part of his youth in Dallas, Kessler was hardly a local boy, having stud­
ied landscape design in Europe and briefly working in New York City before 
moving to Kansas City, where he developed a park system for that city in 
1893. In 1904, St. Louis officials appointed him landscape architect of the St. 
Louis World's Fair, a position that eventually led him to move his offices to 
that city in 1911. By the time Dallas officials contacted him he held a reputa­
tion as one of the nation's best planners.48 
City officials published his forty-page City Plan for Dallas in February of 
1912. It, like other plans of its era, focused exclusively on public works and 
contained a general list of nine proposed improvements, including a levee 
system for the Trinity River and reclamation of nearby land; a belt railroad 
system; a Union Railroad passenger station; a freight terminal; a civic cen­
ter; elimination of grade crossings in the downtown district; openings of 
downtown streets; a comprehensive system of parks, parkways, and boule­
vards; and the building of additional playgrounds. The rest of the plan pro­
vided a more detailed description of recommended improvements.49 For the 
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first time in the city's history, a single document addressed what civic leaders 
viewed as the city's most important needs and problems. Indeed many of the 
projects Kessler proposed had been discussed before, but now these were 
grouped together in one document developed by an outside city planning 
expert. The plan now defined these as city problems rather than neighbor­
hood or downtown problems and suggested that if left untreated they would 
adversely affect the development of the entire city. 
Although the plan's brief introduction hinted at the interrelatedness of 
the city's problems when it discussed the challenge of "harmonizing the old 
and the new," it generally treated the city's needs as a series of discrete prob­
lems requiring discrete solutions.50 The plan was "comprehensive" in ways 
that earlier planning efforts were not in that it attempted to tie Dallas to­
gether into a whole, but it did not imply that the problems were so interre­
lated that it would be impossible to treat them separately. Nor was the plan 
balanced. Kessler devoted twenty-two pages of the plan to street openings 
and his special interests of parks and parkway development, while the other 
seven components of the plan were covered in only eleven pages. Most of 
Kessler's attention centered on the development of streets and parkways to 
make the center more accessible, and to provide easier access to all parts of 
the city. Dallas suffered the consequences of having several grids converging 
on the downtown in different angles that particularly affected northward 
and southward mobility. Much of the downtown's development had been 
limited to three east-west streets—Main, Commerce, and Elm—that con­
nected the Trinity River to the Houston & Central Texas Railroad. Because 
of these street arrangements, Dallas lacked adequate through streets. As a 
result, Kessler noted, Dallas lacked "direct lines of comfortable communica­
tion between different residence districts and in turn between these districts 
and the business city." He proposed to correct this by opening and ex­
panding fifteen streets in the downtown area.51 
Kessler also wanted to better tie the rest of the city together through a sys­
tem of parks connected by boulevards and parkways, which he designed as 
"two distinct but related systems." One, the inner park system, would take 
care of the immediate needs of Dallas, while the outer system would be re­
served "for future requirements and to give proper direction to growth and 
development of each section of the city."52 The park-and-boulevard system 
also promised a "new basis for development," Kessler predicted, "and will 
enable the residents in the older sections to materially better the physical 
conditions of properties through which the boulevards pass."53 
In addition to street development, the plan advocated the straightening 
and leveeing of the Trinity River. Such an undertaking would accomplish 
several goals. First, it would protect Dallas from the Trinity River during the 
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spring rains, a very real concern for the city after the devastating flood of 
1908. Second, it would help accelerate the canalization of the Trinity River, 
something Dallas leaders badly wanted. Third, it would better link the Dal­
las community of Oak Cliff, on the west side of the Trinity, with the rest of 
Dallas, located on the east side of the river.54 
Proposals to fuse the separate parts of Dallas together and order the parts 
more coherently, then, proved central to the plan. The belt railroad lines, 
one loop around Dallas and the other around Oak Cliff, would connect in 
the Trinity River bottoms, allowing all railroads entering Dallas to have 
"perfect inter-communication." The beltline railroads would now permit 
the construction of freight terminals that would facilitate the handling of lo­
cal freight. And this, according to the plan, would draw industrial and ware­
house properties now existing along the various tracks entering Dallas to 
the more accessible freight yards and prevent the "intrusion into residential 
districts of factories and warehouses." The belt railroad would also allow 
the construction of a Union passenger station that could accommodate all 
passenger trains entering the city.55 
Kessler also called for the elimination of grade crossings to ensure the 
"proper growth of the retail section" and proposed the removal of the Texas 
& Pacific Railroad tracks on Pacific Avenue and the Houston & Texas Cen­
tral tracks just east of downtown. Such activity would make the downtown 
area more attractive and accessible from all parts of the city. Ease of access 
to and through downtown was the main consideration that led Kessler not 
only to recommend a variety of street openings in that city's core but to pro­
mote street platting and building lines for the city. Such centralized control, 
something previously missing from the city, would guarantee the city's or­
derly development, Kessler predicted.56 Finally, the plan recommended the 
additional construction of playgrounds. Together, such planning efforts, ac­
cording to Kessler, would "immensely enhance the attractiveness of the city 
and . . . give impetus and stability to its commercial life."57 
As Professor William Wilson has observed, "The Plan was comprehen­
sive in the sense that it addressed city wide problems and offered city wide 
solutions—but rarely paused to explain how they might be related."58 Nor 
did Kessler offer any way to carry out the plans through a coordinated pro­
gram. He discussed financing for his plan in a single paragraph. Kessler 
warned against relying too much on bonds and called for special assess­
ments and local improvement districts to fund most of his suggestions. As a 
result, even though the city now had a type of "comprehensive" plan, offi­
cials attempted to carry it out in a piecemeal fashion.59 Some projects—such 
as the Union Railroad Station, which opened in 1916—rallied citywide ap­
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proval, while others, including the levee/reclamation project, languished be­
cause of the lack of such support. Without a clear vision of how to proceed, 
enthusiasm for citywide planning died, exemplified by the disbandment of 
the Dallas City Plan and Improvement League during World War I.60 
Dallas's early foray into zoning in 1915 also suggests a particular vision 
of how the city worked.61 Unlike later comprehensive zoning ordinances that 
identified and treated a variety of functions and covered all of the territory 
within the corporate limits, the city's first tentative venture into zoning took 
a different approach, focusing exclusively on the problem of business estab­
lishments in residential neighborhoods. As a result, it prohibited the con­
struction of "any business house, or a place for the barter and sale of goods, 
wares and merchandise of any description or character, or for the conduct 
therein of any business within any residential portion of the city." If there 
were more residences than business houses within a 300-foot radius of the 
proposed commercial building, then the law would forbid the erection of 
additional business dwellings. Council granted exceptions only if three-
fourths of the property owners in the area to be affected would sign a peti­
tion allowing the business to locate in their neighborhood.62 The ordinance 
provided a citywide solution to one problem, but did not attempt to tie the 
solution of "zoning" to other land-use problems nor designate land uses for 
the entire city. The Texas Supreme Court eventually invalidated that law in 
Spann v. the City of Dallas (1921), but the law nevertheless demonstrates the 
city's approach to zoning in 1915.63 
The next year, council passed still another zoning ordinance, one at­
tempting to segregate Dallas's black and white populations. The initiation 
of racial zoning came not from the city commission but from the Deere Park 
Improvement League of South Dallas. When the Commission refused to 
agree to amend the city's home rule charter to permit racial zoning, the 
league's president, George K. Butcher, undertook a petition campaign to get 
his proposal for racial zoning on the ballot. The league secured the required 
14,000 signatures on the petitions and saw Dallas citizens approve a racial 
zoning ordinance by a vote of 7,613 to 4,693, despite the opposition of the 
influential Dallas Morning News. In attempting to preserve the status quo 
and block the expansion of blacks into white neighborhoods, the law stipu­
lated three classifications: white, black, and open blocks. Blocks here re­
ferred to both sides of a street between intersecting streets. If only whites 
lived on a block, the city could designate it a white block and blacks would 
be forbidden to own property or reside there. If only blacks lived on the 
block, it was designated a black block and the law forbade whites from 
owning property or residing on the block. Open blocks were in fact already 
30 • CHAPTER ONE 
occupied by whites and blacks and under the ordinance remained open to 
joint occupancy.64 Even though the United States Supreme Court over­
turned a racial zoning ordinance from Louisville, Kentucky, in Buchanan v. 
Warley (1917), Dallas enforced its law until the Spann case. After that ruling, 
the Commission experimented with other forms of racial zoning and passed 
a new law that borrowed from the racial covenant idea. Under this zoning 
plan, written consent of occupants in a block would allow the Board of Ap­
peals to designate a block either white or black. The racial composition 
could then only be altered on application of three-quarters of the block's 
property owners. During the next eight years, city commissioners passed 
seven additional ordinances dealing with racial zoning issues.65 
Both zoning laws reflect the turn-of-the-century notion of the city as a 
system of differentiated parts and functions that are interdependent but 
treatable separately. For instance, the invasion of businesses into residential 
areas created a problem that was perceived to threaten the welfare of the en­
tire city, and commissioners responded to that problem by forbidding the 
erection of business houses in residential areas. That same approach of treat­
ing a single problem applied to racial zoning. Blacks moving into white 
neighborhoods posed for some a city wide threat affecting real estate values 
and promoting civil unrest among whites. The city commissioners re­
sponded by passing a narrow type of zoning law, focusing on only one ele­
ment of the land-use problems. Soon, however, such piecemeal zoning 
would be replaced by a different comprehensive zoning effort that ap­
proached the city as a system of systems so interrelated that defects in one 
part not only affected the entire city but also disrupted all the other parts in 
the system as well as the working of the whole. 
Despite the implementation of the city commission government, and the 
nearly complete domination of the Citizens Association slate for the next 
eleven years, supporters of "good government" criticized both the form and 
the personnel. As early as 1918, K. K. Hooper, planning writer for the News, 
complained to Dealey about Dallas's slow progress in regards to completing 
the Kessler Plan. "It is my candid opinion," the newspaperman wrote, "that 
with two bit politicians in authority in city hall we never will get anywhere. 
With real big men at the head of the government we ought to be able to ac­
complish really big things. I am convinced that the city hall crowd has no 
conception of the importance of city planning and I do not believe that they 
have the mental caliber to ever appreciate it. I am in favor of ousting the 
whole bunch and putting in a city manager under the direction of some of the 
big men of our city."66 
Although Hooper's attack focused on governmental officials, his frustra­
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tion also stemmed from the politicization of a government structure based 
on administrative function. Instead of looking out for the city as a whole, 
commissioners were usually too busy protecting their turf. Instead of focus­
ing on long-term projects, commissioners got caught up in the day-to-day 
grind of administering their departments and taking care of their workers. 
Even the Citizens Association fragmented in 1917 after many original mem­
bers of the group left and formed the Good Government Association.67 
Meanwhile, planning suffered the same type of paralysis. City govern­
ment implemented several proposals from the Kessler Plan, including the 
Union Station, but others languished because of costs and rivalry between 
the city's different sections. Officials also failed to promote a long-term 
bond program to carry out the Kessler Plan. Businessmen and neighbor­
hood improvement leagues focused on specific programs that would benefit 
their sections while failing to rally behind those that did not. Indeed, a whole 
new series of improvement organizations appeared in the second decade of 
the twentieth century to promote specific agendas. Planning, then, paral­
leled city government's problems at this time. The city commission form of 
government had centralized government in Dallas, in contrast to the frag­
mented aldermanic form previously experienced. Yet its functionally di­
vided treatment of the whole proved unsatisfactory to a growing number of 
people by 1920, because it appeared not to be working the way supporters 
had hoped. Commissioners seemed more intent on looking after their own 
departments than governing the city as a whole. City planning also had cen­
tralized and coordinated efforts at public improvement, but it too failed to 
bring the results originally anticipated and encouraged a new type of frag­
mentation that inhibited the carrying out of the plan. 
Controversy over Kessler Plan priorities resulted in the formation of two 
new planning organizations after World War I. George Dealey, now a mem­
ber of the Governing Board of the National Conference on City Planning, in­
itiated a movement to complete the Kessler Plan affecting the property be­
tween Akard Street and the Trinity River, the original site of old Dallas.68 His 
newspaper building, located in this deteriorating western part of down­
town, appeared threatened by the district's increasing blight. Dealey saw 
leveeing the Trinity River and the reclamation of its flooded bottoms as the 
key to revitalizing that part of town. Toward this end, he joined with others 
who owned property in the west end of downtown Dallas and helped form 
the Dallas Property Owner's Association (DPOA) in March of 1919 to un­
dertake "intensive city planning in one section." Although the News re­
ported that the DPOA had been organized to encourage the "symmetrical 
development of the city with special attention to the downtown district," 
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the group really focused on the west end of downtown. The twenty partici­
pants at the first meeting also wanted to better accommodate their end of 
downtown to the automobile through street openings such as the Lamar 
Street extension, as well as to secure the levee/reclamation project for the 
Trinity River bottoms. 
One association member envisioned the DPOA as Dallas's version of the 
Fifth Avenue Association of New York City, an organization to combat en­
croachment of industries and commerce in that city's retail district in order 
to prevent its further deterioration. Not by accident, members of the associ­
ation elected Charles L. Sanger, nephew of department store magnate Alex 
Sanger, the first president of the association. Sanger's department store 
stood in the downtown's western section. Under Sanger, membership in the 
DPOA swelled to 100, and it used part of each recruit's dues of $200 to em­
ploy George Kessler as an engineer and allow him to revise his original plan, 
particularly in regard to the western portion of downtown. Kessler paid par­
ticular attention to accommodating the automobile and to improving his 
proposed levee/reclamation project.69 For instance, Kessler's revised street 
plan for the west end resulted in the widening of Lamar Street from fifty to 
seventy-five feet between Pacific and McKinney Avenues. This provided bet­
ter access to the west end from the north and increased real estate values in 
that area.70 
Shortly after organizers formed the DPOA, uptown businessmen created 
their own organization, the Central Improvement Association (CIA) in 
April of 1919. Headed by realtor Clayton Browne, this organization pro­
moted Kessler Plan improvements for the uptown (east) section of the city's 
core. The CIA focused on making its area more accessible to the automobile 
through street widenings and by extending Harwood and St. Paul Streets 
into the east end. Some members of this organization opposed public fi­
nancing for the reclamation of the Trinity River bottoms area because they 
felt it disproportionately helped the city's western section. The two groups 
saw very little accomplished but did manage to stir up sectional animosity 
and prejudices. Other improvement organizations also embraced piecemeal 
planning at this time. For instance, the Pacific Avenue Improvement Associ­
ation, a group of landowners along that avenue, played a critical role in hav­
ing the Texas & Pacific Railroad remove its tracks from their downtown 
street, another recommendation of Kessler's City Plan.71 
These groups, like the Kessler Plan, reflected a certain type of approach to 
"comprehensive" planning that suggested a city composed of discrete parts, 
connected yet individually treatable. That approach paralleled the approach 
to governmental reform associated with the city commission movement. 
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Just as the turn-of-the-century planning movement treated the city as an as­
sortment of individually treatable parts tied together as a whole, the com­
mission movement approached the city as a series of discrete functions 
clearly related but individually managed. Both planning and governmental 
reform brought some order out of the administrative chaos associated with 
the late nineteenth century, but it also faced growing criticism by the end of 
this century's second decade for not effectively helping the city as a whole. 
New developments in both planning and government after World War I 
would alter that, however, and reflect new notions about the relationship of 
the city's parts and needs to the whole. 

• II

Dallas during the Second 
City-as-a-Whole Era 

1 he 1920s proved a tumultuous time for Dallas and the nation. During this 
period the city experienced unprecedented growth and expansion. It had 
taken about seventy years since the city's founding in 1841 for Dallas to 
reach its first 100,000 in population. During the twenties the city added an­
other 100,000. It also nearly doubled its physical size from 23.4 square miles 
to 45.09 square miles (see map 2). Moreover, between 1920 and 1926 Dallas 
contractors erected more than $150 million worth of buildings, an unparal­
leled feat in the city's history. The Dallas skyline dramatically changed that 
decade when workers completed the thirty-one-story Magnolia building. 
Other new skyscrapers such as the Southland Life Building and the Medical 
Arts Building also graced the skyline.1 
Both the building boom and the population explosion resulted from the 
city's economic prosperity in the years following World War I. Located in the 
blackland prairie region of North Texas on the eastern bank of the Trinity 
River, some of the most fertile land in the nation surrounded the city. Indeed, 
almost half of Texas's four million cotton acres lay within a 100-mile radius 
of Dallas. This fact, combined with the city's good rail connections, helps 
explain why it developed into the largest inland cotton exchange in the 
country at the turn of the century. Its close economic ties to St. Louis also as­
sisted the city's successful quest to become a leading supplier of farm ma­
chinery to the region. Indeed, aided by the aggressive actions of civic boost­
ers, Dallas captured the wholesale and retail trade in North Texas by 1920. 
The city also emerged as the region's leading banking, finance, and insur­
ance center, a development helped considerably when local boosters ac­
quired a branch of the Federal Reserve Bank in 1914. Finally, Dallas engaged 
in textile manufacturing, and in 1925 enlarged its nascent automobile-
manufacturing efforts when the Ford Motor Company built a new factory 
on East Grand Avenue. 
Ford's expansion whetted the city's appetite for more industry, and that 
led the chamber of commerce and other booster organizations to attract 
even more manufacturing. In 1927 the Dallas Chamber of Commerce en­
gaged Lockwood, Greene and Company to undertake an industrial survey 
for the city. Based on that effort, the chamber initiated a three-year "Indus­
trial Dallas" movement in 1928. The $500,000 advertising campaign pub­
lished seven reports about the Dallas area and placed full-page ads in the 
Saturday Evening Post, Nation's Business, and Literary Digest promoting 
the area to industrialists. The campaign secured 126 new manufacturing 
plants for the city and gave Dallas unprecedented national publicity.2 
The success of such growth ventures, however, resulted in enormous de­
mands for city services in a place run more like a small town than a booming 
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metropolis. The city's infrastructure, particularly its sewers and paved 
roads, failed to keep up with the rapid growth. As late as the 1920s, some 
downtown streets remained unpaved while many older subdivisions faced 
spring floods due to the lack of storm sewers. Even worse, the city's rapid 
growth had left the primitive sanitary system obsolete. The rapid physical 
expansion of the city created real challenges since the original sewer plan 
had failed to anticipate such growth, and the city's main sewers were com­
pletely inadequate to handle the increase in usage from new subdivisions. In 
addition, the city had no sewage treatment plant and discharged its un­
treated waste into the Trinity River.3 
Prior to the "Industrial Dallas" campaign, the National Fire Protection 
Association found serious problems with the city's fire record. Its survey of 
twenty-five of the nation's cities showed that Dallas experienced the highest 
per capita loss of all cities examined for the five-year period between 1922 
and 1926. Dallas fire losses averaged $8.45 per capita compared to Los Ange-
les's fire losses of $1.66 per capita. And in 1927 Dallas experienced a horren­
dous crime wave, aggravated by the city's spatial expansion. Only Oak Cliff 
had a police station outside of the central headquarters, and the delay in po­
lice response had the community in an uproar. So did the meager 240-man 
force, which meant 1 policeman for every 1,000 residents, far below the na­
tional average. Mayor Louis Blaylock became so frustrated with the situa­
tion that he suggested declaring a modified sort of martial law for the city.4 
Although the city's rapid growth and transformation in the 1920s made it 
different from many northeastern urban centers, its changing spatial pat­
terns paralleled their trends. Dallas whites, who made up a vast majority of 
local residents, segregated themselves by income and class during that de­
cade. As late as 1895, the Social Register listed equal distribution of mem­
bers of the city's elite throughout the town. By 1925, 60 percent of the elite 
lived in suburban Highland Park or North Dallas, while 25 percent lived in 
East Dallas (along Swiss Avenue), 14 percent remained.in South Dallas, and 
only 1 percent resided in Oak Cliff, the area across the Trinity River (see map 
2).5 An even stronger confirmation of the economic differential of neighbor­
hoods appeared in a study made in 1927 by Lockwood, Greene and Com­
pany. The rental for housing in exclusive Highland Park, north of the city, 
averaged $73.22 per month, while an area adjacent to City Park in South 
Dallas averaged $20.18 per month.6 Oak Cliff, which developers originally 
established as a restricted suburban development, took on a different char­
acter in the twentieth century. With the exception of several subdivisions 
like Kessler Park, Oak Cliff assumed an increasingly blue-collar tone in 
the twenties. Fast-growing East Dallas demonstrated the increasingly seg­
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mented nature of Dallas due to the widespread use of the automobile and re­
strictive covenants. Parts of East Dallas had been developed as an upper-
class area in the late nineteenth century, but as the automobile lured resi­
dents out farther from the city's core, a new pattern emerged. The southern 
portion of East Dallas became a working-class area with a mix of apart­
ments, single-family housing, and small commercial establishments. The 
area nearest downtown housed boarders, while the middle class occupied 
neighborhoods further out, around Baylor Hospital. The wealthy moved 
farther north and east along Swiss and Gaston Avenues.7 
Dallas did fail to follow one spatial pattern common to northern cities. It 
experienced no new large-scale ghetto, as many northern cities did at this 
time, but its black population, about 15 percent of the total population, con­
gregated in concentrated pockets throughout the city. The Hall Street neigh­
borhood near North Dallas, the Elm Thicket neighborhood adjoining Love 
Airport, Wheatly Place in South Dallas, and the Wahoo Lake neighborhood 
in West Oak Cliff were some of the more prominent ones (see map 3). Afri­
can Americans also had their own commercial, business, and entertainment 
section in Deep Ellum, immediately east of downtown Dallas along Elm 
Street between Preston and Good Streets.8 
Mexicans also concentrated in Dallas during the 1920s. Although census 
material does not show it, locals estimated that nearly 10,000 Mexicans set­
tled in the area by 1920, both fleeing the turmoil of the revolution in Mexico 
and being drawn to the economic opportunities of a booming city. Ac­
cording to one contemporary, Little Mexico, just north of downtown, was 
"a close-packed mass of flimsy, tumbled-down frame shanties and 'shot­
gun' houses threaded by narrow, twisting, unpaved streets." The Cumber­
land Hill School Center became the center of communal life, and a monthly 
periodical titled La Variedad proved the chief organ of communication. In 
addition, other ethnic neighborhoods persisted in Dallas during the 1920s, 
including a Jewish area in southeast Dallas and an Italian neighborhood in 
East Dallas.9 
The story of rapid urban growth and change in the United States is at 
least as old as the 1820s, and does not necessarily explain why cities took 
specific actions. Indeed, responses to urban growth and the problems it cre­
ates change over time. By the 1920s, a new way of approaching urban prob­
lems appeared, manifested in the discourse about cities among not only 
scholars (including the Chicago School of Sociology) but also "reformers" 
associated with the National Municipal League and planners who attended 
the National Conference on City Planning. No longer did academics, re­
formers, and planners approach the city as a series of parts to be tinkered 
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with independently of other parts. A new emphasis on the comprehensive­
ness of the city came to dominate both governmental reform and planning 
in the 1920s. Academics such as the members of the Chicago School of Soci­
ology discussed the close interrelationship of municipal corporation to sur­
rounding suburbs as well as the inseparable connection of urban parts. The 
artificial city boundaries did not delineate the true urban community, ac­
cording to this view. Rather, city and suburb were part of the "real" urban 
community. Likewise, the urban area appeared to them so interdependent 
that one defective part affected all other parts as well as the city. 
As a result of this new perception, urbanists promoted a new "systems 
approach" to urban problem solving in such areas as government and plan­
ning. This new perception also created increased anxiety about urban frag­
mentation and malfunctioning urban parts. In response, reformers em­
braced the council-manager government to deal with their new perception 
of the city and its inextricably linked problems while planners promoted 
comprehensive planning and comprehensive zoning as solutions that articu­
lated their new ideas about the nature of the city. Unlike earlier plans associ­
ated with the so-called city beautiful movement that dealt only with public 
projects seeking to coordinate their development, the new comprehensive 
plans of the 1920s began with systematic surveys of the economic, social, de­
mographic, political, and public-works aspects of the city, as if the condition 
of every group and every part of the city affected not only the welfare of the 
whole but the condition of every other group or part.10 Even in cities like 
Dallas, where such a plan did not appear until the 1940s, a growing intensity 
surfaced in the 1920s over the need to coordinate better treatment for the 
entire city. The popular council-manager government in the 1920s also re­
flected this emphasis on the new comprehensive approach to the city and the 
concern for better coordination of the various governmental functions by 
making significant changes in the way officials administered and interacted 
with each other. Urban growth, then, proved not to be the sole determinant 
of how civic leaders defined and responded to their city's needs. Changing 
ideas about the city, in Dallas and elsewhere, also helped shape the responses 
to those cities at this time. 
Rethinking Planning and Governing 
in the 1920s 
v>ivic leaders in Dallas after World War I voiced displeasure over the prog­
ress of city planning and made new commitments to address those needs. 
This resulted not only in additional organizations to respond to the plan­
ning needs of the city but also in a different approach to the city's physical 
needs. A new public discourse about the nature of the city, a discourse that 
helped redefine the meaning of comprehensive and coordinated treatment of 
the whole, also shaped postwar planning in Dallas. The emphasis on devel­
oping and implementing new planning strategies emerged as a major, al­
though not the only, preoccupation of civic leaders in the 1920s. By 1927 the 
same concerns that had helped redefine planning after World War I pushed 
civic leaders to question the city's commission form of government. And 
that would lead to a movement resulting in a council-manager government. 
Planning and governing strategies in the 1920s, then, showed a new empha­
sis on and new approach to promoting the welfare of the city as a whole. 
Both the City Plan Commission (CPC) and the Dallas Metropolitan De­
velopment Association (DMDA), established in 1919, took a more compre­
hensive and coordinated approach to city planning than had earlier efforts. 
The CPC was the first official body in Dallas responsible for guiding the 
city's physical development. The DMDA attempted to coordinate the city's 
disparate planning groups and act as a resource for them. Both bodies also 
focused on securing the city's first comprehensive zoning ordinance. These 
two groups, as well as the Kessler Plan Association (KPA), established in 
1924, responded to the city's problems differently than had earlier organiza­
tions. The new planning groups treated the city as a system of systems so in­
terrelated that the malfunction of one disrupted all the other elements of the 
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system. No longer could parks or streets be treated as discrete parts uncon­
nected to other physical elements of urban life. 
On January 29,1919, the city commissioners authorized the creation of a 
fifteen-member City Plan Commission. According to the resolution offered 
by Mayor Joe Lawther, the commission would advise the Board of Commis­
sioners on "all natures of public improvements, civic improvements, city 
planning, opening, widening and changing streets, routing of public utili­
ties, controlling and regulating traffic upon the public streets and ways of the 
city of Dallas, and other matters relating to civic improvements."1 It also 
would help "secure a charter amendment providing an official city plan 
commission." The Dallas Morning News strongly promoted the CPC, a 
body established to address and coordinate treatment of a variety of physi­
cal needs facing the city. As an early advocate of planning in Dallas, the 
News had become increasingly impatient about the city's inability to carry 
out the Kessler Plan.2 At its first meeting, the CPC selected aging civic leader 
J. T. Trezevant as chair, and requested the younger R. E. L. Saner to assume 
the title of vice chair while actually leading the body. Under Saner's direc­
tion, the commission discussed the need to submit a bond issue to widen, ex­
tend, and open Dallas's streets. It also made plans to annex areas lying out­
side the corporate limits.3 In addition, the commission contacted planning 
bodies from Denver, Salt Lake City, and St. Louis for guidance.4 
Several months later, Dallas narrowly approved an amendment to its 
charter making the city plan commission a permanent arm of local govern-
ment.5 This amendment was passed in the 1919 municipal election, which 
also saw the election of Mayor Frank W. Wozencraft, who appointed a new 
fifteen-member city plan committee and selected John J. Simmons, promi­
nent real estate investor, as chair. The News reported that at this group's first 
meeting members discussed "ambitious plans for the symmetrical growth 
and development of Dallas." The commission seemed particularly inter­
ested in addressing the problem of downtown traffic congestion, but they 
also discussed sewer needs throughout the city and brainstormed how to re­
route interurbans to promote more efficient public transportation. The real 
significance of the commission is that for the first time the city had one offi­
cial body to plan for the physical development of the entire city. This re­
flected the new emphasis of coordinating the city as a whole, rather than 
merely solving singular problems.6 
Lack of adequate funding threatened to hamper the commission's abil­
ity to succeed, so the mayor asked the chamber of commerce for help. 
It responded by creating the DMDA, which promptly initiated a $40,000 
fund-raising effort "to employ a permanent, capable corps of engineers 
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and other technical men to work out and assist in the execution of plans 
for contemplated improvements."7 
The chamber of commerce also hoped that the DMDA would help "ob­
viate any appearance of diversity as between sections of the city in the con­
sumption of the [Kessler] plan." The DMDA viewed its main objective as 
"the ultimate carrying out of the entire city plan program." Toward this end, 
it attempted to refocus attention from the individual city section to the com­
prehensive whole. To achieve this goal, it provided an umbrella organization 
modeled after the city's health and welfare boards for the city's now thirty-
eight improvement associations interested in planning. The DMDA also 
published a planning periodical entitled Dallas Metropolitan and hired 
George Kessler as consultant to help update and improve the city's plan. In 
addition, the association wanted him to assist officials in developing a com­
prehensive zoning ordinance for the city. Such an ordinance would allow the 
city to control private as well as public land use. Much of the DMD A's early 
work focused on preparing maps that would furnish the necessary data for 
zoning the city. The DMDA also employed Kessler's planning representa­
tive, E. A. Wood, a Cornell University graduate in civil engineering, as resi­
dent engineer.8 Organizers of the DMDA emphasized that the new 
countywide organization would not replace any existing bodies or "limit 
their activity in any way." Rather, it would "encourage interest and activity 
along city planning and community lines in all sections of Dallas and 
[would] make available to the people of each section the services and opin­
ions of men of wide experience in such matters."9 
Unlike the earlier Dallas City Plan and Improvement Committee 
(DCPIC), composed of thirty-eight "prominent citizens" appointed by the 
chamber of commerce, the new organization's membership included repre­
sentatives from district improvement associations, women's clubs, service 
clubs, trade associations, and other similar groups. A. C. Ebie, chair of the 
finance committee, explained that "the entire city—business, residential 
and suburban sections—will have the DMD A's best efforts and any and all 
proposed activities will be considered on their individual merits." Founders 
of the DMDA would allow no more than one member from any single orga­
nization on the governing council and promised that "every section would 
be represented." This, according to the News, provided a "guarantee 
against any favoritism to any one sector in the city" and instead promoted 
"the best interest of the entire community."10 
No issue preoccupied the CPC and the DMDA more than comprehensive 
zoning. About three months after its creation, the CPC formed a zoning 
committee and seemed clearly intent on developing a comprehensive zoning 
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ordinance similar to the ones written for New York City and St. Louis. To­
ward this end, the DMD A employed not only George Kessler but also prom­
inent zoning consultant Robert Whitten to develop comprehensive zoning 
for the city. Unlike the city's early forays into zoning, this effort started with 
the city rather than with a problem and proscribed acceptable land use for 
the municipality's entire 23.5 square miles, thus reflecting the new emphasis 
on the city's interconnectiveness. It acted on the assumption that Dallas had 
become a complex entity made up of separate parts and responded by recog­
nizing those divisions and creating zoning districts for residential, business, 
and industrial development. Not stopping there, the zoning ordinance iden­
tified separate areas in the city for low-density housing, composed of single-
family homes and duplexes, and high-density sites, dominated by apart­
ments. It also defined different types of business and industrial areas. Finally, 
the zoning proposal included five classes of height districts and five classes 
of "allowable area." In the latter case, it created five classifications for lot 
size from class A—1, which called for one family per 6,000 square feet of the 
area of the lot, to class A—5, which required no more than one family for each 
375 square feet of the area of the lot.11 
The first public presentation of the new zoning plan took place at a meet­
ing of the chamber of commerce on November 23, 1920. George Kessler, 
Robert Whitten, and E. A. Wood, the compilers of the plan, all spoke. Kess­
ler explained how zoning protected the interest of all Dallas citizens, the 
homeowner and the businessman. He also clarified how zoning was just one 
part of the larger planning process. He emphasized that the city's transpor­
tation, water and sanitation, outdoor recreation, and paving needs all re­
quired study and planning. Good planning, Kessler asserted, studied "every 
physical development of the city" and worked "toward its future." Zoning 
and planning for Dallas in 1919—20, then, focused on a variety of needs 
viewed as inextricably linked. Although Kessler saw inadequate transporta­
tion as the city's greatest problem, he conceded that it could not be resolved 
without addressing other pressing needs.12 Earlier planning and zoning ef­
forts had focused on singular issues or city parts and had not attempted the 
same type of comprehensive approach now being employed. 
At the same time the city embraced comprehensive zoning and planning, 
it also considered a comprehensive housing act. That act, initiated by the ef­
forts of the Dallas Housing Commission, would regulate the construction 
and sanitation of all dwellings in Dallas. It promised, among other things, to 
assure adequate light and ventilation as well as proper sanitation and water 
supplies, and to demand minimum dimensions for rooms. In reporting on 
the proposal, the News pointed out that the new housing and zoning ordi­
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nances were "closely related." Indeed, the newspaper noted that the authors 
of both ordinances had held several meetings to coordinate the two ordi­
nances "for the greatest welfare of the city."13 
Comprehensive zoning in Dallas met a setback, however, when the state's 
supreme court, on November 3,1921, struck down Dallas's earlier attempt 
at piecemeal zoning in the case oiSpann v. the City of Dallas. The court's rul­
ing concluded that zoning promoted aesthetics rather than public safety and 
reasoned that it did not come under the policing power of the state's cities. 
Despite the ruling, George Kessler pled for the city to pursue comprehensive 
zoning, observing that the decision voided only a very limited type of zon­
ing. According to the planner, the city's old ordinance "was simply a partial 
attempt to do some of the things which a [comprehensive] zoning ordinance 
will do thoroughly and completely for the whole city." Unlike the city's ear­
lier effort, Kessler continued, comprehensive zoning would "regulate the use 
of all kinds of property, for the mutual protection of all property and for the 
safeguarding of investments therein."14 
Local officials and civic leaders failed to share the optimism of Kessler 
and concluded that the ruling invalidated any type of zoning in Texas. The 
day after the court's decision, the News predicted that the Spann decision 
would have "a disastrous effect upon the plans for a zoning ordinance for 
Dallas." Indeed it did. Stymied by the court ruling, the city did not adopt a 
comprehensive zoning ordinance until September 9,1929.15 
Civic leaders did not abandon planning between the time of the court rul­
ing and the final passage of zoning. Other planning issues, including street 
widening and extension, the development of the Trinity River levees, and 
reclamation of the river bottoms, captured the attention of the DMDA. So 
did the removal of the Houston & Texas Central railroad tracks and the de­
sire for a direct thoroughfare from the north into the city.16 
The creation of the Kessler Plan Association (KPA) in 1924 by members 
of the Dallas Property Owner's Association (DPOA) provided another ex­
ample of planning that typified postwar Dallas. The KPA also reflected the 
new perception of the city that influenced Dallas civic leaders after World 
War I. Besides the DMDA and CPC, the DPOA stood as the city's most 
powerful planning organization in 1919. As we have seen, influential busi­
nessmen, including newspaperman George Dealey, department store mag­
nate Alex Sanger, and bank president Edward O. Tennison, participated in 
this civic organization. West-end businessmen, impatient with the progress 
of the Kessler Plan, had organized that body in March of 1919 to promote 
and improve their part of downtown. Club officials collected over $18,000 
from wealthy members and set off to plan and lobby for a street through 
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their section of downtown linking South and West Dallas. They also worked 
for the leveeing of the nearby Trinity River and the reclamation of its bot­
toms. Toward this end, the DPOA employed George Kessler as engineer. 
Kessler revised his plans for the west end, especially those dealing with street 
traffic and levee development. Yet the high cost of the projects, and the sus­
picion by some that the DPOA "was organized for selfish purposes. . . con­
trary to the interests of other sections of the city," led to its demise.17 
Aware that little advancement could be made so long as Central Business 
District (CBD) businessmen supported two planning groups with compet­
ing priorities, some members of the DPOA pushed for the disbandment of 
that group and the creation of a new one. According to its Committee for 
County and City Wide Association, "Only through cooperation and orga­
nized effort with county and city wide support of an entire citizenship will 
things get done."18 These conclusions led to the formation of the KPA, which 
would carry out "the entire Kessler Plan and scientific development of every 
part of greater Dallas." The DPOA took this step in 1924 after concluding 
that no sectional organization could ever secure the Lamar Street Traffic 
Way or the Trinity River Levee Project, both pet projects of the sectional 
planning group. Those two projects were actually citywide in scope, the 
DPOA concluded, and needed the support of a citywide organization. 
The KPA's emphasis on the city as a whole shared some characteristics 
with the chamber's Metropolitan Development Association. Both solicited 
participation from a variety of neighborhood groups, treated them as hav­
ing something significant to contribute, and attempted to promote the wel­
fare of the city as a whole. Although founded by the DPOA, which had been 
dominated by project-oriented downtown businessmen, the KPA would at­
tract groups from all walks of life and advance the city's interests. Publicity 
generated by the new organization stressed that it served "no particular sec­
tion, but all sections alike, since all are to benefit from the Kessler Plan."19 
The association's board of directors reflected the city's geographic and 
political composition, by 1928 representing 115 civic groups interested in 
planning matters—including labor unions, manufacturing associations, 
and mothers' clubs. KPA leaders invited poor along with rich, blacks as well 
as whites, to public meetings and encouraged them to discuss their planning 
needs in what the organization's second president, Dr. E. H. Cary, called 
"the most democratic organization in Dallas."20 The association, however, 
did attempt to educate the members to "want the right thing." At its first 
meeting, chaired by President Charles Sanger, the membership agreed that 
special planning emphasis should be placed on alleviating traffic conges­
tion. Since better roadways promised a way of more effectively connecting 
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the city together, it should come as no surprise that planners prioritized 
their development during this era of planning for the city as a whole. If the 
city was to be one instead of many, neighborhoods needed easy access to 
downtown—the core of the city—as well as to each other. Civic leaders also 
viewed geographic unity as a prerequisite for civic unity and the making of 
a coherent community, a priority continually emphasized during this era. As 
a result, many supporters of planning viewed street thoroughfares as an im­
portant necessity.21 
Because Dallas leaders constantly worried about fragmentation and dis­
unity within the civic body during the 1920s, groups like the KPA used plan­
ning not only to foster orderly geographic development, but to encourage a 
sense of community and consensus among city residents.22 The KPA de­
pended on two strategies to promote comprehensive planning. First it tried 
to educate the public on the interdependence of the parts of the whole city. 
According to Cary, the KPA engaged in missionary work "showing leaders 
of each group and each district that things they needed would also benefit 
other districts, and that by joining and putting over the entire Kessler pro­
gram all would be best served."23 Borrowing freely from citizen planning 
movements in Chicago, Los Angeles, and St. Louis, the KPA specifically fo­
cused on educating the public about the benefits of planning. For example, 
the association published in 1927 a text for Dallas seventh graders entitled 
Our City—Dallas: A Community Civics. The 384-page book, written by 
former school superintendent Justin F. Kimball, emphasized the interrelat­
edness of the parts of the whole city and traced the benefits brought to Dallas 
by an active and civically responsible citizenry working for the city as a 
whole.24 
The book started by discussing the city's founding and early history. It 
stressed the role of civic-minded citizens in the city's development. Dallas 
was just one of fifteen or so towns vying for dominance over the rich North 
Texas hinterland in the mid-nineteenth century, Kimball observed, but the 
village became an important city, the author asserted, because "her early cit­
izens pushed and worked and strove to make it grow and develop." Early on, 
Kimball continued, citizens developed the "Dallas Spirit," characterized by 
a loyalty to the city, enthusiasm, enterprise, industry and teamwork, "and 
above all the willingness to make sacrifices for the good of the city and her 
people." The book's history of early Dallas also stressed how the metropolis 
grew without any planning. As a result, Kimball concluded, "The city was 
cramped and confused." Only after the city commission employed George 
Kessler did Dallas develop a comprehensive strategy to respond to its physi­
cal problems. Kimball claimed that the resulting plan was "probably the 
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greatest single contribution to the future welfare of Dallas that has been 
made by any human being since John Neeley Bryan [its founder]."25 If fol­
lowed, Kessler's plan would, according to Kimball, make the city into a 
"compact harmonious unit in which people might work and live." The 
problem with Kessler's plan, Kimball suggested, was that it had been carried 
out only in fragments, not comprehensively.26 He criticized the city's failure 
to implement the entire plan and urged its immediate completion. 
Indeed, a parenthetical note in chapter 6, entitled "The Probable Growth 
of Dallas," reminded teachers that "the essential feature in teaching this 
chapter is to impress upon the child the fact that Mr. Kessler made a plan for 
the city as a whole [italics mine]," and that it provided one plan "for the city 
as a unit, and at the same time gave us a plan that touches every part of the 
city." The book then proceeded to identify and discuss features that inhib­
ited the city's proper growth and development, including badly placed rail­
road tracks, lack of thoroughfares, inadequate housing, and a meandering 
Trinity River with a smelly flood plain. The author also discussed the func­
tions of city government and promoted the importance of metropolitan-
type rule to guide greater Dallas's development. Finally, he challenged stu­
dents to be good citizens, and called for a renewal of the Dallas Spirit.27 
"Fifteen years ago," Kimball continued, "our leaders in thought and action 
were thinking somewhat more seriously than now about the general better­
ment of Dallas, the development of her personality, the stimulation of her 
livableness. We ought to swing back to that view-point."28 The book's last 
page repeated the theme of civic loyalty and asked students to serve their city 
"devotedly, unselfishly and without thought of gain."29 
In addition to financing publication of the book, the KPA provided a fo­
rum that allowed various neighborhoods in the city to bring their concerns 
about planning to civic leaders. Acknowledging the diversity within the city, 
the planning association sought to provide neighborhoods a setting to voice 
their concerns and needs, and help experts truly plan for the entire city. In­
deed, the KPA repeatedly emphasized that comprehensive planning should 
be for the city as a whole, not dominated by special, parochial interests. It 
also used the meetings to educate citizens about the needs of the whole city.30 
The new enthusiasm for planning and coordinating the city's future in 
a comprehensive fashion helps explain the city commissioners' decision to 
establish a City Plan Office in city hall on August 1, 1922, and to hire for­
mer Kessler representative E. A. Wood as the city's first plan engineer. He 
promptly drew up a seventeen-element "Dallas Plan" that called for zoning, 
street adjustment, and water provision. It also espoused the treatment of 
blighted districts, adequate recreational facilities, improvement of the Trin­
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ity River, traffic control, and regulation of all additions to Dallas, inside and 
outside. Other elements of the plan called for cooperation between city and 
county officials in county or regional planning, and promoted the planning 
of railroad and electric trolley lines as well as improved health and sanita­
tion laws and regulation of the smoke nuisance.31 The city never published 
this plan nor does a full edition of it appear to exist, but it clearly influenced 
the nature of planning in Dallas for the next ten years. Its call for the securing 
of legislation necessary to carry out every detail of the Dallas plan and its 
emphasis on developing methods of financing public improvements would 
initiate a movement that resulted in the Ulrickson Program. Several years 
later the chamber of commerce also contributed to the city's planning effort 
with its own "Twenty-five-Year Program" for the city in March 1925. That 
program ranged from street widening and flood control to public works 
such as auditoriums and parks.32 
Although the city now had plans, it still had no comprehensive program 
to carry them out. This changed, however, after the mayor, following the 
CPC's recommendation, appointed a five-member board, dubbed the Ul­
rickson Committee, in June of 1925. Chaired by C. E. Ulrickson, general 
manager of Trinity Portland Cement Company, the committee included one 
lawyer and four businessmen. The chamber of commerce and the KPA 
would assist the Ulrickson Committee in working out a comprehensive pro­
gram of long-range financial planning similar to one recently developed by 
St. Louis. The committee, aided by city plan engineer E. A. Wood and city 
engineer E. A. Kingsley, labored more than two years before issuing its pro­
gram of public improvements under the title of Forward Dallas!, but com­
monly referred to as the Ulrickson Report. 
The fifty-page report proposed a nine-year, $23.9-million bond strategy 
to finance specified projects including streets, a triple underpass, building 
lines, a central boulevard, railroad track removal, reclamation of the Trinity 
River, improved water purification, a municipal auditorium, a municipal 
airport, and schools. In tune with the new emphasis of the 1920s, the pro­
gram also called for the development of comprehensive systems for streets, 
parks, sanitary sewers, storm water drainage, as well as for libraries, hospi­
tals, and the water supply. Some of the programs for the city's physical 
makeup drew heavily on the Kessler Plan, with other parts borrowed from 
the Dallas Plan as well as the chamber's report. The result differed from the 
Kessler Plan in regard to comprehensiveness and treatment of the city.33 
As might be expected from the general planning rhetoric of the decade, 
the program called for $5.7 million for street development. Defending this 
large commitment of money, the committee reminded Dallas citizens, "The 
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streets of Dallas are the veins and arteries through which the life of the city 
must flow. Where the circulation is good, we find growth and vigor. Where 
the circulation is bad, we find blight and dilapidation."34 Ulrickson commit­
tee members expressed particular concern for the "woeful lack of adequate 
thoroughfares radiating from the heart of the business section to the various 
residential sections," and also commented on the lack of adequate cross-
streets through downtown connecting North Dallas with the city's south 
side. It also looked beyond the downtown area and warned that streets in 
Oak Cliff on the west side of the river badly needed "co-ordination, correc­
tion and extension." Forward Dallas! called for crosstown or "by-pass" 
streets, "which would enable much traffic to reach its destination without 
passing through and crowding the already congested sections of the city." Fi­
nally, the program concluded that the street systems of both sides of the river 
"must be properly related to one another and tied together by an efficient 
number of conveniently distributed, connecting thoroughfares and under­
passes." Indeed, the problem of the Trinity River flood plain, which sepa­
rated Oak Cliff from the rest of Dallas, got special attention from the com­
mittee. As matters now stood, the committee complained that "we have in 
effect two separate towns, connected by virtually one street. Large areas on 
each side of the river remote from the viaduct are almost wholly uncon­
nected with each other, and are accessible to the rest of the city and to each 
other only by unsatisfactory and circuitous routes." Such a reality seemed at 
odds with what the committee felt Dallas as a city ought to be. As a result, 
the Ulrickson Committee pledged to cooperate with the Dallas Levee Im­
provement District, committed to leveeing and reclaiming the Trinity River 
valley by providing adequate drainage and road development. Overall, the 
Ulrickson Committee identified eighty-two specific projects that if com­
pleted would give the "entire city and every section of the city a vastly im­
proved and well-connected street system."35 
The Ulrickson program also called for $1 million to be spent on devel­
oping a sewer system. In explaining the need for the sewer system, Forward 
Dallas! recalled the city's early experience in constructing a few small lines 
to serve the business section. It complained that this "piecemeal policy has 
been continued through the years, and no really comprehensive plan has 
ever been made to take care of drainage areas served by the various main and 
lateral interceptors." Such an approach no longer seemed appropriate, so 
the Ulrickson program proposed a comprehensive sewer program for pres­
ent and future needs. In keeping with its emphasis on serving the city as a 
whole, the committee recommended that the $1 million should allow "sew­
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age facilities [to] be extended to sections not having the same." Such action, 
the program continued, would be allowed only after the preparation of the 
comprehensive plans.36 
Next, the report recommended that $3.5 million be allocated for storm 
water drainage. As with the sewage problem, the program recommended a 
systematic approach to drainage. "The City of Dallas has never given seri­
ous attention to its drainage problem as a whole," the report observed, "but 
has pursued a hand-to-mouth policy, resulting in an occasional temporary 
pipe, a concrete culvert, or an open channel, most of which are usually inad­
equate, and in the long run represent more or less a waste of money." As a 
result, the program recommended that a "complete storm water drainage 
system be planned to take care of the present and future growth of the city 
before any additional money be expended upon construction."37 
The program's approach to libraries also offered a system capable of serv­
ing the needs of the entire city. At the time of the report, only two public li­
braries existed in Dallas: the central library built in 1901 with money from 
Andrew Carnegie, and an Oak Cliff branch erected in 1914. Since then, the 
report continued, the city's library services had fallen behind places such as 
Houston. To remedy this, the program recommended that Dallas add four 
branch libraries, including one for the city's African American citizens. 
"The sites of the branches should be carefully selected," the Ulrickson re­
port warned, "with a view to equitable distribution of service, and with a 
view to attractiveness and sufficient size for further enlargement in future 
years."38 
Not a traditional physical plan with maps and predictions of future 
growth patterns, the Ulrickson Program called for the city to develop "ma­
ture, scientific and orderly plans" to effectively coordinate the program and 
argued that none of the proceeds of the bonds should be spent unless "the 
general city plan for such character of projects has been prepared and ap­
proved . . . and the plan for the particular project, consistent with such gen­
eral plan, has been prepared and approved in advance with the advice of the 
City Plan Commission."39 The comprehensive nature of the proposals, as 
well as the emphasis on the inextricable linkage of different parts of the city, 
illustrates the prominent focus of comprehensive planning in Dallas in the 
1920s. 
Not only did the Ulrickson Report identify and offer solutions to many of 
the city's physical needs, but it also proposed charter amendments to give 
the city adequate "legal and financial power to plan, prosecute and com­
plete the entire program in an orderly and connected way [italics mine]." 
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The proposed bonds necessary to complete the work would be issued over a 
nine-year period, and a charter amendment guaranteed that no more than 
$4 million worth of bonds could be sold in one year.40 
In all, the Ulrickson committee proposed thirty-two charter amendments 
to allow the program's execution. Some of these asked for approval of gen­
eral laws that the state legislature adopted during its last session authorizing 
cities to perform certain functions such as developing zoning laws, establish­
ing building lines, and levying assessments for parks and parkways. Another 
included an amendment permitting the city to extend its indebtedness from 
$25 million to $50 million. Several additional amendments enabled the city 
to make charges for the use of the sanitary sewer, to provide for and con­
struct a general storm sewer drainage system, and to establish methods of 
assessing benefits and charges against property owners. Still another charter 
amendment extended the payment period of assessments for street widen­
ings from five to fifteen years. In addition, charter amendments permitted 
the city to create a $900,000 revolving fund for street improvement so street 
pavings would not be delayed by litigation.41 This would allow for better co­
ordination of street paving for the city as a whole. Together, these charter 
amendments addressed a variety of needs in Dallas and gave city leaders the 
ability to circumvent some of the barriers imposed by the state's homestead 
provision and to carry out their comprehensive Ulrickson program. The 
multifaceted emphasis of the Forward Dallas! program, including its coordi­
nated projects as well as the financial and legal means of achieving them, 
made it the most comprehensive planning document in the city's history. 
The report did not provide a specific timetable showing the date each im­
provement would be initiated. Rather, it left that decision up to the CPC and 
a "Committee on Supervision of Expenditures." That group, composed of 
fifteen citizens from various civic and governmental bodies, would provide a 
body "of experience, business ability and political independence." Together 
with the Plan Commission, it would suggest the sequence of projects to the 
City Commission. Such a procedure allowed the city some flexibility in its 
response to its complex and changing needs.42 
The Ulrickson Committee called an election on December 15, 1927, to 
ratify the program's fifteen separate bond proposals and the thirty-two 
amendments to the city charter needed for the program's successful imple­
mentation. The News campaigned relentlessly for adoption of the program, 
providing front-page articles on the program from December 1 to election 
day. It also responded to several letters to the editor criticizing the bond 
package. The publicity for this election emphasized the comprehensive na­
ture of the package being offered for voters' approval. One News editorial 
Rethinking Planning and Governing in the 1920s • 55 
concluded, "This is not a city of sections but one community, every citizen 
of which ought to be deeply wishful for the development of every part of the 
city."43 Former mayor Joe E. Lawther also emphasized the need to heal divi­
sion within the city by supporting "the most comprehensive program of im­
provement that has ever been proposed for our city." In fact, he continued, 
"it is the only comprehensive proposition . . . ever submitted to our citi­
zens." Such a program demanded the "revival of the old Dallas spirit," he 
said, warning, "This is no time to fight for personal or sectional desires. Our 
city needs a long strong pull all together."44 J. W. Park, president of the Cen­
tral Labor Council, also reported that his group unanimously endorsed the 
bond budget program, agreeing that it was the most "comprehensive and 
constructive program of city building ever."45 
The News also explained how the bond program would benefit the "little 
fellow" with its attention to schools, parks, and sewers. Indeed, the program 
would aid "every citizen of Dallas and every section," according to the 
News, because the Ulrickson Committee envisioned the city as "a single 
civic entity." "Dallas was not a city of sections," the News continued, "but 
one community." Other News articles reminded readers that the bond 
money meant jobs and continued progress in the race for the urban sweep­
stakes in the Southwest. Not only did the city suffer competition from Fort 
Worth, Houston, and San Antonio for state supremacy, the News warned, 
but it also competed with Tulsa, Oklahoma City, Kansas City, and St. Louis 
for domination of the larger Southwest. Passage of the comprehensive bond 
package, according to the newspaper, would help the city meet its chal-
lengers.46 
Some opponents of the Ulrickson Program attacked the basic idea of 
planning while others feared it would not be fair. D. E. Waggoner, in a letter 
to the editor, wondered "how any body of men . . . can foresee the future 
needs of a growing city like Dallas." Former state senator V. A. Collins at­
tacked the Ulrickson Program as "savoring of socialism and declared that 
the authors probably got their ideas from Russia."47 J. Waddy Tate, an Oak 
Cliff resident and future mayor of Dallas, ridiculed planning in general and 
warned of a conspiracy. "No set of men," Tate warned, "can tell how Dallas 
will grow, or how fast." Furthermore, he cautioned that four of the five 
members of the Ulrickson Committee lived in suburban Highland Park and 
only one called Oak Cliff home. Such a situation had resulted in inadequate 
attention for Oak Cliff. Indeed, opponents pointed out that although Oak 
Cliff contained one-third of the city's population it would receive only one-
ninth of the bond money. Having too many blue bloods on the committee 
messed up priorities, according to Tate. "They want us to borrow money 
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and build a negro library," he complained. That remark suggested that in at 
least this regard the Ulrickson Program was too comprehensive for this Oak 
Cliff resident.48 
Despite such rhetoric and the concern by some that leaders had called the 
bond/charter election too soon, leaving Dallas citizens little time to discuss 
the issues, the city's voters approved the Ulrickson's bond schedule and char­
ter amendments in overwhelming numbers. The margin of victory received 
from the 8,000 voters varied from 2,379 votes for the sanitary sewer system 
to 1,150 votes for the art museum.49 
The passage of the Ulrickson package, then, suggests a different solution 
to the city's planning needs than the one manifested by the Kessler Plan of 
1911. That plan had focused on specific problems and needs, and made little 
effort to treat them as an inextricably linked package. Planning in that de­
cade also emphasized specific problems rather than the whole city. That 
clearly had changed by the 1920s. New city-oriented planning organizations 
appeared and an emphasis on systematic planning for the city as a whole 
emerged. Or at least the definition of system had changed. According to one 
historian of technology, systems before 1920 were viewed as "static entities, 
composed of diverse, fixed, and limited parts hierarchically arranged." But 
the new systems of the 1920s, were perceived as "dynamic" and "predicated 
on a much more complex relationship among parts." Moreover, "each part 
seemed to acquire a share of definition from its interrelationships with the 
other parts in the system" so that the "parts seemed to reflect on one an-
other."50 The new emphasis on comprehensive planning for the city, and on 
a coordinated and comprehensive bond program for Dallas, reflected this 
new 1920s notion of Dallas as this type of system. It also influenced the dis­
course about politics and government. 
Planning was not the only civic undertaking reconsidered in the 1920s. 
Growing dissatisfaction surfaced over the nature of the city's government 
during this time. Approaches to government closely followed the planning 
emphasis and reflected an image of the city that suggested that the whole 
was more than the sum of its parts and needed treatment in a truly compre­
hensive way. Critics of the city commission form of government claimed it 
encouraged city officials to think about their department's functional re­
sponsibility rather than the needs of the entire city. Even though this form of 
government had performed admirably in a variety of ways just as the origi­
nal Kessler Plan had, neither offered the kind of coordinated program for the 
city as a whole deemed necessary by those who now viewed the city as a new 
type of system.51 
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During the 1920s, the Citizens Association's control of local government 
came undone and local municipal elections became increasingly politicized. 
The Citizens Association (CA) suffered a particularly devastating blow in 
1923 when the Ku Klux Klan-backed slate swept to office by a more than 2 to 
1 margin.52 Two years later, after the Klan had lost its power, the incumbent 
Democratic ticket, led by seventy-five-year-old mayor Louis Blaylock, badly 
defeated the CA, which had nominated former Highland Park mayor Perry 
Claiborne as its mayoralty candidate. A third slate, the Citizens Indepen­
dent Ticket, led Claiborne to charge that the Democrats won by default 
since the administrative opponents had been unable to cooperate and run 
just one slate.53 Multislates would characterize city politics in the 1920s. 
Even though the Democratic administration faltered and experienced 
tensions and turmoil during the next two years (including a fistfight in coun­
cil chambers), the business-led CA proved unable to mount a strong chal­
lenge in 1927. Indeed, many deserted that body and supported another 
business-led good government slate called the Nonpartisan Association 
(NA). That group nominated R. E. Burt, who promised "a good business 
administration of the city's affairs."54 This election saw the appearance of 
three additional tickets, including the Democrats, the All Dallas Party, and 
Citizens Independents. Several independents boosted the number of candi­
dates for the five positions to twenty-seven.55 
The business-backed NA and the Democrats benefited most from the all-
time-high voter turnout and faced each other in a runoff election. That con­
test saw Dallasites vote into office the entire NA's slate.56 Instead of opening 
up an era of unity, this body exhibited great discord and strife, with dubious 
efficiency and petty politics.57 A variety of growth-related issues, from air­
port development to Trinity River reclamation, helped polarize city govern­
ment. In addition, a constricting economy due to a bad cotton crop, an oil 
slump, and a building decline helped inflame unhappiness with local gov­
ernment. 
At the same time, accelerating demands for neighborhood services fur­
ther taxed local government and promoted conflict. One example of this 
came from Oak Cliff when residents in the Tyler Street neighborhood fought 
with the city over removal of a streetcar track. When the city failed to force 
the streetcar company to restore the track and provide transit service, neigh­
borhood activists initiated a recall movement on September 3, 1927. Al­
though protesters secured more than 11,000 signatures, the movement failed 
when the commissioners threw out 7,000 invalid names.58 
Even after the business-backed nonpartisan slate secured power, criti­
cism of the commission form of government continued. Louis Head, a 
writer for the News, wrote a fifteen-article series evaluating Dallas govern­
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ment with good-government criteria developed by Harvard University 
professor William Bennett Munro. The Harvard professor had been a sup­
porter of commission government earlier, but his good-government criteria 
now disclosed defects in Dallas government.59 Using the Munro criteria, 
Head concluded that city government in Dallas had an efficiency rating of 
only 56 percent, enough to rank the city above average but proving it defi­
cient in specific administrative areas. Agreeing with Hooper's earlier evalua­
tion, Head stated that the vital defect of Dallas's government was the "lack 
of concentration of authority" over administration. The mayor's limited 
powers failed to override the power of each commissioner. Instead of work­
ing for the whole, the newspaperman stated, "Each Commissioner is jealous 
of his own prerogatives and resents to a greater or less degree the intrusion 
of some other member in his departmental affairs." The Head series also 
soundly criticized the commission's spoils system and the failure of the 
commissioners to educate the public about government by issuing annual 
reports.60 
Indeed, critics consistently complained that local government seemed to 
promote disinterest among the general voting public. In his very first article, 
"Civic Faults Have Basis in Voter Apathy," Head observed that the last city 
election had drawn only 17,775 of 45,000 qualified voters to the polls. Even 
more disturbing, according to Head, these voters proved indifferent once 
they cast their ballots. "They immediately forgot the promises made by can­
didates," Head complained, "and go about their individual affairs."61 
Despite these criticisms, Head's series also identified successful elements 
of city government. Head's investigation concluded that the city awarded 
contracts fairly, had an adequate budget system, and had a generally 
"sound" financial structure "with good audit controls." But these positive 
attributes were not enough, according to the reporter, who recommended 
that city government needed some significant improvements, either without 
charter reform or with it.62 
About the time Head's articles appeared in the News, Mayor Louis Blay­
lock also criticized the commission form of government. Probably no other 
man had been so closely associated with it. Blaylock had served the commis­
sion thirteen years, including three as finance commissioner, six as police 
and fire commissioner, and four as mayor. According to Mayor Blaylock, 
Dallas citizens could never have really effective government under the com­
mission plan because it promoted the politicization of government.63 
The News's series initiated a wider discussion about city government and 
council-manager government, a structural innovation gaining much atten­
tion throughout the nation in the 1920s. Although some cities had employed 
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managers before Dayton, Ohio, that city in 1913 became the first to adopt 
council-manager government. Unlike commission government, Dayton's 
new governing arrangement provided administrative powers to the city 
manager, and legislative powers to city council, elected at large without par­
tisan labels. Two years later, council-manager government secured the en­
dorsement of the National Municipal League, and its popularity soared. 
By 1926, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Kansas City had adopted this well-
publicized new form of government.64 As the city elections of 1927 drew 
near, several slates of candidates promised to submit the issue of charter re­
form to the people if elected. Mayoralty candidate R. E. Burt of the Non 
Partisan Association's ticket made such a pledge, and after winning he ap­
pointed a special committee of five to investigate the possibility of the city's 
adopting council-manager government.65 
The movement for council-manager government, then, did not stem 
from an attempt to destroy a political machine, or even to rid the city of in­
competent public officials. Nor was it a conspiracy to weaken neighborhood 
influence through the destruction of wards—that had been achieved in 
1907. Rather, the movement focused on creating a more efficient and better-
administered government through structural change, a government capable 
of action on immediate problems and long-term planning for a healthy fu-
ture.66 In the 1923 edition of his textbook Municipal Government, Professor 
William Bennett Munro concluded that the council-manager form of gov­
ernment proved superior to commission government because it established 
"a real pivot of administrative authority" and placed "this under expert 
control." Munro also thought that council-manager government provided 
"a better basis for cooperation and harmony," another concern of Dallas 
leaders.67 
By the end of the 1920s, Dallas faced major challenges brought on by its 
rapid growth. That growth had increased the city's appetite for even more 
expansion, and council-manager government seemed the most efficient tool 
to realize the city's potential. Finally, council-manager government would 
better educate residents about Dallas's needs, and allow a professional to ac­
commodate differences generated by the city's various segments. Indeed, the 
rhetoric of city manager supporters suggested that politics in city govern­
ment caused fragmentation, and if politics were eliminated (as council-
manager government promised to do), then fragmentation would decline. 
Shortly after Mayor Burt established his new committee, the News ran 
another series, this time a nine-part report, examining the nature of city gov­
ernment. The first article, again authored by Louis Head, provided some 
background on the council-manager movement. It also criticized commis­
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sion government for not meeting "the desires of the thinking citizens nor the 
requirement of the phenomenally rapid growth of many communities."68 
The second article looked at the most common objections to the council-
manager government—that it gave too much power to one person and that 
it often meant government by an outsider. The next four articles reviewed 
the achievement of the council-manager government in Dayton, Cincinnati, 
Cleveland, and Kansas City. Other articles surveyed council-manager gov­
ernment in Texas and emphasized the general virtues of the plan.69 
Despite the enthusiasm generated for council-manager government by 
the News, officials held no general referendum on the matter in 1927 since, 
as we have seen, Dallas voters were being asked that year to pass the $23.9 
million bond issue and charter amendments recommended by the Ulrickson 
Committee for public improvements. Some civic leaders feared that by ask­
ing citizens to vote on the bond issue and the government reforms, they jeop­
ardized the success of both. Although the News did not initially agree and 
wanted no postponement on the city manager referendum, editorializing 
that "delay would mean death," it eventually reversed its position, since sev­
eral members of Burt's charter committee strongly felt a postponement nec­
essary. As a result, Dallasites in 1927 voted only on the comprehensive Ul­
rickson bond program. 
Several months after the bond election, the council-manager movement 
slowly regained momentum. In April 1928, Mayor Burt named Hugh S. 
Grady, former assistant city attorney, to head a twenty-member charter 
committee. According to the News, that body would "make a systematic 
study of the charter of the city, completely revising it, ironing out anachro­
nisms, modernizing the provisions that have been antiquated since 1907," 
and "evolve a document consistent with a population of 300,000 instead of 
90,000."70 Because under the state constitution, cities could amend their 
charters once every two years, no charter election could be held until De­
cember 16,1929, giving the committee ample time to do its job.71 
That charter committee included four lawyers, the editors of the Dallas 
Morning News and the Dallas Times Herald, and fourteen other business­
men. The city commission confirmed the appointments unanimously. This 
committee worked with an earlier Burt-appointed committee established to 
investigate council-manager government. 
The urgency for charter revision seemed heightened during this time be­
cause of the pressure that the Ulrickson bonds would put on the city's bud­
get. Under the old charter, if the general fund of the city increased then other 
parts of the budget also required additional allotments. As a result, because 
the city needed to raise its general fund to service the Ulrickson bonds, the 
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charter forced it to significantly increase automatic allotments to budget 
lines, such as parks and schools. That development obliged the city to search 
for more revenue, resulting in a reappraisal of city real estate and the deci­
sion to increase the percent of property value to be taxed from 45 to 50 per­
cent. According to some observers, including city attorney J. J. Collins, the 
city might have avoided its difficulty had it obtained a charter granting it 
more flexibility in financial matters. Indeed, Collins asserted that "the dif­
ficulty of determining upon a proper revenue for the coming fiscal year was 
the most compelling reason that council appointed a charter committee."72 
The committee, which had studied a variety of city manager charters— 
including that of its neighbor, Fort Worth—issued its report on March 5, 
1929. To no one's surprise, it recommended that the city adopt a council-
manager form of government. The proposed charter called for a city council 
of nine members rather than five commissioners, because the committee 
"believed that distribution of more members in council over the city will 
give a wider popular representation in the government than will be possible 
with a smaller number as a commission form of government." The charter 
committee also recommended at-large elections for council seats rather 
than ward-based elections "to eliminate the possibility of sectional jealous­
ies and so-called log-rolling."73 
The eventual charter included a provision that designated three council 
positions as at-large ones while the other six would be district positions, re­
quiring the council candidate to live in the district even though he or she 
were elected by the entire city. This provision acknowledged the geographic 
diversity of Dallas yet guaranteed candidates who, because of their electoral 
base, would not look out merely for their own district.74 
The Charter Committee also proposed that council, rather than the 
people, select the mayor, in order to "prevent jealousies between members 
of the council. . . and eliminate . . . the bitterness and strife that might oth­
erwise be injected into the elections." This proposal followed the recom­
mendations of the National Municipal League's Model Charter. Finally, the 
report urged that the new charter should be submitted to the people in De­
cember of 1929.75 
Since the committee released the report during the city election cam­
paign, the News quickly pressured all candidates to agree to submit the city 
manager question to the people to vote on if elected. All five mayoralty can­
didates agreed, but the victory of independent mayoralty candidate J. Wor­
thington Tate, popularly known as J. Waddy Tate, would spell trouble for 
the charter movement. 
Tate had moved to Dallas from Houston in 1897 to work for the Chicago 
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Greater Western Railroad Company. He entered the real estate business in 
1925 with Colonel S. E. Moss, and the two established the Moss-Tate Invest­
ment Company, which helped develop the Hampton Terrace subdivision in 
Oak Cliff. His success in real estate allowed the fifty-nine-year-old Tate to 
"retire" and become involved in city politics. He was, according to a local 
newspaper columnist, "addicted to bold and elegant attire, a gold-headed 
cane and impressive jewelry." Tate, who resided in Oak Cliff, had served on 
the CPC under Mayor Louis Blaylock in 1923. He ran an unsuccessful cam­
paign for mayor in 1927, although he did receive more than 5,000 votes after 
he entered the race just two weeks before the election.76 
Tate championed the causes of what he called the plain people and la­
beled his supporters the "blue shirt boys." The mayoralty candidate became 
known as the "hot dog" mayor because he served hot dogs at some of his 
campaign rallies. Tate promised to increase the minimum wage for city la­
bor, expand the welfare department, give raises to police and fireman, and 
place donkeys in the city parks for the children. He also pledged to appoint 
a woman to the park board if elected. In addition, his platform emphasized 
that "the paramount issue of this campaign is the conservation of the re­
mainder of the Ulrickson bond money." This included cutting what he 
viewed as useless appropriations for an African American library and a city 
art gallery and instead using those allocated funds for a public amusement 
park. Such positions helped him gain the endorsement from the Indepen­
dent Voters Alliance, said to include the remnants of the Ku Klux Klan, as 
well as the Dallas Non Partisan Labor League and much of the city's Repub­
lican element. Even though Tate's toughest opponent also hailed from Oak 
Cliff, the blue shirt candidate received heavy support from that predomi­
nantly working-class area. It is unclear how many women voted for him, but 
it appears that support was heavy due in part, no doubt, to his appointment 
of Annie E Chapman to head his executive committee for election. He was 
the only candidate to have a female heading his campaign.77 
Although one might be tempted to explain Tate's election as an accident 
caused by the business elite's preoccupation with the council-manager gov­
ernment movement, this does not appear to be the case. Rather, the election 
of Tate and two other independent candidates to the commission, R. A. Wy­
lie (street commissioner) and W. C. (Bill) Graves (police and fire commis­
sioner), reflected a rejection of the traditional civic leadership, which had 
fragmented badly over the use of Ulrickson funds for the Trinity River recla­
mation project. 
At the very time the Ulrickson Committee developed its program, prop­
erty owners of the Trinity River bottoms fashioned a strategy for leveeing 
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and reclaiming the Trinity River flood plain. After reviewing engineering re­
ports about the cost of reclaiming this area, the 1,300 property owners in 
1926 asked the County Commissioners Court of Dallas to create the City 
and County of Dallas Levee Improvement District. Under the laws of Texas, 
this body could sell bonds to help finance improvement of the river bottoms. 
The members of the district, led by John J. Simmons, manufacturer and 
longtime civic leader, and Leslie A. Stemmons, president of the Atlas Metal 
Works and the Southwestern Loan Association, agreed to that plan after 
working out a comprehensive improvement program with the city, county, 
railroads, and utilities to shoulder some of the financial improvement (see 
map 4). The city promised to provide $3,270,000 for water mains, sewers 
and underpasses while county officials committed $3,339,000 for under­
passes and viaducts. The railroads and utilities offered another $5,405,000 
of improvements for the area. In return, the district agreed to spend $9 mil­
lion for the actual leveeing of the river and refilling the soggy bottoms, as 
well as sharing the costs for storm sewers and roads. Estimates of the final 
cost for the project exceeded $21 million.78 
Earlier there had been resistance to heavy public financial subsidy of the 
levee/reclamation project but now both the city bond proposals, included in 
the Ulrickson program, and the county bond election, held the same year, 
passed by impressive majorities. Part of the success of the levee/reclamation 
program came from its close association with the larger planning efforts for 
the city as a whole, and its association with the Ulrickson Program.79 The 
KPA undertook an impressive educational effort to sell the levee/reclama-
tion program as an essential part of the revised Kessler Plan. Indeed, the 
KPA attempted to rally citywide support for the completion of all parts of 
the Kessler Plan. In one pamphlet the association offered the citywide bene­
fits of carrying out the Ulrickson Program: "It will give every section of 
Greater Dallas wide and ample trafficways, relieving traffic congestion, 
guarding against the shrinkage of values and reviving blighted areas." The 
pamphlet concluded by claiming that the program would make "Greater 
Dallas a unified City, with every section accessible to every other section, 
with wide thoroughfares for the main flow of traffic in every direction."80 
That last reference was a particularly telling reason for the city to support 
the straightening, leveeing, and reclamation of the Trinity River, since that 
program anticipated five new viaducts that would link Dallas to its isolated 
and cantankerous appendage, Oak Cliff. In the very first issue of the Kessler 
Plan Salesman, published in 1926 by the KPA, a feature article underscored 
the importance of that project to all of Dallas. Other Kessler publicity for 
the levee/reclamation would follow. John Surratt, the talented executive 
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secretary of the KPA, wrote national planning figure Edward Basset after 
the successful Ulrickson bond election and bragged that his association 
played a critical role in educating many previously hostile civic leaders as to 
the worth of the levee/reclamation project for the city as a whole.81 
Although the levee/reclamation program had been sold to the public as a 
way to better link downtown Dallas with Oak Cliff, protect the city from 
flooding, and open up new land for industrial development, many remained 
concerned by what they viewed as a huge public subsidy for a private real es­
tate venture. Shortly after the county court organized the reclamation dis­
trict, Stemmons and Simmons created the Industrial Properties Corporation 
to develop the Trinity River bottoms. That corporation, by exchanging capi­
tal stock for properties, eventually owned or controlled nearly 75 percent of 
the land in the district. Such real estate holdings would allow Industrial 
Properties to plan and develop a massive industrial park. Estimates that the 
reclaimed property value could reach $52 million led some to question how 
much the city should be helping private developers. Other business transac­
tions undertaken by the property owners also raised questions about the rec­
lamation district's business practices. For instance, the district offered its 
bonds without competitive bidding and gave the excavating contract for the 
levee to an in-house firm. In addition, Stemmons and Simmons constantly 
pressured city officials to give their project top priority in regards to bond 
money.82 Such action ran counter to the notion publicized by both the Ul­
rickson Committee and the KPA that the gigantic bond program was for the 
city as a whole, and threatened to undo the consensus that the KPA had tried 
to create for comprehensive planning, especially since some downtown 
businessmen agreed with neighborhood sentiment that said the Ulrickson 
bond money designated for drainage sewers for needy residential sections 
should be spent first. 
The split in the downtown business establishment resulted in two full 
slates for the 1929 election—the United Dallas Association (UDA) and the 
Greater Dallas Association (GDA). The UDA, composed of those opposing 
the immediate commitment of Ulrickson funds to the reclamation project, 
nominated as its mayoralty candidate Temple Morrow, grandson of Texas 
legend Sam Houston. Morrow's heavy involvement in the Tyler Street Meth­
odist Church had led some opponents to label him a religious fanatic but he 
countered with his own charges, claiming that the GDA ticket had been 
sponsored by the levee district. If it won the election, Morrow warned, the 
GDA planned to divert funds from the Ulrickson bond program for more 
improvements in the river valley than were authorized by voters.83 Morrow 
and the UDA called for more unity in city hall and the end to the bickering 
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that had characterized Dallas. "For three years Dallas has dragged behind 
the other cities in the state," Morrow warned. Only a "United Dallas, 
against the call of special interest and organized vice, against bickering and 
strife," could, according to the mayoralty candidate, redirect the city "to­
ward prosperity."84 
The GD A, which had allegedly been established by the levee district sup­
porters, nominated W. C. Everett, president of the Empire Building and 
Loan Company, as its candidate for mayor. Its platform identified the "co­
ordinated expenditures of public funds from the Ulrickson bond issue by the 
city, the highway bond issue by the county, and the Trinity River reclamation 
bond issue by the Dallas County Levee District" as the "paramount issue of 
the city political campaign."85 
Unlike earlier elections in which the News usually backed one ticket, the 
1929 election saw the paper, which was very sympathetic to the levee district, 
splitting its endorsements between the two business slates. "The News takes 
no stock in the theory that ticket unity in advance of election necessarily 
means harmony afterward," stated one editorial. "Experience of recent 
years with administrations elected as tickets and not as men makes the exact 
opposite the more responsible assumption." As the News explained, it sup­
ported three GDA candidates and two UDA candidates because "they sup­
port Dallas as a single entity."86 
The News's sister afternoon-paper, the Dallas Journal, went even further 
in its editorial position, arguing that supporting a "straight ticket" was a 
vote for "bossism in the Dallas City Hall," a vote for "influence in govern-
ment."87 The Dallas Times Herald, chief critic of the levee district's actions, 
took a different view. It supported "the courageous and open campaign" by 
Temple Morrow and the United Dallas ticket, explaining that in this elec­
tion "the only point at issue is whether the rest of Dallas is to be considered 
in its proper relationship with the levee district."88 
In the election that followed many apparently agreed with the News, 
since no slate swept into office. For that matter, only one candidate received 
a majority vote at all—the UDA nominee for finance commissioner, John 
Harris. Temple H. Morrow and J. Waddy Tate, top vote-getters for mayor, 
faced each other in a runoff election. UDA candidates qualified for runoff 
elections in three other positions against independents. The GDA slate, 
most associated with the levee district, placed only one candidate in the run­
off. The Times Herald celebrated the achievements of the UDA, reminding 
voters that their slate identified with the "interests of the city as a whole."89 
The Dallas Journal perceived the election differently and used it to pro­
mote council-manager government. "The recent campaign," the Journal 
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observed, "should convince any intelligent citizen that it will be best for Dal­
las if this should be the last political contest of the sort in connection with 
administration of the city's business. The imperative need of Dallas and of 
any growing metropolitan city is businesslike administration," it continued, 
"backed by a citizenry that is united for the welfare and progress of the city." 
The Journal concluded, "It will be folly to perpetuate a system that makes 
for dissension among the citizens, that makes possible the election to posts 
of great responsibility of men who are unfitted for such service."90 
During the runoff elections, the UDA emphasized two points. First, it 
questioned if Tate was even competent to be mayor. Second, it called for sup­
port of the entire slate to guarantee a "harmonious administration."91 
Within this context, mayoralty candidate Temple Morrow complained that 
Dallas had lost industries the last two years because of "the turmoil of mis­
management at city hall." "Bankers and businessmen were losing confi­
dence" in their city, he warned, and only the UDA could restore it.92 
J. Waddy Tate and the other independents agreed and reminded voters 
that many who supported the UDA slate had helped put together the ticket 
that resulted in the Burt administration. Tate claimed that downtown busi­
nessmen had handpicked the UDA candidates and complained that those 
office seekers did not adequately represent the city's diversity. Even worse, 
according to Tate, many of those who participated in the selection process 
actually lived in Highland Park, the wealthy suburban community just 
north of the city (see map 2).93 
John Erhard, former assistant district attorney, attacked the city's fac­
tionalism and also emphasized the unrepresentative nature of the UDA and 
the GD A in explaining why he supported the independent candidates: "Dal­
las is now dominated by cliques, represented in two slates with the only hope 
of the people to break their alliances resting on the election of independent 
candidates." Many voters must have agreed, for the April 23rd runoff elec­
tion saw more than 20,000 voters elect three independent candidates to the 
commission, including J. Waddy Tate, in what the News called "the most 
hectic city campaign in the history of Dallas."94 
Tate defeated Morrow decisively (12,069 to 8,557) while independent 
candidates R. A. Wylie and W. C. Graves also won. The fifth commissioner's 
seat went to GD A candidate John Fouts. Tate beat out his rival thanks to his 
strong showing in the Oak Cliff and South Dallas precincts. In some ways, 
the 1929 election proved to be a high-water mark for Oak Cliff, as four of the 
five commissioners lived in that area west of the Trinity River.95 
Soon after Tate took office, it became apparent that he did not consider 
council-manager government a high priority, even though he had promised 
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during the campaign to submit the matter to the public if elected. Tate, who 
strongly disliked the inclusion of Highland Park residents on the charter 
committee, demanded that they resign. When they refused, he introduced a 
bill that would require all city workers, including nonpaid board and com­
mittee members to reside in Dallas. Such a bill, the mayor observed, would 
"keep those Highland Park birds from roosting on the city hall." The com­
mission voted down the mayor's proposal 4 to 1, but passed another pro­
posal for him several days later that exempted nonpaid board members. 
Had the original proposal passed, Tate would have successfully disrupted 
the charter commission and delayed its final report. During this time Tate re­
iterated his promise to submit the council-manager plan to the voters but in­
dicated that he would offer an alternative form of government so the people 
could have a choice.96 
When the committee finished its draft of the charter on October 16, Tate 
balked at its recommendation to hold an election on the new charter sched­
uled for December 17,1929. He argued that only the city commission, rather 
than the charter committee, could call the election, despite the claims to the 
contrary by charter supporters. He also promised to veto such a proposal if 
the commission ever passed it, claiming, "Nobody but residents of High­
land Park want the city manager plan." Later he modified this position and 
suggested that the "public utilities [were] behind the city manager idea."97 
The Dallas Morning News and other local newspapers had a different 
idea, however. The News applauded the proposed charter and its attempt 
"to apply to the business of government in Dallas the same principles of ca­
pable management as are employed in the government of the nation's largest 
business enterprises." Particularly attractive was the plan's ability to cen­
tralize responsibility and eliminate "the element of 'buck passing' in city ad­
ministration." Furthermore, according to the News, "It makes the council 
responsible to the people in a larger degree than the present commissioners 
are responsible, for it provides for district representation so that every sec­
tion of the city will have a voice in the council." As a result, the new charter 
offered a "more representative type of government" while at the same time 
insuring "the attainment of greater efficiency and responsiveness in its ad-
ministration."98 The Citizens Charter Association (CCA) agreed and also 
stressed the ways the new governmental structure would bring greater effi­
ciency and more responsiveness to the public.99 
The charter movement did suffer a setback when the city's legal depart­
ment ruled that the charter committee had no right to call an election. Under 
state law, Dallas citizens, not the mayor, should have selected the committee. 
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As it now stood, the mayor's committee only exercised advisory powers and 
could not schedule an election.100 In response to this ruling, the commission 
voted 4 to 1 on November 4, 1929, to call its own referendum on council-
manager government. Despite widescale support by the city's newspapers, 
and notwithstanding the apparent inability to sustain his veto, Tate held his 
ground and vetoed the proposal to accept the charter committee's report, 
a necessary first step to holding a December referendum on the matter. 
He criticized the report for not reviewing the problems in city manager-
governed cities, and for neglecting to discuss the origins of the movement or 
adequately justify why Dallas needed it. He also complained that the com­
mittee never consulted with the mayor or the commission and "was submit­
ted as the finished product of an autocratic body, responsible neither to the 
governing authorities of the city nor to the people." Finally, Tate pointed out 
that the proposed charter had four elements that the assistant city attorney, 
A. A. Long, found unconstitutional.101 
Mayor Tate especially disliked the document's origin. The movement for 
charter revision did not originate from the people, the mayor observed. 
"They have known nothing about it, nor could until the lone voice of Louis 
P. Head came crying through the wilderness." He concluded his veto address 
by warning that "radical departure in form of government must be under­
taken with grave caution," and warned Dallasites that "efficiency is gained 
in proportion to the disassociation of government from popular control."102 
Since Tate's veto delayed any action on the bill for seven days, supporters 
of the charter worked to modify portions of the charter that conflicted with 
state law. After some delay, the commission overrode Tate's veto and sched­
uled the vote for a new charter for January 28,1930. But acting city attorney 
A. A. Long thwarted this action when he refused to approve the revised city 
charter in December, arguing that state law required a popularly elected 
charter committee to author the new charter. Such a ruling made it impossi­
ble to hold a January election and threatened to postpone approval of the 
charter for some time.103 
In late February, when the city commission attempted to get around the 
popular election of a charter committee by proposing the revised charter as 
a series of amendments rather than a new charter, the mayor again vetoed 
the bill. In this veto message, Tate not only attacked council-manager gov­
ernment, but criticized the coarse attempt to secure the new charter through 
an amendment process—a process that he correctly observed was "against 
the spirit of the law." Indeed, such action, according to the mayor, "was born 
of an utter ignorance of or disregard for fundamental safeguards of demo­
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cratic government." He also accused the newspapers of a biased and "vi­
cious" attack on the city commission form of government and railed against 
the city charter committee and its call for a new city manager charter.104 
The commissioners sustained the mayor's veto when Bill Graves, police 
and fire commissioner, reversed his earlier position and sided with Tate. Af­
ter some reflection, Graves concluded that "the city manager plan is theoret­
ically wrong and unsound from two opposite viewpoints. If the manager 
can not be interfered with he becomes a dictator . . . and if he is controlled 
by council in administering the affairs of the city he becomes a mere fig­
urehead, his job and his enormous salary are useless." The People's City 
Charter Club, a group opposed to council-manager government, endorsed 
Graves's controversial action and held a rally in the city auditorium the day 
the commissioner made his announcement. The group passed resolutions 
praising Graves for his stand and condemned the newspapers for their un­
critical endorsement of council-manager government. Some supporters of 
Graves, like Lanz Miller, smelled conspiracy. "There is a coterie of men con­
nected with the Chamber of Commerce and the Real Estate Board and in 
conjunction with some men on the Ulrickson committee who have so ma­
nipulated and managed affairs that they have profited personally enor­
mously without regard to the general welfare of the city."105 
Unwilling to concede defeat, the CCA started a petition campaign to 
place the proposed charter on the ballot as a series of amendments. That ac­
tion, which required the signatures of 10 percent of the city's eligible voters, 
proved successful and resulted in a special election scheduled for October 
10, 1930, over whether or not to ratify the thirty-nine amendments that 
would create council-manager government.106 
The CCA, headed by Hugh Grady and Louis Head, launched its formal 
campaign for those charter amendments on September 15, 1930, mailing 
pamphlets of the new charter to the city's 49,797 qualified voters. The CCA 
also employed John Erhard, the young lawyer active in Tate's campaign, to 
run the amendment effort. The CCA established a separate organization for 
Oak Cliff and appointed a banker from that area to head it.107 Lenore Hall, a 
prominent clubwoman, chaired a woman's committee that organized Dallas 
females along precinct lines. Indeed, the CCA, acknowledging the organi­
zational effectiveness of the city's clubwomen, made a special appeal to 
women for help and relied heavily on them to secure passage of the city man­
ager referendum.108 In addition to the CCA's attempt to rally women's sup­
port, its "flying squadron of speakers" visited every industrial plant and 
large commercial firm in the city and gave fifteen-minute talks on the advan­
tages of the new charter amendments. The plants did not give the same privi­
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lege to charter opponents.109 Supporters also held neighborhood meetings 
throughout the city as well as several large rallies. 
The CCA sought and secured a variety of endorsements for the charter 
amendments. All of the city's papers supported the reforms and so did the 
Dallas Chamber of Commerce. The Junior Chamber of Commerce not only 
endorsed the charter revisions but actively worked for them. The Dallas Ad­
vertising League's journal, OKed Copy, broke its own rule about taking par­
tisan stands and recommended the charter amendments, explaining that 
this was a "business . . . not a political issue."110 
The campaign continued to emphasize how the council-manager struc­
ture would promote a more businesslike (and efficient) government. A News 
editorial promised that it would take "the business of running the city out of 
politics as far as possible." This was good, according to the paper, because 
"politics has no proper place in the enterprise at all."111 Other civic leaders 
seconded the News's editorial and provided additional reasons for council-
manager government. 
Mattie A. Slater, a leading Dallas clubwoman, backed the change be­
cause "business and professions require specialists now, and certainly city 
government requires the direction of a specialist." Hugh Grady agreed but 
also pointed out that by making council a part-time job, "men and women 
in this town who would make good members of the council but who can not 
afford to go there and spend all their time" will be able to serve "as you do 
on the school board." It appears that Grady believed that the city manager 
and his professional staff would do the hard work and present council with 
legislation that they could accept or reject. Unlike the commissioners who 
were full-time, city council would make laws but pass administration of 
them to the city manager.112 
Advocates of council-manager government made special appeals to the 
working classes. First, they argued that the council system would promote 
wider and more direct representation at city hall because each section of 
Dallas would have "a voice in the shaping of policies and on their execu­
tion." Time and time again the theme that the charter was "endeavoring to 
widen representation by placing nine men on council" appeared. Campaign 
manager John A. Erhard promised that the new government could amply re­
spond to the city's pluralistic nature. "We can not build one-sided cities," 
Erhard observed. "We can not build cities at all unless we take into consid­
eration the needs of all kinds of classes of people."113 
The day before the election, a News editorial probably best reflected why 
the city's boosters supported city manager government so strongly. "Dallas 
is now at the parting of the ways," the editorial observed. "It can remain in 
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the small class or go up into the big city class. The Kessler Plan, the Ulrickson 
Plan, Industrial Dallas, Inc., the Levee District, the Trinity Canal Associa­
tion, the City Manager Plan—all are part and parcel of one great program 
for making Dallas bigger, better and busier than ever before." Support of the 
city manager plan was critical to this growth program.114 
The opposition, lacking the money or organization of the charter sup­
porters, waged a limited contest. James L. Lantz, Mayor Tate's secretary, 
seemed a major player against the amendments. Opponents pitched their 
campaign particularly to city employees. For instance, a circular with the 
headlines "Save Our City From Bondage and Despotism" appeared in city 
hall on the eve of the election. The pamphlet argued that many city-hall 
workers would lose their jobs with the adoption of the new charter amend­
ments and also predicted that the civil service commission, the subject of one 
of the proposed amendments, would be a costly burden to the city.115 
Only 13,179 of the 49,797 eligible voters turned out for the election, but 
those supporting the amendments won by a 2 to 1 margin (8,962 to 4,217). 
Most of the eighteen precincts that voted against the city manager plan were 
located in South or Southeast Dallas. Many of the city's poorer working 
classes lived in this area and remained suspicious of businesslike government 
and structure that centralized power in Dallas and made it harder for work­
ing people to get elected to council. Voters in North and Northeast Dallas 
and in Oak Lawn gave the amendments tremendous support (10 to 1 in fa­
vor). Much of Oak Cliff supported the city manager plan, too.116 
The adoption of the council-manager government joined the Ulrickson 
program and comprehensive zoning as a solution to the problem of the city 
as defined in the 1920s. Seeing Dallas as a complexly interconnected system 
in dire need of coordinated and efficient government, civic leaders turned to 
a council-manager government that would put administration under the 
control of a professional, but leave the legislative function to citizens elected 
at large. Just as early planning and zoning practices, with their focus on dis­
crete problems, had failed to address the city in a truly comprehensive fash­
ion before the 1920s, so too did the government organized functionally as 
the commission government. This government structure proved unable to 
provide a strong executive to coordinate and administer government effec­
tively and comprehensively. But the fight for better-coordinated government 
did not end with the charter amendments. Charter promoters created a per­
manent organization to guarantee that the new government worked the 
right way. And that organization turned to politics and controversy to secure 
its goals. 
The CCA in Control: 
The Edy Years, 1931-1935 
O n  e week after the approval of the charter amendments, leaders of the Citi­
zens Charter Association (CCA) announced that they would work for the 
election in April of the best men to operate the new government. Under their 
direction city manager government took shape, one very different from ear­
lier Dallas governments, and one that clearly demonstrated the new vision 
that the civic leaders had embraced in the 1920s. Although supporters of 
council-manager government placed great importance on nonpartisan and 
efficient government, the amendments' attention to coordination and its 
creation of a governmental structure seemingly able to look after the inter­
ests of the city as a whole proved a particularly important innovation. Ac­
cording to a report by the Committee on Public Administration of the Social 
Science Research Council published in 1939, the Dallas commissioners had 
lacked adequate prestige "to be independent of the demands of minority in­
terests or pressure groups." In addition, the report continued, "the commis­
sioners' concentration of interest on single departments enabled them to 
grant special favors or exert political power." Moreover, there was really no 
one "whose function was to prepare or recommend a program of policy that 
gave impartial consideration to the needs of all departments." As a result, 
the researchers concluded, such conditions permitted "minority interests to 
control municipal politics." According to the report, council-manager 
structure changed all that, giving Dallas a government that "put into effect 
the will of the majority and did not try to build up political support by favor­
ing special interests."1 
The charter amendments also discouraged the traditional role of political 
parties by refusing to allow party designations on the ballot and by forbid­
ding primary elections to select candidates. Rather, they required council 
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hopefuls to secure 300 qualified voter signatures on a petition andfile it with 
the city secretary at least one month before the election.2 The Committee on 
Public Administration reported that "politics" was "a word with com­
pletely objectionable meaning to the city's civic leaders." That word, ac­
cording to the committee, meant "patronage and selfish intrigue of those 
who lived on the public payroll and therefore considered hindrances to com­
munity development."3 
CCA leaders not only changed the charter to avoid politics, they also 
named a nine-member executive committee to help select candidates and se­
cure their election. Three active clubwomen, Grace Fitzgerald, Lenore Hall, 
and Adella Kelsey Turner, served on the committee. John Erhard, who had 
guided the charter amendments to victory, managed the CCA campaign. 
The CCA selected a slate of businessmen for council. It included Arthur 
Moore, president of Cox-Moore Drug Company in Oak Cliff. Moore, a can­
didate for District A in Oak Cliff, was born in Comanche, Texas, in 1890. 
He came to Dallas at the age of thirty-one to join the Cox-Moore Drug 
Company. Moore served as a director of the Oak Cliff-Dallas Commercial 
Association and participated in city beautification projects and highway 
planning.4 
H. C. Burroughs, candidate for District B in Oak Cliff, arrived in the city 
in 1918. Another native Texan, he was born in Merkel, Texas, in 1894. Bur­
roughs owned the Marsailes and Boundary dry goods stores and also served 
on the Oak Cliff-Dallas Commercial Association's board of directors, in ad­
dition to presiding over the Oak Cliff Kiwanis Club. 
Victor H. Hexter, a native of Baltimore, Maryland, journeyed to Dallas 
in 1888. This candidate for District C, South Dallas, headed the board of ed­
ucation in 1908 and currently chaired the city's zoning board of appeal. Hex­
ter practiced law and served as vice president of the Union Title and Guar­
anty Company. Active in civic affairs, Hexter also sat on the governing 
board of the Jewish Federation of Social Services. 
W. H. Painter, another CCA candidate, ran for the District D council seat 
for East Dallas. Born in east Tennessee, Painter moved to Dallas at age nine­
teen and became assistant secretary of the Texas Electric Railway Company. 
In addition, he assumed the job of secretary in two other business institu­
tions, the Dallas Security Company and the United Fidelity Life Insurance 
Company. 
The CCA's candidate for District E in northeast Dallas, E. R. Brown, ar­
rived in Dallas in 1914. Born in Little Hocking, Ohio, in 1868, he pursued a 
successful career in oil that culminated in his selection as president of the 
Magnolia Petroleum Company. By the time of his nomination, the former 
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president of both the Dallas Chamber of Commerce and the Community 
Chest was one of the city's most prominent citizens. 
T. M. Cullum, the CCA's choice for District F in North Dallas, had lived 
in the city longer than any other candidate. Born in 1871 near Covington, 
Tennessee, Cullum's parents brought him to Dallas a year later because his 
father had been invited to pastor the Oak Lawn Methodist Church. Cullum 
first went to work for a grocery store but later started a sporting goods firm 
in 1901. That company, Cullum and Boren, grew to be one of the largest 
stores in the Southwest. Cullum also presided over the chamber of com­
merce and the community chest before his selection by the CCA to run for 
office. 
Charles E. Turner, born in nearby Richardson, Texas, in 1886, lived in 
Oak Cliff when the city annexed that community in 1903. After working for 
a wholesale drug firm, he entered the real estate profession in 1914 and be­
came a charter member of the Dallas Real Estate Board. His public service 
included tenure on the City Plan Commission (CPC) and on the appraisal 
board of business and industrial properties. 
Joe. C. Thompson, secretary-treasurer of the Southland Ice Company, 
ran as a CCA candidate-at-large. Born in Waxahachie, Texas, in 1900, he 
graduated from Oak Cliff High School in 1922. Thompson served as past 
president of the Oak Cliff-Dallas Commercial Association and as director 
of the Oak Cliff Bank and Trust Company. 
The final CCA candidate, Tom L. Bradford, was born in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, in 1887. Active in Dallas public life since 1904, Bradford served 
as alderman before adoption of the city commission form of government. 
Not only had he participated in the commission government movement, but 
he gave the city the Bradford Memorial Hospital for Children. By the time 
he ran for council, Bradford chaired the board of the Southwestern Life In­
surance Company. 
The collective profile suggests that these were well-established, respect­
able citizens who as a group maintained a reputation and achievements su­
perior to earlier council slates. Five of the nine were Masons in a city where 
Masonry appeared important and powerful. Of the six council candidates 
whose religious preferences could be determined, three were Methodists, 
one a Baptist, another a Presbyterian, and a sixth Jewish. Although none 
had been born in Dallas, they all had made their fortunes in the city as Big D 
grew from a town to a city. Such an experience surely shaped their attitudes 
and sense of priorities about Dallas's needs. 
The CCA started its campaign on March 31, 1931. CCA leaders relied 
heavily on the city's clubwomen to promote their ticket, just as they had in 
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order to secure the charter amendments. In one of the strangest campaigns 
in the city's history, the CCA refused to write a platform, asserting that the 
quality of the men on the ticket "constituted a sufficient guarantee that they 
would give the city the best government possible under the conditions." In 
addition to no platform, the good government group forbade its candidates 
to speak—rather, it held rallies in different sections of the city to garner sup­
port. Speeches and platforms, according to the CCA, smacked of politics, 
something that group wished to avoid. The strongly supportive Dallas 
Morning News applauded such actions and reminded readers, "When you 
elect these men you will send to the city hall a council no one of whose mem­
bers is beholden to any man or group of men, none of whom has made a sin­
gle promise, not a single speech, but whose own standing in the community, 
whose personal integrity constitutes the platform." Hugh Grady, charter 
supporter, called the CCA candidates "the freest group of men ever offered 
in Dallas." Grace Fitzgerald predicted that instead of being swayed by parti­
san or neighborhood concerns, they would "be influenced only by the best 
interests of Dallas as a whole."5 
Whether it was the CCA's strategy or the willingness of potential oppo­
nents to give the experiment in good government a chance, no opposition 
tickets appeared to run against the CCA candidates. John J. Kettle, chair of 
the Dallas County Republicans, announced his party's decision not to adopt 
a slate of opponents because the present campaign is "one where politics 
should be forgotten and civic spirit manifested in putting this exceptional 
ticket into office." The News explained the community's support for the 
CCA candidates by observing that "Dallas has had quarreling and divided 
leadership for some time and needs to get back to team work and construc­
tive peace." The new council promised to lead the way.6 
Although six independents challenged the good government slate, CCA 
candidates swamped the opposition in what the News called a "majority 
that almost reached unanimity." No opponent polled more than 1,202 votes, 
while the CCA winners received from between 8,655 to 10,097 votes. Only 
one of the fifty-nine precincts voted against the CCA candidates.7 
Meeting one day after the election at the Baker Hotel, the newly elected 
council selected Tom L. Bradford as mayor. After looking at eight to ten 
other men including T. W. Ballard, C. A. Harrell, and C. E. Schultz, council 
agreed to hire John N. Edy as its first city manager. The forty-eight-year-old 
Edy, born in Missouri, received a degree in civil engineering from the Univer­
sity of Missouri in 1909. Although he worked ten years in railroad construc­
tion, Edy spent much of his life in public service, starting as an assistant 
street engineer in St. Louis. He also held the job of county engineer in Mis­
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souri and Montana and served as chief engineer and managing executive of 
the Montana State Highway Department from 1919 to 1923. He left Mon­
tana to become Berkeley, California's first city manager. While at Berkeley, 
he also took a master's in political science and became president of the Inter­
national Association of City Managers. In 1929, Edy accepted the city man-
ager's post in Flint, Michigan, only to lose his job when an anti-city man­
ager group won election in 1931. Dallas, then, secured an experienced and 
accomplished city manager. The 5'8" Edy, described by the News as "genial, 
affable and a good public speaker," accepted the job on April 17, after coun­
cil agreed to let him have a free hand in suppressing vice and granted him 
sufficient budgetary control to force Dallas to live within its income. It paid 
him a very substantial salary of $16,500 to manage Dallas.8 Edy brought 
new methods to city hall and achieved much of the centralization and effi­
ciency that civic leaders wanted to see in their city government. 
Under Edy's leadership, council-manager government fostered a coordi­
nation of government unprecedented in the city's history.9 Changes in the 
budgetary procedures, including the development of a budget office with 
financial control, both centralized and coordinated expenditures. Unlike the 
commission form of government, where each commissioner fought for allo­
cations for his department, and often traded votes for budgetary favors, 
council had no particular incentive to protect specific departments. Even 
more important, the city manager "brought all expenditures of the city to­
gether in one place and considered them as a whole."10 The procedure won 
praise from an independent auditor who wrote that the administration of 
the city's finances were on par with "the best municipal governments any 
where in the country."11 It also reflected the emphasis on governing the city 
as a whole. 
Not only did Edy try to coordinate the city's finances in a better way, 
but he also did the same for the staff. The city manager held biweekly meet­
ings, primarily to inform department heads of what others were doing. 
This simple act, according to Stone, for the first time in Dallas's history 
brought department heads together "to attack problems concertedly." In­
deed, Edy spent much of his time conferring with his staff and coordinating 
activities. He also met with department employees to coordinate their work 
with other department employees.12 Because the city now had an overall ad­
ministrator, Dallas benefited from budgetary planning for the first time. Ad­
ministrators drew up a five-year forecast of both operating and capital bud­
gets, with detailed plans for departments, equipment, and other city needs.13 
The city manager required even those independent officers, boards, and 
commissions not under the manager to submit budgets for inclusion in a 
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consolidated document. As a result, all budgetary needs of the city, 
according to a Social Science Research Council report, "could be considered 
as a whole.14 
Edy mandated monthly reports from departments to keep him further in­
formed and allow him to accommodate the whole. He particularly wanted 
to evaluate the physical work and accomplishment of each department. Fi­
nally, the city manager instituted systematic procedures to allow uniform 
practices in the city—from answering citizens' questions to buying mate­
rials and supplies.15 
Changes in administrative format reflected a new notion of the city that 
had helped shape the Ulrickson program too. Both council-manager govern­
ment and the Ulrickson program treated the city as something greater than 
the sum of its parts, inextricably linked and demanding treatment as a 
whole. As a result, both emphasized coordination of all parts and both 
planned for the future. Just as the Ulrickson program anticipated the future 
physical needs of the city after careful study of the whole, the council-
manager government developed planning tools to anticipate future city 
needs. For instance, officials instituted performance records to chart the di­
rection in which costs and worker productivity were moving.16 
The new administrative procedures also helped make government more 
efficient. Now Dallas had at the helm an officer focused on serving the city 
as a whole. Inefficiency often stemmed from officials' pursuing personal 
agendas that neglected the larger city. Eliminating the politics associated 
with commission government, the city manager attempted to stop such ac­
tivity and save Dallas money. In addition to halting personal politics, "The 
central executive made possible coordination of the employees, reducing de­
lays and increasing production," according to the Committee on Public Ad-
ministration.17 
Not only did the newly elected slate pledge a nonpartisan approach to 
government, but the new charter amendments promoted that ideal as well. 
They discouraged professional politicians from seeking city council seats by 
paying council members only $20 per council meeting and no more than 
$1,040 per annum. In addition, the charter stated that the city manager, the 
city's chief administrative and executive officer, should be selected solely on 
"his executive and administrative training experience and ability, and with­
out regard to political consideration [italics mine]." Along the same lines, 
the amended charter warned that "neither the Council nor any of its com­
mittees or members shall dictate the appointment" of the city manager's 
choices. The revised charter also provided for a three-member civil service 
board to select and promote other city workers on the basis of "merit, effi­
ciency, character and industry" rather than political influence.18 
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Council itself changed as a result of charter reform and the influence of 
the CCA. First, the new council, composed of prestigious businessmen and 
professionals, saw their entry into government as a service rather than a ca­
reer, and did not, according to the report, seek to reward their friends with 
petty favors and special services as the commissioners had. The new at-large 
council structure also encouraged that body to treat all areas of the city 
equally, since each council member had a citywide constituency. Unlike ear­
lier legislative bodies that had acted through committees, the council under 
the new charter, according to the 1939 Social Science Committee report, 
"dealt with the whole policy of the city, acting collectively." Council formed 
special committees rarely and depended heavily on a civil service-protected 
administrative staff that could "produce on short notice information relat­
ing to all the departments without favoring or neglecting the interests of any 
of them." In addition, council members had access to the city manager and 
his staff. Executive meetings with the manager before council sessions gave 
council members the opportunity to hear about the city's needs in a "sys­
tematic and thorough manner." As a result of these developments, the Social 
Science Committee concluded, "For the first time the affairs of the city were 
determined by a deliberative body that considered municipal policy as a 
whole in relation to the needs of the city as a whole rather than in relation to 
the needs of individual administrative departments or minority pressure 
groups."19 
When the innovative charter amendments took affect on May 1, 1930, 
they brought a new comprehensive approach to Dallas city government. 
The changes clearly reflected a different idea not only about urban adminis­
tration but about the city as a system. Administrative reforms also bore re­
sults that endeared this government to a cost- and health-conscious middle 
class. During its first nineteen months, the CAA-headed government cut 
costs by $980,000, doubling garbage collection in all sections of the city 
while spending less money doing so. In addition, it eliminated a $450,000 
overdraft in the water department and reduced water rates. Edy, with the 
help of Jay W. Stevens, fire marshal of California, reorganized the fire de­
partment. He did the same for the health department, and saw the American 
Public Health Association recognize his efforts by giving the city a good 
health rating. Because of the actions of the health department, the city's milk 
rating improved from 57 percent to 95 percent. The city manager also estab­
lished a new central purchasing office that would better coordinate and con­
trol city purchases.20 
Changes in the police department best exemplify the new emphasis 
on efficiency from the city manager. According to one observer, the po­
lice department had for a long time been viewed as a "sinecure of camp 
80 • CHAPTER THREE 
followers," and had to deal consistently with outside interference. Under the 
new government, according to T. R. Garretson, that all changed. Although 
he retained the police chief, Claude Trammel, Edy brought in outside help to 
better organize the department. O. W. Wilson, police chief of Wichita, ana­
lyzed the department and suggested ways to improve it. In response to his 
advice, city officials developed professional standards and required police­
men to attend training school. Under city manager government, officials 
promoted policemen based on ability rather than political pull. The city also 
equipped police cars with radios and established thirteen patrol districts. 
"For the first time in the history of Dallas," Captain Garretson reported, 
"the entire city is receiving a share of protection." And that occurred despite 
the fact that Edy trimmed the police force by forty-eight men. 21 
Indeed, Edy discharged 10 percent of all city employees, including forty 
from the water department and twenty from the health department, claim­
ing the latter had become a "dumping ground" for politicians or their 
friends who could not find positions in other departments.22 Edy justified his 
action by reminding citizens that efficient government meant clearing "the 
chiseling politicians and loafers from the corridors of the city hall." Working 
under assurances from council that he had complete authority over all em­
ployees, Edy dismissed the head of the health department, a political hench­
men of former mayor Tate, and demoted the city's popular engineer.23 The 
firings had a positive impact on the budget. During the first two years of its 
existence, council-manager government spent $357,000 less than the city's 
income, even after it quadrupled welfare department expenditures. Finally, 
council-manager government negotiated a reduction in power and light 
rates, and reduced real estate taxes by 15 percent.24 
Edy, according to one observer, also instilled discipline in city depart-
ments—something unknown previously. Even more important, according 
to the same observer, Edy had made changes at city hall "that should have 
been made 20 years ago and has made them without fear or favor. This is 
something that no citizen of Dallas could or would have done for fear of po­
litical reprisal."25 A political scientist from outside Dallas came to a similar 
conclusion in 1938 when he wrote that Edy "eliminated time-honored pro­
cedures and modernized the organization and services of the city gov-
ernment."26 
Along with his efforts to bring greater efficiency to city government, Edy 
increased efforts to suppress vice in this Bible-belt city. He enforced regula­
tions against gambling, prostitution, and illegal sale of liquor more consis­
tently than before. Under orders from the city manager, the chief of police 
broke the bond between gamblers and the police, and suspended those offi­
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cers who took payoffs and refused to cooperate with the new enforcement ef­
fort. The increased crackdown on vice ruffled enough feathers that pa­
trolmen were assigned to protect the city manager's residence both day 
and night.27 
Others opposed Edy because of his large-scale dismissals of city workers 
and the new emphasis on discipline, hard work, and accountability. The 
stringent measures had a chilling effect on worker morale. In a letter to Carl 
Callaway, new head of the CCA, a city employee claimed that 90 percent of 
the city employees were "very bitter in . .  . the way the affairs of the city are 
being run under the present form of government."28 Businessmen used to 
bursting into the mayor's office with suggestions and small talk were also 
taken aback by the city manager's demand for appointments. 
As a result, despite the intent of its founders, the council-manager gov­
ernment became embroiled in "politics," with the actions of the city man­
ager the center of controversy. In January 1933, it became clear that tickets 
supported by disgruntled citizens would oppose the CCA slate and that 
those anticharter efforts would make Edy a campaign issue. The most vocal 
opposition came from former city employees and politicians who had lost 
their jobs and influence under the new government. The Dallas Dispatch 
observed that at one early political meeting called by an opposition group, 
forty-eight discharged policemen attended, as well as the former health of­
ficer and a former assistant district attorney.29 
The most formidable challenger emerging at this time appeared to be the 
Home Government Association (HGA). The core of that party seemed to 
include four civic organizations from South and Southwest Dallas. J. Elliot 
chaired its executive committee, which also included W. A. Riley, John G. 
Brubak, Bertha Swarthrort, and P. L. A. Jeffers.30 This group not only criti­
cized Edy's high salary but accused the city manager of being self-centered. 
Spokesmen for the HGA argued that Dallas should be managed by a Dal­
lasite and not some outsider. "Back in the W s ,  " HGA supporter Judge 
George Burgess recalled, "my grandfather stood in the city of Richmond 
and saw Federal troops enter. Some time later he had to take a bomb and run 
the carpetbaggers out of Virginia. At the same time," he continued, "those 
who proceeded us in Texas were attempting to run the carpetbaggers out of 
Texas. We stand here tonight, my friends, in the same situation. It is the in­
tention of the National [sic] City Managers Association to dominate the af­
fairs of every principal city of this country. Mr. Edy has spent a great deal of 
his time since he has been in Dallas attending to the affairs of the City Man­
ager Association." Reflecting the suspicion of other Dallasites, the judge 
concluded, "Government should come from the people and should rest in 
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the people. I don't want government from above; I want government from 
below. The only safe government is that which lies within easy reach of the 
people. If we do not have that we have tyranny. If this National [sic] City 
Managers Association is going to tell our council what to do I don't want 
any of this government. What I want is a council who will direct the City 
Manager [on] what to do and if that council will not tell him what to do, we 
will tell the council what to do."31 
The dismissal of John Edy and his replacement by a Dallas man became 
one of the main planks of the HGA's platform. According to the plank, Edy 
should be fired "because of his temperamental unfitness for the position, be­
cause he had destroyed the morale of the municipal employees, because of 
his selfishness in insisting on the maintenance of his own salary of 
$16,500 . . .  . while repeatedly cutting those of the rank and file." The plat­
form also attacked the city manager for his "dictatorial attitude toward the 
general public" and for his neglect of "the forgotten man while safeguarding 
the vested interests."32 The HGA slate included three Oak Cliff residents, a 
South Dallas investor, and the president of the Labor Council.33 
Unhappiness with Edy's war on vice apparently helps explain the HGA's 
formation. According to CCA president Carl Callaway, members of the 
HGA strongly opposed the city manager's strict law enforcement efforts. 
Callaway claimed that in July of 1933 a businessman visited him with a 
threat that Police Chief Trammel should ease up on his effort against orga­
nized gambling or some "big" businessmen would create an opposition 
council slate in the upcoming election. When Callaway refused to pressure 
the CCA-dominated council to respond to this request, the HGA ap-
peared.34 
Other Dallas citizens formed the Progressive Voters League (PVL) and 
ran candidates against the CCA. This organization also made Edy a central 
campaign issue. It accused him of "oversupervision of departments" and 
promised to replace the city manager if elected with someone "who is im­
bued with the Dallas spirit, breathes the Dallas atmosphere; someone who 
is in sympathy with our aspirations and has respect for our traditions." PVL 
councilmen would "melt the iceberg at Main and Commerce and Harwood 
and introduce the human element into the municipal government."35 
In addition to these two opposition slates, the Socialists ran seven candi­
dates, and former mayor J. Waddy Tate and two others sought office as inde­
pendents. Despite the crowded field of thirty-seven candidates, and despite 
the lack of endorsement by the Dallas Morning News, the CCA slate of eight 
incumbents and one newcomer won office without a runoff. The News's de­
fection from the CCA ticket resulted from Dealey's anger over the city man­
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ager's response to the levee district controversy, an issue that would continue 
to thwart the CCA's efforts to promote a new sense of consensus and unity 
in the city.36 
The CCA-controlled city government had inherited the controversial 
and unresolved issue about where the city's drainage sewer bonds, approved 
as part of the 1927 Ulrickson bond program, should be spent. As part of the 
agreement with the Levee Improvement District, the city had promised to 
provide $375,000 for protection of that area from excess drainage. Under 
this arrangement, city officials consented to build a pressure sewer main, the 
Pacific Avenue and Dallas branch, to keep the water of Mill Creek, east of 
City Park, from flowing into the reclaimed land. The city also pledged 
$175,000 for taking care of water accumulating in the hydraulic fill area of 
the reclaimed area. Finally, it agreed to control the flood waters of the Kids 
Springs and Coombs Creek branch.37 Tensions developed when the levee 
district demanded the city act immediately on all of these commitments de­
spite serious drainage needs found in some city neighborhoods. 
The Great Depression also caused problems. There had been grumbling 
about the city's role in the reclamation program since 1927, but a full-scale 
revolt broke out in 1930 as the Depression started to affect the city adversely. 
When Mayor Tate announced the tentative budget for Dallas that year and 
predicted that the city would have to raise taxes to pay for the debt service 
needed to complete a $1.1 million pressure sewer for the reclamation area, 
strong opposition developed. Protesters complained that government 
should be committed to retrenchment rather than a tax increase. Levee sup­
porters rallied to the mayor's defense and emphasized how important the 
city's drainage program was to the reclamation program's successful com­
pletion. After meeting with the levee district supervisors, Tate publicly reaf­
firmed his commitment to sell the bonds and raise taxes to service them. 
The mayor's decision to support the tax increase set off a protest move­
ment that helped delay completion of the levee project for more than fifteen 
years. A June 7th meeting drew a crowd of between 800 and 1000 protesters 
against the tax, including downtown theater owner Karl Hoblitzelle and 
Kessler Plan Association (KPA) president Dr. E. H. Cary. They applauded 
Rosser J. Coke, who charged that the reclamation project, a private under­
taking, deserved no public moneys. The protesters also created a commit­
tee to fight the tax increase and included Hoblitzelle and Cary in it. When 
John J. Simmons attempted to explain why the district needed the money 
immediately, the crowd walked out on him.38 
The insistence that more money be spent on the district irritated those 
who remembered that the $3.5 million drainage bond had been passed for 
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the city as a whole. The city suffered from horrible drainage problems and 
neighborhoods that flooded badly during rainy season, including the fash­
ionable Munger Place on the city's east side. In poorer sections, flood waters 
got so high that several residents had drowned.39 The protesters wondered 
why the city had designated the first bonds to protect the unpopulated levee 
district rather than the built-up sections of the city. Attorney J. Hart Willis 
asked when sewers would be provided for "those of us who live on Turtle 
Creek Boulevard in East Dallas and in other parts of the city [who] have suf­
fered for years from flooding."40 
In order to counter the charges of selfish interest, levee district supervi­
sors volunteered to provide the city with two gifts of land from the reclaimed 
Trinity River bottoms. First, they offered 3,300 acres between the levees and 
the river for a city park. Proposing that this could be the Central Park of Dal­
las, a levee district spokesman detailed how valuable such a park would be 
for the city's downtown workers. He also promised generous acreage for the 
city to develop a new airport next to the central business district. Dallas of­
ficials declined both offers, citing the high costs of upkeep involved in main­
taining the district's presents.41 
The levee district's actions had little impact on softening the charge of 
special interest from some critics. For instance, in an editorial entitled "Will 
the Taxpayers be Bluffed?" the Dallas Times Herald pointed out that the Ul­
rickson Committee had recommended that Dallas spend no sewer money 
until consulting engineers developed a citywide plan. Others, such as Dr. 
E. H. Cary, Karl Hoblitzelle, and KPA secretary John Surratt, also took up 
this theme and petitioned the city commissioners to consider all parts of the 
Ulrickson Plan, and work to be "done in all sections of Dallas." The immedi­
ate crisis passed in regard to the proposed tax hike, as the mayor and com­
missioners decided to fund service on the bonds through cutbacks in the city 
government. But the controversy over the propriety of providing bond 
money immediately to the levee district did not.42 
Several days after the commissioners' decision to sell the Ulrickson bonds 
for that year, Hoblitzelle, Surratt, and businessman Tom Bradford (who 
would eventually serve as mayor) met with others and formed the Dallas 
City and County Taxpayers League. That organization called for the "co­
ordinated development of Dallas" and stated that "we are not fighting de­
velopment of the levee district but are opposing the efforts to place that un­
dertaking paramount to other sections of Dallas."43 Many associated with 
the KPA, which had campaigned for the levee/reclamation plan as part of a 
broader, comprehensive package of improvements, now argued that city of­
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ficials had unfairly singled out the levee/reclamation program for special at­
tention while they ignored populated areas in South and East Dallas in des­
perate need of drainage sewers. According to this view, advocates of the 
levee seemed willing to sacrifice the needs of the larger city for their own spe­
cial interests. 
Supporters of the levee/reclamation project viewed the situation differ­
ently and countered that their undertaking benefited the city as a whole. 
W. L. Prehn, general manager of Southwestern Bell Telephone, took such a 
stance when he reminded Dallasites that the levee/reclamation project in­
cluded five new viaducts that would better connect Oak Cliff to the rest of 
the city, helping to bind "these two sections together," Prehn contended, so 
"as to eliminate any sectional or factional feeling." J. L. Lancaster, president 
of the Texas & Pacific Railroad, also supported the levee/reclamation proj­
ect and concluded that the "reclamation project is the most important devel­
opment in the city since its founding."44 George Dealey, the city's leading 
planning advocate, threw the weight of the News behind the levee/reclama-
tion project and lobbied incessantly with city officials on behalf of the 
project.45 
Bad feelings about the reclamation/levee project polarized the city. One 
side viewed the excessive preoccupation with it as damaging to the develop­
ment of the rest of Dallas, while levee supporters believed the project would 
accelerate the development of the entire city and accused levee opponents of 
harboring their own selfish agendas. Close friends and business associates 
split and "bitter and irreconcilable enmities developed" between longtime 
companions. The city's Critic Club, a forum where civic leaders discussed 
important civic issues, also suffered greatly from these tensions.46 
Hoblitzelle, Cary, and Surratt joined with Finance Commissioner John 
C. Harris to demand that the city develop a comprehensive plan for its 
drainage sewer system before spending more money on piecemeal develop­
ment. The Citizen Committee on Supervision of Expenditures of the Ulrick­
son Committee (CCSE) concurred. As a result, the local commissioners, led 
by independent-minded mayor J. Waddy Tate, secured an engineer to de­
velop such a plan. But the controversy continued when the commissioners 
refused to employ an engineer recommended by the KPA and the CCSE, and 
hired a less-qualified engineer to undertake the survey and plan.47 In addi­
tion, the city announced it would release some money for drainage sewers in 
the reclamation area before the engineer completed the sewer plan. This in­
furiated Karl Hoblitzelle, who secured a temporary injunction to halt that 
action.48 All this occurred at a time when civic leaders were also trying to 
86 • CHAPTER THREE 
restructure city government. Once the CCA achieved that goal, and saw its 
slate elected to council in 1931, officials had the levee problem immediately 
dumped in their laps.49 
The new city council and City Manager Edy proceeded cautiously but 
gradually antagonized the impatient levee district supporters. First, Edy 
named O. H. Koch as public works engineer for the city after his first choice, 
Major Edward Woods, declined the appointment. Koch had earlier been 
identified with the group fighting the actions of the levee district group. 
Next, concerned with getting the best sewer plan possible for the entire city, 
council employed W. W. Horner to develop a general plan for the drainage of 
the entire city.50 Horner, the chief engineer of sewers and paving at St. Louis, 
replaced the Benham Engineering Company, which had been hired to make 
the plan by the Tate administration. As we have seen, that had been a partic­
ularly controversial hiring, since Benham had little experience and had not 
been recommended by several leading civic organizations. Indeed, the Ben-
ham hiring had struck many as an embarrassment to the city's image. A 
spokesman for one of the recommended companies that did not get the job 
blasted the Tate administration as being dominated by "high-grade mo­
rons." He also observed that in his thirty years of business he had never "run 
into a city of the population of Dallas with such a low order of intelligence, 
integrity and standing of the city officials."51 
The highly recommended Horner, however, provided first-rate exper­
tise in the matter of drainage sewer systems. His finished plan recom­
mended eight new sewer lines, including one for the reclamation district's 
hydraulic fill area. He also proposed a sewer system for the reclamation 
area that would allow the district to close its levee walls, without the city 
having to build the expensive pressurized sewer for the reclaimed area. 
The city, then, finally had the comprehensive citywide sewer plan that had 
been called for by the Ulrickson program. New mayor Charles E. Turner 
greeted Horner's findings with the comment that the conflict had been re­
solved. Those wanting a more comprehensive plan and an orderly devel­
opment of the city's sewers had gotten their wish, while those who had pri­
oritized the reclamation project seemingly secured what they had wanted, 
a chance to start development in the salvaged Trinity River bottoms. Tur­
ner concluded that the plan would "benefit the entire city of Dallas and 
with the adoption of a definite policy of this sort, serving the entire com­
munity, there should be a new unity of thought and effort for the city's 
development."52 After council approved Horner's plan, the Times Herald 
editorialized that "the new city council demonstrated that its purpose is 
to promote the growth of Dallas as a whole, giving each section its fair 
The CCA in Control: The Edy Years, 1931-1935 • 87 
sense of bond money. Plainly its object is to prevent factional controversy 
and bring all groups into a unit in developing Greater Dallas."53 
The initial response from the levee district also seemed positive.54 How­
ever, Leslie A. Stemmons, bitter over what he saw as a reneging of the deal 
cut before the Depression, continued to push city officials to give the district 
everything it had promised in the original agreement immediately. He and 
other district supporters emphasized that the city had a moral obligation to 
fulfill its commitment of 1927, even if the Ulrickson report was just a recom­
mendation. But Horner, the developer of the drainage plan, pointed out the 
injustice of the city's providing thousands of dollars for sewer development 
in an unpopulated area while much of settled Dallas lacked adequate drain­
age facilities. KPA secretary John Surratt agreed and concluded that the Ul­
rickson report neither legally nor morally bound the city.55 
The Depression's continued impact on the city's budget further compli­
cated matters. Although the Ulrickson report had originally anticipated the 
selling of $3 million worth of bonds in 1932, Edy cut that to $1.2 because of 
lessening revenue. This created new tensions between residents from East 
and South Dallas and the levee district. The KPA, now speaking for those 
people rather than the west end interests, continued to protest about allot­
ting the bond money to the levee district. Surratt invited officers of various 
improvement leagues to his office and heard them explain the dire needs of 
their neighborhoods. South Dallas neighborhoods, for instance, had storm 
sewers that were constantly overflowing; some backed up to their bath­
rooms. Surratt agreed that these conditions needed top priority, since Ul­
rickson bond money was "supposed to take care of all of Dallas, and not just 
one set of people."56 The News, a vocal advocate of the levee district, re­
sponded by observing, "All city planning is based on intelligent self-
interest. . . . Coordination is the soul of planning; having withdrawn co­
operation, the city has to that extent abandoned city planning."57 
The demands of the levee district intensified after October 1,1931, when 
that body defaulted on its loans.58 Angered by this development and the 
city's unwillingness to build the drainage sewer in the reclaimed area im­
mediately, the district backed out of its agreement to the Horner plan, and 
John J. Simmons, one of the project's leaders, unsuccessfully sued the city for 
breach of contract.59 Although Simmons lost the suit, the city finally com­
pleted its commitment to the levee district in March 1934 when it advertised 
for bids for the final sewer commitment it had made. Builders completed the 
project by March of 1935.60 
Even though the CCA-supported city council and city manager eventu­
ally fulfilled the city's obligations, their cautious and slow effort thoroughly 
88 • CHAPTER THREE 
discredited them among many of the levee supporters. George Dealey re­
mained at odds with John Edy, whom he blamed for the long delay. Although 
Edy had identified the levee/sewer controversy as a political issue and thus a 
council matter, Dealey viewed it as an engineering problem, and thought the 
city manager should handle it.61 Leslie A. Stemmons, one of the organizers 
of the levee district as well as one of the city's most powerful men, blasted the 
city manager and his public works director. According to Stemmons, these 
men were "so prejudiced against the Levee District that they have declined 
to make proper investigations about matters submitted to them." Instead, 
they listened to "unfounded rumors." Stemmons concluded that Edy was "a 
man of insufficient experience in a city the size of Dallas," as well as a man 
of "small vision and high prejudices."62 
It is somewhat ironic that a form of government heavily criticized today 
for being a stooge of business and downtown interests made a stand for 
neighborhood services, comprehensive planning, and the city as a whole in 
regard to the levee controversy.63 Such support cost the CCA dearly in the 
next election and demonstrated the impossibility of having "nonpolitical" 
government. Politics—the method of deciding who gets what, when, and 
where—consumed the attention of CCA council members and underscored 
the idea that government had to do more than just promote efficient delivery 
of services; rather, it had to prioritize that delivery, a matter of great contro­
versy in the levee/reclamation matter.64 The CCA's cautious handling of the 
levee/reclamation controversy discredited it before powerful levee support­
ers and played a critical role in the defeat of that good government organiza­
tion in 1935. Another event, the state's centennial exposition, would also 
promote political controversy and raise issues that contributed to the 
CCA's defeat. 
The Defeat of the CCA and the Victory 
of Council-Manager Government 
Shortly after its successful city council campaign in 1933, the Citizens 
Charter Association's president, lawyer Carl B. Callaway, resigned. He fol­
lowed the precedent established by that organization's initial president, law­
yer Hugh Grady, who had quit after the first election victory two years ear­
lier. Callaway recommended that this tradition become part of the CCA's 
constitution to prevent the organization from becoming "a political ma­
chine or ever getting into the hands of a small group of men to use it for polit­
ical purposes or their own personal ends."1 Toward this goal, Callaway also 
requested that the membership designate a twelve-person nominating com­
mittee to select future slates of candidates. To guarantee that the CCA 
would remain truly representative, Callaway suggested that the organiza­
tion include six vice presidents, one from each of the city's districts. In addi­
tion, he wanted to expand the CCA's executive committee to 150 members 
and have each precinct in the city elect one male and one female to that gov­
erning body. Callaway also thought that the CCA should welcome "at all 
times representatives of any group or any section of our city or any class of 
our people who are not already properly represented on the committee."2 
The retiring president also believed that the CCA's executive committee 
should function between elections rather than just during city council cam­
paigns. According to Callaway, such a committee could work "diligently for 
the interests of all our people" and provide a contact between the mass of cit­
izens and elected representatives. He wanted the CCA to hold semiannual 
meetings to allow council to report to the membership. Finally, Callaway 
suggested that the group create a standing fifteen-member committee to act 
as a contact body between membership and city council.3 Callaway, then, 
proposed to create a different type of organization than that which had 
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initially been devised. Originally, reformers had established this good gov­
ernment group to secure the council-manager charter amendments. Then 
they worked to make sure the "right type of men" got elected in the first po­
litical contest under the new charter. Callaway proposed a more permanent 
organization to promote good citizenship as well as good government. If 
Dallas citizens could be educated to be good citizens—willing to support 
citywide needs—then the charter association would see its candidates 
elected on a regular basis. Good government reformers in Dallas clearly sup­
ported citizen participation as long as it was on their own terms. Although 
not all of Callaway's suggestions were heeded, he clearly articulated a vision 
that seemed consistent with an emphasis on the needs of the city as a whole. 
Despite some organizational innovations, the CCA faced tough competi­
tion for council in 1935. Dallas, like municipalities elsewhere, suffered from 
the Great Depression. Although its diversified economy spared it from the 
worst effects of that economic calamity, the city clearly felt the impact. By 
the end of 1931,18,500 unemployed men and women applied for relief at city 
hall. The caseload of the city's public welfare department increased from 
1,370 in October 1931 to 2,847 by March 1932. The city's retail sales plum­
meted from $189 million in 1929 to $130 million in 1935. Building permits 
declined by more than $3.5 million between 1930 and 1931.4 
In addition, the charter-dominated government's emphasis on efficiency 
and businesslike methods put off some Dallasites used to the old days, when 
officials ran government on a more casual basis. New regulations increased 
workers' accountability for their time. Under the council-manager charter 
amendments, the civil service board not only recruited and tested prospec­
tive city employees but also constantly rated them. The personnel director 
(also a new position under the amendments) oversaw the work force. During 
the first six months this office operated, the cost to the city of time lost to em­
ployee illness or injury dropped 30 percent.5 City employees forced to take a 
pay cut in 1935, ranging from 5 to 20 percent, complained about the new, 
more demanding system and its chief administrator. As we have noted ear­
lier, Edy fired many workers not willing to maintain his standards, including 
substantial numbers from the police and fire departments. 
Moreover, Edy saw himself as an administrator (rather than a politician) 
and acted like one. According to a longtime Dallas observer, newspaperman 
Sam Acheson, Edy "tended to suspect sinister purposes behind the open 
smile or warm handclasp of a visitor." Once when banker and former mayor 
Joe Lawther called on the city manager, Edy greeted him with "You are an 
old line politician with your hand out. What do you want?"6 His brusque 
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manner with Lawther and other business leaders, as well as his treatment of 
city workers, helped create strong political opposition in 1935. To many 
Dallasites, Edy's approach to governance appeared too harsh and imper­
sonal, and they called for a more humane government, responsive to individ­
ual needs as well as the city's needs. Few publicly argued with the desired 
goal of a more comprehensive approach to government, but many attacked 
the means used by Edy to achieve it. 
The city's civic and business leaders' new preoccupation with hosting the 
state's centennial celebration also spelled trouble for the CCA in 1935. Busi­
ness leaders like banker Robert L. Thornton committed so much energy to 
centennial planning that all other civic issues, including the 1935 city elec­
tions and the health of the CCA, paled in comparison. Civic leaders' time 
and money went to centennial exposition preparation.7 
Since 1923 Texans had discussed the idea of using their state's centennial 
to promote its economic attractiveness throughout the country, but state 
legislators did not act on the idea until February 27, 1934, more than four­
teen months after voters passed an amendment to the state constitution au­
thorizing Texas solons to provide funding for a major exposition. The bill 
legislators approved in February included a clause allowing the state centen­
nial committee to award the central exposition to the city offering the largest 
financial inducement and support, much to the chagrin of some who 
thought cities with historical ties to the Republic of Texas should get the ex-
position.8 Dallas leaders saw this as an unparalleled opportunity for the city 
and decided to bid for the opportunity to host it, despite Big D's lack of his­
torical identity. Led by the Chamber of Commerce president, banker Robert 
L. Thornton, the city started devising a plan to secure the exposition. On 
August 3, Dallas business and civic leaders unanimously adopted a report 
from the chamber's centennial committee, headed by banker Fred Florence, 
that outlined a strategy to secure the exposition. That report suggested that 
the city's private and public sectors offer $7-$8 million to host the celebra­
tion. The committee recommended that the city turn over the state fair­
grounds and its buildings, worth $4 million, for the centennial exposition. In 
addition it proposed that the business community provide $l-$2 million 
and asked city council to authorize a $2.5-$3 million bond package to im­
prove the grounds and surrounding streets. At that meeting, Thornton de­
clared that "the exposition offers Dallas its most important project during 
the last forty years." He reminded listeners how the Chicago Century of 
Progress Exposition had helped lift that city out of the Depression and pre­
dicted the same for Dallas.9 Civic leaders bubbled with enthusiasm not only 
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because of the immediate relief the exposition would bring to the city's econ­
omy but because of the publicity it would generate for Dallas and the 
Southwest. 
City officials greeted the opportunity to host the exposition with less 
zeal, however. The Dallas Morning News reported that "while business­
men, civic leaders and women's groups are lining up solidly behind the plan 
to secure the exposition for Dallas, the enthusiasm of city officials is not yet 
steamed up to the boiling point."10 The reason was simple—money. City of­
ficials feared that another multimillion-dollar bond package would inten­
sify the city's financial crisis. Dallas had experienced the fiscal crunch of the 
Depression ever since the CCA had assumed power. Charter officials had 
balanced the budget each year, but not without severe cutbacks. Besides lay­
ing off more than 10 percent of the work force, council had cut salaries of city 
employees an average of 12 percent.11 The proposed 1934-35 budget already 
appeared about $260,000 short of anticipated revenue, which meant the city 
faced either an increase in property tax or, as was finally settled on, a sewer 
tax to raise the extra money to provide debt service on the sanitary sewer 
bonds. When council passed this sewer tax on August 29, it faced a massive 
public protest condemning it as unfair and an undue hardship on the poor 
and working classes.12 Within this context, it is easy to understand local gov-
ernment's reluctance to board the centennial booster bandwagon. After in­
tense lobbying by the business community, local officials finally agreed to 
participate in the centennial proposal with a promise to authorize the bond 
package if state officials selected Dallas as the host centennial city. After the 
meeting, Mayor Turner joined the chorus of centennial supporters and 
called for a "United Dallas" to "get behind the bid for the Centennial."13 
On September 1, 1934, Dallas, along with San Antonio and Houston, 
submitted bids for the centennial exposition. Several days later Robert L. 
Thornton met with the state centennial committee, headed by Dallasite Cul­
len F. Thomas. Thornton suggested that the centennial should point to the 
future as much as retell the past, with particular emphasis on the state's 
progress. Thornton also promised his city would carry out an exposition 
even without state and federal aid. Only Dallas made such a commitment. 
By all accounts, Thornton gave an impressive and forceful presentation. The 
commission made its decision on Sunday, September 9, awarding Dallas 
the exposition.14 
The announcement initiated a citywide celebration and the anticipation 
of the event's impact for the city. According to the News, the centennial ex­
position would "set off a modern renaissance for the city." Not only did the 
exposition promise the future of economic recovery and prosperity, but the 
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victory gave an enormous boost of pride to a city that had seen itself steadily 
losing ground to Houston now that city had completed its ship channel. In 
an editorial on September 12, entitled "Dallas Is Itself Again," the News de­
clared, "Old Man Depression and his brother, Gloom, have had their in­
nings in Dallas and they are out!" It went on to observe how the energetic 
efforts of civic leaders to secure the centennial had helped reunite the busi­
ness community. "The lasting benefits [of the exposition]," the News con­
cluded, "will be in the intangibles—the spirit of unity, of hearty cooperation 
and of invincible confidence in the great future."15 
With the prodding of the newspapers and the city's civic leadership, Dal­
las voters lent their support to the centennial in an overwhelming fashion. 
On October 31,1934, in the midst of the depression, Dallas property owners 
passed a $3 million bond issue by a vote of 5,520 to 1,088. All sixty precincts 
voted for the bonds in what the News reported as the "largest majority ever 
cast for a bond issue in the history of Dallas." Now city officials could im­
prove Fair Park, the sight of the centennial exposition, and improve the thor­
oughfares leading to it.16 
That successful bond campaign, as well as the larger program of exposi­
tion planning, completely occupied the city's business leadership. Charles F. 
O'Donnell, president of Southwestern Life Insurance Company, chaired the 
Centennial Fair Park bond committee while leading bankers Fred Florence, 
Robert L. Thornton, and Nathan Adams played critical roles on the Dallas 
Centennial's executive committee. After the bond election, these men incor­
porated the Texas Centennial Central Exposition and issued $2 million in 
bonds for public sale in denominations of $100, $500, or $1,000. When inves­
tors came up with only $1.8 million, twenty-eight leading businessmen met 
at the First National Bank and underwrote additional fair expenses to the 
sum of $650,000. And when the state stalled in providing its own aid to the 
centennial, local leaders agreed to proceed, even though voters at the bond 
election had been given the impression that local action would be taken only 
after the state had provided funds.17 A pamphlet on the "New Plan for Hold­
ing the Texas Centennial Central Exposition" explained that "with or with­
out State or National assistance the 'Spirit of Dallas' is undaunted, and Dal­
las will present to the world a Texas Centennial Central Exposition of which 
we, and all Texans, may justly be proud."18 
Thornton and other civic leaders' great enthusiasm for the centennial re­
flects their understanding of this as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for Dal­
las. Not only would it revive the real estate market and solve the unemploy­
ment problem, but in generating nationwide publicity it would lure new 
industries and residents to the city. Thornton articulated the prevailing idea 
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of good citizenship and the public interest when he spoke on the need for full 
citizen support of the centennial. "For if we stand united on general matters 
affecting the city," Thornton predicted, "we can accomplish a reality that 
will well record the efforts of those who live today and leave a heritage for 
those who will live tomorrow."19 In a later guest editorial for the News, 
Thornton reiterated his theme of civic unity. "The time has come," he 
warned, "when petty jealousies, sectional bickering, and personal differ­
ences must be cast aside by all Dallas citizens for the common good of the 
city." After predicting that eight million people would attend the centennial, 
Thornton declared that "we must convince these visitors that Dallas is the 
leading city of the Southwest—that is our task."20 
City hall sacrificed for the cause by allowing one of its most prestigious 
members to work for the centennial. In 1935, before the municipal elections, 
centennial officials hired Mayor Charles E. Turner at a $12,000 salary as fi­
nance officer and special events director of the Texas Centennial Exposition. 
Turner, a prominent realtor, had served as part of the CCA's original city 
council slate. Because of these new responsibilities, Turner declined to run 
for reelection in 1935, depriving the CCA slate of a popular vote-getter.21 
The combination of the preoccupation with the centennial and Edy's de­
clining popularity helps explain the defeat of the Citizens Charter Associa­
tion in 1935.22 On February 24, the News announced that the Citizens Civic 
Association, a group organized in January would field a full slate against the 
Charter Association. That association owed its existence to Joe Lawther, 
Tony Brignardello, and Jim Dan Sullivan. The latter had served on J. Waddy 
Tate's park board and continued for two years on the charter park board be­
fore clashing with the city manager over the independent park board's selec­
tion of workers. An immensely popular man, the "Wild Irish Rose" ran un­
successfully against the CCA slate in 1933 and then played a prominent role 
in developing a secretive political group. According to the News, Sullivan 
had worked for nearly two years to get rid of Edy. Dislike for City Manager 
Edy also seemed to be the major factor behind Lawther's involvement in 
this movement.23 
CCA opponents first called themselves "The Organization." According 
to one source, "A group of leaders with a taste for ritualistic organization 
and a hankering for political influence" headed this new political body.24 
One of them had been a leader of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s and another 
the leader of the Home Government Association, which had run against the 
CCA in 1933. Discharged city employees, men accustomed to working in 
political organizations for their jobs, made up the association's nucleus. 
This group particularly targeted the working-class people of South Dallas 
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and blue-collar Oak Cliff for support and reached out to members of ritual­
istic organizations like the Elks and Odd Fellows. It collected dues from its 
members and organized a captain for each precinct and a lieutenant for each 
block, building up its membership to several thousand. In its effort to secure 
funds to compete successfully with the CCA, "The Organization" willingly 
took campaign donations from all sources, including those sympathetic to 
gambling and the utilities. When a less than sympathetic Dallasite exposed 
the group and labeled its members "catfish" who lived out of sight in the 
mud, the name stuck, and The Organization became known as the Catfish 
Club.25 
Although Catfish leaders desperately wanted power, they realized that 
many Dallasites agreed with the nonpolitical rhetoric of the CCA and its 
emphasis on businesslike government for the city as a whole. They also 
understood that their group needed to appeal to the city's middle-class con­
stituency, who seemed to have accepted these notions about local govern­
ment. As a result, Catfish leaders created their own businessmen-led civic 
group, the Citizens Civic Association, and publicly supported the council-
manager government and its emphasis on efficient and nonpartisan govern­
ment. Earl W. Cullum, Oak Lawn grocer, headed the executive committee 
of the Citizens Civic Association.26 On February 7th, that committee an­
nounced that it had appointed Hal Mosely as campaign manager. Mosely 
represented both worlds of Dallas politics. This Texas A&M University 
engineer had participated in city government since 1915, when he served a 
two-year term as city engineer. In 1919, while he was still stationed in 
France, Dallas citizens elected him commissioner of streets and public prop­
erty. During the 1920s, he sat on the City Plan Commission before retiring to 
go into private practice. But he also was a frustrated office-seeker, having 
been rejected by Edy when he applied for the position of director of public 
works in 1931.27 
Not only did the Catfish Club select a respected civic leader for its cam­
paign head, but it provided a solid gallery of candidates for council, with 
three lawyers, including George Sergeant, former chief justice of the Texas 
Court of Civil Appeals. In addition, the Civic slate nominated two insurance 
men, Cleve Reach and D. R. Graham. Graham had been recording secretary 
for the Baptist General Convention of Texas prior to entering the insurance 
business. Other candidates included an Oak Cliff businessman with exten­
sive real estate holdings, a grocer and president of the State Retail Grocers' 
Association, a packing-plant owner, and the general manager of the Dallas 
Waste Mills. Writing about those candidates in 1939, the Committee on 
Public Administration concluded that although they did not compare in 
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prominence and prestige to the "business leaders . .  . on the council from 
1931 to 1935," they nevertheless were "substantial citizens, prominent in 
church, lodge, and service club activities, and could by no stretch of the 
imagination be called either 'political' or proletarian."28 
The Civic Association's platform called for a Dallas man for city man­
ager, repeal of the sewer tax, and a commitment to keep the centennial cele­
bration out of politics. It also supported the retention of council-manager 
government and called for the courteous treatment of citizens and the exclu­
sion of "foreign" experts. Finally, it promised adequate provision for 
schools, better maintenance of the streets, fair property assessment, and 
more-efficient garbage pickup.29 
The CCA organized its slate about the same time. The February 22 issue 
of the News announced that the executive committee of the CCA had se­
lected its candidates. According to the News, the CCA had taken that action 
with little discussion. Only T S. McBride voted against the slate, saying he 
felt the committee needed more time to examine prospective nominees.30 
Three other incumbents besides Mayor Turner refused to run for reelection 
to the time-consuming council. The new charter council ticket included 
three lawyers, a civil engineer, a salesman, a cotton-seed businessman, and 
the president of Cox-Moore Drug Company. The two most prestigious can­
didates, both incumbents, were M. J. Norrell, president of the Texas Bank 
and Trust Company and former executive of the Chamber of Commerce, 
and W. A. Webb, vice president and general manager of the Katy Railroad.31 
As in 1933, the News, which had initiated the council-manager move­
ment, failed to endorse CCA candidates, even though that slate was most as­
sociated with good government. Once again this decision clearly reflected 
George Dealey's unhappiness with City Manager John Edy and the CCA 
council that had appointed him. Even though the city had completed the 
sewers for the levee district, Dealey's strong personal dislike for Edy most 
likely influenced his decision to have the News avoid endorsing the CCA 
slate. That paper did not support candidates from any ticket, even though 
several of the paper's leading reporters urged Dealey to rally behind the 
CCA. Nor did Dealey contribute money to the good government group, de­
spite the pleadings of powerful retailer Herbert Marcus.32 Even the efforts of 
CCA president Dr. W. D. Jones failed to change Dealey's mind. At one point 
Jones threatened to put the News on the spot by bringing in a committee of 
merchants who advertised extensively in the paper to pressure him. Jones 
also warned that if the News refused to support the CCA he would an­
nounce that the News had an alliance with the levee district, strong backers 
of the Civic ticket." 
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The lack of endorsement did not mean, however, that the News withheld 
an opinion about the meaning of the election. On election eve, the News edi­
torialized that one issue dominated the election. "If Dallas is satisfied with 
the present administration of City Manager John Edy it should vote for the 
Citizens Association slate. If Dallas is dissatisfied with Edy and the old 
council," the News concluded, "change is assured by electing the Civic As-
sociation."34 
The Civic Association also made Edy the major issue in the campaign. At 
its initial rally, held at the city's Technical High School, Civic Association 
leaders called for a "Texas" city manager for Dallas. Frank Holliday en­
dorsed the Civic slate so the city could hire a city manager "who would bow 
his head at the name of Sam Houston and carry on for Dallas during the 
Texas Centennial."35 Not only was Edy an outsider, according to the Civic 
Association, but he completely dominated council and set the agenda. 
Council's closed-door executive sessions, something not endorsed by the 
National Municipal League, helped perpetuate such a perception. These 
meetings allowed council members to air their differences and resolve issues 
away from public scrutiny, so that when they met in formal session much 
business could be conducted with minimum debate or discussion. For some, 
the city's legislative body appeared nothing more than a rubber stamp for 
the city manager. Civic candidate Cleve Reach made such a charge during 
the campaign and complained that council had submerged its identity to its 
hired man. Others disputed that Edy had really achieved all the success the 
CCA claimed. For instance, opponents charged that Edy had manipulated 
the city's financial records to cover up $900,000 that had been added to the 
overdraft. Civic Association campaigners also accused Edy of depriving the 
public schools of much-needed revenue. Indeed, Civic Association workers 
warned forty Dallas teachers to expect a 10 percent pay cut if the CCA slate 
won the election.36 The Civic Association also attacked the city's practice of 
employing experts from other cities. Civic candidate George Sprague ridi­
culed Edy's decision to pay St. Louis engineer W. W. Horner $60,000 to de­
velop a sewer system for the city.37 
Throughout the campaign the Civic Association portrayed the CCA and 
Edy as insensitive to the people's needs, undemocratic, and very much en­
gaged in politics. One Civic supporter suggested that the CCA resembled 
"the well-oiled workings of a political machine operated and dominated by 
professional politicians." Civic leaders attacked Edy's decision to cut taxes 
15 percent prior to the 1933 election as politically motivated. They accused 
Edy of appointing prominent CCA members to important city posts as pay­
back for their support. A Civic spokesman insisted that the current CCA 
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slate had been handpicked by City Manager Edy, campaign manager John 
Erhard, and an unnamed Republican woman. Council candidate J. Willis 
Gunn chided the CCA's administration for its "policy of concealment and 
evasion." Another council candidate, Emil Corenbleth, ridiculed his Char­
ter opponents for being arrogant and "over educated fools." Corenbleth 
questioned the idea that the CCA worked for the city as a whole, claiming 
that under their rule South Dallas had become a "forgotten land." Further­
more, he blamed Columbia University—educated City Attorney Hugh 
Grady and one of the founders of the CCA for holding up the state legisla-
ture's passage of the centennial bill to help Dallas finance the centennial ex­
position. According to Corenbleth, the spat-attired Grady antagonized 
many legislators with his lobbying efforts.38 As one might suspect, such ap­
peals stirred the working-class voters of Oak Cliff and South Dallas. So did 
the attack on the so-called sewer tax. 
Public antagonism to the recently approved sewer tax proved a challenge 
to the CCA's reelection. As we have seen, council approved the tax to avoid 
raising property taxes necessary to finance the debt service on some sanitary 
sewer bonds. The act created an enormous amount of protest and anger— 
particularly from the working-class communities.39 Council passed the act 
on August 29 without public hearings or even without giving the city attor­
ney time to look over the proposed ordinance. That law created such an up­
roar that citizens poured into city hall for a September 5 council meeting, 
where they protested the tax for one and a half hours. Two weeks later, un­
happy citizens returned to the council chambers and flayed the tax once 
again in what the News reported as "probably the noisiest experience since 
the council-manager government came into power." When former Dallas 
County district attorney Shelby Cox, CCA's spokesman, commented in fa­
vor of the tax, "pandemonium almost broke loose," according to the News. 
Sewer-tax opponent R. C. Travers berated Cox, saying, "You do not repre­
sent the poor people." Despite these protests, council retained the tax.40 The 
sewer tax issue would haunt the CCA throughout the campaign. 
The Charter Association ran a campaign emphasizing its accomplish­
ments and attacking the Civic Association as fronting for "old time, dis­
gruntled politicians who wish to regain control of the city again." Shelby 
Cox concluded that a group of "discharged, disgruntled and disgraced city 
employees" provided the real force behind the opposition slate. Moreover, 
CCA supporters argued that vice lords led the fight against their candi­
dates because of their strong law-and-order record. But it appears that 
more than the city's criminal element opposed the CCA for its strict law 
enforcement. According to one observer, a number of businessmen were 
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fearful that Edy's desire to make Dallas a "bluenose town" would work 
against its success in hosting the centennial exposition.41 
CCA supporters saw the centennial issue differently. According to Mayor 
Charles E. Turner, if the CCA lost the election the Texas Centennial Exposi­
tion would "fold up and make Dallas the laughing stock of the nation." 
CCA supporter Judge R. B. Allen repeated a similar theme when he warned, 
"Upon the eve of our great Centennial, any change in our present city gov­
ernment would prove unfortunate, and it might even prove disastrous."42 
As the election drew near, the News anticipated a record voter turnout to 
select a government that would "plot Dallas through probably the most im­
portant two years of its history."43 It appeared to be a close contest, with 
many expecting a split council in what the News termed "one of the most 
vigorously contested political campaigns in the city's annals." The Civic As­
sociation had strong support in the working-class neighborhoods of South 
Dallas and Oak Cliff, and a heavy turnout from that area would truly 
threaten the CCA's reelection chance. 
Two situations within the city during the election may have encouraged 
that strong turnout. First, the city was in the midst of a garment workers 
strike. The International Ladies Garment Workers sent an organizer to Dal­
las in November 1934 to help unionize the nearly 1,000 dressmakers at the 
city's fifteen garment factories. By late January 1935, the union had 400 
members and started pressuring the dress manufacturers to increase wages 
and reduce hours. When this did not occur, the women struck in early Febru­
ary. Factories attempted to break the strike by importing "scabs," while the 
Dallas police responded with brutal tactics against the strikers in support of 
a local industry that had routinely ignored or circumvented NRA codes. 
During the city's political campaign, Dallas papers printed detailed descrip­
tions of picket-line skirmishes, the refusal of the garment factories to negoti­
ate, and the jailing of the women strikers. The business community made no 
effort to intervene and mediate the differences between the exploited work­
ers and their bosses. Such indifference might have made some Dallas work­
ers question the kind of government promoted by the business-associated 
CCA.44 
In addition to the garment strike, the city experienced on March 17 a 
"strike" by workers on government relief. Protesting the wage cuts imple­
mented on March 1, several hundred relief workers led by local socialist Carl 
Brannin occupied the city hall auditorium and refused to move until officials 
met their demands. This created havoc because it forced officials to cancel a 
variety of meetings (including political rallies) scheduled for the city-rented 
auditorium. Both the garment and the relief strike may have helped explain 
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the increased turnout from the blue collar precincts in the 1935 election—a 
turnout that appeared critical in determining that election's outcome. Not 
everyone seemed anxious to support a government bent on business effi­
ciency and nonpolitical action, or at least not as the CCA interpreted it.45 
To the surprise of many, voters swept the upstart Civic Association to vic­
tory in all nine council seats. Place 9 Civic Association candidate George 
Sergeant won most impressively, securing 58 percent of the votes against in­
cumbent Alex Camp. Meanwhile, Civic Association candidate for place 5, 
Cleve Reach, just squeaked by M. J. Norrell with a 51 percent majority. Vot­
ing patterns suggest two reasons for this Civic Association victory. First, as 
expected, the precincts associated with the city's working and poorer classes 
saw an increase in voting strength of more than 2,300 votes than had been 
cast in 1933. As a result, the Civic Association picked up 2,300 votes that 
were not there in 1933. At the same time, the middle- and upper-class neigh­
borhoods of East and North Dallas experienced an increased turnout of a 
little more than 1,800. Even more important, those sections did not view this 
election as like earlier ones between those supporting the charter and those 
opposing it. The campaign focused on more specific issues—such as Edyism 
and the sewer tax. As a result the traditional Charter stronghold districts did 
not vote for Charter candidates in the same strength they had in the 1933 
election. That year Charter candidates had pulled 7,680 votes from the 
twenty-seven precincts of middle- and upper-class homes. Two years later 
the CCA garnered only 6,727 votes and actually lost thirteen precincts in 
residential districts that in the previous election had given the CCA 65 per­
cent of its votes.46 
Following the election the News described the campaign as "one of the 
most peculiar ever seen in Dallas because the opposition . . . kept its move­
ments closed in secrecy for the most part. Only in the last week did fireworks 
begin."47 It also reported that several days after the election, CCA executive 
committee members held a stormy meeting where they debated the reasons 
the good government organization had lost. They also developed new strat­
egies for the future, including a recommendation to establish a full-time mu­
nicipal research bureau to keep people informed about their government.48 
Victorious Civic Association councilmen acted quickly after the election 
and selected Hal Mosely to replace "retiring" city manager John Edy.49 
Mosely, the Civic Association's campaign manager, had wanted to be city 
manager for several years. He had joined the International City Managers' 
Association in 1930 and had taken a correspondence course in municipal fi­
nance from Syracuse University. Although he was a much more political be­
ing than Edy, he refused to take orders from the Catfish Club and appointed 
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his own men to key positions—men qualified by their experience rather 
than their political friendships.50 This was particularly the case when he se­
lected his new police chief, rather than appointing Catfish choice E. J. Rail-
ton. By November tension between Mosely and the Catfish Club, and frag­
mentation among the city council, resulted in a failed effort to fire Mosely by 
a vote of 5 to 4. The next month the Catfish Club initiated a petition cam­
paign to recall thefive councilmen who supported Mosely, but that too came 
up short.51 
The new city council did follow through on some of its campaign prom­
ises after taking office on May 1. After electing Sergeant mayor, it cut salaries 
of the "big boys," including the city manager. It offered Mosely a $10,000 
yearly salary, $6,500 less than Edy's original pay. Other positions such as the 
city attorney and the city secretary saw their salaries reduced too. In another 
populist move, the Civic Association leaders announced that they would 
hold fireside chats on the city's municipally owned radio station and offer 
town meetings throughout the city "to bring government to the people" and 
not make them "feel like strangers in the city hall like they have been feel­
ing." Finally, the new council rescinded the sewer tax, although it raised 
water rates to compensate for the lost revenue.52 
Except for these acts, the new council showed remarkable consistency 
with the earlier CCA ones. It worked closely with business-civic leaders who 
promoted the centennial to assure the city would be attractive and safe for 
fair visitors. The city added forty-one policemen, thirty-six firemen, and six 
health inspectors specifically for the fair. Such actions cost Big D more than 
$73,000 beyond the money needed to service the $2 million bond issue.53 Re­
sponding to a March 1 News editorial calling Dallas a wide-open town, city 
officials also launched a crackdown on gambling, with special emphasis on 
removing slot machines, pinball games, and pool tables. According to 
Mayor Sergeant, Dallas would not be a wide-open town for the exposition. 
Several days later the News reported the success of that promise. Police 
Chief R. L. Jones called the campaign "one of the most thorough gambling 
and vice drives in the city's history."54 A variety of civic groups also formed 
to help close the town, including the Dallas Council of Church Men and the 
Good Government League.55 
Even before the antivice campaign, the new council had done enough to 
alienate its old ally, the Catfish Club. The secretive group proposed massive 
charter changes including a salaried mayor with veto power and a district-
elected council. In addition, its revisions had the new council playing a more 
central role in making appointments. According to its sponsor, Jim Dan 
Sullivan, such change would "bring government closer to the people." Oth­
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ers viewed this as a direct attack on the council-manager government.56 Of­
fering a generally positive assessment of council after its first year in office, 
the News noted that despite the intent of the council-manager government 
"the council finds it is in politics." Like its predecessor, too, the News con­
tinued, "It has learned that Dallas has not discerned the difference between 
council-manager government and aldermanic government."57 
The Catfish Club proved unsuccessful in its effort to alter the charter and 
gradually disintegrated. In a News report on June 28,1936, one of its lead­
ers, E. J. Railton, claimed "the Catfish Cub is dead."58 Meanwhile, the city 
council it had helped elect was anything but dead. City officials worked 
smoothly with the centennial exposition committee in carrying out the cen­
tennial celebration. Although the exposition fell short of the expected atten­
dance figure of ten million, the News reported, under the headlines "Cen­
tennial Launches Dallas's Greatest Era," "The consensus of opinions 
among businessmen generally is that the city has made more history and 
more progress in the last six months than in all its previous existence."59 
Council initiated a number of other improvements, including opening up 
Field Street in the western district of downtown Dallas. Despite the fact that 
such a project had been called for since the Kessler Plan of 1911, it had been 
neglected, in part because some thought it promoted growth northward at 
the expense of East Dallas. Even after voters approved bonds for it as part of 
the Ulrickson bond package, the Field Street opening languished because of 
this opposition.60 Although criticism persisted, council pushed ahead and 
approved the controversial project. Soon after, the city's business commu­
nity held a testimonial to honor council members for this and other actions. 
Principal speakers included bankers Joe E. Lawther and Robert L. Thorn­
ton, along with L. B. Denning.61 More than 1,000 people attended to honor 
council and to revive the Old Dallas Spirit, according to toastmaster 
Lawther. Thornton, the city's leading civic figure, praised council, pointing 
out, "This administration has been courageous enough to be progressive 
and prudent enough to be conservative."62 It appeared that council-manager 
government, even without the CCA in office, had demonstrated its worth to 
this progrowth, booster-oriented city. 
Even though newspapers and civic leaders applauded the actions of coun­
cil, it faced four different slates of candidates in the 1937 city election. The 
Utility Rate Reduction League, which had tangled with city council over the 
telephone franchise a year earlier, announced a full slate of candidates dedi­
cated to lower utility rates and the increased taxation of the telephone, gas, 
and electric companies. The All-Dallas Ticket, which secured an endorse­
ment from organized labor, ran an antivice campaign and had the distinc­
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tion of nominating the only woman candidate. It also called for fair ap­
praisal of real estate and more city jobs for Dallas workers. The Dallas 
Democratic Association pitched its campaign to the working-class sectors 
of Dallas and called for the abolition of the council-manager form of gov-
ernment.63 
But the Citizens Charter Association and the Forward Dallas "parties" 
played the most important role in the 1937 election. The Forward Dallas 
party traced its lineage back to the Legion of Honor political faction. That 
group included a number of politicians associated with the Catfish Club in­
cluding Tony Brignardello and E. J. Railton. After a postcard survey of se­
lected voters, the Legion endorsed the current council for reelection but also 
supported the replacement of Mosely as city manager. Even though it is not 
entirely clear, the relationship between the Legion and Forward Dallas ap­
peared similar to that between the Catfish Club and the Citizens Civic Asso­
ciation in 1935.64 
The CCA also fielded a slate, but not without some difficulty. The pro­
moters of nonpartisan council-manager government had a problem. The in­
cumbent council, although originally nominated by the partisan Catfish 
Club, had been impressively nonpartisan. And it had conducted local gov­
ernment in a very efficient and effective way. The CCA executive committee, 
headed by new president O. D. Brundage and vice president J. J. Collier, de­
cided to support a slate of candidates anyway. Taking more time than usual, 
the CCA announced that it would support four incumbents for reelection: 
Sergeant, Brinker, Corenbleth, and Gunn. The CCA endorsed these men, a 
spokesman explained, because it believed in overlapping terms for council.65 
Problems developed, however, when the CCA announced that it ex­
pected the four incumbents to endorse the rest of its slate. Corenbleth and 
Gunn declined, citing their unwillingness to support men who would run 
against their present colleagues. Indeed, the CCA had a hard time securing 
candidates to run against the well-liked incumbents. Throughout the early 
stages of the campaign, newspaper articles suggested the Charterites and 
the Legion might combine their efforts. Another report concluded, "Because 
of the trouble the Charter Association is having with its ticket. . . the orga­
nization was dangerously near breakup." Indeed, several of its executive 
committee members quit and joined the Utility League's campaign. Al­
though the Legion of Honor claimed it would back all nine incumbent coun­
cilman, it eventually decided not to endorse the two CCA nominees, Ser­
geant and Gunn, and nominated two other candidates in their place.66 
During the days preceding the election, CCA candidates made the city's 
continued vice problem a major campaign issue and promised to close the 
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city if they were elected. Although the incumbent council had successfully 
addressed this issue prior to the centennial, it changed its tone after nearby 
Fort Worth opened its Frontier Centennial celebration to compete with the 
Dallas Exposition. In an effort to lure Dallas visitors thirty miles west, Fort 
Worth offered massive entertainment and a wide-open town. To combat 
Fort Worth's appeal, city council, meeting without Mayor Sergeant's knowl­
edge, agreed to open up Dallas too. Prostitution, gambling, and after-hour 
drinking flourished under the new policy.67 That situation angered the 
strong religious community in the city and increased the activities of several 
antivice groups. The Good Government League, one such organization, 
held a major rally the Saturday before the city election and invited Mayor 
Sergeant to attend. Dr. Graham Frank, head of the Dallas Pastors' Associa­
tion, spoke, as did Major W. G. Gilks, head of the Salvation Army, and Rev. 
Frank C. Brown, pastor of the city's large and influential First Presbyterian 
Church. The Cleaner Dallas League, another antivice organization that en­
dorsed CCA candidates, held a parade of Sunday School children during the 
last week of the campaign to promote better law enforcement. Area pastors 
conveniently preached about the city's vice problem the Sunday before the 
election.68 
The CCA also tried to educate Dallasites about the differing slates. CCA 
spokespersons reminded voters that "members of the Charter Association 
are business and professional men and women who have no selfish interests, 
no political axes to grind, no friends to reward nor enemies to punish." Such 
statements implicitly suggested that the chief rival, the Forward Dallas 
ticket, had support from the very political Legion of Honor, bent on remov­
ing City Manager Mosely and interested in keeping Dallas an open town. 
Hugh Grady argued that council-manager government had been subverted 
under current council's rule by political factions, making it a "mere clerk­
ship" with party leaders attempting to dictate appointees. CCA candidate 
Sergeant promised that the election of the CCA slate guaranteed a more har­
monious council than the city had experienced the last two years. Sergeant, 
who had kept a journal during those years, emphasized the turmoil of coun­
cil, particularly in the first year when Catfish Club spokesmen had lobbied 
hard for their agenda—including specified appointments and a new city 
manager.69 For the CCA, then, a government sympathetic to the priorities of 
the city's business leadership was not enough. Rather, government needed 
to be nonpolitical and willing to address the city as a whole. 
The News apparently agreed and threw its support to the Citizens Char­
ter Association. Although it acknowledged the high quality of some opposi­
tion candidates, it concluded that the CCA offered the most able and quali­
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fied candidates to carry out a "simple program of efficiency, economy and 
enforcement." The newspaper also believed that the CCA slate held to the 
civic principles favored by the News. Finally, News editorials applauded 
CCA candidates' support of a "closed" city. One observed that "most of 
Dallas desires with this newspaper a moral city, outlawing the professional 
gambler, the 'bookie' and the street walker, a city that shields its growing 
youth from the insidious line of the slot machine, the marble board and the 
open saloon."70 This was from a newspaper that had praised the incumbent 
council's performance in January. 
Realizing it was in for a fight, Forward Dallas turned to the city's black 
community for support. Blacks traditionally had played a minor role in local 
politics, as they had in the state. However, under the leadership of Rev. May­
nard H. Jackson, Sr., pastor of the New Hope Baptist Church, and A. Maceo 
Smith, a recent arrival to Dallas, African Americans organized themselves 
into the Progressive Voters League (PVL). Jackson, whose son would later 
become mayor of Atlanta, emerged as one of Dallas's leading African Amer­
ican citizens in the 1920s. His involvement with the powerful Interdenomi­
national Ministerial Alliance, an organization of the city's most prominent 
African American clergy, made him a logical choice to lead the PVL and 
unite the city's blacks into a solid voting block. Smith, newly appointed ex­
ecutive secretary of the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce, also played a 
critical role in this group that was established to help Dallas blacks become 
more involved in state and local politics. A native of Texarkana, Texas, 
Smith held an undergraduate degree from Fisk University and a master's in 
business administration from New York University. He started the Harlem 
Home Journal while in New York City but returned to Texarkana in 1929, 
where he began to organize the Negro Business League in the South. He 
moved to Dallas in 1933 and soon became executive secretary of the Dallas 
Negro Chamber of Commerce, which hired him to rejuvenate the organiza­
tion. Smith also helped create the Progressive Citizens League in 1934 to en­
courage Dallas blacks to participate more in local elections.71 
The event that motivated Jackson and Smith to form a more permanent 
and powerful organization occurred as a result of a special election in 1935 
to replace state representative Sarah T. Hughes, who resigned her seat to 
serve as district judge. Although state law barred blacks from participating 
in the Democratic primary, special elections had no primary, so blacks could 
vote. Sixty candidates ran for the office, including the African American at­
torney Ammon S. Wells, former Dallas N A ACP president. Wells lost by only 
859 votes. This experience suggested that if more blacks had cast ballots, 
Wells might have actually been able to win. The enthusiasm generated by the 
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special election in 1935 led to the formation of the PVL. Working with the 
Dallas Interdenominational Ministers' Alliance and the Negro Chamber of 
Commerce, the Progressive Voters League became very active in city council 
elections. Preparing for the 1937 city election, PVL supporters canvassed 
black neighborhoods and visited clubs and associations to encourage blacks 
to pay their $1.75 poll tax. The effort proved successful as 7,000 citizens did 
just that, more than four times as many as had done so in 1934. That number 
made up one-sixth of registered voters in Dallas. Not only would blacks vote 
for city councilmen in the upcoming election, but they also would partici­
pate in the school bond election, which included money for a new black high 
school in South Dallas.72 The city desperately needed that school because 
students overcrowded its current one, Booker T Washington High School, 
so badly that the board of education had forced students to attend in dou­
ble sessions for the last five years. Even then students shared thirty-inch 
desks. 
Black mobilization had a significant impact on the outcome of the 1937 
election. At a late March meeting, the PVL voted 106 to 0 to support the For­
ward Dallas association slate. It did this partly to reward the accomplish­
ments of the present council, which had authorized the bond package for a 
black high school, and had spread gravel on several streets in black neigh­
borhoods in addition to placing fifty-eight street lights in black districts. But 
the PVL also endorsed the Forward Dallas slate because it pledged to hire 
black policemen, provide more parks, open up additional city jobs, and help 
promote better housing and slum clearance.73 
That support allowed the Forward Dallas ticket to win five of the nine 
council seats in a runoff election with the CCA. Despite its strong support 
from the News, and its identification with good government, the CCA saw 
only two nonincumbents win. Indeed, Dallas voters returned seven of the 
nine council members already serving. Ridding the city of vice, the major is­
sue, according to the CCA, failed to win the good government group the 
type of support it had anticipated. For blacks, acknowledged by both orga­
nizations as a major factor in the election, better neighborhood infrastruc­
ture and improved public services, rather than vice control, seemed the deci­
sive issues that drew their support.74 Many white voters also stayed away 
from the CCA because in this election it really came across as another parti­
san organization bent on winning office rather than saving good govern­
ment. The Forward Dallas Association had initially promoted a slate of the 
nine incumbents, only to see the CCA attempt to steal four of them for its 
ticket. The CCA could have simply endorsed them but rather chose to force 
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them to support its entire ticket and break from their sponsoring organiza­
tion. Voters sensed that this CCA slate was not really for the city as a whole 
and rejected it. 
Although Forward Dallas candidates had compiled an impressive record 
of achievement, that body remained vulnerable to charges that it repre­
sented groups who wanted specific things from government rather than citi­
zens committed to working for the city as a whole. Even though it coopera­
ted fully with business leaders, the Forward Dallas slate, and particularly its 
backers, the Legion of Honor, seemed flawed because of some of its particu­
laristic concerns. The formula for urban growth, and thus urban success, ac­
cording to the city's civic leaders, was unity and cooperation focusing on ur­
ban development. Disputes over specific distribution of services promoted 
disunity, something deadly in the urban sweepstakes in the Southwest. Crit­
ics viewed the lack of unanimity over appointments and other issues as the 
real sin of the present council. However, the election of 1937 exacerbated the 
problem by putting candidates of two different organizations on council for 
the first time. Unable to resolve their differences, council members bickered 
and fought for the next two years. A park board scandal near the end of 
council's term also promoted an image of corruption and government in 
disarray. 
The 1937 council started its term much like the 1935 council—with con­
troversies about council appointments and the city manager. The four CCA 
councilmen supported retaining Hal Mosely as city manager, despite the 
fact he was ultimately responsible for the lax law enforcement that the good 
government group had so criticized during the election. Several of the For­
ward Dallas councilmen, still not forgiving him for his break with the Cat­
fish Club, wanted him removed and popular utilities-supervisor Joseph F. 
Leopold appointed in his place. However, since two of Moseley's strongest 
critics, Cleve Reach and James F. Cochan, lost their bid for reelection, coun­
cil voted to retain the city manager by a 6-3 margin, with J. Willis Gunn, 
Emil Corenbleth, and Max Hahn dissenting. Council also selected the top 
vote-getter, George Sprague, as mayor by acclamation after incumbent Ser­
geant declined nomination for the post. In addition, council reappointed all 
other city heads in what the News called a stormy session at city hall.75 Al­
though city government achieved some noticeable successes during the next 
two years, including the opening of Field Street, the construction of a new 
sewage disposal plant, and the expansion of the sanitary and drainage sew­
ers systems, along with improvements at Love Field, conflict and contro­
versy marked council sessions. Council members also faced pressure from 
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angry Dallas citizens who wanted it to do more to stem the city's vice prob­
lem. Carr P. Collins, president of the Dallas Council of Churchmen's Com­
mittee of 100, called Dallas "one of the most immoral cities in America."76 
Contrasting priorities and controversial issues not only pitted Forward 
Dallas council members against CCA council members, but often caused 
disputes within both groups. When Charter councilman Z. Starr Armstrong 
failed to support several street openings promoted by George Sergeant, the 
frustrated Sergeant responded, "I'm still a Charter Association man and be­
lieve in its principles but I am not going to line up with Armstrong and 
Knight in always opposing public improvements." This helps explain his de­
sertion of the Charterites and his vote for Forward Dallas supporter J. Cleve 
Reach to replace Max Hahn in council, who died while in office.77 
Relations between the city council and the park board became particu­
larly testy at times over lines of authority. The park board, appointed by 
council, did not have to report to the city manager, according to the charter. 
But City Manager Mosely wanted the park board to submit its plans to pub­
lic works director A. P. Rollins. Park board members refused, and council 
split over this issue, some supporting the park board and others the city 
78manager.  Additional disputes over the type of sewage disposal plant to 
erect, a debate over how to handle the algae problem in the city's water sup­
ply, and investigations into the Public Works Department and the city-
owned radio station WRR also promoted turmoil in council. It was perhaps 
park board member E. J. Railton who best underscored the turmoil in an 
October 1937 newspaper interview: "There is no department up there that 
is not sore at another one. Mosely had a falling out with (City Attorney 
Henry) Kucera. There is a fight between the police department and the wel­
fare department. There's trouble between the city manager and the supervi­
sor of utilities. There's trouble over the dance hall ordinance, trouble over 
paving bids, trouble over the way the park department is to make purchases. 
The council is always bickering."79 The recession of 1937-38, as well as the 
disappointing turnout for the city's Greater Texas and Pan American Expo­
sition in 1937, strained council's budget and heightened tensions between 
its members.80 
While the council-manager form of government had not solved all prob­
lems faced by city officials nor eliminated "partisan politics" from the city, it 
had provided a more efficient and better coordinated local government than 
before. In their 1939 study of Dallas government for the Committee on Pub­
lic Administration of the Social Science Research Council, Harold and Kath­
ryn Stone, along with Don Price, compared the new government to the city's 
earlier city commission government. They emphasized how the city man­
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ager was better at coordinating the efforts of workers and departments, re­
ducing delays and increasing production. The authors also pointed out that 
the new governmental structure promoted planning, selected qualified per­
sonnel, and maintained financial control—the three fundamental tools of 
management. Indeed, they argued that "the city as a large-scale enterprise 
was run on schedule in a way that showed up the inefficiency of the former 
commissioners." Finally, they wrote, "It promoted a professional spirit 
among local officials." According to the Stones and Price, the commission­
ers had little acquaintance with any professional knowledge or sources of in­
formation. But since the council-manager government came to Dallas, offi­
cials established new contacts with professional associations, and the 
government had developed a group of young executives "with a highly pro­
fessional attitude." In sum, the social scientists concluded that council-
manager government had given to the people of Dallas "the kind of govern­
ment they wanted: an efficient, impartial one, without patronage or special 
favors."81 The new governmental structure seemed quite compatible with a 
progrowth strategy for the city as a whole. 
Despite the positive evaluation by social scientists, some civic leaders, un­
happy with the continued partisan politics and the perceived fragmentation 
of local government, wanted more. They desired to do for civic leadership 
what had been done for planning and government in the city—create a new 
civic body with enough power and authority to coordinate and help manage 
effectively the city's disparate problems. Just as the desire for a government 
body that could get things done for the city as a whole led to the development 
of the council-manager government, the same motives guided the develop­
ment of the Dallas Citizens Council. 
Dallas Business Leadership, Planning, 
and World War II 
1 he organization of the Dallas Citizens Council (DCC) in 1937 by a group 
of the city's leading businessmen proved a watershed event. Not only would 
it provide the most powerful civic body ever established in the city's history, 
but its members would also help revive the failing Citizens Charter Associa­
tion (CCA) in 1938. These two bodies would be most responsible for shap­
ing modern Dallas. They too approached Dallas as a system of systems 
needing coordinated and comprehensive treatment and strongly supported 
comprehensive planning and the council-manager form of government for 
the city as a whole. 
The city had a tradition of strong business leadership before the DCC. Its 
chamber of commerce, formed in 1909, had played a critical role in the city's 
development. Just as the earlier commission government had attempted to 
make city government more responsive, the chamber tried to do the same for 
the city's business leadership by merging the city's leading business-led 
organizations—the Commercial Club, the 150,000 Club, the Freight Bu­
reau, and the Trade League—into one powerful and centralized business 
organization to work for the welfare of the entire city.1 Whether it was city 
planning, promoting industrial progress through an extensive national ad­
vertising campaign, developing a municipal airport in the 1920s, or righting 
for the right to host the centennial exposition in 1936, leading businessmen 
invested large amounts of time and money for their version of the civic 
good.2 
The chamber, large and unwieldy, and committed to rotation of office, 
had been unable to resolve the problems of disunity and fragmentation 
among the elite, however.3 Both sides of the levee district controversy be­
longed to the chamber of commerce. Nor was the chamber always able to re­
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spond quickly in time of urban crisis. It had a complex structure with a vari­
ety of committees and an organizational configuration that limited its 
ability to act quickly. As a result, while the chamber proved a powerful force 
in some areas, its composition and orientation prevented it from being in­
fluential in many other aspects of community activity.4 The DCC's more 
limited structure and smaller governing body gave it greater latitude to act 
in a number of activities, and facilitated a quick response to urban problems. 
This helps explain why the Dallas Morning News dubbed the new body 
"the minute men."5 
According to a Dallas Times Herald editorial, the DCC would provide 
another important role. "Dallas has the Chamber of Commerce and many 
other organizations as well as its governmental bodies to deal with various 
community problems," it observed, but "there is an obvious need tor greater 
co-ordination [italics mine]."6 The DCC, then, assumed the role of coordi­
nator of civic undertakings. Numerous groups and organizations had pet 
projects for which they sought private funding. Because of the enormous 
wealth represented by the new group, any serious civic undertaking would 
benefit from going through this committee. As a result, that body could pri­
oritize and coordinate civic initiatives. Those projects it supported had a 
good chance of success because of the financial resources that might be di­
rected at promoting them. Those without support had little chance.7 Not 
only could members of the body bring their concerns to the board of direc­
tors for discussion, but DCC leaders encouraged other members of the com­
munity to do the same. The News understood the coordinating purpose of 
the DCC from its inception. "Without duplicating the work of any existing 
organization," the News observed, "it offers a basis for merging the interests 
of Government, business, labor and the arts in support of projects that will 
make Dallas even more pre-eminent as a Southwest metropolis and a center 
of industry and culture."8 
Unlike the chamber of commerce, which saw itself primarily as a booster 
for Dallas business, the DCC saw itself as the chief booster of Dallas.9 The 
News used the formation of this group to appeal to civic patriotism. "All cit­
izens of Dallas should work in unison in matters affecting the city's prog­
ress," it announced. "Sectionalism should be forgotten. This organization 
will use its efforts to promote the old Dallas spirit which in years past made 
Dallas the leader among the cities of Texas."10 
Although as in the case of the Ulrickson program bonds, businessmen 
sometimes differed on how best to achieve growth and development, and 
often favored ways that would best return immediate profit, a host of other 
public issues demanded and received business leaders' attention when the 
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immediate rewards were not so evident. Implicit in all this was the assump­
tion that the DCC was best positioned to lead and coordinate the needs of 
Dallas. Bankers, wealthy industrialists, and newspaper publishers, ac­
cording to this line of reasoning, held positions that gave them the best per­
spective on the needs of the entire city and what would best promote the 
public interest. All other political actors in Dallas, according to business 
leaders, including neighborhood groups, labor representatives, and minor­
ity leaders, harbored a tainted vision of the public interest because of their 
identification with some part, rather than the whole, of Dallas. They should 
be heard and should provide input, so the reasoning went, but the final deci­
sion would be made by the DCC, much in the same way that the city man­
ager solicited information from his department heads yet himself made the 
final recommendations in city government. The Times Herald summarized 
this view by warning that "no city can attain balanced prosperity and gain 
as an enjoyable place in which to live unless it has a leadership that can view 
it as a whole and prevent bickering between sections and groups."11 
The DCC emerged as an outgrowth of the centennial exposition. The ex­
position provided an important boost to Dallas and a real challenge to its 
leadership. It not only supplied thousands of jobs during a time of high un­
employment, but it helped publicize Dallas and the Southwest—the city's 
trade area—throughout America.12 Even more important, it brought about 
a rapprochement of warring business factions and, according to some, 
helped revive the "Old Dallas Spirit." The News emphasized this theme in 
its evaluation of the exposition's impact. "It is the intangibles of good will, 
of confidence in Dallas ability to get things done, of individual leadership in 
big matters," the paper declared, that had made the exposition an "unmea­
surable success."13 
Financing the expensive exposition did not come easily. Banker Robert L. 
Thornton often had to call leading businessmen together to raise money for 
it. Because he needed men who could commit their companies' resources im­
mediately, this group evolved into a meeting of corporate presidents, or "yes 
men," as Thornton called them. When the Exposition Corporation required 
additional funds to complete the grounds in March 1936, Thornton and 
twenty-seven other business leaders met at the First National Bank board 
room and raised $650,000 on the spot. Those business leaders continued to 
assemble during the summer to provide additional funds to keep the Centen­
nial Corporation solvent.14 And when civic leaders decided to run the expo­
sition the following year as the Greater Texas and Pan American Exposition, 
they again reached into their pockets to help fund the undertaking. Thorn­
ton secured $457,000 from local businesses for that exposition at a banquet 
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in the city's Baker Hotel. Civic leaders provided such support because they 
believed the exposition improved trade relations with Latin American coun­
tries and continued to publicize the city throughout the country.15 
Thornton also continued his regular meetings with business heads to 
keep tabs on the exposition and coordinate responses to its needs. The suc­
cess in mobilizing business leaders to provide aggressive, coordinated fi­
nancial leadership for the exposition convinced the banker that such a body 
could also benefit Dallas as a whole. As a result, he joined with Nathan Ad­
ams to establish a permanent group known as the Dallas Citizens Council, 
an organization of "boss men" able to commit the financial resources of 
their companies for civic projects and the booster goals of growth and devel­
opment. 
Membership, limited to company presidents or board chairmen, was by 
invitation. Only those with a "sincere interest in Dallas" and a "willingness 
to assume a leadership role in the community at large" could join. Dues 
were a mere $25 a year and membership was for life. As late as the 1950s, the 
organization had no permanent office and remained informal. Original 
membership started at ninety-five (see appendix), but that gradually in­
creased over time as new members were added. The general membership 
met once a year to ratify the actions of the board of directors, who held 
monthly sessions. That group, made up initially of twenty-two but later ex­
panded to twenty-five members, served as the core of the DCC.16 
The first board of directors clearly reflected the power and prestige of the 
new organization. The original members underscored the dominance of the 
city's bankers in civic leadership. Dallas's most powerful bank presidents, 
Nathan Adams, Robert L. Thornton, and Fred Florence, served on that 
board. So did Joe E. Lawther, president of the Liberty State Bank of Dallas; 
J. B. Adoue, Jr., head of the National Bank of Commerce; and Ernest R. Ten­
nant, president of the Dallas National Bank. Charles F. O'Donnell, former 
Dallas judge, president of Southwestern Life Insurance Company, and 
member of the board of directors of the First National Bank of Dallas, 
headed the DCC as its first president. 
Other board of directors members included A. H. Bailey, J. B. O'Hara, 
T. M. Cullum, Thomas E. Jackson, Arthur Kramer, Herbert Marcus, Karl 
Hoblitzelle, Jack Pew, D. Alva Little, C. W. Davis, John W. Carpenter, L. B. 
Denning, A. M. Matson, H. A. Olmsted, and Walter Prehn. Bailey served as 
president of Higginbotham's Wholesale Dry Goods Store, and was a domi­
nant figure in the city's dry goods, hardware, and lumber businesses. Like 
many of the DCC executive board members, Bailey migrated to Dallas from 
out of state. J. B. O'Hara, a native of Pennsylvania, served as president and 
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general manager of the Dr. Pepper soft drink company. T. M. Cullen came 
to Dallas at the age of forty-nine in 1914 from his native state of Tennessee. 
President of T. M. Cullum and Boren Co., a wholesale and retail sporting 
goods firm, Cullum prospered as the city grew. Thomas E. Jackson, a native 
of Illinois, came to Dallas in 1907. He served as Southwestern manager of 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, a company he started out with as a sales­
man in St. Louis. Arthur Kramer, president of A. Harris and Company, was 
another lawyer who made good in the business world. Born in Louisville, 
Kentucky, Kramer came to Dallas in 1889 and took a law degree from the 
University of Texas in 1902. Eight years later he married Camille Harris, 
daughter of Adolph Harris, founder of the city's A. Harris and Co. Depart­
ment Store. He assumed the presidency of the store in 1912 and became very 
active in the city's cultural scene, presiding over the Dallas Symphony from 
1925 to 1939. Herbert Marcus, another prominent merchant, also migrated 
to the city from Louisville, Kentucky. In 1897, the nineteen-year-old Marcus 
arrived in Dallas and pursued a career in retailing. Ten years later he started 
a specialty store with his sister and brother-in-law, A. L. Neiman. By the 
time he joined the DCC, Neiman-Marcus had become one of the city's most 
famous stores. Besides serving as president of the store, Marcus proved ex­
tremely active in civic affairs. 
Karl Hoblitzelle was another civic leader born outside of Texas. He ar­
rived in the Lone Star State after working in the St. Louis World's Fair. Tak­
ing the money he had earned from that work experience, he started a chain 
of vaudeville theaters in North Texas as part of his Interstate Amusement 
Company. During the 1920s he converted those theaters to movie houses 
and extended his holdings well beyond Texas. By the time he joined the 
DCC, Hoblitzelle presided over Interstate Circuit Incorporated, and had be­
come quite wealthy and an influential player in Dallas civic affairs. 
John W. Carpenter was one of the few Texas natives on the board. Born 
in Navarro County in 1881, Carpenter came to Dallas in 1918 as manager of 
the Dallas Power and Light Company. The board of directors named him 
president of Texas Power and Light Company shortly after it was organized, 
and he later formed the Southland Life Insurance Company. Carpenter was 
one of several utility heads who joined the DCC. Other included Walter 
Prehn, general manager of Southwest Bell Telephone; C. W. Davis, president 
of Dallas Power and Light; and L. B. Denning, president of Lone Star Gas. 
Two oilmen also sat on the board of directors: Jack Pew, assistant vice presi­
dent for the Sun Oil Company, and D. Alva Little, president of the Magnolia 
Petroleum Company. Born in 1902 in Beaumont, Texas, Pew attended 
Southern Methodist University, Cornell, and MIT before entering the oil 
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business. Texas native Little started life in Corsicana, Texas, in 1887. He at­
tended Southwestern University in Georgetown, Texas, and moved to Dal­
las after graduation in 1914. Nineteen years later he became president of 
Magnolia Oil Company. Little is known about the final two original mem­
bers of the DCC board of directors. A. M. Matson was managing director of 
Butler Brothers, while H. A. Olmsted presided over the Olmsted-Kirk Com­
pany. All of these men also served on the board of directors for Dallas banks. 
Eleven of the twenty-two original board members had served on the execu­
tive committee of the Texas Centennial Exposition Commission. Unlike the 
Exposition Commission, the DCC did not permit proxies.17 
The all-white board included Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. Although 
several members came from wealthy families, what is most impressive is 
how many experienced upward mobility in Dallas. Robert L. Thornton pro­
vided one of the city's most spectacular rags-to-riches stories. Born in a half-
roof sod dugout in rural Texas, he grew up as part of a family of tenant farm­
ers. As an adult, he failed in several enterprises before moving to Dallas and 
opening a bank on borrowed money. The combination of an acute business 
sense and a booming city brought the uneducated Thornton spectacular 
success.18 Charles O'Donnell, the child of Irish immigrants, lived on a farm 
west of Dallas. He attended public school and then took a law degree from 
the University of Texas in 1907. After serving the city as prosecuting attor­
ney, judge, and city attorney, he joined a Dallas law firm and became general 
consul of the Southwestern Life Insurance Company before being named its 
president.19 Nathan Adams, although starting life in a promising situation, 
also experienced rapid advancement in Dallas. His father, Nathan Adams, 
Sr., had been a prosperous lawyer and landholder in Giles County, Tennes­
see, but died shortly after Adams turned five years old. His mother took a 
teaching job at Giles College to support the family, but cash problems ap­
parently continued to plague them and later forced Adams to drop out of 
college to help support his mother and siblings. At age 18 he moved to Dallas 
with $4 in his pocket and took a job as runner for the People's National Bank 
for $8.33 a month. Later he worked for the National Exchange Bank and by 
1894 headed one of its departments. When his bank merged in 1905 with 
American National Bank, officials appointed him vice president of the new 
bank. Twenty-four years later he became president of the city's First Na­
tional Bank.20 
Fred Florence, head of the city's largest bank, was the son of Lithuanian 
immigrants living in New York City. Three months after Florence's birth, 
his family moved to East Texas, where the elder Florence became a small 
but successful merchant. At age sixteen the younger Florence took a job 
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sweeping and check sorting at a bank in the East Texas town of Rusk. After 
learning the banking business there, he moved to Dallas in 1911 and worked 
for the American Exchange National Bank. He returned the next year to 
East Texas and eventually became president of the Alto State Bank in Chero­
kee County. After World War I he cast his future with the growing city of 
Dallas and accepted a job as vice president of Guarantee Bank and Trust 
Company. By 1929 that bank had been renamed the Republic National Bank 
and Florence had assumed its presidency. Like Thornton and Adams, Flor­
ence had benefited from the expanding economy and growing opportunities 
associated with the Southwest.21 
Jean Baptiste Adoue, Jr., was hardly a rags-to-riches story, but his success 
clearly underscores the opportunity for advancement in rapidly developing 
cities like Dallas in the expanding Southwest. Born in downtown Dallas on 
November 4,1884, to French parents, Adoue received a law degree from the 
University of Texas in 1906. However, he turned to banking, working for the 
National Bank of Commerce, whose president was his father. In 1924 he be­
came president of that bank after his father retired.22 
DCC members, then, like civic leaders elsewhere, clearly understood the 
relationship between a growing city and economic opportunity. Many of 
them had started in Dallas with meager resources but prospered as the city 
expanded. Because urban growth had been and continued to be so impor­
tant to their economic success, they believed that extensive involvement in 
civic undertakings made economic sense and threw themselves into urban 
service without hesitation. Their particular form of urban activism mir­
rored assumptions found in planning and government activities. 
The DCC also stemmed from an unhappiness with current civic leader­
ship and proposed to provide better coordination and efficiency than earlier 
business-led civic organizations. Just as the council-manager form of gov­
ernment permitted government to respond more effectively to the needs of 
the city as a whole, so now the DCC gave civic leaders that same ability.23 
The DCC also promised more stability for civic leadership in the same way 
that council-manager government fostered it for Dallas government. 
Council-manager government had done that through professional adminis­
tration and nonpartisan elections, while the DCC promoted continuity and 
stability in civic leadership by granting the city's most successful business 
and civic leaders lifetime membership in their organization, and by in­
cluding no term limits for the board of directors. In addition, the DCC mir­
rored the emphasis on using elites to guide city growth. The city manager, a 
trained professional, now administered government, while professional 
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planners, often hired from outside the city, helped ensure its proper physical 
development. The DCC guaranteed a key civic role for the city's most suc­
cessful businessmen who had proven management skills at a time when 
many compared the municipal corporation with the business corporation. 
The DCC held its first meeting of the full membership on March 1,1938, 
at the elegant Adolphus Hotel. Members heard theater owner Karl Hoblit­
zelle give the keynote address. "You have a more difficult task than the lead­
ers of thirty years ago," Hoblitzelle cautioned. "Things move more swiftly. 
You no longer know your neighbors. Results depend upon bringing in 
around the council table representatives of those classes not ordinarily 
found at such meetings. It will make them better citizens. You will get to 
know them, these people who work with their hands. It is the only way the 
democratic form of government can survive." 
At that meeting, Hoblitzelle recommended more traffic arteries to the 
central business district, the development of a superairport, a downtown 
auditorium, the Trinity River canal, and a master plan for the metropolitan 
region's future growth and development. Hoblitzelle also called for "fair­
ness to the Negro population." Toward this end, he asked the city to partici­
pate in the federal government's slum clearance and public housing program 
and pleaded with the leaders to help "protect those sections where Negroes 
live," and "help them to help themselves." The DCC spokesman also called 
for "better coordination in welfare work and closer cooperation with the 
working men in building a greater Dallas." In addition he urged leaders to 
attract high-paying industries, and emphasized that a successful city needed 
cultural, educational, and medical facilities as well. Hoblitzelle compli­
mented the present government but also suggested that it was "handicapped 
by lack of interest, the insistent demands of selfish citizens, lack of competi­
tion such as that which brings progress and reorganization, economy and 
efficiency in business" as well as "limitations set by outdated laws and or­
dinances." In their first official action taken at the meeting, members in­
structed Chair C. F. O'Donnell to appoint a committee to confer with city 
officials regarding a downtown auditorium.24 
As early as February, 1939, the News called this group "the most power­
ful concentration of business executives ever banded together in Dallas for 
civic good."25 Although its first year's achievements were modest, they nev­
ertheless underscored the DCC's vision of the public interest. The group 
helped promote the passage of a 1938 bond issue to expand the city's airport. 
The DCC also raised funds to refurbish the city's auditorium at Fair Park, 
and lobbied successfully with council to halt the development of the East 
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Grand thoroughfare through Fair Park, a project that threatened the integ­
rity of the city's showcase.26 But even more important, DCC members 
played a critical role in revitalizing the CCA. 
Forbidden by its charter to engage in politics, DCC members saw the 
CCA as a political vehicle that shared many of its concerns and values. That 
organization had suffered greatly since its losses in 1935 and 1937, no longer 
rallying the kind of support it had once experienced in the early 1930s. Even 
more important, its creation, the council-manager government, had come 
under strenuous attack from a portion of the city's population. Charter 
leaders turned to the businessmen for help, giving DCC officials significant 
influence in selecting CCA slates. 
The attack on the council-manager government started during the mu­
nicipal election of 1937. Candidates from the Dallas Democratic Party 
promised to abolish the system if elected and to work for its destruction even 
if they lost at the polls. Shortly after the election, members of the defeated 
slate formed the Commission Government Association. At its first meeting 
on November 8, 1937, members elected George K. Butcher as chair. Many 
supporters of that association came from South Dallas and had also op­
posed council's failed efforts to hire black police officers. George W. Owens, 
who seemed to be the prime mover behind the petition drive, had played a 
major role in the effort. At the meeting, speakers attacked the council-
manager government as a dictatorship and called for the return of the com­
mission form of government, as was in place when "Dallas was a symbol of 
progress and happiness." That organization floundered but reemerged the 
next year as the Plain People's Party. It wanted Dallasites to be able to elect 
both their mayor and eight commissioners to supervise the city's depart­
ments. Toward this end, it started passing out petitions to force a referen­
dum on this issue.27 
Sensing danger to the council-manager system, the CCA reorganized to 
do battle against the movement. After its defeat in 1937, the CCA leaders de­
cided to form an active organization to maintain interest in the city's 
council-manager government throughout the year rather than reorganize 
every two years to run a slate of candidates. In addition, the CCA employed 
a public relations firm to advise it on how to be more successful. It recom­
mended an executive committee representing the city's six districts of South 
Oak Cliff, North Oak Cliff, South Dallas, East Dallas, Northeast Dallas, 
and North Dallas. One man and one woman would be selected to represent 
each district and would work closely with the organization's president, male 
and female vice presidents, secretary, treasurer, and executive secretary. The 
firm also advised CCA leaders to organize on the precinct level and also sug­
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gested that the CCA executive committee issue a bimonthly bulletin to every 
member. Finally, the report recommended that the CCA maintain a com­
plete library about city government, have a member attend all council and 
committee meetings, and maintain contact with other cities over govern­
ment issues.28 
CCA officials followed many of those recommendations, including the 
creation of an executive secretary. They selected Herbert Carpenter for that 
position and established an office in the Santa Fe Building in downtown Dal­
las. Finding a new president for the ailing good government group proved 
difficult. After several other civic leaders declined, insurance man Roscoe L. 
Thomas accepted the appointment. What he inherited "was not the vital or­
ganization of 1931," but a CCA, according to the Dallas Times Herald, 
"shattered by defeats in the 1935 and 1937 elections." Despite these prob­
lems, Thomas's strong leadership and willingness to work closely with lead­
ing businessmen allowed him to secure the teetering CCA.29 With the help of 
the News, the CCA also thwarted the campaign to change council-manager 
government. It now could focus on the 1939 election. 
Toward that end, Thomas approached Thornton seeking contributions 
for a yet unnamed council slate. He secured money only after placing Thorn­
ton on a secret nominating committee—a committee that eventually in­
cluded six bank presidents or vice presidents, a financier, an insurance com­
pany president, an attorney, a former mayor, and a securities broker.30 
Thomas initiated this contact with the influential and wealthy business 
leaders, and it can be said that the CCA needed them more than they needed 
it. Historically, Dallas business leaders always had access to government of­
ficials no matter what kind of governing structure existed. However, be­
cause the CCA supported the kind of government form that made sense to 
business leaders in the 1930s, and because business leaders would now have 
a chance to nominate candidates with a citywide view, the relationship ben­
efited both parties. 
Although so many members of the Dallas Council participated in the 
Charter Association that the latter would come to be characterized as the 
political arm of that business civic group, no formal relationship ever ex­
isted. But the same financial supporters of the CCA participated in the 
DCC, too. Not surprisingly, the CCA's interests reflected the same interests 
as the DCC, including city planning, airport development, and other 
growth-promoting programs. This stemmed more from a shared vision of 
priorities than from business leaders pressuring the good government 
organization for specific favors. To assure no individual pressure from 
major contributors, the CCA executive committee kept the source of all 
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contributions secret from individual council candidates and forbade its 
business-dominated executive committee from ever requesting "services or 
favors" from the administration it backed.31 
Dallas business leaders supported the CCA because it emphasized busi­
ness efficiency rather than partisan politics based on neighborhood issues or 
class, and because it accepted the basic tenets of the business community— 
that Dallas growth and economic development should be the top priority. In 
the context of the city-as-a-whole rhetoric, this made perfectly good sense, 
since urban development would ultimately benefit all citizens. 
The CCA's reemergence as a significant political force in the city not only 
benefited from increased support from the business community but by a 
scandal in the park board, disclosed late in December 1938. The city's park 
board had always been somewhat problematic under the new charter gov­
ernment. As we have seen, that board retained its independence from the su­
pervision of the city manager. It had its own budget, and its appointees re­
mained free of civil service regulation. As a result, it became one of the few 
remaining vestiges of the patronage system, especially during the Catfish-
Legion of Honor era, 1935-1939.32 
At a hearing on January 6,1939, George Ripley, park board member and 
defeated candidate for council under the Forward Dallas ticket, charged that 
board members Harry Gordon and E. J. Railton had "used their positions 
for their own gain." He accused the board's vice president, Harry Gordon, 
of having his house remodeled by city-paid workman. At a later hearing, he 
testified that E. J. Railton had sold city materials for his own gain. Other ac­
cusations alleging payoffs, fixed specifications, and nepotism made the scan­
dal front-page material for most of January and early February. Council dis­
missed both Gordon and Railton at the end of January, and in March 1939 a 
Dallas County grand jury returned indictments against these two as well as 
several park workers.33 
The park scandal helped further discredit the current bickering govern­
ment and made the CCA's appeal for unity and efficiency more attractive. 
During this time, CCA officials announced their group would run nine new 
men, pledged to doing their own thinking and acting as an economical and 
efficient administration. As we have seen, the CCA had been holding nonpo­
litical, educational meetings emphasizing the accomplishments of city man­
ager government since late 1938 because of their concern about a movement 
to abolish council-manager government. Such activity restored the CCA's 
image as a civic group bent on good government rather than a political party 
solely interested in electing its slate. 
Other civic bodies announced competing tickets. Robert B. Allen and 
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Tony Brignardello established the Progressive Civic Association to run a 
slate of candidates for city council. That group promised that if elected it 
would investigate every department in the city and provide "a ticket of good, 
clean, upright men."34 Robert B. Allen, president of the Progressive Civic 
League, also pledged to save Dallas from the gamblers who had supposedly 
had Dallas by the throat for the past three and a half years. He promised to 
bring in a new city manager and to promote charter amendments to allow 
the people to elect the mayor directly. Furthermore, he wanted to reduce city 
government from nine to six council seats elected from each district.35 The 
Plain People's Party, dedicated to replacing the council-manager govern­
ment with a commission form, also proposed a full slate in the 1939 election 
but eventually withdrew it. A fourth group, the Citizens Nonpartisan Asso­
ciation, called for cooperation with labor and merged with the newly refor­
mulated Catfish Club. In addition to these slates, five independents ran, in­
cluding George Sprague, incumbent mayor.36 
Even before the association announced its nominees, CCA head Roscoe 
Thomas emphasized that his group would select only those who would "for­
get selfish sectionalism" and would "represent all of Dallas." In a later 
speech Thomas explained another theme of the CCA. "Dallas voters are 
tired of politics instead of business methods at city hall," the CCA head ob­
served. "Dallas people know teamwork and a business administration will 
increase the city's prosperity." The CCA asked voters to elect all nine of its 
candidates in order to avoid the political bickering and division characteris­
tic of the current administration. Proper coordination of government, ac­
cording to this view, meant selecting team players, individuals who shared 
common assumptions about the nature of the city. This differed from poli­
tics that emphasized selfish agendas and particularistic goals. Politics, ac­
cording to the CCA, had caused the park department scandal. Partisan poli­
tics during the election also threatened Dallas's well-being by "raising class 
and racial hatred." Implicit in all this was an assumption that harmony 
rather than division, and efficiency rather than democracy, were central to 
effective city government, for this promoted urban growth that would allow 
"the people of Dallas, laboring classes and office workers alike, to accord­
ingly prosper."37 
Both the Dallas Morning News and the Dallas Times Herald endorsed 
the Charter ticket. Although the News conceded that "there is a civic health 
in individual nominees seeking seats on the city council," it concluded that 
it is "nevertheless preferable that Dallas policies should be directed by men 
that the city is absolutely sure can work together for the common good." 
The lack of harmony in council for the past four years had, according to the 
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News, "retarded and in some directions completely stopped" progress in the 
city.38 Opponents of the CCA viewed the call for consensus and cooperation 
differently. According to leaders of the other two slates, the CCA was not in­
terested in serving Dallas as a whole. Rather, wealthy businessmen, power­
ful bankers, and influential newspaper publishers, many of them residents of 
suburban Highland Park, sought to use city government for their own selfish 
ends. Jack Burroughs, chair of the Citizens Nonpartisan Association, the 
CCA's chief rival, denounced the "hidden interests" behind the CCA slate. 
He particularly singled out Fred Florence, chair of the Republic National 
Bank, as the power behind the CCA. According to Burroughs, the race pit­
ted "the people's ticket against the bankers' ticket."39 
Despite the presence of a more representative ticket, including the first la­
bor representative, the CCA drubbed the Nonpartisan Association and all 
other opponents too. More than 20,000 voters turned out for the April 4 
election and gave all the CCA candidates a more than 2 to 1 victory over the 
opposition. Although traditional strong support from North and East Dal­
las figured in this victory, black votes also proved critical for the CCA suc­
cess. Because of the efforts of the Progressive Voters League (PVL), Dallas 
blacks had become a significant factor in city elections. Indeed, News politi­
cal writer Barry Bishop claimed that blacks constituted "the biggest and 
most solid [voting] block in the city." A year before the 1939 election, CCA 
opponent George Owens had promoted district elections to council rather 
than city wide elections because he feared that blacks under the leadership of 
the PVL might have too much say in citywide elections. Such a concern made 
sense, since few voters turned out for city elections and one well-organized 
group really could sway the outcome of the election.40 Unlike the 1937 elec­
tion, this time the league supported the CCA. Charter officials made no 
promises about black police similar to the one made but unfulfilled by the in­
cumbent council. Instead, the CCA pledged to provide better and more 
parks and schools for blacks, as well as improve street conditions in black 
neighborhoods. According to the Dallas Express, the PVL endorsed the 
CCA slate because that organization best supported the program of the 
league. In an election that saw a little more than 20,000 citizens participate, 
the 5,000 black voters gave heavy support to the CCA ticket and according 
to the Express became the deciding factor in the election.41 
Shortly after the CCA victory, council named corporate lawyer J. Wood-
all Rodgers as the city's mayor. Born in New Market, Alabama, in 1890, 
Rodgers held a B. A. from Vanderbilt University and a LL. B. from the Uni­
versity of Texas. He did further graduate work at Columbia University. Rod­
gers entered the Dallas law firm of Saner and Saner after World War I and in 
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1925 established his own law practice with Charles D. Turner. The Standard 
Oil Company of Indiana and its Texas subsidiaries were among that firm's 
clients.42 
As mayor, Rodgers listed his top three priorities: elimination of the algae 
in the city's drinking water; the realization of a north-south central boule­
vard; and the preparation of a Master Plan. He also announced that since 
council had been elected as a unit it would act and speak as a unit.43 More 
than two and a half months after the election, council also named a new city 
manager, twenty-seven-year-old James Aston. According to the News, the 
selection of a city manager would have been done earlier, but this council, 
elected on a harmony ticket, wanted a unanimous decision. Aston had been 
an assistant to Mosely and his right-hand man before taking over as city 
manager in Bryan, Texas. He only accepted the Dallas offer when council as­
sured him that Mosely had no possibility of retaining his job.44 Aston wasted 
little time and selected new department heads, including a police chief, fire 
chief, and public utilities supervisor. 
In some ways, the true significance of this election, however, goes beyond 
its immediate impact on city government. For it marks the beginning of a 
twenty-year political dominance by the CCA and the powerful DCC. The 
agenda of the latter soon became the agenda of city government. The success 
of these two groups does not mark the first time business leaders helped 
shape city government—that has been going on throughout the twentieth 
century. Rather, it was the ability of the DCC to promote consensus among 
powerful businessmen and the capacity of the CCA to foster the same from 
the voting public that makes this union so significant. Both successes relied 
closely on the rhetoric of "the city as a whole" and an assumption that gov-
ernment's chief goal was to promote urban growth and development. 
Once elected, the CCA, working closely with the DCC, proceeded to 
push its vision of the city. Toward this end it embraced comprehensive plan­
ning. As we have seen, the DCC had also made comprehensive planning a 
top priority in 1938, and the next year the businessmen elevated the employ­
ment of a city plan consultant and development of a new city plan to its top 
priority.45 Just to make sure the newly elected councilmen also understood 
the needs of the city, C. F. O'Donnell, president of the DCC, visited each 
lawmaker and explained the group's program of civic development to 
them.46 No doubt he emphasized the importance of planning, an issue that 
Mayor Rodgers already enthusiastically embraced. Not only would plan­
ning help the city prepare for the future and combat immediate problems but 
also, Rodgers believed, planning would focus on the city as a whole and help 
sweep aside petty political and sectional differences. 
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The idea of bringing in an outside consultant to help develop a new city 
plan had been discussed since the late 1920s. As we have seen, the Ulrickson 
Report recommended the development of a master plan, and in 1928 the 
City Plan Commission proposed that the city employ Harland Bartholo­
mew to draw up a plan. It did not, choosing instead to hire E. A. Wood, local 
representative of Kessler and a man already employed by Dallas as city engi-
neer.47 He developed a master plan map but no real text-based plan as Kes­
sler had done. 
Controversy over the levee district led some civic leaders to call again for 
an outside planner. In 1929 John Carpenter had advised the Critic Club, an 
organization of leading citizens, that Dallas needed a new plan written by an 
"outsider, unhampered by local viewpoints and not to be influenced in the 
slightest by local pressure." According to Carpenter, in terms of planning 
the city had been riding on a "rudderless craft" since the death of George 
Kessler in 1923.48 A year after Carpenter's comments, George Dealey wrote, 
"If Mr. Kessler were alive today, he would unquestionably urge . . . yet an­
other plan for Dallas; a new city plan extending into the county as a regional 
plan, coordinating the needs of the present with the probable needs of the 
immediate future, and unifying the whole metropolitan area."49 Karl 
Hoblitzelle, an adversary of Dealey over the levee district, came to the same 
conclusion about planning in 1938 and, as we have seen, articulated it at the 
initial DCC meeting. Politicians with their own special projects come and 
go, Hoblitzelle pointed out, but a master plan drawn up by disinterested 
professionals would provide a clear guideline for the city's growth. Like 
Dealey, Hoblitzelle also wanted the plan to "extend beyond the limits of city 
and county . . . and consider the vast empire from which Dallas draws her 
people and her wealth."50 Both recognized that the real metropolitan com­
munity extended beyond the municipal boundaries and thus needed inclu­
sion in any new plan. 
With the strong endorsement of the DCC, the movement for a new plan 
seemed to get a boost. Robert E. McVey, city planning engineer, concurred 
with the DCC and noted that both the Kessler Plan and the Ulrickson pro­
gram were now out-of-date. Ralph Porter of the Dallas Real Estate Board 
cautioned that "Dallas never will reach any real objective until the people 
from differing communities stop bickering and begin to look at suggested 
improvement from a city-wide perspective," something encouraged by a 
master plan.51 Before council fired him, City Manager Hal Mosely had also 
urged the drafting of a new city plan and appointed a committee to investi­
gate employing an outside planner, an action unanimously endorsed by the 
city plan commission.52 The News editorialized its strong support by ob­
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serving the importance of bringing in an outsider to provide an "objective 
view of the city's physical problems not clouded by local views." It also re­
peated the notion that "city planning substitutes expert engineering for the 
political muddling that often has marked city development in the past."53 
Shortly after the 1939 election, to energize the city's planning process, 
city council hired E. A. Wood as Dallas's first city plan engineer. The cham­
ber of commerce joined the movement in 1941 just before Pearl Harbor and 
established a committee on "Post-War Emergency Plans for Dallas," to pre­
pare a twenty-five-year blueprint to help in the transition from war to peace. 
And during that same year, Wood completed two "master plans"—one for 
the fairgrounds, another for the city—while S. Herbert Hare of Kansas de­
veloped a park master plan. Like the earlier Wood-drawn plan, these were in 
fact more master plan "maps" than broader plans with text and ample dis­
cussion about current problems and proposals for the city's future.54 
The DCC supplemented its planning movement with a call for the merger 
of the wealthy suburban cities of Highland Park and University Park with 
Dallas proper. In 1938 DCC leaders agreed to assist in a merger movement 
supported by Mayor Sprague. Civic leaders called for an election that year 
to amend the city charter to allow Dallas to add additional members to city 
council if Highland Park or University Park joined Dallas. Merger support­
ers dropped the amendment just about a month before the scheduled elec­
tion as strong opposition to consolidation developed in the Park Cities.55 
Despite this failure, DCC leaders decided to continue the push for merger 
with its wealthy neighbors. On October 19,1939, the DCC executive com­
mittee voted unanimously to sponsor and finance a campaign to merge 
Highland Park and University Park with Dallas so as to protect the interests 
of each municipality. Toward that end, a DCC committee developed a bor­
ough system of government, roughly following that of New York City. This 
plan allowed the Park Cities to maintain control of their parks, police, 
schools, zoning, and other local functions while officially making them part 
of Dallas in time for the 1940 census count. Mayor Rodgers strongly em­
braced the movement and promised that merger would "eliminate the polit­
ical barrier—the silk stocking bugaboo, the class distinction propaganda of 
a professional politician which has been the barrier to friendly relations be­
tween the three cities and detrimental to a united Dallas." For the mayor, the 
"well-rounded city" included "men, women, and children from all walks of 
life. . . . Let the strong encourage the weak," he continued, "the fortunate 
give aid and comfort to the unfortunate. Every city is composed of its north 
and south, east and west, and in the great scheme of things, none should live 
without the other."56 Merger under this vision would eliminate strife and 
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finally recognize the interdependence of the three cities providing govern­
ment for what Dallas leaders viewed as the real social unit. The "silk stock­
ing bugaboo" that Rodgers referred to was the often-reported criticism that 
outsiders ran city business and politics in Dallas. The fact that DCC mem­
bership included fifty-three Park City residents as opposed to fifty Dallas 
residents gave the statement some merit.57 Despite a strong lobbying job, the 
DCC failed to get a vote on the merger issue during the first two terms of the 
CCA council. However, after the 1943 election, the DCC and Mayor Rod­
gers revived both the planning and merger movements, making them inex­
tricably linked. 
Even before the election, council had authorized Mayor Rodgers to se­
cure the services of Harland Bartholomew to assist the city in developing a 
master plan. City leaders had sought master plan studies for eight areas: air­
ports, improvement of blighted areas, development of a downtown civic 
center, major street plan linking downtown to outlying airports, park and 
boulevard plans, revision of zoning, railroad track removal and relocation, 
and rerouting of buses and streetcars to improve traffic. The earlier map 
plans of E. A. Wood and S. Herbert Hare (parks) served as a starting point 
for a new plan that would be like the Kessler Plan, i.e., a plan with text and 
available for public consumption. Before finalizing details with Bartholo­
mew, the mayor and several other civic leaders visited St. Louis, Kansas City, 
Memphis, and Louisville, cities for which Bartholomew had provided plans. 
What they found bothered them. Generally pleased with the work of Bar­
tholomew, civic leaders returned to Dallas concerned that the cities they 
viewed had a head start on Dallas because they were already preparing for 
the postwar era. Louisville's interest in capturing the Latin American air 
trade particularly upset local boosters because they had assumed Dallas 
would dominate that trade. Kansas City's plan for 117 projects after the war 
and for an airport near downtown also made local leaders understand the 
type of competition they would face in their attempt to increase Big D's size 
and importance. Newspaperman Barry Bishop voiced such a sentiment 
when he warned that "competition between cities in the post war period will 
be the greatest fight for business and leadership this country has ever 
known." The trip underscored the need to plan and civic leaders returned to 
Dallas with notebooks filled with information to help their city become a 
major American metropolis.58 
Council bought into the planning emphasis and ratified the contract with 
Bartholomew at an August 7 council meeting. Dallas gave Bartholomew 
$22,000 for developing the master plan. Under the terms of the contract, the 
planner would devote A of his time to the plan for the next twenty months. 
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After that meeting, Mayor Rodgers excitedly told a News reporter that Dal­
las appeared on the threshold of solving all of its major civic problems.59 
The city's governing body clearly understood Bartholomew's general vi­
sion of proper urban development as he made frequent trips to Dallas to 
share them with the city plan commission, council and civic groups. The 
planner wanted a "city better balanced in development and more desirable 
socially than we have had." Toward this end, he promoted a planning pro­
gram of improvement focusing on the needs of the entire city and its met­
ropolitan region. He also treated the city as a system of systems needing 
comprehensive and coordinated treatment. Bartholomew proposed a com­
prehensive major street plan and a comprehensive transit system plan, and a 
comprehensive plan for rail, air, highway and water transportation facili­
ties. In addition, the planning document provided for a comprehensive sys­
tem of parks and schools, comprehensive zoning, and the arrangement of 
public buildings. It also offered a comprehensive housing plan for Dallas and 
detailed a plan to improve the city's physical appearance. In addition, Bar­
tholomew and his associates produced reports on a capital expenditure pro­
gram for carrying out the plan and one proposing how best to administer 
the plan.60 
In their first report entitled "Character of the City," the planners exam­
ined the city's history, its physical characteristics, economic and social back­
ground, and municipal finances. They characterized Dallas as a "man-made 
metropolis" and linked its growth as a trade and financial center to the 
expansion of the Southwest, an area that included New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas. The plan explained that only by examining 
past developments could it "gauge the future" and lamented the inability of 
past zoning and planning efforts to "control the total urbanization process" 
for Greater Dallas (see map 5). Early planning efforts, according to the re­
port, had not been comprehensive enough. Comprehensive planning for 
Dallas would promote an orderly future development and bring "the maxi­
mum urban advantage to all citizens at the most reasonable cost."61 
The second report, "Scope of the City Plan," appeared in the same vol­
ume and laid out the broader purposes of the plan which included both eco­
nomic and social betterment. First, it would bring "full and wholesome life" 
to Greater Dallas. It also promised to make Dallas a "convenient and pleas­
ant place to work and live." Third, the plan would foster an attractive city 
more capable of luring new commercial and industrial enterprises. Fourth, it 
promised to promote good economy of city resources. Finally, the new plan 
would encourage "spacious and stable residential neighborhoods."62 
The third report, "Past and Probable Future Population," anticipated 
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growth patterns. It explained the importance of population projections in 
planning the location of future schools, parks, electricity, water and sewage, 
as well as a host of other utilities. The authors of the report thought Dallas 
"too widely scattered from a social science standpoint" and suggested that 
such a trend needed to be halted (see map 6). Toward that end, they recom­
mended the need to establish and enforce "controls over all future urban de-
velopment."63 
The plan's comprehensive approach treated the city as a system of sys­
tems devoting separate reports to these different functions and parts. For in­
stance, report number four proposed a major plan for a more efficient street 
system. It criticized the city's current "haphazard and uncoordinated devel­
opment of the present system" and promoted a system that guaranteed 
greater accessibility to the Central Business District (CBD). At the same 
time, the report reaffirmed the interrelatedness of street planning to zon­
ing, mass transportation, land use and population density. Street planning 
without understanding how other urban elements affected it would not 
succeed.64 
The fifth report focused on the city's public transportation system. It pro­
posed a transit plan that would "provide maximum service in those parts of 
urban areas now well-developed." An improved public transit system 
seemed necessary, according to the report, to promote the health of the Cen­
tral Business District and to combat excessive congestion. The plan empha­
sized the best way to guarantee a coordinated streetcar system was through 
a unified management of that system. It also called for a gradual addition to 
and extension of the city's 230-mile streetcar system. If the recommenda­
tions were followed, the report predicted the development of "a system of 
transit facilities that will provide the best possible transportation for the 
people of the city . .  . that will be harmonious with the other proposals and 
objectives of the master plan."65 
Report number six planned the city's rail, air, highway and water facili­
ties. The object of the report, according to the authors, was "a system of 
these facilities adequate to meet the needs and properly related to other 
components of the future urban area." For instance the planners called for a 
navigation plan for the Trinity River "coordinated with plans for flood con­
trol, soil, water and forest conservation, reclamation, alleviation of stream 
pollution, conservation of wild life, and the storage of water for municipal, 
agricultural, industrial and recreational uses." In regard to railroads the 
plan envisioned a "more harmonious relationship between the railroads and 
urban areas they traverse without any sacrifice in efficiency of railroad oper­
ation." The planners also recommended a comprehensive airport plan of 
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twenty-one airports. The plan for truck traffic included terminals, provi­
sions for heavier and wider pavements, recommendations for truck by-pass 
routes and proper traffic regulation. As with the other reports, planners 
closely coordinated the planning of public transportation facilities with the 
planning of other urban systems.66 
"A System of Parks and Schools," the plan's seventh report, proposed "a 
carefully integrated system of parks and schools to serve the future growth 
of Dallas." After discussing the close relationship of schools and parks to 
neighborhood life, the report also stressed the importance of developing ho­
mogeneous neighborhoods. It specifically called for the development of ad­
ditional neighborhoods for Dallas blacks. Towards this end, planners in­
sisted on the construction of new parks in areas scheduled for postwar black 
development. The report also emphasized that it had been coordinated with 
the findings and recommendations of earlier planning reports on popula­
tion, major streets and transit. Finally, "A System of Parks and Schools" re­
peated a familiar theme when it observed that "a comprehensive system of 
parks and playgrounds must serve all sections of the city and must be so di­
versified as to supply the needs of all age groups."67 
The planners' eighth report, "Land Use," reviewed and analyzed the 
present development of the city, examined the city's zoning ordinance, and 
estimated future land needs. The authors reminded the reader of a common 
theme of the era, that "the city is made up of many small parts, all interre­
lated and interdependent. Unless all are coordinated with the Master City 
Plan," they continued, "resulting maladjustments will impair the effective­
ness of the plan and introduce undesirable elements into the pattern of the 
community." Planners repeated here their commitment to promote "a com­
prehensive, well integrated and well balanced design" of Dallas land use. 
This report also stressed the need for better neighborhoods and argued that 
Dallas should be committed to developing and maintaining fine residential 
areas for "all income groups."68 
In the next planning report, Bartholomew offered a new zoning ordnance 
to promote "a reasonable and well-integrated pattern of land use that would 
be part of the comprehensive master plan." The plan called for eleven differ­
ent land use districts including two for single family housing. The A-l dis­
trict required single family lots of at least 10,000 square feet while district 
A-2 required single family housing on at least 6,000 square foot lots. This at­
tention to single family housing attempted to correct an earlier zoning ordi­
nance that had not included a zoning district for just single family homes. 
Planners noted that their zoning ordinance attempted to give "each particu­
lar land use. . . adequate area in a suitable location" with "the various land 
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uses properly related to all others into that pattern most beneficial to the 
community as a whole." The report concluded that the comprehensive plan 
benefited "the entire city and that in any conflict with individual interest, the 
public welfare should be paramount." Just as earlier planning reports had 
proposed comprehensive street, transit and park and school systems, the 
land use and zoning reports proposed systematic treatment of all the city's 
land use.69 
Possibly the most remarkable of all the reports, number ten, entitled 
"Housing," outlined the first systematic housing policy and program ever 
developed for Dallas. Many of the city's bad housing conditions, according 
to the report, stemmed from "past methods of haphazard or inadequately 
controlled community growth and the failure of the city to adopt definite 
policies for firm control of housing standards." The report criticized Dallas 
housing and suggested that the entire city suffered from neighborhood de­
fects. The reasons were simple, according to the report. "Past housing devel­
opment [had] been left almost entirely to the vagaries of land and building 
promotion and exploitation. No conscious direction has ever been given this 
development, either toward meeting the needs of different ethnic and in­
come groups, or toward controlling and coordinating the physical design 
and location of this growth. Consequently present housing is a patchwork 
of individual projects, bearing little relation to cohesive, unified, and homo­
geneous neighborhoods or to a logical community pattern."70 
Bartholomew particularly worried both about the city's decentralizing 
tendency and its lack of effective neighborhood community. To stop the first 
trend he proposed more adequate subdivision regulation and unified control 
over the area's entire urban area. He also wanted to safeguard current Dallas 
neighborhoods by adopting new housing and building regulations as well as 
a new zoning ordinance. Furthermore, to promote neighborhood stability 
he recommended local government divide the city's residential areas into 
neighborhoods and encourage the establishment of neighborhood associa­
tions to protect the appearance of each neighborhood. He also suggested 
deed restrictions to guarantee "neighborhoods of good character." In addi­
tion, the plan recommended the rehabilitation of blighted neighborhoods 
and the clearance and rebuilding of slum neighborhoods. Bartholomew sug­
gested that limited dividend public service housing corporations could be 
formed to do that task but also proposed additional public housing. The re­
port concluded by noting that "good results can be achieved through coop­
eration and coordination of individual effort" and reminded readers that 
"harmful and piecemeal practices must be curbed."71 
Report number eleven continued the process of focusing on city needs. It 
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provided a plan for the grouping of buildings into a municipal center for 
Dallas. According to the report, such a "well-planned group of public build­
ings would be evidence of well-ordered public business. . . .  " Such a group­
ing would also improve the city's appearance, a topic addressed in report 
number twelve. It recommended placing such a center adjacent to the CBD 
where it would not "constitute an interruption of the more intensive high 
value commercial use of property" and where it could "foster an improved 
use of surrounding [the CBD] property not already fixed in character." That 
report reminded its readers that "It is not enough . . . that this future city be 
an efficient urban machine; it also must be pleasant and attractive place. . .." 
Toward this end, the report examined the relationship of other planning 
phases to the city's appearance and suggested measures to improve the city's 
orderliness and cleanliness. In addition, it surveyed the design and appear­
ance of both public and private properties in the city.72 
The final two reports of the master plan proposed administrative policy 
and practices and a capital expenditure program. The latter recommended 
a twenty-five-year public works program for the entire urban area. The city 
at the time was guided by a six-year capital development program approved 
in 1940. Now the master plan would provide "a basis for coordinating . . . 
improvements, for eliminating duplication, and for insuring that each im­
provement [would] be in scale with the requirements that are placed upon 
it." The report also outlined the basic principles guiding the selection and 
programming of projects.73 
In "Administrative Policy and Practice" Bartholomew identified two de­
velopments that would make the plan a "truly effective instrument that will 
direct the growth of the patterns most beneficial for all citizens." First, he 
urged a strong educational program to promote wide scale understanding of 
the plan and the need for it. Second, he called for "adequate legal powers 
and procedures" to fully implement the plan's various phases. Toward the 
former end he encouraged the publication and distribution of the plan. In 
addition, Bartholomew suggested the establishment of a new citizens' orga­
nization to promote the plan. "Such a large city-wide organization," ac­
cording to Bartholomew, "could include representatives of all groups and 
interests without domination by any."74 
The report also explained the specific legal powers and procedures neces­
sary to implement the plan. It particularly emphasized the need to expand 
the power of the city plan commission from its advisory role. "Only such a 
commission," it warned, "could be representative of the various interests of 
the city" and take the "longview over political and departmental expedi­
ency." Just as the city manager's office coordinated Dallas government, an 
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empowered city plan commission would act "as the coordinating agency for 
all the governmental and private organizations that are engaged in building 
the city."75 The report also stressed the need for better housing and building 
regulations, subdivision control three miles beyond city limits, health regu­
lations for unincorporated areas in the urbanized area; county zoning, a 
state urban redevelopment law, and city mandated neighborhood organiza­
tions that would be "made an advisory arm of city government." In addition 
to these recommendations, the report reasserted the need for "governmental 
unification of the urban area" and suggested that this was the "most impor­
tant measure needed to insure the development of the community in accor­
dance with the Master Plan." This recommendation initiated another 
movement by Dallas leaders to have the wealthy Park Cities of University 
Park and Highland Park join the city.76 
Unlike some interpretations of wartime and postwar planning which 
stressed almost a single-minded emphasis on improving downtown, this 
fourteen volume master plan did not focus solely on the CBD.77 Although 
that section received significant attention so did the neighborhoods. A care­
ful reading of the plan underscores the planners' "belief in the interdepen­
dence and interrelatedness of the city's different parts." A failure to educate 
Dallasites to this reality, according to the plan, had doomed the success of 
earlier planning efforts.78 In order to focus attention on the city as a whole 
rather than its parts, the planners carefully avoided report titles associated 
with specific areas. For instance, Bartholomew produced no report devoted 
solely to the central business district (CBD) nor the levee district nor Oak 
Cliff even though the plan included proposals affecting all these areas. It is 
true that Bartholomew designed the major street plan in part to protect the 
central business district against decline by making it more accessible. The 
plan also called for the redevelopment and revitalization of the deteriorating 
west end of the CBD. And planners proposed to combat blight just outside 
the CBD by promoting the development of a "fine group of public buildings 
with considerable open space and planting." One of the major purposes of 
the master plan was "the development of a compact and stable business dis­
trict, wherein high property values can be maintained over a long period of 
time."79 But the plan had other important purposes, too. 
As we have seen, Bartholomew's report on housing attacked the city's 
"haphazard and heterogeneous development" and emphasized the need to 
promote stable neighborhoods. It also called for better housing for the city's 
poor and minority residents. For Bartholomew and others interested in 
housing during the 1940s, bad housing included more than deteriorated 
dwellings. It also meant a neighborhood environment that promoted alien­
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ation and anomie, rather than a sense of community and concern for the 
larger city. To help promote better citizenship, Bartholomew borrowed from 
Clarence Perry's self-contained neighborhood idea and proposed to divide 
the metropolitan area into eighty neighborhoods. Those units, developed 
around parks or schools, would promote a sense of local community by pro­
viding places for residents to meet and get acquainted. The plan's call for the 
organization of neighborhood protective and improvement associations in 
all the city's residential sections also would encourage more neighborhood 
interaction and civic consciousness. According to Bartholomew, "When the 
people of a neighborhood fully realize the problem and understand mea­
sures that would improve conditions, the first great step will have been taken 
in the preservation and rehabilitation of residential neighborhoods."80 Such 
settings would also help them better understand the interdependence of the 
larger urban unit. 
The report on housing particularly criticized the housing stock for the 
city's nonwhites. Dallas blacks, according to the plan, suffered not only from 
lack of proper neighborhood community but also from horrendous housing 
conditions. Prejudice and discrimination forced Dallas's black citizens, Bar­
tholomew observed, to locate in "the areas of old homes, unsanitary condi­
tions, and generally bad or inadequate facilities." Indeed, Bartholomew 
warned, "The condition of negro housing is one of the most serious prob­
lems confronting the community." Those obsolete areas required mass re­
building while less severely run-down houses needed rehabilitation. To pro­
mote redevelopment, the plan provided specific guidelines on how to rebuild 
one of the city's worst areas, the Alamo neighborhood.81 
Bartholomew also worried that the lack of planned development on the 
city's suburban fringe threatened to replicate "the haphazard and heteroge­
neous development found in the older parts of Dallas."82 Indeed, he empha­
sized that effective planning would not stop at the city limits but would in­
clude Dallas's natural watershed, an approximately 200-square mile area 
that could be expected to be subjected "to some degree of urban develop­
ment in the next 25 years." This area was "physically, socially and economi­
cally a single unit," and required expansion in a "balanced and coherent 
manner in accordance with a unified plan." The master plan, then, did more 
than single out the CBD for its single-minded attention. Rather, it focused 
on developing comprehensive solutions and coordinated systems from 
housing to streets for the entire metropolitan area. To facilitate such ambi­
tious planning, Bartholomew concluded that there "must be a political uni­
fication in some degree."83 
The emphasis on metropolitan planning, then, helped launch a new effort 
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to consolidate the Park Cities with Dallas. As it had done earlier, the DCC 
played a critical role in the movement, providing the funds necessary for a 
massive advertising campaign. The Greater Dallas Citizens Commission, 
organized in January of 1945, actually ran the campaign to merge the cities. 
Officials scheduled an April election to determine if Highland Park, Univer­
sity Park, and another independent North Dallas suburb, Preston Hollow, 
would vote to merge with the city (see map 6). C. F. O'Donnell, earlier chair 
of the DCC and resident of Highland Park, headed the committee composed 
of the area's leading civic leaders. That committee included 200 residents 
from the Park Cities. Of course, the publicity campaign primarily aimed at 
convincing the Park Cities residents to vote for merger, in what the News la­
beled as "one of the most vigorous campaigns in Dallas history."84 Ac­
cording to O'Donnell, it was "difficult to understand how anyone interested 
in his own welfare through orderly and economic progress of our related cit­
ies could possibly see in unification anything but the greater good of all 
people."85 Supporters stressed that the master plan could only be fully real­
ized if unification took place.86 The News, in a series of articles, promoted 
what it called "painless" annexation, arguing that Park Cities' residents 
would not lose their unique way of life after the merger with Dallas and 
hinted that Park Cities' voters would be guilty of "selfishness" if they de­
feated the proposal to join Dallas. Indeed, two days before the consolidation 
election, the Greater Dallas Citizens Commission ran a full-page advertise­
ment pledging to protect the Park Cities' exclusive zoning, police and fire 
services, schools, taxes, parks, water and sewage, streets, and local prohi­
bition. 
Despite the massive campaign and the promises to preserve the Park Cit­
ies' lifestyle, University Park and Highland Park citizens voted against con­
solidation. University Park defeated the measure by 291 votes even though 
its mayor, A. L. Slaughter, supported the measure. Highland Park opposed 
it by 497 votes. Only Preston Hollow agreed to consolidation, by a vote of 
300 to 76. In Dallas, every precinct voted for consolidation. The overall loss 
dealt a hard blow to the DCC and Mayor Rodgers, although the latter 
claimed that he would not give up his push for a Greater Dallas.87 Voters in 
Dallas did approve an amendment to the city charter that allowed the city to 
annex adjoining unincorporated areas with or without consent of property 
owners and adopted another amendment that permitted the city to extend 
its zoning powers three miles beyond the city limits. A day after voters 
passed the amendments, council annexed forty square miles of Dallas 
County territory, including areas around the Park Cities.88 
The city's failure to entice the suburban communities into union did not 
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derail the larger planning movement. Rodgers continued to promote the 
master plan program, terming it "a social trust to be protected against the 
whining and selfish interests." The mayor appreciated the remedial effects of 
the plan in combating further conflict and fragmentation in Dallas because 
it met "the needs of every community and section of the city without favor­
ing one against the other, but with consideration for all."89 That theme reap­
peared when local leaders offered a $40 million bond package, the largest in 
the city's history, in December to carry out some of the recommendations of 
the master plan during the next ten years. 
This bond package reflected a commitment to improve the entire city and 
the impatience of civic leaders to realize the master plan. Bartholomew's ef­
fort had projected development over the next twenty-five years and antici­
pated the construction of public buildings between ten and fifteen years after 
its completion at a total cost of $146,957,000. He estimated the city's cost for 
master plan development at a little under $109 million. Local officials, con­
cerned with the need to employ returning veterans, however, decided to ac­
celerate the funding of the master plan and adopt a much larger initial bond 
package than anticipated by Bartholomew. Although it offered funding for 
some of the businessmen's pet projects, such as a civic auditorium, a public 
market, a livestock arena, and airport improvement, the bond package also 
included proposals for additional schools, fire stations, storm and sanitary 
sewers, waterworks improvement, and a public library. More than $25 mil­
lion of the proposed $40 million went to residential neighborhood needs.90 
According to CCA president R. L. Thomas, "North, South, East and West 
[would] be treated fairly and alike." This might help explain why Dallas res­
idents approved all seventeen bond issues.91 
Civic leaders and the city government had wrestled with what to include 
in the bond program since the previous summer. On August 1, several of the 
city's leading businessmen visited council and requested bonds to cover the 
building of a civic auditorium, public library building, and livestock 
arena—all three buildings proposed by the master plan. Robert L. Thornton 
urged the inclusion of these in an early bond package because they would 
"build the city faster and place us in a better position to compete with other 
cities."92 Debate over whether the bond package should include funding for 
a civic center—and if so, where that would be— delayed the eventual deci­
sion on what to include in the package until October 22, 1945. The two 
largest bond issues were one for $10 million for school construction and an­
other for $7 million for the civic auditorium.93 
Throughout the bond campaign, a campaign that saw no organized op­
position, supporters emphasized how the city desperately needed the bond 
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program to keep up with urban rivals such as Houston, Fort Worth, New 
Orleans, Oklahoma City, and San Antonio. An editorial on the day of the 
election forecast disaster if Dallas citizens failed to approve the bond issue. 
By such action, the News warned, "Dallas would in effect abandon its mag­
nificent city plan while its competing cities are going ahead."94 
As it turned out, the plan and bond issue that passed proved inadequate 
to address the city's immediate needs. Neither had anticipated the city's 
rapid growth during and after the war, nor the annexation of forty square 
miles at this same time. Such action made the plan's street and sewer sched­
ule ineffective from the start.95 Indeed, in the 1940s, the war rather than 
planning proved the most important event influencing the city's future 
development. And it showed both the strengths and the weaknesses of 
the business-civic leadership approach to policy development and urban 
growth. 
World War II brought an economic window of opportunity for Dallas. 
The city's well-organized business community, aided by efficient and coop­
erative city government, helped it to take advantage of many opportunities 
coming from war preparations. The war allowed the city to pursue its inter­
est in aviation and in the military. Dallas leaders not only committed their 
energies to enlarging the city's airport and making it the aviation capital of 
the Southwest, but they also initiated an aggressive campaign for the aircraft 
industry in the 1930s, having promoted airplane manufacturing since at 
least the late 1920s.96 In addition, city leaders offered Hensley Field, devel­
oped in 1928, as a lure to secure a military base for the city. Just as civic lead­
ers used the war to promote their master plan ideals, so they used wartime 
preparation to boost these other concerns. 
The business community's acquisition of the North American Aviation 
airplane plant proved one of its major successes. Chamber of commerce 
leaders had seriously courted airplane manufacturers since March of 1940. 
They emphasized the city's good weather, "open shop" traditions, and the 
willingness of local officials to cooperate with the company's needs. But 
Dallas secured its plant only after President Franklin D. Roosevelt fully com­
mitted the federal government to expanding the aircraft industry. In May of 
1940, the president announced a production goal of 50,000 airplanes annu­
ally and mandated government assistance to promote that goal. Roosevelt 
authorized the creation of the Defense Plant Corporation and provided large 
financial assistance to that corporation to help it build plants for aircraft 
manufacturers. Defense concerns dictated that the aircraft industry decen­
tralize from the coasts and locate new plants inland between the Allegheny 
and Rocky Mountain ranges. Except for these restrictions, the aircraft com­
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panies appeared to have freedom to choose the sites for the new factories. 
Responding to this new opportunity, Thornton, along with Ben Critz, gen­
eral manager of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, flew to California and 
visited with officials of the North American Aviation and Consolidated Air­
craft (soon to merge with Hall Aluminum Aircraft) companies in an attempt 
to secure a new plant. Others on the special committee to secure aircraft in­
dustry included Nathan Adams, Fred Florence, C. F. O'Donnell, Z. E. Mar­
vin Jr., and Henry S. Miller.9^ 
Their efforts were successful. On August 18,1940, the News announced 
that the North American Aviation Corporation had selected a site just west 
of the Dallas city limits next to Hensley Field to locate a $7 million airplane 
factory.98 Civic and government leaders played a critical role in securing the 
plant. Chamber of commerce leaders worked hard to educate factory offi­
cials on the advantages of locating a plant near Dallas. In addition, they pro­
vided aerial, topographic, and soil surveys for the airplane company based 
in Inglewood, California. Chamber of commerce leaders also negotiated 
options from the twenty-seven property owners of the 140 acre site needed 
for the factory. City council spent $25,000 to expand Hensley Field by 104 
acres and built a connecting runway between the plant and Hensley Field's 
existing runways. Dallas County Commissioners promised to provide nec­
essary utilities and build the needed roads to accommodate the traffic. Offi­
cials in nearby Grand Prairie also cooperated and agreed to supply water for 
the plant and to establish a public housing authority to help address the an­
ticipated housing demand. All these groups clearly understood the eco­
nomic value such a plant would bring to "Greater Dallas."99 
Groundbreaking for the plant took place on September 28, 1940, for 
what the Dallas Chamber of Commerce called "the greatest industrial de­
velopment in the history of Texas." The factory complex, according to 
chamber officials, would eventually employ 12,000 workers, six times as 
many currently employed in the Ford Assembly Plant, the city's largest man­
ufacturing concern. The main building, one of seven structures erected, was 
a windowless, air-conditioned plant, which encompassed 885,000 square 
feet of floor space. Plant A, which produced AT Trainer Planes, opened 
April 7, 1941. By the end of the year, North American employed more 
than seven thousand workers, a figure that would increase to over 39,000 
by 1943 with the addition of Plant B to produce the B-24 Liberator. The 
$35 million undertaking not only boosted the economy, it also provided 
unprecedented job opportunities for women, blacks, and unskilled labor. 
As early as 1942, more than half the workers had never before been em­
ployed in a factory. That percentage increased as more blacks and women 
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entered the work force. In 1944, more than 13,000 women and some 2,400 
blacks worked at the mammoth airplane factory.100 
An equally impressive vocational program helped facilitate the massive 
labor requirements. Workers clearly benefited from the cooperation be­
tween North American Aviation and local and federal officials. The federal 
government provided $125,000 worth of equipment for a training school lo­
cated at Fair Park. The Dallas Technical High School, a North American 
Aviation defense school, and a local vocational training center for blacks 
supplemented the Fair Park undertaking. The federally funded technical ed­
ucation, then, added immeasurably to the city's economic base by training 
thousands as skilled industrial workers.101 It also provided new and better 
work opportunities for the city's labor force. 
In addition to North American Aviation, the city secured two other air­
plane manufacturers during the war. In 1942, the chamber of commerce par­
ticipated in the acquisition of the Lockheed Aircraft Modification plant for 
Love Field. This plant modified the Lockheed Vega planes and was, ac­
cording to chamber of commerce officials, the largest of its kind in the 
United States. Like the North American Plant, it more than doubled its size 
during the war.102 The Southern Aircraft Corporation also located an air­
plane parts plant in suburban Garland, northeast of the city.103 
Other industries benefited from defense preparations as well. For in­
stance, the Defense Plant Corporation built a $3 million diesel factory plant 
in Garland for the Guiberson Company. Contracts for ordnance production 
went to several manufacturers. Even established industries like the city's 
clothing manufacturers benefited from military orders. By March of 1941, 
well before America had entered the war, defense mobilization had pro­
duced more than $91 million in defense contracts for Dallas firms.104 
Defense mobilization tripled Dallas County's industrial payroll between 
1940 and 1943, allowing the chamber of commerce to claim that Dallas was 
"the war capital of the Southwest." When the numbers included nearby Fort 
Worth as well as Dallas, they were truly astounding. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reported that through September of 1943, $115 million dollars had 
been spent in the Dallas-Fort Worth area by the federal government on the 
expansion of war facilities. It also found that officials had awarded $lV2 bil­
lion in contracts to Dallas industry through December of 1943. Approxi­
mately 90 percent of that went to the aircraft industry in the area, which em­
ployed 85,000 aircraft workers.105 
In addition to the rapid increase of industry due to mobilization, Dallas 
also benefited from the expansion of the military presence in the city. As 
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with the defense industry, this did not just happen but resulted from booster 
efforts of civic leaders and a cooperative city government.106 For example, 
local efforts played an important role in the Navy's decision to locate one of 
its Reserve Aviation Squadrons in Dallas. The chamber of commerce cele­
brated this announcement in August of 1940, and pointed out that it had re­
sulted from a major campaign by that business organization to obtain a big 
training base for the city. General Manager Ben Critz and Industrial Man­
ager Clyde Wallis of the chamber of commerce worked closely with Navy of­
ficials and prepared them briefs on the city's advantages. To secure the naval 
airfield, the city of Dallas deeded approximately thirty acres of its Hensley 
Field property, located on the opposite side of the runways from the North 
American Aviation company, to that military branch. The $1 million facility 
provided a practice training air field for Naval reserve flyers and would also 
serve during the war as an elimination flight school for aviation recruits. 
Twenty-five officers and 150 enlisted men would call the base home, as 
would four squadrons made up of 608 men.107 
City leaders also secured the Army's Eighth Service Command, the first 
major U.S. command ever located in Dallas. That body administered the en­
tire army complex for a five-state region and was called the Southwest's 
greatest and largest business organization. When the government changed 
the territory that this command serviced, dropping Arizona and Colorado 
from its region and adding Arkansas and Louisiana, Dallas leaders saw an 
opportunity to take it from San Antonio. Armed with facts and figures to 
convince Army officials that Dallas now was the geographic center for the 
Command, chamber officials undertook an intense lobbying effort to secure 
the military plum. The Army's announcement of its intention to move this 
multimillion-dollar business to Dallas in September of 1942 made hard­
working civic leaders ecstatic. Not only did it bring in an additional 2,500 
newcomers to the city and provide a monthly income of $250,000 but, ac­
cording to chamber officials, it elevated Dallas to becoming "one of the prin­
cipal military cities of the nation."108 
The acquisition of the Fifth Ferrying Group, Air Transport Command, 
at Love Field in 1942 also profoundly impacted the city's postwar aviation 
development. The Air Transport Command operated a vast ferrying and 
transport network that flew planes, men, and cargo wherever they were 
needed throughout the world. Federal officials selected Dallas as one of the 
nine nerve centers for this network. As its operations expanded at Love Field 
in 1943, the army offered to make more than $6 million in improvements at 
the air field over the next three years if the city secured the necessary land. 
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That decision persuaded local officials to rethink aviation plans for the post­
war world, disrupting proposals to abandon Love as the city's major airfield 
for a new airport southeast of the city.109 
Civic leaders had established Love Field in 1917 as a way of securing an 
aviation training center for the Army Air Corps. The next year, when the 
Army declared the field surplus, fifteen local businessmen purchased it and 
ran it as a private airfield. The city bought Love Field on the recommenda­
tion of the Ulrickson report, issued in 1927. 
Just as they had done in a number of other matters, civic leaders rather 
than government officials initiated the movement anticipating a great avia­
tion future for the city. Dallas's commitment to municipal airport ownership 
appears to have been part of a national trend characteristic of the late 1920s. 
Encouraged by Charles Lindbergh's successful flight across the Atlantic in 
1927—which helped demonstrate the airplane's potential—municipalities 
throughout the country turned to airport ownership. Dallas refused to stop 
with mere ownership, however, as voters passed a $300,000 aviation bond is­
sue to improve the airfield. By 1934, the city manager reported that Love 
Field had been transformed "from an unfenced weed-covered field into a 
modern airport, fully equipped with the most modern apparatus for control 
of air traffic and given its highest ra t ing. . . by the United States Department 
of Commerce."110 
Love Field deteriorated as the Depression took its toll on the city and as 
reform government gave way to the Catfish politicians. However, the DCC 
led a movement to improve the field in 1938. Working closely with the cham­
ber of commerce, it secured voter approval of a $300,000 general obligation 
bond for airport improvement that year.111 
About that same time, Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act of 
1938, which specifically designated federal money for airport development. 
When Dallas officials applied for some of that money, the Civil Aeronautics 
Authority (CAA) suggested they investigate the possibility of developing a 
joint regional airport with Fort Worth, a city less than thirty miles from Big 
D. Civic leaders, who had proposed a joint airport in 1927, agreed to look 
into the possibilities but smaller Fort Worth balked at the idea, fearing the 
larger Dallas would dominate any joint airport.112 
Unwilling to give up, the CAA attempted to coerce Dallas and Fort Worth 
into the cooperative venture by inviting tiny Arlington, midway between 
Dallas and Fort Worth, to sponsor the proposed regional airport. Fearful of 
being left out, Dallas and Fort Worth joined with Arlington and agreed to 
establish Midway Airport in October 1941. According to the arrangement, 
the airlines would purchase 1,000 acres of land and deed it to the three cit­
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ies, which in turn would form a corporation to erect hangars, repair shops, 
and a terminal. Federal funds would construct the runways and control 
tower.113 
Despite the agreement, the cooperative venture never took place. Dallas 
Mayor J. Woodall Rodgers and Fort Worth's leading citizen, newspaper 
publisher Amon Carter, feuded over the final location of the airport's ad­
ministration building after the plans were altered to make that building 
more convenient (and closer) to Fort Worth. Dallas newspapers vilified Car-
ter's actions and worked hard to whip up a public frenzy against Fort Worth. 
Although the Army proceeded to build the airfield with Arlington's sponsor­
ship under the Landing Areas for National Defense Program, neither Fort 
Worth nor Dallas participated in this venture.114 
Because of the city's decision not to participate in Midway Airport, Love 
Field remained the city's principal airport even though it appeared to be in­
adequate for larger planes coming into service. Wedged in between Bach-
man Lake on the north and neighborhoods and business areas on the south, 
east, and west, Love Field's future seemed unclear. That might help explain 
why Mayor Rodgers was so interested in having Harland Bartholomew in­
vestigate the city's airport situation after the planner agreed to do the city's 
master plan. Realizing that aviation played a critical role in the city's future, 
and fearful that Dallas had fallen behind, Rodgers claimed that of all the 
parts to be examined by the master planner, "airport improvements have the 
No. 1 place on the city's master plan."115 
After studying the matter, Bartholomew agreed with Dallas leaders' op­
position to the Midway Airfield, arguing that the idea of developing an air­
port nineteen miles from the CBD was not "practical. . . for intensive local 
use." Bartholomew, who already worried about Dallas becoming "a scat­
tered, abnormally decentralized city," thought such a suburban airport 
would accelerate the trend. "No large city has its main airline depot at such 
a great distance from the business district or from the center of population," 
Bartholomew told a local newspaper.116 In addition, the planner found the 
airport "too small in size" for use as the city's superairport. 
Bartholomew also believed that Love Field had a limited future because 
too much money would be needed to make it the city's future superairport. 
According to the planner, Dallas would be able to secure much greater and 
far superior air facilities "for the same amount of money" it would take to 
improve the city's current airport. As a result, he recommended that the city 
provide minimum expenditures to maintain Love Field as an adequate air­
port but construct a new one as soon as possible.117 
Bartholomew recommended a site in southwest Dallas in the Lake June 
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area for the superairport. That airport would cover 4,400 acres and include 
10,000-foot runways and enough room to expand them to 15,000 feet. Such 
massive size would allow Dallas to accommodate the largest air passenger 
and cargo ships imaginable. Located about twelve miles from the CBD and 
a twenty-minute drive from downtown, the site fell within the city's water­
shed in what Bartholomew viewed as the city's natural metropolitan region. 
Midway Airport was located outside that region.118 
At the very time Bartholomew offered his airport plan, the Army made its 
announcement about improving Love Field. Local officials accepted the Ar-
my's proposal shortly after it approved the acquisition of the new airport 
site in southwest Dallas. Despite this commitment to developing an all-new 
"superairport," the Army's expenditures on Love Field, just a ten-minute 
drive from downtown Dallas, clearly revived interest in making Love Field 
the city's primary airport after the war. According to the News, the city de­
cided to hold the Lake June airport in reserve until it had need for 10,000-
foot runways. Dallas leaders saw the military's willingness to invest in Love 
Field as another window of opportunity for postwar economic develop­
ment and took it. This was particularly important because for some time the 
city had seen itself as a major air center and feared losing its lead to other 
rivals. 
Dallas businessmen, then, working through the chamber of commerce 
and the DCC, provided strong and unified leadership when responding to 
the opportunities brought on by World War II. Civic leaders, not local gov­
ernment, had taken the lead in securing an aircraft factory.119 Civic leaders 
also provided both time and money to planning endeavors and to attract de­
fense industry and military operations to Dallas. Aided by a government 
committed to the same priorities, the city prospered as it had never pros­
pered before. Fighting the Germans, Japanese, and even Fort Worthians uni­
fied the city and created a consensus that manifested itself in the limited op­
position the CCA council faced during the first half of the 1940s. In 1941 the 
so-called "harmony council" did face opposition from the Dallas Citizens 
Association, a group led by W. F. Jacoby, former director of the parks, and 
former utilities supervisor Joe Leopold, closely associated with the Legion 
of Honor. It attacked the CCA slate as under bankers' control, criticized 
council for turning the city over to foreign experts, and suggested implicitly 
that the DCC now controlled council and the city. Despite its promise to re­
turn government to the common working people, the Dallas Citizens Asso­
ciation could not even secure the endorsement of the AFL. According to Bill 
Harris, head of the local union, the CCA had "come to have a better under­
standing with organized labor [and] have recognized us in many ways." All 
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of the city's newspapers endorsed the CCA slate, and the News noted that 
the CCA had produced a "remarkably successful city government which 
had come far closer than its predecessors to achieving the true objectives of 
council manager government." The election ending the campaign termed 
the "dullest in years" saw a complete landslide for the CCA slate, with its 
weakest candidates drawing more than 65 percent of the vote.120 
The CCA, cooperating closely with the DCC, proved very successful 
throughout the war years. In 1943, CCA incumbents ran unopposed for of­
fice, the first time that had happened in the city's history. Trying to explain 
the development, the News suggested several reasons for the lack of a politi­
cal contest, including the war and "an apparent public confidence in the 
present administration."121 Two years later, the CCA slate ran unopposed 
again. Although several CCA opponents tried to get up a rival slate ticket, 
they found few willing to run against the popular councilmen. Jack Barr, a 
Dallas contractor, explained the dominant attitude in the following way: 
"We have a competent group of city officials. I don't believe that there is any­
one that is not in accord with the idea of a master plan for Dallas, and the 
present administration are [sic] the logical ones to carry on the work which 
has been going on for sometime."122 Rapid growth and plans calling for the 
development of the entire city helped promote council's popularity. The lack 
of public conflict between members of council also proved useful in pro­
moting an image of a harmonious council truly interested in serving the city 
as a whole. And the fact that the war had produced a booming economy cer­
tainly did little to discredit local civic leadership or local government. 
The CCA's new success, then, appeared closely linked to the ability of the 
city's business leadership in using the war to improve the Dallas economy 
and plan for the city's future. The DCC seemed a most effective organization 
in identifying and responding to city needs. Civic leaders had called for a 
new comprehensive master plan since the late 1920s, but only when the DCC 
made it a top priority did the city secure one. Moreover, the extended news­
paper coverage of civic leaders associated with the DCC and chamber of 
commerce working feverishly to secure defense industry and military bases 
for the area lent great credibility to civic leaders' claims that they were in­
deed working for the city as a whole. The emphasis on planning during the 
war, with its systematic treatment of the city, further reinforced that vision. 
In some ways, revitalization of the CCA and the development of the DCC 
could not have come at a better time. Because of the nature of the war years, 
which limited the type of programs the city could undertake; the general 
wartime mentality, which promoted consensus; and the city's ability to ben­
efit from wartime economic opportunities—for these reasons both the DCC 
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and the CC A's emphasis on their type of city as a whole approach gained va­
lidity. Yet the legacy of that approach was not without its faults. The city's 
treatment of needy groups, particularly the poor and racial minorities, sug­
gests the limitations of a city-as-a-whole strategy aimed at growth and de­
velopment. 
• 6

Responding to Urban Problems: 
Limitations of the 
City-as-a-Whole Strategy 
v^ivic leaders and government officials in Dallas did not totally ignore ur­
ban social problems such as bad housing and poverty, but their emphasis on 
the city as their primary unit of concern and their own peculiar notion of 
what best benefited the city as a whole clearly shaped their response to those 
problems. Prioritizing the city as a whole above the individual needs of mi­
norities (such as African Americans or Mexican Americans) or other "inter­
est groups" (such as labor) unquestionably limited how civic leaders and 
government officials responded to social problems and group needs. For in­
stance, civic leaders defined bad housing as a problem not because it injured 
the individual spirit and inhibited citizens' ability to look out for their fam­
ily. Rather, it drew civic attention because bad housing promoted sickness 
and criminality—forces that adversely affected urban stability. Civic lead­
ers' focus on the city also helps explain their relative inattention to the plight 
of Dallas workers and their fierce opposition to union organizers. Since the 
booster rhetoric of the city emphasized ordered growth above all else, gov­
ernment addressed urban social problems most expeditiously when they 
seemed to promote disorder. But when "solutions" threatened to create tur­
moil and dissension among the white body politic, civic leaders withdrew or 
severely modified those solutions. The city's response to black crime and the 
black community's call for black police is one example of the limits of city 
action. 
When the Progressive Voters League (PVL) in 1937 made the employ­
ment of blacks as city policemen a top priority, it was not the first black orga­
nization to do so. African Americans had been calling for such employment 
since 1888, but their voting strength in the council election in 1937 made 
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such demands more viable than ever before. As we have seen, the PVL en­
dorsed the Forward Dallas Association in 1937 for two reasons. First it had 
been pleased with the successes of the incumbent council in meeting black 
needs. Second, Forward Dallas promised to do more and pledged to employ 
black policemen, build more parks and schools for blacks, and promote bet­
ter housing and additional city jobs for African Americans.1 
Several months after the new council took office, African Americans 
started lobbying with council members for the promised black police. The 
argument they used to convince city lawmakers to employ black policemen 
had nothing to do with their rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend­
ment; rather, they offered a "city as a whole" argument. Dallas had a horren­
dous murder rate— one of the highest per capita in the nation. In 1936, Dal­
las experienced 105 homicides: blacks accounted for 79 of those murdered, 
and all but 5 had been killed by other blacks. Groups such as the Interde­
nominational Ministerial Alliance, the Negro Chamber of Commerce, and 
the PVL all claimed that the employment of African American police to pa­
trol black districts could curtail these embarrassing numbers as well as di­
minish other black-on-black crime.2 
Although council had discussed the issue in August 1937 during an execu­
tive session, City Manager Hal Mosely appeared reluctant to act without 
specific orders from the city's governing body. But that group, fearful of 
alienating some white voters, wanted Mosely to make the final decision and 
viewed it as an administrative matter. Meanwhile, Dallas African Ameri­
cans saw no black police, due to what the Times Herald called a serious case 
of "buck passing."3 That apparently changed after Dr. R. T. Hamilton of the 
Negro Chamber of Commerce appeared before city council on September 
10 and presented a petition signed by 260 of the city's white civic leaders call­
ing for the employment of black police to stem crime in black neighbor­
hoods. Council voted 5-2 to instruct City Manager Mosely to experiment 
with the employment of black police. Councilman Starr Armstrong, a CCA 
member, made the motion, stating that "Dallas will be backward if we do 
not do this." Mosely feared council's action might promote citywide dis­
ruption by unhappy whites and "cause the old KKK to be revamped," but 
obeyed the council's request and ordered the civil service board to immedi­
ately prepare exams for blacks to take for the police force the following 
week. Police Chief Robert Jones announced that at least seven African 
Americans should be hired so a pair would be available each shift and a re­
serve available if needed.4 
Initial reaction to council's decision appeared muted and resigned. The 
Dallas Journal editorialized that it believed council's decision a "mistake" 
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under the "existing conditions" but now would support the act. Early oppo­
sition came from George K. Butcher, former Texas KKK head, who on Sep­
tember 16 called for council to rescind the recommendation. Butcher feared 
that if the city hired black police that black leaders would next want black 
fireman, black meter readers, and black city health workers. Despite his agi­
tation, the Dallas Morning News reported on September 19 that opponents 
of the plan, many of whom resided in Oak Cliff, had failed to show much 
strength.5 
Opposition to the use of black police increased several days later, how­
ever, after lumberman George W. Owens got into the fray by claiming that 
"this is a white man's city and should be kept that way." According to Ow­
ens, "It is time to say we won't stand for Negroes tagging our wives and be­
ing insolent." The lumberman took two actions to halt the hiring of black 
policeman. First, he started a petition campaign, circulating a hundred peti­
tions throughout the city. Second, he filed a temporary injunction to halt the 
civil service exam for blacks scheduled for later that week. In his request for 
the injunction, Owens pointed out that Dallas was an essentially southern 
city bound by southern ways in race matters. To employ black police officers 
would, according to Owens, create an intolerable condition, causing strife 
and friction and resulting in lower property values. Owens also claimed that 
because the city normally administered the civil service exam annually, it 
was illegal to give it before the end of the year. Justice Tom Ball of the Forti­
eth Judicial District Court in Waxahachie granted the temporary injunction 
and scheduled a hearing over a permanent injunction for October 4.6 
The ruling and delay seemed to give new momentum to black police op­
ponents. Shortly after the injunction former governor O. B. Colquitt spoke 
out against the employment of black police, claiming it would cause "a dan­
gerous situation and would be certain to cause serious trouble" by inflaming 
racial prejudice. He argued, "It is our duty to treat Negroes fairly and to see 
that they are properly cared for but it is a serious mistake to start granting 
them equality. The appointment of Negro policemen would be the entering 
wedge toward social equality. City officials should be taught that such cater­
ing to Negro votes won't be tolerated in Dallas."7 
Three days after the temporary injunction, the Times Herald reported 
that Owens had secured between 7,000 and 10,000 signatures protesting 
council's action. The same day political columnist Barry Bishop of the News 
wrote about what he called a "practical revolt of constituents" over the pro­
posed employment of black police. Despite the continued support of a vari­
ety of whites including the Dallas Council of Federated Church Women, city 
council backed off when it saw the large resistance. The Times Herald did 
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not help matters when it ran the headline "Police Strike Rumored if Negro 
Cops Hired," even though the Journal reported that most Dallas police fa­
vored the hiring of black policemen. The Times Herald, which saw the effort 
to employ blacks as nothing but an attempt to pay a debt for black support 
in the last election, also reported that the local Ku Klux Klan played up the 
threat of black police when recruiting new members.8 
In response to the growing pressure, council rescinded its recommenda­
tion to the city manager on September 28,1937, by a vote of 7-2. Only the 
original sponsors of the resolution, Starr Armstrong and Emil Corenbleth, 
opposed the order to rescind and allow Dallas to join Houston, San Anto­
nio, Beaumont, Corpus Christi, Galveston, and Austin as Texas cities al­
ready employing black policemen. In explaining why he now voted against 
a resolution he had helped pass, Mayor Sprague explained that "too many 
people don't want this carried out."9 While it will never be clear how many 
actually disapproved, it is quite true that those who did threatened to dis­
rupt the city if leaders did not follow their will, something taken seriously in 
an image-conscious city trying to recover from the Great Depression. In or­
der to stem the possibility of disorder by the racists fiercely combating the 
city manager's decree, council reversed itself and ignored the pleas of the 
black community for justice. 
The city's response to its black housing problem, although more compli­
cated, also reflected a concern with not antagonizing whites as well as a de­
sire to improve the horrible housing conditions of blacks. Again, local offi­
cials appeared motivated by a wish to improve the city as a whole rather than 
to correct injustices suffered by blacks. This approach clearly affected the 
nature of the city's public housing movement. As late as the 1930s, blacks 
lived in every census tract in the city, in part because 25 percent of that race 
provided domestic help for whites and resided in servants quarters on their 
white employers' lots. Most blacks, however, were confined to designated 
neighborhoods throughout the city (see map 3). The Hall Street-Thomas 
Avenue neighborhood in North Dallas grew into one of the city's largest 
areas. Other districts included Elm Thicket in extreme North Dallas near 
Love Field, Boggy Bayou and Wheatley Place in South Dallas, and a black 
section in Oak Cliff. Numerous Dallas blacks also lived in an East Dallas 
"black belt," close to the nearby mansions of Munger Place, one of the city's 
most prestigious addresses.10 
Many blacks resided in ramshackle "shotgun" houses, narrow buildings 
that had rooms of equal width lined up one behind the other, allowing access 
through doorways without provision of a side hall or some other room, such 
as a side-galley kitchen, that could be used as a hallway. The name came 
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from the fact that one could fire a shotgun from the front of the house out 
through the back, through all rooms, provided that the doors were open. A 
1925 survey of black housing in the city by the Civic Federation found 6,723 
units for African Americans. Field agents inspected 20 percent of those 
homes and rated 51 percent of them as barely habitable or completely unfit 
for habitation. Sixty-six percent of all black housing had no bath, toilet, or 
indoor water.11 Little changed during the next fifteen years. The first housing 
census for Dallas in 1940 discovered 13,789 dwelling units for blacks with 80 
percent of those units ranked substandard.12 
Early on, leaders realized that such housing posed problems for the city 
as a whole in two ways. First, inadequate black housing produced disease 
and bad citizens. The civic textbook, Our City—Dallas, written for the Kes­
sler Plan Association in 1927 by Justin F. Kimball and required reading for 
the city's fifth graders, made this point in its chapter on "Zoning and Hous­
ing": since "many of the colored people work in the homes of the whites," 
Kimball observed, "the importance of good housing of the negro is a very vi­
tal matter to the welfare of white homes since ill-housed blacks could carry 
contagious diseases such as diphtheria, scarlet fever, and tuberculosis to the 
homes of their employers." Kimball went on to tell about such an incident 
involving scarlet fever, concluding, "We white folks of the south need, not 
only for humane reasons to our colored neighbors, but also for our own pro­
tection and the protection of our children," to see "that our colored people 
have decent, wholesome, clean homes in which to live and raise our chil­
dren." The textbook also called for Dallas to provide new opportunities for 
blacks to become homeowners, since "the home-owning negro is a good cit­
izen and can be depended on to uphold the law and to support the institu­
tions of the state and the city." Kimball concluded by emphasizing the need 
to open areas for black housing—for humble homes as well as upscale ones. 
"We white people need this for the benefit of our city," he concluded, and for 
"our own homes as well as the benefit of the negroes themselves."13 In an 
even more forceful statement about the "city as a whole" thesis, Kimball 
warned that "every such congested, overcrowded, unhealthful center is like 
a canker or eating sore on our fair city. The rest of our city can no more live 
and grow and prosper with such a condition, than our body can be well 
when it has as angry, bleeding inflamed sore on some part of it. The rest of 
the body will be injured in health and strength; so will the rest of our city."14 
The other "problem" presented by bad and inadequate housing was that 
it encouraged blacks to move into white neighborhoods. The expansion of 
blacks into white areas in Oak Cliff, North Dallas, and South Dallas had 
helped give birth to the powerful Ku Klux Klan in the city during the early 
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1920s.15 Even with the Klan's decline by 1925, tensions remained. Violence 
erupted when African Americans started moving into the 2300 block of 
Caddo Street in North Dallas. Vandals bombed Moses Stenor's home in late 
February 1927, one of four attempts within a month to wreck the homes of 
blacks moving into the area.16 In 1929, the News reported that whites had 
tried bombings, burnings, and near riots to stem the expansion of blacks 
into their neighborhoods.17 
Throughout the twenties the city responded to this so-called problem by 
passing racial zoning legislation, promoting racial covenants, and blaming 
unscrupulous real estate agents for causing the trouble. As we have seen, as 
early as 1916, city council approved zoning legislation providing for racial 
segregation by blocks. Council enacted the law to prevent conflict and ill 
feeling between black and white citizens. With the exception of servants 
quarters, neither whites nor blacks could live in a block designated for the 
other race. Both landlords and tenants could be fined as much as $200 a day 
for breaking the law.18 One year later the Texas Supreme Court struck down 
the city's entire zoning ordinance because it violated the "natural right of 
property owners." The U.S. Supreme Court also ruled racial zoning invalid 
in its 1917 decision of Buchanan v. barely. The city passed another segrega­
tion ordinance in 1921, however, attempting to circumvent the court ruling. 
That law gave the board of appeals on zoning matters the responsibility for 
residential segregation. If black or white property owners in a block gave 
written consent to designate the block either white or black, officials could 
record the decision in the county deed book. Only after three-fourths of the 
block's residents requested it could the block's racial characteristic be al­
tered. In 1927 city council passed an ordinance strengthening the power of 
racial covenants, which restricted the selling of black property to whites. Ac­
cording to the new ordinance, it was "unlawful to make use of any such 
property so restricted." Three years later, when civic leaders amended the 
city's charter to adopt council-manager government, it reaffirmed residen­
tial segregation by securing section 321, which gave the city power "to pro­
vide for the use of separate blocks for residences... by members of the white 
and colored races."19 
Despite this emphasis on legalizing de jure segregation, civic leaders ac­
knowledged that in order to preserve segregation realtors had to provide 
decent housing for blacks. Such a theme appeared in Justin KimbalPs civics 
textbook. Adequate housing for blacks, the book observed, was "one of the 
most importantly vital questions in city planning in Dallas. If suitable areas 
for good negro housing are not provided by wise city planning," Kimball 
Responding to Urban Problems • 153 
warned, "then not only will the welfare of the negroes be injured, but white 
districts will be blighted in values, the health and wealth of whites lessened, 
and worst of all, friction and misunderstanding between the races arise." 
Segregation would only work if the city provided blacks ample room to de­
velop their own housing, something that did not happen in the 1920s.20 
Conditions only worsened after the Depression. A 1938 city survey of 
nineteen slum areas found 3,334 of the 3,882 structures studied to be sub­
standard. Forty-three percent of black homes in the Hall Street-Thomas 
Avenue area examined had no indoor toilet, while 31 percent of the dwell­
ings contained no inside water. Another survey found that 30 percent of 
black homes were without electricity, while 83 percent were located on un­
paved streets.21 
Such conditions, along with the equally appalling housing for poor 
whites and Mexican Americans, presented a real dilemma to leaders who 
believed that bad housing threatened the welfare of the city as a whole. As 
early as October 1933, there appeared to be some interest in developing a 
nonprofit corporation to build housing for the city's needy, as allowed by the 
Housing Division of the Public Works Administrations (P W A). That federal 
agency provided 85 percent of the loan for low-cost housing at 4 percent in­
terest. However, when this program stalled in Dallas and the rest of the na­
tion, PWA officials decided to build low-cost housing and lease it to local of-
ficials.22 
Despite some interest in the PWA's limited-dividend program, local lead­
ers did not initiate a movement for local public housing when it became 
available through the PWA. Even though dreadful housing conditions had 
been documented by a WPA Real Property Survey in 1934, and even though 
city officials concerned with "the city as a whole" ran local government, 
public housing came to Dallas only after PWA officials approached M. N. 
Chrestman, local lawyer and former member of the Texas Relief Commis­
sion, about assuming leadership of a public housing movement for Dal­
las. Two PWA engineers had already made an investigation of the city and 
concluded that blacks desperately needed public housing.23 The News ap­
plauded the movement, editorializing, "There are fewer greater civic ser­
vices than the elimination of living conditions which breed crime from squa­
lor and misery."24 
Chrestman agreed to head a public housing committee and invited a 
group of local civic and business leaders to work with the federal govern­
ment and investigate the city's housing needs and locate adequate sites for 
the projects. The committee included six whites and two blacks. Although it 
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appears the PWA had plans to develop a black housing project, the commit­
tee recommended the development of two projects, one for whites and one 
for blacks, to avoid the appearance of giving special privilege to blacks.25 
From the beginning, that council planned to build separate housing proj­
ects for blacks and whites. Few could disagree about the need for additional 
housing, since the real property survey had found an acute housing shortage 
in Dallas with overcrowding in 22 percent of all homes. A very conservative 
estimate based on the 1934 Real Property Inventory concluded that the city 
required a minimum of 1,843 new units. The housing committee wanted $3 
million in federal aid for a 200-unit project for whites and a 200-unit project 
for blacks. Black public housing, according to local officials, deserved top 
priority, but that changed when they found it almost impossible to secure an 
appropriate site. Although relatively inexpensive vacant land existed within 
the city limits, local officials stubbornly refused to look at those areas, fear­
ing white protest if officials opened up a new black residential area. As a re­
sult, the housing committee focused on securing building sites in already es­
tablished black areas. The committee found a site in the Hall Street—Thomas 
Avenue area but feared that title problems in a location owned by fifty differ­
ent people would delay the acquisition of the area at a time when the PWA 
wanted to act swiftly.26 
Despite acknowledging that blacks suffered a much greater proportion of 
bad housing than whites, the local housing committee requested that the 
PWA build the city's first public housing project for whites only. That proj­
ect would be located on an 18-acre vacant tract in North Dallas. Most 
agreed with a News editorial that lamented the decision to erect a white 
project before one for blacks, since "there is a wider spread of inadequate 
housing and sanitation for the black than the white population."27 But the 
city's color line, and local officials' fear that any breach of it might cause dis­
ruption and turmoil that would hurt the city, doomed the PWA project for 
blacks. 
Shortly after the housing project got underway in December, the PWA 
appointed the Dallas Advisory Committee on Housing to select tenants, to 
provide a local liaison between the PWA and city government, and to supply 
advice on the project's management.28 Members of that group included 
banker Joe E. Lawther, department store owner Edward Titche, Dr. Justin F. 
Kimball, and two women, Catherine Hanna and Sarah C. Moore. Nathan 
Adams, president of the city's largest bank, headed the committee.29 Al­
though that committee continued to articulate the need for a black PWA 
project, a curtailment of funds doomed public housing for blacks under 
PWA sponsorship. 
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The PWA completed its 181-unit white-only project in 1937. Develop­
ment costs and the broader strategy of public housing in the 1930s, empha­
sizing rehabilitating the slum dwellers who were "deserving," also kept the 
city's neediest whites out of the North Dallas project, called Cedar Springs. 
Public housing advocates in the 1930s wanted their projects to do more than 
merely provide adequate shelter; they wanted them, according to the Jour­
nal of Housing, to make better citizens.30 As the result, Cedar Springs in­
cluded more than just dwellings. It provided neighborhood space and orga­
nizational activities to promote a sense of community and encourage citizen 
participation. The Dallas Housing Authority reported in 1940 that Cedar 
Springs was "alive" with neighborhood activities, all of which "have been 
sponsored and maintained by the tenants and neighbors in the area." The 
project had a monthly newspaper, as well as a variety of clubs. A new busi­
ness district developed nearby and the city provided a park and recreation 
center as another community focal point.31 To ensure the success of the ex­
periment, public housing advocates let only those viewed as the "deserving 
poor" into the project. PWA officials required minimum incomes as well as 
credit and other references. Indeed, the nature of its residents, including a 
city policeman, made the project controversial in Dallas and infuriated 
much of the real estate community. Dr. Paul M. Pearson of the PWA re­
sponded by likening the project to "a sort of social siphon." By drawing 
people from bad, if not the worst, housing in the city, the projects would free 
up additional dwellings for those "living in less attractive quarters" and "in 
turn those deserted quarters will be taken over by the next social station. . . . 
It is hoped," Pearson continued, "such a process would help draw people 
from the worst slum area resulting in their destruction."32 
If nothing else, the PWA involvement focused attention on the city's 
housing problems and helped ready Dallas for action when new opportuni­
ties occurred. That took place after Congress passed the Housing Act of 
1937, which provided the nation's first permanent public housing program. 
Shortly after that act, the Texas legislature approved enabling legislation 
allowing Texas to participate in the program. Black leaders showed great in­
terest in taking advantage of the new housing opportunities. Indeed, a joint 
committee of the Dallas Negro Chamber of Commerce and the PVL exam­
ined the nineteen slum areas identified by the Real Property Inventory of 
1934 and called for the city to participate in the recently created public 
housing program. Black leaders urged immediate action, since their survey 
also documented that more than 50 percent of the city's African Americans 
lived in these slum areas.33 Social workers and members of the Dallas Feder­
ation of Women's Clubs joined African Americans in promoting the city's 
156 • CHAPTER SIX 
involvement in public housing. Despite those endorsements, the non-CCA 
city council divided over the desirability of participating in the program. 
When Emil Corenbleth proposed creating a housing authority to undertake 
slum clearance and public housing, councilman J. Willis Gunn opposed the 
idea and Starr Armstrong asked that council postpone taking action on the 
housing authority for a week. Jim Dan Sullivan, president of the park board 
and a large property owner, condemned additional public housing and ar­
gued that private enterprise could furnish housing for the poor. After the 
weeklong postponement, however, council voted 8-1 for the authority.34 
Although it is hard to evaluate the impact of Dallas business leaders on 
the public housing movement, it probably was not an accident that council 
voted for a housing authority shortly after the Dallas Citizens Council's 
first public meeting. At that gathering, Karl Hoblitzelle's keynote address 
specifically called for the city's participation in the federal government's 
program to eliminate slums. As we have seen, banker Nathan Adams, exec­
utive member of the DCC, served on the original Dallas Housing Advisory 
Committee for Cedar Springs and had a deep concern for the housing of 
blacks.35 And when Mayor George Sprague appointed the first housing 
authority for the city, he included C. W. Davis, another DCC executive 
member on the committee. Others on that first housing authority included 
Rabbi H. Raphael Gold; Huber Boedecker, president of the Oak Cliff-Dal-
las Commercial Association; J. S. Loving, vice president of the Dallas Build­
ing and Loan Association; and James L. Stephenson, director of Cedar 
Springs, the PWA housing project. Despite heavy lobbying by the city's 
black leaders, and the fact that their support had helped elect him, Mayor 
Sprague refused to appoint an African American to the housing authority, 
fearing that white opposition to such a decision might torpedo the entire 
housing program. The Dallas Housing Authority (DHA) did eventually cre­
ate a Negro Advisory Committee, however, to help in land acquisition and 
relocation.36 
Shortly after its establishment, the housing authority ordered Assistant 
City Plan Engineer R. E. McVey to survey local housing conditions. Such an 
investigation would not only help the authority develop proposals to submit 
to Washington, but it would educate the general public as to the awful hous­
ing conditions existing in the city. Authority members strategized that an ed­
ucational campaign might win additional support for this controversial pro­
37gram.  The city's black newspaper, the Dallas Express, disagreed and 
argued that any additional survey work to document housing needs was re­
dundant. To underscore the need for immediate action the paper ran a series 
of articles depicting the grim housing conditions of blacks in Dallas.38 
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Despite this protest, the DHA proceeded to reexamine housing condi­
tions, focusing on the nineteen slum areas identified by the Real Property In­
ventory of 1934. It defined substandard conditions as those that threatened 
health, fire, traffic, and welfare of the inhabitants. In the white areas studied, 
the survey uncovered substandard dwellings in 79 percent of those investi­
gated. Indeed, the Mill Creek area, home of poorly paid white textile work­
ers, contained the greatest number of slum houses in the city. Investigators 
rated 80 percent of those homes substandard. The survey also investigated a 
191-acre slum area within the black Hall-Thomas area and found it con­
tained 76 percent substandard housing, including 447 structures with "terri­
ble conditions existing." In addition, the survey also identified deplorable 
conditions in Little Mexico, the city's largest Mexican enclave, located just 
north of downtown. Of the 588 structures surveyed, 568 or 96.6 percent met 
substandard criteria, including 257 with no indoor facilities.39 
On reviewing the survey, the News demanded that something be done 
about the slums. "They ring the central business district with blighted areas 
that breed disease and delinquency and give the city a depressing appear­
ance," it observed. Moreover, it concluded that "piecemeal improvement is 
impracticable." Rather, the News agreed with the DHA that such areas 
needed complete clearance and replacement with "modern low-rent apart-
ments."40 Based on the survey the DHA estimated that approximately one-
fifth of the city's population lived in substandard houses and concluded that 
the city plainly needed slum clearance and public housing as authorized by 
the Housing Act of 1937.41 Using this information, the DHA agreed to pro­
ceed immediately with a black project and promised to develop other appli­
cations for white and Mexican American slum clearance projects.42 
Despite petitions from blacks in the Elm Thicket area near Love Field 
asking for slum clearance, the DHA decided to locate its project in the Hall-
Thomas area, the proposed site of the earlier doomed PWA project. Several 
factors influenced that choice for the site of Roseland Homes. According to 
the DHA the "ideal site for slum clearance is one which eliminates the maxi­
mum number of obsolete and unsanitary dwellings and which lends itself 
readily to the development of a project of a size which would permit effi­
ciency in management, the improvement of the neighborhood, and the stim­
ulation of private investment to improve other property which is substand­
ard." The slum clearance project would also help thwart the expansion of 
blight, which had been moving toward northeast Dallas from this slum area. 
Finally, according to the DHA, the project would bring better housing to an 
area that "has definitely [become] established as a negro area," and which 
was intended to remain that way by the city.43 
158 • CHAPTER SIX 
Although council did not support public housing unanimously, in De­
cember it approved the resolutions necessary to allow the slum clearance 
project to proceed. Black leaders applauded the vote, but some residents in 
the twenty-six-acre Hall Street-Thomas Avenue neighborhood scheduled 
for clearance voiced displeasure. In a series of meetings beginning in June 
1939, affected blacks gathered at the Munger Avenue Church and de­
nounced the DHA's decision to undertake slum clearance in their neighbor­
hood. They disputed the slum designation for Hall-Thomas and character­
ized it as "the most highly cultivated, progressive and sanitary community 
in Dallas." At one meeting more than seventy-five black property owners 
vowed not to sell and ended the meeting by singing "I Shall Not Be Moved." 
Unable to persuade the DHA to change its site, fifty-three black homeown­
ers led by Will Higginbotham secured an injunction on October 10, and 
challenged the validity of the state's public housing law.44 
Both homeowners and renters wondered where they would go after clear­
ance. As we have seen, the city suffered from an inadequate supply of black 
housing, and black neighborhoods already experienced extreme conges­
tion. At the very time that Dallas blacks protested their displacement, more 
than 600 whites poured into the auditorium of Ascher Siberstein school to 
protest the growing presence of African Americans in South Dallas, particu­
larly the area bordered by Lobdell, Eugene, and Myrtle Streets near the 
newly constructed black Lincoln High School. Rev. John G. Moore of the 
Colonial Baptist Church led the meeting. Speakers warned of violence if 
blacks continued moving into the area. Several weeks later at another gath­
ering, whites demanded that two black families move from the south side of 
Eugene Street immediately. Tension over the expansion of black neighbor­
hoods also existed in North Dallas.45 
The displacement of approximately 400 blacks so worried housing au­
thority members that at one point they discussed the possibility of housing 
those being dislocated in tents.46 The authority did not pursue such an op­
tion after City Plan Engineer E. A. Wood claimed in September of 1940 that 
he had found an area in North Dallas to develop for blacks without en­
croaching on white areas. He reported this discovery to the all-white Interra­
cial Committee headed by Mayor Woodall Rodgers and DCC former head 
C. F. O'Donnell, appointed to help with relocation plans. Wood had found 
whites in a North Dallas area bordering a black neighborhood who would 
sell or rent their homes to blacks, he thought, if the Interracial Committee 
lobbied with them. This was the extent of the city's relocation plans.47 
Delayed by the Higginbotham suit, the DHA did not break ground for 
the 188-unit project that would house 600 black families until January 2, 
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1941. Contractors destroyed 266 structures on the 191-acre site. Although 
the suit bought more time for the DHA to develop relocation plans, none 
were forthcoming.48 Faced with severely limited options, some blacks, up­
rooted by the slum clearance project, moved into a previously all-white area 
of South Dallas. That action antagonized the area's white residents, who 
harassed the newcomers and bombed their homes.49 Civic leaders re­
sponded to this new crisis in a way that clearly mirrors their city-as-a-whole 
approach to urban problem solving. 
The first incident of what would become eleven months of violence 
against blacks in South Dallas occurred when C.L. Walker and George 
Johnson purchased homes in the 3600 block of Howell Street near Exline 
Park in South Dallas. When they attempted to move in on September 3, 
1940, an angry mob of neighborhood whites, including many rock-throwing 
housewives, greeted them.50 One month later, 100 "unmasked" whites vis­
ited blacks in the disputed area and told them to move or see their houses 
bombed. As one white agitator said, "We helped develop this neighborhood. 
We're too far along to move to a new neighborhood but we couldn't stay 
here with Negroes. So there aren't going to be any Negroes."51 Council re­
sponded to white threats and violence not by an all-out effort to capture the 
bombers, something that might further antagonize whites in South Dallas, 
but by passing still another racial zoning ordinance on October 16,1940. In 
addition, city officials offered to buy out blacks who had already moved into 
the contested neighborhoods. Mayor J. Woodall Rodgers deemed this "solu­
tion" as in "the best interests of all citizens in Dallas." Rodgers also blamed 
blacks who had moved into the white neighborhoods for causing the distur­
bances. Council rescinded its action on October 30, after being reminded 
that the state enabling legislation for racial zoning had been declared uncon­
stitutional. Indeed, on hearing a related case, Federal Judge William H. At-
well branded council's October 16 resolutions as "un-American" and 
warned that it had "no place in any government statute, whether it be the 
city or the state."52 Meanwhile, an indignant Dallas Express protested, 
"What will have to be done to make Dallas Policemen wake-up and take 
some action on the bombings in Negro neighborhoods?" The paper pointed 
out that Dallas had never experienced a race riot but that now it was a real 
possibility.53 
Violence in the South Dallas neighborhood subsided by May, but a new 
crisis appeared in July when the South Dallas Civic League demanded that 
the Dallas school board turn Lincoln High, the recently completed South 
Dallas high school for blacks, over to whites. C. O. Goff, leader of the move­
ment, presented a petition of 1,200 signatures to the school board requesting 
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the change. When that failed, South Dallas property owners filed an injunc­
tion suit to close Lincoln High to blacks. It too failed.54 Responding to the 
new crisis, the Dallas Express editorialized in August of 1941 that in a short 
space of time, "Dallas has changed from a comparatively peaceful city, with 
race relations normal and cordial, to a city that is a veritable powder mine, 
requiring just one small spark to set off a race war." It particularly decried 
the lack of white leadership in responding to this crisis. City officials' limited 
response to these atrocities, it seemed, stemmed from a fear that more ag­
gressive action in halting the violence might actually encourage additional 
disorder in the city by angry white residents of South Dallas.55 Such action 
would be, in their view, harmful to the city as a whole. 
Tension continued into the fall. Although Lincoln High School opened 
the academic year without violence, several more bombings did take place 
in November. On the 28th of that month, the city experienced its eighteenth 
bombing, although this was the first one in about six months.56 The attack 
on Pearl Harbor and American entrance into World War II appeared to ease 
temporarily the hostile race relations but certainly did not completely elimi­
nate them. 
The 1941 city elections occurred in the midst of the racial tension. The 
PVL had supported the CCA in 1939 after that group seemed ready to pro­
vide better parks and schools for blacks. It refused to endorse the incumbent 
council and City Manager Hal Mosely, because they had failed to hire 
blacks for the police force. The solid black vote, which had been critical to 
electing the Forward Dallas slate in 1937, now played a critical role in de­
feating it two years later. By 1941, however, the PVL had become dissatisfied 
with council's handling of the racial problems in South Dallas and sup­
ported only two CCA candidates, Ben Cabell and Hal Noble. Had the 8,000 
blacks who had registered and paid their poll tax voted, they could have 
defeated the CCA; but as we have seen, this did not happen and the incum­
bent council easily won the election.57 After the election, the Express ran an 
editorial entitled "For a Bigger and Better Dallas," suggesting that it too 
bought into the city-as-a-whole strategy. In the editorial, it pointed out that 
the city could remain divided or people could forget their differences and 
"join hands to make Dallas a bigger and better city." Blacks had voted 
against the incumbent as a protest vote "against racial difficulties which 
have gone unnoticed in South Dallas." However, the Express pledged con­
tinued cooperation with the city to promote its growth and development.58 
Black civic leadership, then, whether the black press or the Negro Cham­
ber of Commerce, bought into the emphasis on the city as a whole and the 
goal of growth and development. Indeed, the PVL did support CCA candi­
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dates throughout the rest of the 1940s, despite the ongoing injustices faced 
by blacks in the city. The CCA gave blacks at least some recognition, and a 
small piece of the pie, to promote a sense of hope that things would get bet­
ter. Rarely did an alternative slate seem any more sensitive to the needs of 
blacks in this southern city. 
Although white business leadership responded to black needs as much as 
or more than opposition populist tickets, they still failed to address ade­
quately the city's serious racial problems. Unlike their ability to secure new 
businesses for the city and undertake massive projects like the centennial ex­
position, civic leaders floundered in the face of racial tension. While they 
were able to get most Dallasites to agree on matters affecting the city's eco­
nomic health, racial issues proved another matter. Preoccupied with pro­
moting harmony and consensus, viewed as necessary for ordered urban 
growth, the city leaders avoided strategies focusing on black needs and only 
developed programs to help blacks when such action conformed to their 
city-as-a-whole strategy. Since the hiring of black police posed a greater 
problem to the city (by promoting white unrest) than a greater good (by re­
ducing crime), civic leaders dropped the plan. 
Unlike the black police issue, civic leaders could make a stronger case for 
public housing in the context of their city-as-a-whole rhetoric. But as we 
have seen, their housing program brought as many problems as solutions to 
Dallas blacks and largely ignored the input of the people being affected. And 
when displacement of blacks led to unrest in South Dallas, local officials re­
fused to protect blacks and thus antagonize South Dallas whites because 
such action could lead to further disorder. Rather they tried to avoid addi­
tional conflict by moving blacks out of the contested area. 
Public housing for the city's Mexican American residents followed a simi­
lar pattern: civic leaders identified bad housing among Mexican Americans 
in Dallas as a problem that affected the welfare of the city as a whole. Fearful 
that the continued unimproved development of Mexican American housing 
in the city's largest barrio, Little Mexico, threatened the city's health and 
safety, leaders approached that problem from a perspective that emphasized 
the good of the city rather than compassion for the barrio's residents. In­
stead of providing adequate housing outside the barrio, which might have 
prompted protests from Anglo residents, local officials advocated strategies 
to rebuild Little Mexico and promote a better sense of community among 
its residents. 
What became known as Little Mexico occupied an area covering ten 
city blocks along both sides of McKinney Avenue, just north of downtown. 
The area started attracting Mexicans around 1914. Surrounded by huge 
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warehouses and towering smokestacks, congested Little Mexico's popula­
tion may have reached 10,000 by 1920 (although the census does not verify 
this), due in part to the impact of the Mexican Revolution. While that num­
ber declined after this period, Little Mexico remained, in the words of one of 
the city's guidebooks, "a close-packed mass of flimsy, tumbled-down frame 
shanties" and "shot-gun houses threaded by narrow, twisting, unpaved 
streets, muddy or dusty according to the weather." A survey of the area dur­
ing the mid-thirties found 94 percent of the homes there in very bad con-
dition.59 
City officials had long been concerned by the district's miserable condi­
tions. So had the Mexican consul for Dallas, Adolfo G. Dominguez, who de­
scribed Little Mexico as "the filthiest Mexican settlement I have ever 
seen."60 As the city in 1935 prepared for the centennial exposition, Mayor 
George Sergeant pushed for Little Mexico's improvement to avoid offending 
Mexicans visiting the exposition. Again, priorities focused on saving face 
for the city rather than meeting the needs of the Mexican Americans. 
Sergeant's interest went beyond merely planning shelter. He proposed 
that PWA money could be used to develop a model village for Mexicans and 
a tourist site for city visitors. If the mayor had his way Dallas PWA money 
would produce a Mexican village with a central plaza and appropriate ar­
chitecture. Just as San Francisco had its Chinatown, Dallas would have its 
Mexican village, providing good housing for its Mexican American resi­
dents and a tourist spot for visitors.61 Public housing, then, not only would 
help Mexican American residents but would benefit the larger city. 
Despite the efforts of local officials working with the Mexican consul to 
convince the PWA to allocate money for a slum clearance and public hous­
ing project for Little Mexico, none came. Tenants of Little Mexico did not 
have enough money to pay the minimum rents required by the PWA. Efforts 
to get the private sector to provide Little Mexico with better housing also 
failed, despite the fact that area had only four indoor toilets and, in the 
words of the past president of the Dallas Medical Society, was a "septic cen­
ter that should be removed from the city's body." In 1936 the city's Lion's 
Club sponsored a cleanup program for the district but proved unable to pro­
vide additional housing units for the congested district.62 
Once Congress approved the Housing Act of 1937, local officials jumped 
at the opportunity to develop a housing project for Little Mexico. They se­
lected a fourteen-acre site containing only eight houses near Summit Play 
Park in the Little Mexico district. Work started on the $519,000, 102-unit 
project in September 1941, and the first tenant occupied an apartment Sep­
tember 16,1942, amid much fanfare and celebration.63 The project also in­
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eluded a community center, equipped with an auditorium, demonstration 
kitchen, medical clinic, and library—not just for Little Mexico Village pub­
lic housing occupants, but for the entire Mexican American community. 
Moreover, the DHA asked its project manager "to build solidly the founda­
tion for a broad community and tenant activity program."64 Again, officials 
promoted the idea that public housing in Little Mexico would improve the 
city's health and produce better citizens. 
By the end of 1941, the DHA began construction on three other public 
housing projects. It developed a new project for whites in East Dallas after 
rejecting public housing in the area's worst slum area, the Mill Creek dis­
trict. Before erecting the project, it demolished seventy houses in the 
fourteen-acre site. The $900,000 project would house 250 families. The 
DHA also more than doubled Cedar Springs by adding 220 units to the 181 
already erected. Finally, the DHA built a 200-unit project for blacks on 
about fifteen acres of land in East Dallas near Wahoo Park. The DHA de­
stroyed thirty-seven dwellings to develop this project.65 The local housing 
authority completed all three projects by January 1,1943, although wartime 
shortages delayed an addition to the new all-white project, Washington 
Place, until 1945. Between 1941 and 1945, the DHA had constructed 1,569 
public housing units for Dallas. Of those, 900 units were for blacks and 102 
for Mexican Americans.66 Despite these achievements, the civic leaders' re­
cruitment of war industry and the military intensified the city's housing 
crisis. When the Housing Authority completed the Cedar Springs Place ad­
dition in November 1942, military personnel associated with the Eighth 
Service Command, rather than low-income residents, became its first occu­
pants. The DHA also turned Washington Place Homes over to the military 
after its completion. As a result, the DHA reported in 1945 that servicemen's 
families occupied 30 percent of its dwellings.67 
Local leaders, then, did not completely ignore the needs of the poor dur­
ing the 1930s and 1940s. They discussed the city's housing problems and 
their threat to the city's health and social stability. They even employed con­
troversial programs like public housing to address the city's hideous housing 
conditions. But the emphasis always remained primarily on the needs of the 
city as opposed to the needs of blacks or Mexican Americans. Their actions 
underscore the central role that the city, as opposed to the individual or 
group, had in urban problem solving during the 1930s and 1940s. Such em­
phasis is in stark contrast to today's emphasis on individual needs and 
rights. 
Despite the obvious limitations of such an approach, the emphasis on 
working for the city as a whole brought some benefits to politically impotent 
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groups like the city's Mexican Americans or the highly discriminated-
against African Americans. Because their welfare did impact the larger city's 
welfare, civic leaders attempted to address their most visible problem, that 
of inadequate shelter. But the limitations of such an approach to urban 
problem solving outweighed the success. The city-as-a-whole strategy de­
manded consensus and avoided the appearance of catering to "special" in­
terests. This not only limited how civic leadership addressed the issues, but 
also compromised the advocacy role of the black community or other "spe­
cial" interest groups. For the city to prosper, the argument went, blacks and 
whites needed to act in the best interests of the city, even if it meant sacrific­
ing one's own agenda. For the public welfare, blacks would stay in delegated 
areas and conservative whites would turn to the federal government for help. 
Certain responses by either group might be dangerous since they could en­
courage fighting and fragmentation within the city— something that would 
discourage the city's economic growth and development, and hamper the 
prospects of a good life for all Dallasites. 
The city-as-a-whole strategy also dictated the city's response to its labor 
problems. Between 1935 and 1940 Dallas gained the reputation as one of the 
fiercest antiunion towns in the nation. Socialist Norman Thomas told the 
Times Herald in 1937 that Dallas had a nationwide reputation of being 
"more determined in its anti-labor attitude and activities than any other 
town of its size in the United States."68 The treatment of female strikers dur­
ing the 1935 garment workers strike underscored this point. 
The Open Shop Association, created by the chamber of commerce in 
1919, played a critical role in inhibiting the labor movement in Dallas during 
the twenties and early thirties.69 New Deal legislation, providing some pro­
tection for laborers, helped the union movement overcome the Open Shop 
barrier and gain momentum. Between November 1934 and February 1935, 
the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, at the request of local 
dressmakers, sent Meyer Perlstein to organize the city's dressmakers. De­
spite the city's conservative nature and its extreme antiunionism, Perlstein 
managed to enroll about 400 of the 1,000 dress workers in the union. 
Faced with incredibly low wages and long hours—and companies un­
willing to follow NRA codes—the dressmakers threatened to strike unless 
management increased wages and shortened hours. When company offi­
cials refused to recognize the union and fired suspected members, workers 
at all fifteen local dress factories went on strike. The strike turned violent on 
February 12, when pickets attempted to keep strikebreakers away and fought 
with police. Local lawmen responded with what one historian of the move­
ment has called "brutal tactics" and excessive force. Union officials thought 
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it so bad they requested that state officials investigate the actions of the city's 
police force. Most of the violence stemmed from Dallas police efforts to en­
force injunctions that limited the number of pickets outside of factories. 
This pattern of violence continued over the next ten months, as did the re­
fusal of company officials to negotiate with the strikers despite the request 
of the State Commissioner of Labor that they do so.70 
Local newspapers, owned by civic leaders, gave a limited picture of the 
strike. They focused on labor violence and made no effort to discuss the 
dreadful conditions that led to the walkouts. Nor did they report on local 
business leaders' efforts to thwart the new union and intimidate potential 
members. Moreover, the local press failed to disclose the behind-the-scene 
maneuverings of the Open Shop Association, a group that the Texas Indus­
trial Commission recommended be investigated by the state's attorney gen­
eral for its response to the strike. Dallas newspapers did cover in full detail 
the so-called strike-strip riot of August 7, where strikers attacked and 
stripped ten female workers attempting to enter the Morten-Davis and 
Lorch Manufacturing Companies. Despite a nearly yearlong strike, the job 
action failed as strikers voted to end the walkout. The local government, 
then dominated by the Catfish Club—voted in through labor's efforts— 
failed to respond to these working people's needs or even curb the police.71 
Nor did the city's most prominent civic leaders seem willing to mediate and 
bring a just solution to both parties. Because the press blamed the strike on 
outside agitators, and gave very little positive news about the workers, the 
strikers failed to rally public support.72 In the context of the city-as-a-whole 
discourse, the emphasis in this matter was on the disruption of work and 
negative publicity generated by the strike. The civic leadership viewed it as 
a detriment to the economic development of the city as a whole and therefore 
did nothing to intervene to alleviate the real injustices suffered by the 
workers. 
The antiunion activity at the Ford Motor Company plant several years 
later and a growing fear of labor radicalism again showed how the city-as-a-
whole strategy could create severe hardships for the city's workers. The Ford 
Motor Company responded to efforts to unionize its Dallas plant as it had 
in other cities—with violence and a determination not to lose. Even before 
the CIO attempted to enroll Ford workers in Dallas in 1937, plant managers 
early that year created an "inside squad" of labor spies to snoop around for 
union activity and report any organizing efforts of their co-workers. When 
Automobile Workers union organizers, then affiliated with the CIO, arrived 
from Kansas City on June 23, thugs beat them up. Two days later general 
body foreman Rudolph Rutland helped organize a "strong-arm" squad 
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composed of some of the plant's largest and meanest men to discourage 
union recruiters and intimidate possible recruits. On June 30, the plant held 
a big anti-CIO rally and compared that organization with the Nazis.73 Al­
though the Nazi characterization came from Ford managers, the Dallas 
newspaper accounts of the CIO generally portrayed it as a confrontational, 
radical labor organization intent on disruption rather than cooperation, and 
a promoter of class divisions. 
During the summer and fall of 1937, the company's "strong-arm squad" 
attacked more than fifty people. Three years later, in reviewing its actions, 
the National Labor Relations Board characterized the squad's antiunion ef­
forts as extremely violent and exhibiting "merciless brutality." The "strong­
arm squad" directed its actions not just at automobile organizers, but at any 
efforts to form unions in the city or promote worker solidarity. The violence 
climaxed on August 9 with two separate but equally violent attacks. 
At the same time Ford attempted to destroy the CIO in Dallas, the AFL 
endeavored to organize the city's millinery workers. That group had suffered 
decreasing wages since the abolishment of the NRA codes and had become 
more sympathetic to collective action than it had been earlier. George Baer, 
organizer for the AFL-affiliated Millinery Workers' Union, had been in Dal­
las since April trying to recruit for his union and negotiate with employers. 
While there, Ford's strong-arm squad abducted him, beating him with black 
jacks so badly that he lost several teeth and was blinded in one eye.74 
On the evening of the same day, the Textile Workers Organizing Commit­
tee, a CIO affiliate, held a rally in Fretz Park, in the heart of the city's cotton 
mill district, at the request of some local socialists. Union promoters had 
scheduled two movies for the program: "Millions of Us" and "The Plow 
that Broke the Plains." Before the first movie had been completed, thirty 
Ford employees including members of the "strong-arm squad" disrupted 
the meeting, smashed the projector, stole the sound recordings, and kid­
napped the projectionist, Herbert Hill, a CIO organizer from Tennessee. Af­
ter beating him, they tarred and feathered the half-naked union organizer 
and deposited him in front of the News, where a newspaper photographer 
awaited to take a picture of the distressed man. 
Both cases raised serious questions about the commitment of the city's 
police to protect union organizers. In the Baer case, it appears that a Dallas 
police captain who viewed the union organizer as troublesome tipped off the 
Ford "goons" on where to find him. In the park incident, no police patrolled 
the area, even though the city regularly stationed a patrolman there during 
public events. In addition, it took city police more than twenty minutes to re­
spond to the park disturbance, a seemingly long time for the radio-equipped 
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force.75 And when Governor James Allred called Police Chief Bob Jones 
about the city park incident, the police chief responded that the incident 
only involved a "couple of Goddamned red sons o' bitches." The police chief 
also suggested that the only way to prevent further outbursts of violence was 
by closing city parks and the city auditorium to radical groups.76 
Local newspapers viewed the attacks differently and strongly condemned 
them. In an editorial, the News called it a discredit to Dallas and lamented 
that "much of the favorable publicity gained by Dallas in the last two years" 
had been "undone in a night as readers over the nation learned of shame­
ful acts perpetuated here." In a later editorial entitled "Vigilantes Not 
Wanted," the News condemned Police Chief Jones's desire to keep radicals 
out of the parks and city auditorium "as an unqualified abrogation of free 
assembly and free speech." It also cautioned, "It is just as unreasonable as it 
would be to punish a person whose pocket had been picked instead of cap­
turing the thief."77 The Times Herald editorialized, "There is no room for 
that sort of thing in Dallas." In discussing the attack at Fretz Park, the Dallas 
Journal in an editorial entitled "A Socialist Has Rights" mourned that the 
city had been disgraced, and demanded that those who attacked the socialist 
be apprehended. "This is no petty, personal assault and battery case," it de­
clared, "this is a direct affront to free government itself."78 City Manager 
Mosely echoed the same sentiments and promised that "whoever is respon­
sible must be brought to account. The law must be enforced."79 
When local violence against CIO organizers continued, and after the 
Dallas police chief failed to give protection to George Baer despite addi­
tional threats, Governor Allred sent twenty-five Texas Rangers to the city to 
find those responsible for the tar-and-feathering and to discover "why local 
officials can't learn anything definite about the series of outrages against 
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly."80 Mayor George Sprague op­
posed the action as "outside meddling in our city law enforcement." City 
Manager Mosely also protested the governor's action, arguing, "We're on 
our toes and be they Socialists, CIO members or Baptist missionaries, they 
can rest assured that there will be no more tarring and feathering in Dal-
las."81 But Police Chief Jones welcomed the additional law enforcement of­
ficers and claimed it would keep the city from having to employ more po­
licemen. 
The newspapers also approved the addition of state police to Dallas. The 
News applauded the governor's decision to order in the state police "to fer­
ret out responsibility for local interference with freedom of speech." In an 
editorial entitled "People's Business," the News agreed that Allred was 
"right in furnishing whatever force is necessary to see that the practice [of 
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tarring and feathering] ceases or is punished." It also concluded that the 
governor was "wiser than the Mayor and City Manager, far wiser than those 
misguided zealots who have sought by force to repress in Dallas the right to 
think and speak."82 The Journal also agreed that "Governor Allred did ex­
actly right in ordering twenty-five state police to Dallas."83 
The labor violence of 1935 and 1937 and the lack of local response cer­
tainly seem to confirm that local government and civic leaders had little time 
for the needs of working people and unions. However, a closer examination 
suggests that civic leaders compromised their antiunion stance in several in­
stances. During 1937, probably the worst year in labor history in Dallas, rep­
resentatives of the Greater Texas and Pan American Exposition, organized 
and managed by the city's elite business leadership, signed a union contract 
with the Dallas Building Trades Council making the exposition a "closed 
shop." P. Dale Jackson, president of the Central Labor Council, called that 
contract the biggest victory that organized labor had won in Dallas in fifteen 
years.84 And when the millinery factory workers struck for higher wages and 
shorter hours on August 16, 1937, they asked Mayor Sprague to mediate, 
suggesting they had some confidence that this local official would treat them 
fairly. The newspapers also seemed more sympathetic to the strikers than in 
earlier work stoppages, and appeared willing to print reports criticizing 
management. The News reported that Governor Allred's State Industrial 
Investigation blamed "the chiselers making up a minority of manufacturers 
for its failure to secure a negotiated settlement." The same newspaper also 
reported that the Commissioner of U.S. Conciliation Service blamed the 
manufacturers for the failed settlement efforts.85 
Maybe the strangest event to take place in 1937 in this strongly antiunion 
city was its open-arms reception of the head of the AFL, William Green. His 
visit to Dallas during Labor Day weekend garnered an enormous amount of 
publicity. Not only did he lead a twenty-block Labor Day parade, but he 
spoke at the Cotton Bowl on the grounds of the Greater Texas and Pan 
American Exposition, climaxing that fair's tribute to labor. In addition, he 
lunched with fifty of the city's leading businessmen. Several reasons seem to 
explain the city's embrace of this national labor leader. First was pure boost­
erism. The News quickly pointed out that Green was the first president of 
the AFL to visit the Southwest, and that Dallas had the honor of hosting 
him. In addition, this grand reception of Green seemed an easy way to give 
the city's laborers recognition without doing something that might stall the 
city's industrial growth. Finally, Green offered a more moderate position 
than the CIO and socialists, with a conciliatory message fitting more closely 
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with business leaders' view of working for the city as a whole. Indeed, in his 
speech at the Cotton Bowl, which the News printed in its entirety, Green 
attacked the CIO as being too radical for American working men and ac­
cused it of being communist inspired, reaffirming the suspicions local lead­
ers had of the group, which seemed more committed to confrontation than 
reconciliation.86 
Labor secured even more recognition in 1939 when the Non-Partisan 
League selected Wallace Reilly, manager of the Dallas Labor Temple Build­
ing and columnist for the Dallas Craftsman, as a council candidate. Al­
though he was defeated, this was the first time since the establishment of 
the council-manager government that a major slate had included a la­
bor leader.87 And as we have seen, two years later the CCA, most associated 
with "the establishment," secured the endorsement of the AFL's Dallas 
Craftsman.88 
The city's most powerful labor organization chose to cooperate with, 
rather than confront, the CCA and the establishment. It did this, in part, for 
the same reason that black leaders more often worked with Dallas leaders 
than against them. They shared a vision of rapid growth and development 
of this Southwestern city and agreed that its economic development, fos­
tered by the city's civic leadership, would provide new opportunities for all 
in the city. They also understood that alternative leadership in Dallas offered 
less rather than more. The Catfish Club and its splintered organizations pro­
vided rhetoric welcoming both labor and blacks in the fold, but its four-year 
record had been disastrous. The city's worst labor violence occurred during 
these years, and blacks experienced deterioration instead of improvement in 
their housing conditions. Although Dallas blacks gained some parks and a 
high school during the Catfish years, they saw the 1937 council retreat from 
its commitment to provide black policemen. Moreover, one of the chief con­
stituencies of the Catfish Club was white South Dallas working-class people. 
They were the city's most vocal racists, due in part to black expansion into 
their neighborhoods. Indeed, remnants of the Klan appeared to be reassem­
bling in the 1930s, and probably they provided the only real political alterna­
tive to the CCA by 1940. Meanwhile, the CCA did not bill itself as a white 
man's organization; rather, it emphasized its commitment to "represent all 
of Dallas." Dallas people knew that "teamwork and a business administra­
tion [would] increase the city's prosperity," CCA head Roscoe Thomas 
claimed, and that would promote urban growth that would allow "the 
people of Dallas, laboring classes and office workers alike, to accordingly 
prosper."89 
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Citizens apparently accepted this notion during the war years when the 
city's economy boomed, since no opposition slates fielded candidates 
against the CCA in 1943 and 1945. But changes in the postwar years would 
create new challenges for the CCA hegemony, and eventually make it vul­
nerable to charges of bossism and tyranny. The CCA's response to the chal­
lenges marks an interesting but misunderstood chapter in the city's history. 
• 7

Politics, Leadership, and the Public 
Interest in an Era of Rapid Growth, 
1945-1955 
During the ten years following the end of World War II Dallas experienced 
growth unprecedented in its history, but civic leaders still maintained an ap­
proach to urban problem solving and the public interest reminiscent of the 
1920s and 1930s. Their rhetoric and actions remained focused on the city 
(and the metropolitan region) rather than individual or group needs. Not 
only did this show up in the politics of the era, but it also appeared in the 
city's response to its black housing problem. In addition, the tremendous 
emphasis on civic loyalty by Dallas's newspapers and schools influenced the 
city's relationship both with its neighbor, Fort Worth, and with the federal 
government. 
Between 1945 and 1955 the population of Greater Dallas increased by 
nearly 290,000, from 506,000 to 795,000. In that period, the metropolis 
gained 151,000 additional jobs and saw 105,000 new dwellings constructed. 
Furthermore, developers erected an additional twenty-five buildings in the 
central business district (CBD) during this period. The city's phenomenal 
growth can be credited particularly to its expanding manufacturing base 
and the increased migration to the Southwest. Nothing was more important 
than the city's involvement in aircraft manufacturing.1 
Before 1940, the city had no one employed in this line of work, but during 
the war over 43,000 Dallas workers found jobs in that industry. Although 
this number fell sharply after Japan's surrender, the military action in Korea 
and the cold war kept this defense industry healthy, so that it employed 
17,800 workers in 1953. The cold war also accelerated the city's rise as a 
manufacturer of electrical machinery and equipment. In 1940 there were 
about 600 jobs in this field in Dallas. In 1954, Collins Radio Company, 
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Continental Electronics Manufacturing, Texas Instrument Company, and 
Varo Manufacturers helped push that figure to nearly 7,000 jobs. By that 
year, manufacturing also accounted for 74,000 jobs, or 23.4 percent of the 
city's total employment as compared to the 1940 census manufacturing fig­
ures of 19,533, or 19.1 percent of the city's total employment.2 
The development of the Southwest, and the city's critical role as that re-
gion's principal wholesale, retail, commercial, and financial center, also 
helped accelerate Dallas's growth. Ever since the city had secured railroad 
links with northern cities in the last third of the nineteenth century, it had 
emerged as an important wholesale and retail center. By 1948 Dallas hosted 
more merchant wholesalers than any other city in the Southwest. The city 
also ranked as one of the leading insurance and financial centers of the coun­
try by 1950. In addition, it benefited from the expansion of the federal gov­
ernment. Dallas had over 7,000 nonmilitary federal government workers in 
forty-three offices by 1952. The national government pumped more than 
$22.5 million into the city's economy annually.3 
The discovery of oil in East Texas in the 1930s also boosted the city's 
growth after World War II. Although it attracted oil companies before the 
Depression, the city by the 1930s found itself surrounded by some of the 
most productive oil land in the nation. Several principal oil companies and 
hundreds of independent oil operators, along with many petroleum geolo­
gists and geophysicists, established their main offices in Dallas. The city also 
produced oil equipment and provided financing for the oil ventures.4 
Dallas itself changed drastically during these ten years. Not only did oil 
replace cotton as a major economic stimulus in the city, but the automobile 
displaced the streetcar as the major means of local transportation. And as 
the city expanded—from 50 square miles at the beginning of 1945 to 198 
square miles at the end of 1955—it felt the decentralizing effects of the auto-
mobile.5 In addition, neighborhoods traditionally reserved for whites in 
South Dallas and Oak Cliff now housed a growing number of black Dallas 
citizens. 
Other booming sunbelt cities experienced change in government and 
leadership after the war, but Dallas saw continuity in the nature of its gov­
ernment and leadership with the continued dominance of the Citizens Char­
ter Association (CCA) and the Dallas Citizens Council (DCC).6 Even more 
important, despite the rapid changes in the city, civic leaders continued to 
approach urban problems in a comprehensive fashion that reflected their 
continued belief that the city, as opposed to individual groups or neigh­
borhoods, constituted the basic unit of concern. Leaders energetically re­
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sponded to challenges and opportunities offered in the postwar era in this 
context and successfully maintained an image of working for Dallas. CCA 
leaders maintained public support not only by heavy expenditures in elec­
tions and domination of the media, but by actions that responded to the 
needs of the city's various groups and neighborhoods within this broader 
context. To have focused solely on the CBD would have undercut the power 
and influence of these business and professional civic leaders. But that did 
not happen. Between 1945 and 1955 all but one councilman elected was a 
member of the CCA, and the DCC's agenda became, in fact, the city's 
agenda. When tensions within the CCA threatened its hold on local govern­
ment, its supporters in 1953 nominated Robert L. Thornton, founder of the 
DCC and the city's leading citizen, as mayor. Two years later, the good gov­
ernment organization again faced no opposition for office, the only time 
that ever happened in peacetime. 
The CCA council elected in 1945 includedfive candidates chosen for their 
fourth term, one for a third term, and three for their second term. They 
unanimously reelected Rodgers as mayor but disagreed about the retention 
of acting city manager V. R. Smithan, who had replaced Aston on April 9, 
1941, when the latter joined the Army. Despite criticizing Smithan for his lax 
effort to wipe out vice, council worked closely with him in regard to the exe­
cution of the city's most important task—the implementation of the Master 
Plan.7 However, the city's rapid growth impeded the implementation of this 
ambitious undertaking. 
Bond expenditures and the execution of the master plan occupied much 
of this council's term after the $40 million bond issue (discussed in chapter 
5) passed in November 1945. Despite success at the polls, postwar inflation, 
the city's tax cap, and city officials' commitment to furnish streets and sew­
ers for newly annexed areas thwarted much of the master plan's program, 
including the auditorium and all other public buildings voted on in the 
bond election. The rapid influx of population, the need to replace worn-out 
equipment, and the growing demand for basic services had a strangling ef­
fect on the civic leaders' ambitious plans. Even with the postponement of 
major projects prescribed by the plan, the city increased its 1944-1945 bud­
get of $13 million to $21.5 million for the following year.8 The city's unprece­
dented growth in population and territory also severely taxed its finances. 
By the end of 1946, Dallas had 75,000 more people than the master plan had 
anticipated. These new citizens needed basic services like sewers, streets, fire 
and police protection, and water. The city's $50 million debt cap, however, 
thwarted its abilities to address these needs. In 1952, Dallas ran out of 
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money to pave residential streets. Although the city completed more than $6 
million in civic improvements, council postponed much of the work planned 
by the water and sanitary departments and the department of public works.9 
Not only did the higher costs delay public projects, but they resulted in a 
fiscal crisis for Dallas. Although the city's tax base increased substantially, 
the population influx caused greater demand for high-priced infrastructure 
development, especially water, and for an increase in city police andfire pro­
tection. To help remedy the financial shortfall, council voted to impose a 
garbage fee to help make up the city's $1.97 million deficit. According to 
Smithan, the ninety-cent monthly garbage fee would raise as much revenue 
as a 31 percent increase in property taxes. He also noted that it would allow 
the 180,000 who did not directly contribute to city government "to do 
their part."10 
Council's action angered some residents, who stormed a November 20th 
public hearing on the bill. Many from the South Dallas Civic League at­
tended and used the hearing not only to attack the garbage fee as discrimi­
nating against small property owners, but to criticize city council in general. 
Mayor pro tern J. B. Adoue, substituting for Mayor Rodgers, appeared to 
lose control of the meeting, which eventually ended when five council 
members and the city manager left. When city council refused to rescind its 
ordinance, E. M. Lane of the South Dallas Civic League circulated petitions 
calling for the recall of the solons. He thought that "blood-sucking corpora­
tions" should "pay the difference rather than the small man."11 
Meanwhile council also quarreled over the new zoning proposal Bartho­
lomew developed for the master plan. The mainstay of that proposal re­
zoned some commercial property back to residential use. That and the 
strengthening of provisions for nonconforming uses met with heavy opposi­
tion, particularly from the Dallas Real Estate Board (DREB). In what the 
Dallas Morning News characterized as "probably the most controversial is­
sue the incumbent administration has yet faced," council ultimately rejected 
what the DREB called Bartholomew's "idealistic" zoning proposal for one 
that basically reinforced the status quo. Indeed, the movement's historian 
concluded that "zoning revision triumphed over zoning reform as the city of 
1929 remained inviolate, and new zoning turned to the developing fringe."12 
The controversy and conflict surrounding some of council's actions pro­
vided new hope for CCA opponents and resulted in a plethora of parties and 
candidates in the 1947 municipal election. That hope may have increased in 
September 1946 when CCA president Roscoe L. Thomas announced his re­
tirement as head of that organization. Thomas had played a major role in the 
revitalization of the CCA during his eight-year reign. His resignation came 
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more than six months before the upcoming elections, to provide his succes­
sor adequate time to select committees, organize precincts, and draft a slate 
of candidates for city office. According to the Dallas Times Herald, Thom-
as's retirement signaled the start of a "complete reorganization of the 
CCA." Not only would the nominating committee appoint a new president 
but it would also select an entirely new slate of officers.13 That committee re­
sponded by nominating S. J. Hay, an insurance company executive, as presi­
dent. The committee also selected Lenore Hall, a prominent club worker, as 
vice president. 
The nominating committee and the CCA split over the new ticket. Some 
endorsed banker Adoue to head the charter ticket while Rodgers and his 
supporters rallied behind lawyer R. G. Storey. Adoue and the mayor had 
clashed over council's actions and the mayor's pet project, Central Express­
way. Strong feelings both pro and con about the mayor pro tern ran high and 
threatened to split the CCA wide open. An inability to select the new ticket 
also stalled the CCA's effort to name a president. The matter eventually re­
solved itself when Storey withdrew from the race to become dean of South­
ern Methodist University's Law School, allowing the CCA to unite behind 
Adoue.14 
Sensing the CCA might be in trouble, four opposition parties formed and 
entered slates in the 1947 election. The Greater Dallas Democratic Associa­
tion was first to select its slate during the third week of February. Other par­
ties included the All Dallas, GI and Veterans Party, a coalition of three orga­
nizations; the Greater Dallas Association; the People's Party; and the 
People's Protective Party. The names of those four parties underscore the 
context of the election. The CCA emphasized its role in adequately serving 
Dallas as a whole, while opposition tickets argued they could best serve Dal­
las as a whole and attacked the CCA for favoring special interests over the 
needs of all. All four opposition parties charged that the city's business and 
banking elite controlled the CCA and failed to respond to the needs of the 
people. Realizing that such accusations had not been particularly effective in 
the past, opposition groups also challenged the CCA's efficiency, impartial­
ity, and honesty. L. L. Hiegel, former CCA councilman now campaigning 
for the All Dallas, GI and Veterans slate denounced his former colleagues 
and claimed that their incompetence had nearly bankrupted Dallas. C. G. 
Stubbs of that same slate criticized council for its failure to plan for the city's 
water needs, while Joe C. Luther of the People's Party accused current coun­
cilmen with "squandering and waste."15 
The All Dallas, GI and Veterans Party also questioned whether the CCA 
really worked for the city as a whole. It argued that the good government 
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group neglected "the paving and sewer needs of the smaller communities." 
South Dallas residents created the Greater Dallas Association after the CCA 
selected twenty-three-year-old Joe Golman for the South Dallas seat. They 
complained that the CCA's choice insulted the area. Other council candi­
dates accused the CCA of neglecting the needs of South Dallas and Oak 
Cliff. Embittered former South Dallas councilman L. L. Hiegel went even 
further and charged that the "outgoing administration was corrupt." The 
All Dallas, GI and Veterans Party also blamed the CCA-dominated govern­
ment for providing unequal assessments benefiting large property owners.16 
Opponents specifically held the CCA accountable for the previous sum-
mer's drought, and for the unpopular garbage tax. In addition, rival slates 
blasted the CCA for not providing a taxicab franchise to the G. I. Transpor­
tation Company and argued that the city spent more money on the munici­
pal airport than it did to remedy its water needs. Others criticized the CCA's 
"wasteful practice of engaging high salaried experts from out of town to tell 
us how we should build our city." The familiar cries of banker control and 
Highland Park interference in Dallas matters also frequented the cam-
paign.17 Although the faces may have changed, the themes of this municipal 
election differed little from those of 1933. 
Adoue's withdrawal from the race because of illness may have helped heal 
some of the divisions within the CCA. Indeed, the CCA avoided having to 
defend any of its incumbent councilmen by nominating an entirely new slate 
of candidates. That group joined the other four tickets in promising to re­
peal the garbage tax if elected. Despite this and several other issues, the 
CCA relied on its usual strategy of emphasizing the nonpolitical nature of 
the organization by reminding voters that "this ticket has been chosen care­
fully in the interest of good, honest government which the CCA has always 
sponsored. In every instance the office has sought the man, not the man the 
office." A campaign flyer took up the same theme, announcing that the slate 
consisted of seven businessmen and two professionals—"all married, all 
church members, all taxpayers." These men pledged, according to the flyer, 
"fair, impartial, businesslike administration of city affairs."18 In contrast 
CCA campaign manager Robert M. Pery charged that special interest 
groups such as the CIO dominated opposition slates. Indeed, CCA leaders 
characterized opposition parties as being controlled by "self-seeking indi-
viduals—men who do not have the good of the city at heart." For instance, 
CCA council candidate Joe Golman accused his opponents as being part of 
"a political machine in South Dallas which seems determined to return the 
spoils system to City Hall."19 Such an approach had a clear appeal to the 
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city's middle- and upper-class voters, who benefited most from the city's 
economic expansion and did not need additional social services. Those vot­
ers also shared the general ethos of growth and efficiency that dominated 
the CCA. 
The newspapers seemed to agree with the CCA perspective and endorsed 
the good government slate. To vote for the CCA, according to the News, was 
to "insure Dallas a sane, conservative, business-like administration during 
the next two years." In addition, the News assured its readers that "the 
shadow of no political boss or back-room group hangs over them." The 
Times Herald repeated some of the same themes in its support. "These men 
were drafted," the Times Herald recalled. "Before they were asked to be­
come candidates by the Charter Association, they did not even dream of go­
ing into politics. Their only ambition was to promote the welfare of Dallas 
as a whole to the best of their ability." It concluded that "they represent no 
special interest or extremist element."20 
The CCA and its newspaper supporters also pointed out the need for a 
united council rather than one drawn from several slates. "If personal quali­
fications were solely determining, it might be difficult to chose in a number 
of individual cases," the News observed. "But the issue is much larger when 
viewed from the best interest of Dallas. That issue is whether we shall have 
a united, harmonious governing body at city hall, or one composed of two 
warring factions." CCA council candidate Roland Pelt called for voters to 
elect all CCA candidates since "we don't want any fussing at city hall with 
a split council."21 
Despite the CCA's vulnerability, and the lack of endorsement from orga­
nized labor or the Progressive Voters League, it dominated the election. 
CCA candidates won two seats outright and secured six others in a runoff. 
Only the victory of G. C. Stubbs, Sr., of the All Dallas, GI and Veterans slate, 
over young Joe Golman prevented a CCA sweep. As usual, the CCA carried 
upper- and middle-income North Oak Cliff, North Dallas, and Northeast 
Dallas while the All Dallas candidates led in South Oak Cliff, South Dallas, 
and East Dallas.22 
Under the leadership of new city manager Roderic B. Thomas and Mayor 
J. R. Temple, council continued to work on the implementation of the mas­
ter plan. Council appointed the forty-five-year-old Thomas after Smithan 
retired to go into private business. Thomas, the first Dallas-born city man­
ager, came to the city from Corpus Christi where he had served in a similar 
position. A graduate of Texas A&M University, Thomas worked as an engi­
neer for the Dallas firm of Myers and Noyes and served as city engineer for 
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Highland Park before moving to Corpus Christi.23 Mayor Temple lived in 
North Oak Cliff and had been the president of the Oak Cliff Chamber of 
Commerce. He also headed the Oak Farms Dairy Company.24 
These men faced a difficult situation, since state-imposed limits to the 
city's tax rate and a self-imposed restriction on its borrowing capacity cur­
tailed the city's income and made ambitious public works programs diffi­
cult. The city real estate tax rate, which included taxes for schools, stood at 
$2.45 per $100 valuation. The state limited cities to collecting no more than 
$2.50. In addition, the city charter permitted Dallas bonded indebtedness to 
only $50 million, a cap the city fast approached with $45,500,000 indebted­
ness. The limit prevented Dallas from spending $10 million for new schools 
even though voters had authorized that in 1945. 
Frustrated by the limitation placed on the school district by the city's debt 
ceiling, civic leaders supported a successful effort to make the school system 
a separate taxing unit.25 The next year local officials, helped by the DCC, 
promoted a $22.4 million bond issue that the electorate favored by a more 
than 2-1 vote. Moreover, every council district, including South Oak Cliff 
and South Dallas, voted for the bonds. The bond package included $9 mil­
lion for water facilities for a city that had seen water usage increase more 
than 50 percent since 1941. In addition, other bonds included a $5.5 million 
proposal for sanitary sewers to cover the 25 percent of the city that had none. 
The city also designated $5.5 million worth of bonds for street paving, wid­
ening, and openings. Although supporters of the bond program emphasized 
how it would benefit "every major section of Dallas," critics suggested that 
Central Expressway would digest much of the designated roadway money. 
That roadway, the city's new north-south expressway, had finally been 
started in January of 1947, although work could not begin on the southern 
leg of Central until the city provided alternate tracks for the Southern Pacific 
Railroad to the old Houston & Texas Central Railroad freight yards. As a 
result, construction on that section came much later, starting on June 15, 
1954.26 
Despite that delay, and the implications it had for South Dallas, the CCA 
continued to present itself as an organization interested in promoting the 
city as a whole. That theme dominated the 1949 city election when the city's 
labor organizations decided to become more involved in city politics. As 
early as November 1948 the local CIO, with a membership of 7,000, an­
nounced it would take part in the next city election. Unhappy that working-
class interests were too often ignored, it savaged the CCA's lack of effort to 
resolve the city's housing, health, and education needs, all affecting the 
working people of Dallas. In addition, it criticized excessive expenditures 
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for Central Expressway and for the "obvious bungling on Love Field and the 
water solution."27 The AFL's Central Labor Council, which claimed to rep­
resent 30,000 working people, also attacked the CCA and promised to be­
come involved in the 1949 local election to elect a council sympathetic to la­
bor needs. Furthermore, it wanted a new city charter that would replace 
council-manager government with a strong-mayor-council form. This or­
ganized labor body complained that council-manager government simply 
was not "representative of the people" and was "too centralized in one 
man." The Central Labor Council also felt labor had been denied represen­
tation on committees appointed by the city manager and wondered why the 
CCA had never selected a union man to run for council. The incumbent city 
administration also alienated the labor council by paying city workers be­
low prevailing construction rates.28 
The CCA competed against three full slates, one partial ticket, and two 
independents that election. The Dallas County Democratic Association 
(DCDA) had strong support from the CIO in addition to independent 
unions and worked hard to secure endorsement from the city's black popu­
lation. The DCDA also called for the election of councilmen on a district 
rather than at-large basis. It ran five candidates of its own and endorsed four 
other candidates on the Dallas Voters Association (DVA) ticket. Three of 
these nine candidates were union men, but interestingly enough, none of 
those union members belonged to the CIO.29 The DVA, which the DCDA 
called "a junior charter association," nominated a full slate that included 
William J. Harris, president of State Federation of Labor. The DVA had 
been established by L. L. Hiegel, former CCA councilman from South Dal­
las. It opposed what it saw as the "dictatorial system" associated with the 
CCA and argued that Dallas had "remote control democracy."30 Another 
slate, called the Change the Charter Association, entered a ticket calling for 
the replacement of the council-manager government with the strong-
mayor—aldermanic form of government. Two independent candidates also 
ran, including the first black council candidate, Howard Daniels, Jr.31 
CCA officials responded to these challenges by reaffirming their commit­
ment to council-manager government. They also portrayed their candidates 
as being nonpolitical and "for the city as a whole," and attacked opponents 
as being promoters of special agendas. Indeed, one CCA spokesman lashed 
out at what he called a conspiracy of opposition parties to put the city gov­
ernment into the hands of "big labor union bosses and gambling racket­
eers." One CCA advertisement had warned, "Do not let a campaign of ha­
tred, on the part of a political bunch seeking to grab power for the big 
national labor union bosses and the nation-wide gambling interests confuse 
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you." Another advertisement charged that DVA candidate William Harris 
was the "right hand man of Union Boss Caesar Petrulo of Chicago" and his 
election would introduce a political machine to Dallas similar to those oper­
ating in Kansas City, Chicago, and New York. Just as civic leaders often tried 
to secure support by rallying citizens around opposition to Fort Worth, the 
CCA tried the same type of strategy in politics, emphasizing bossism as 
the enemy.32 
The CCA also benefited from strong endorsement of the city's daily 
newspapers, especially the Dallas Morning News. The News often empha­
sized the vast achievement of the city under the CCA and projected the good 
government group as a party of progress, with no ax to grind save the 
growth and development of Dallas in the interests of all of its citizens. In a 
front-page editorial the day before the election the News asked, "Shall we 
continue non partisan municipal government, of, for and by all the people of 
Dallas? Or shall we revert to the old style politically controlled government 
primarily 'for' the interests of one or the other of a small block of political 
leaders?"33 The next day the News editorialized, "The Charter Association 
was formed for the single purpose of keeping ability in and politics out of 
city government. At two-year intervals, it has drafted men public spirited 
enough to devote more time to Dallas than they could really spare." Such ac­
tion, the News observed, had helped promote in Dallas "a spirit of enter­
prise and progress characteristic of a great city."34 
With the help of the newspapers, the CCA ably set the terms of politi­
cal debate. Arguing that it worked for the city as a whole, such a discourse 
suggested, implicitly at least, that all opposition parties sided with special 
interests. In addition to the rhetoric, the CCA also could provide ample 
evidence of the advancement of the city as a whole under its tenure, an ad­
vancement carefully measured by demographic and economic rather than 
social indices. 
Dallas voters apparently favored this approach. They elected all nine 
CCA candidates by a 2-1 margin in a contest that saw 23,696 votes cast, the 
heaviest turnout in the city's history. The CCA even carried South Dallas 
and South Oak Cliff, historically the most staunchly anticharter neighbor­
hoods in the city. Commenting on the landslide, charter president Laurence 
Melton concluded that the election signaled "a complete vindication of the 
clean administration" of the CCA. The largest vote-getter was J. B. "Tieste" 
Adoue, Jr., who smashed labor leader William Harris for the Place 8 at-large 
council seat.35 
Adoue, former chamber of commerce president and head of the National 
Bank of Commerce, had not served in council the previous two years due to 
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illness. Although he had been courted by the DCDA, the independent and 
highly ambitious Adoue agreed to join the CCA slate in February, despite 
some problems with that organization in the past. Many anticipated that if 
the CCA slate won election, council would appoint Adoue mayor. When 
that did not happen, a dispute erupted that nearly destroyed the good gov­
ernment group.36 
Of the council elected in 1949, six were incumbents. None had served 
with Adoue, but they must have been aware of his rocky relationship with 
former mayor J. Woodall Rodgers. Adoue had also irritated some of the 
council candidates by sending a personal letter to the 68,000 eligible voters, 
something that suggested he was not playing by the team rules. When the 
newly elected council met with Melton to decide on the new mayor, it voted 
5-3 to elect the current mayor pro tern, thirty-six-year-old Wallace Savage, 
to that post. Five incumbents voted for Savage. They argued that he deserved 
the post since he was the current mayor pro tern and was someone with 
whom council could work. Although it appears that council acted on its 
own, Adoue charged that the selection of Savage as mayor had been dictated 
by the newspapers and the "penthouse set." Savage's offer to step down as 
mayor after serving one year did nothing to assuage Adoue's anger and his 
feeling of having been double-crossed.37 
In response to his slight, Adoue helped initiate a movement to change the 
city charter to allow direct election of the mayor. As early as July 1949, CCA 
leaders Laurence Melton, Lenore P. Hall, and Katherine Robinson asked 
council to place the charter-change proposal on the ballot. Council's refusal, 
by a vote of 6-3, underscored the split in the CCA over the issue. Failing to 
have council action, supporters of the change passed out petitions to force 
the vote. The Right to Vote Committee secured more than 14,000 signatures 
and got the proposal for direct election of the mayor on the ballot.38 
Opposition to the proposal soon appeared with the formation of the 
Save the Charter Association. That group included three former CCA pres­
idents and Stanley Marcus, generally conceded as one of the city's more 
politically liberal leaders. The News joined this group in an almost hyster­
ical defense of the current selection process, one that the city's League of 
Women Voters endorsed as well as Alfred Willoughly, executive secretary 
of the National Municipal League. In a front-page editorial, the News ar­
gued that if passed, direct election of the mayor would provide "a sub­
stantial change" in council-manager government that would "seriously 
threaten the continued existence of council-manager government here." 
Another News editorial warned that if the charter proposal passed, "Dal­
las would eventually revert to a dictatorial, political-boss type of govern­
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ment which most larger cities have discarded in the interest of efficiency, 
integrity, and cleanliness in city hall."39 
Supporters of the change emphasized its democratic nature. Attorney 
John White, chair of the Right to Vote Committee, proclaimed that "the real 
issue is simply whether the people of Dallas as a whole should be given their 
democratic right to vote for the mayor of their choice, or whether some in­
fluential clique should be allowed to dictate the selection of mayor." Coun­
cilman Adoue agreed and declared that 68,000 people were better qualified 
to select a mayor than nine men who might be obligated to "certain selfish 
groups." Adoue pointed out that the fight to preserve the charter was led by 
a "clique of influential downtown and Highland Park tycoons." An adver­
tisement for the proposal raised the same theme. "Take the election of 
Mayor of Dallas out of the hands of a small, privileged, powerful group," it 
pleaded, "and give it to the people to whom it rightfully belongs." The 
Times Herald supported the amendment and charged that its opponents de­
liberately misled the people.40 
Despite the opposition of some of the city's most influential leaders and 
its most powerful newspaper, the News, voters passed the charter change by 
a 7,620 to 6,216 margin. The proposal to alter the charter also carried in sev­
enty of the city's ninety-two precincts, marking a personal victory for Adoue 
and his line about a more democratic Dallas. The election is also significant 
because it emphasizes the limitations of the News and personal wealth in 
swaying elections. Despite the opposition of the city's prestigious civic lead­
ers and the influential News, Dallas voters approved the amendment. 
Money and publicity did not guarantee electoral success in Dallas.41 
Another charter amendment to raise the city's bonded debt limit from 
$50 million to $75 million passed that November. Only with an increase in 
the debt ceiling would the city be able to complete the needed water, sewer, 
street, and drainage programs scheduled for the upcoming year. Voters 
agreed and approved such a proposal by a vote of 8,793 to 4,107. As a result, 
the city undertook the largest public improvement program in its history, 
despite the continued squabbles within the CCA.42 
Adoue's unwillingness to be a team player with the CCA continued to 
cause the good government group problems. Understanding the popularity 
of the maverick banker, it selected him to be its nominee for mayor in 1951. 
Although Adoue was born with "a silver spoon in his mouth," according to 
the News, he also had a "genius for saying and doing things that endeared 
him to the common man."43 The CCA also nominated four incumbents and 
developed a ticket emphasizing its pledge to keep organized crime out of 
Dallas, continue the public works infrastructure program, and cooperate 
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with the proposals from the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, the DCC, and 
the Council of Social Agencies to revitalize slum-ridden West Dallas. Fur­
thermore, it pledged the speedy completion of Central Expressway and 
promised to build a strong and efficient health department.44 Two opposi­
tion slates challenged the CCA for council seats. Former city plan committee 
member Frank G. Graham established the Square Deal Association and ran 
for mayor because "we feel that the CCA has run its course and has deterio­
rated to the point that it is now running the city of Dallas for the benefit of a 
few and not the best interest of the people." His organization called for the 
equalization of assessments and the elimination of several "nuisance" taxes. 
The group also favored more precinct police stations and promised to solve 
the city's traffic and water problems.45 The Non Partisan Association, led by 
Virgil R. Graves, nominated seven candidates but endorsed Adoue for 
mayor as well as a CCA council nominee. It promised to make city hall "a 
temple of democracy instead of a house of autocracy" and pledged to elimi­
nate the city's tax on automobiles. Several independents, including a black 
candidate, Rev. Stacy Adams, also ran.46 Dallas voters elected CCA candi­
dates by a landslide, giving them majorities in ninety-two of the city's 
ninety-three precincts. Only 14,208 voted, compared to the 23,696 that went 
to the polls two years earlier.4 
Despite the CCA sweep, controversy soon appeared in council over the 
future of City Manager Charles Ford. Council had appointed Ford to that 
post in December 1949 after Roderic Thomas had resigned to go into busi­
ness. Ford gained the appointment when councilman Adoue refused to hire 
Kansas City city manager L. P. Cookingham. Council had originally invited 
Cookingham, acknowledged as one of the nation's best city managers, to 
help it find a suitable candidate. But after working with him, the Dallas 
lawmakers decided he was the best candidate and offered him the job for 
$27,500, a significant increase over the current city manager's salary. The 
deal fell through, however, when Adoue had second thoughts about the ap­
pointment and feared the high salary would make the selection unpopular 
with city voters. Because Cookingham would only come to Dallas if all 
councilmen were unanimous in hiring him, Adoue's lone opposition pre­
vented the city from securing the services of the talented Cookingham. In­
stead, council hired thirty-eight-year-old Charles Ford, who had served as 
assistant city manager since 1945. It paid the novice city manager $13,500.4<s 
Adoue soon became disenchanted with the new city manager and asked 
him to resign after the 1951 election. When Ford refused, Mayor Adoue 
charged him with inefficiency, ineptness, and bungling and asked the newly 
elected council not to reappoint him. Council ignored the mayor's request 
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and voted 8-1 to retain him, with Adoue's vote the only in opposition. This 
conflict, which continued until Ford finally resigned on May 2,1952, set the 
tone for Adoue's administration.49 The mayor, described by some as "bull­
headed, vindictive and ruthless," not only constantly clashed with Ford and 
city council but had run-ins with the president of the chamber of commerce 
and new city manager Elgin Crull. A News columnist argued that Adoue's 
"one man show at city hall [had] put city government in contempt in the 
eyes of the average voter" and helped defeat a $19,185,000 bond issue in Jan­
uary 1952, the first time this had ever happened. At that same election, citi­
zens also voted 6,639 to 4,120 against a charter amendment that would 
allow the city to exceed its $75 million debt limit by removing the city's $36 
million of water and sewer bonds from its $75 million debt limit because 
they were revenue bonds.50 
Other factors also helped explain the bond and charter defeats. The city's 
annexation policy, which since 1945 had added massive amounts of undevel­
oped land to the corporate limits, spurred the construction of 22,000 new 
homes during the next six years. And that rapid development led to de­
mands for expensive infrastructure, particularly water and sewers. City 
officials responded by selling an unprecedented number of bonds to fund 
the development. Until October 1, 1945, Dallas had sold approximately 
$65,847,000 bonds in its entire history. During the next six years it sold 
$72,660,000 in bonds.51 As a result, the city's debt, which had been $36 mil­
lion in 1945, more than doubled in less than seven years, and taxes increased, 
also. Despite this, many sections in the city still had no water or sanitary 
sewers, and waste overloaded the downtown sanitary sewer system due to 
the new buildings and the aging system in place.52 Faced with the mounting 
taxes not only from local but from state and federal government, the theory 
went, local taxpayers "revolted" and refused to increase the city's debt limit 
and sell more bonds since both affected taxes. 
A third reason the measure went down to defeat had to do with the con­
tinued push of civic leaders to build a civic center. The civic center, proposed 
in the Master Plan of 1945, had called for a civic auditorium, a city hall, and 
a library near downtown Dallas. As we have seen, the auditorium had been 
a top priority for both the DCC and the chamber of commerce since the end 
of World War II. In November of 1945, voters had approved a $10.5 million 
in bonds for the entire civic center, but the need to provide basic infrastruc­
ture had delayed implementation of that bond. The city now seemed ready 
to move on the program and signed a contract with architect George Dahl to 
develop such an area. Landowners of the proposed forty-three-acre site, just 
south of downtown, protested the city's plan, however. The property own­
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ers were particularly upset by the city's refusal to allow them to improve 
their land, since that might result in higher prices. Feeling that they would 
not receive a fair price from the city, the property owners organized as the 
South Side Association and opened an office in downtown to work against 
the center. Calling the civic center "lavish and costly and nonessential," the 
association wanted the civic center put to a referendum. When the city re­
fused to allow a referendum on the issue, this group organized the City Wide 
Taxpayers Association and campaigned against the charter amendment to 
allow the city to exceed its debt and to sell bonds already approved. Led by 
former South Dallas councilman Emil Corenbleth, it argued that the amend­
ment would allow the city to sell nonessential bonds for the development of 
the civic center. Such action, coupled with the still real need for essential ser­
vices, Corenbleth warned, would cause a huge rise in taxes. The city could 
have proposed to increase the debt ceiling for essential services, but they 
chose a sneaky way, according to Corenbleth, so civic leaders could get their 
long-desired civic auditorium. Shortly after hearing this argument, the Dal­
las Home and Property Owners Association, led by longtime CCA nemesis 
Frank Graham, joined the opposition.53 
The defeat of the bond and charter amendments proved the most serious 
setback suffered by DCC/CCA leaders between 1945 and 1955, sending 
shock waves through these groups. Some saw it as the first step in a cam­
paign to discredit the CCA and council-manager government. Others inter­
preted it as a result of overconfidence and a misreading of the public by civic 
leaders. The News worried that the defeat of the bond issue did not "sound 
like the old Dallas."54 The CCA responded to the defeat with a strategy to 
emphasize again Dallas as a whole. 
In March, council started meeting with neighborhood groups and other 
civic organizations to help decide what bonds to sell in the next bond elec­
tion. This resulted in a $49,985,000 bond issue. The city manager proposed 
$39,244,000 and the rest, $10,741,000, came from various civic organiza­
tions. Seventeen of the nineteen improvements requested were street im­
provements; the other two were airport expansion and a new library. Mean­
while, the city dropped plans for the civic center and offered a charter 
amendment to increase the debt limit from $75 million to $125 million to 
cover the proposed bonds.55 
This bond package, dubbed the People's Bond Program, and the massive 
advertising campaign for it, emphasized that many of the bonds originated 
from the people and "that every section of Dallas benefits." Campaign lit­
erature also promised that passage of the bond package was absolutely 
necessary for the city's continued growth and development.56 The strategy 
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apparently worked, as more than 32,000 turned out in the heaviest local 
election ever to support all of the bonds, as well as the charter amendment 
to increase the city's debt ceiling.57 
Despite this success and the appointment of a new city manager after the 
bond election, tensions continued between the mayor, city manager, and 
council. The most important problem involved a severe drought that threat­
ened the city's water supply. Dallas's spectacular growth and industrial de­
velopment during and after the war severely taxed its water reserve. Between 
1944 and 1948, to keep up with the demand, city officials spent $4 million in 
enlarging its water system. By the time it finished those improvements, new 
problems required that officials initiate an additional round of work on the 
water system, including a new water purification plant in Carrollton, Texas, 
north of Dallas. Despite these efforts, and a program calling for the Army 
Corps of Engineers to initiate a $60 million reservoir development for North 
Texas (eventually leading to the lakes of Grapevine, Garza-Little Elm, La-
von, and Benbrook), the city faced a major water crisis during Adoue's may-
oralty.58 
Dallas experienced a three-year drought starting in the summer of 1951. 
By October of 1952 this escalated into a full crisis when the Army Corps of 
Engineers issued a report predicting that the city had only a four-month sup­
ply of water left. Lake Dallas, the city's main source of water, had fallen 
more than twenty feet below its spillway, the lowest ever.59 Council imple­
mented water rationing, the third time this had been done in three years, and 
discussed ways of tapping emergency sources of water. It considered three 
major sources. First, the city could secure water from the Red River, al­
though this would be costly and time-consuming. In addition, that water 
had a high mineral and salt content, which would result in bad-tasting and 
corrosive water. Second, the city could tap one of Fort Worth's water sup­
plies such as Lake Bridgeport. However, Dallas would need Fort Worth's co­
operation and enough water for both cities. Finally, the city could dam the 
West Fork of the Trinity River and use that water during the shortage crisis. 
T. Carr Forrest, Jr., water engineer employed by City Manager Elgin Crull to 
investigate matters, made that recommendation. According to Forrest, the 
West Fork solution offered the most practical and least expensive plan.60 
That decision brought a howl of protest from many Dallas citizens, since 
upstream cities, including Fort Worth, had dumped their sewage in the West 
Fork for years. Such opposition helped delay council from proceeding with 
the West Fork option. While awaiting a resolution of that problem, council 
authorized the digging of several new wells and gave $36,000 to Dr. Irving P. 
Krick, of the Water Resources Development Company of Denver, to seed the 
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clouds with silver iodide to intensify any rainstorms in the Dallas water­
shed. That move of hiring a cloud seeder also proved controversial, but City 
Manager Crull justified it by pointing out it was cheaper than drilling addi­
tional wells.61 
As more information became known about the type of treatment needed 
to make the West Fork usable, the mayor, who initially supported the plan, 
reversed his position and charged that the city manager simply had not been 
honest with council about the usability of the West Fork water supply. 
"We've been lied to by Crull on down the line at city hall," Adoue charged. 
"They know the truth. I have been doing a lot of checking on it," he contin­
ued. "All Crull and Hoefle are doing is putting it off hoping it will rain."62 
Having lost confidence in his own city manager, Adoue recommended that 
council appoint a committee to select an outside expert to investigate the 
city's overall water needs and to propose a solution to its shortage. It did that 
at a December 3 meeting, choosing Fred I. Brinegar, president of Continen­
tal Supply Company; E. DeGolyer, a geologist; and Robert L. Thornton, 
head of Mercantile National Bank. Council also voted to abandon the West 
Fork plan, a popular decision but one that left the city without any immedi­
ate plan for the use of additional surface water. 
The citizens committee hired C. S. Stevens, E. W. Steele, and Jack Ledbet­
ter of the Houston engineering firm Lockwood and Andrews to undertake 
the study. That group filed a report on February 10,1953, and recommended 
that council should tap both the Red River and the West Fork as emergency 
measures. Council followed the recommendation, although the latter re­
mained controversial and faced the wrath of Councilman George Schene­
werk, who called the West Fork "a stream serving as a sewage outlet for up­
stream cities."63 
Council members also wrangled over a proposition to secure water from 
below the Texoma Dam near the Oklahoma border. This recommendation 
had been made by Marvin Williams, candidate for mayor. Even though Wil­
liams acknowledged this was a long-term solution to the city's water needs 
rather than a remedy for the immediate crisis, Councilman Clarence Kloppe 
supported the plan and proposed that council request a $13.5 million bond 
election to finance it. In what the News called "a comic opera session," city 
fathers voted 7-2 against the plan. Mayor Adoue sided with Kloppe, who 
called the body a "do nothing council."64 
City officials never utilized the West Fork Trinity plan, although it pro­
ceeded with tapping the Red River and used that supply throughout the 
1950s as an emergency measure. Heavy rains in May 1953 finally eased the 
water crisis, but not before it had tarnished the CCA-controlled council's 
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reputation for efficiency and effectiveness.65 Indeed, the water shortage 
played an important part in the 1953 municipal elections, an election that 
demonstrated one of the reasons the CCA continued to win elections during 
these years. 
Despite some impressive successes, the incumbent council and its mayor 
had been highly controversial and often criticized. In addition the CCA ap­
peared about to fragment over the future of Mayor Adoue, who had both 
strong supporters and critics in the good government league. As a result, 
1953 seemed to offer new opportunities for opponents of the CCA to defeat 
that powerful body at the polls. 
Although the city's political season usually started during January of the 
year municipal elections were scheduled, nineteen CCA leaders met behind 
closed doors on December 12,1952, to discuss the future of their organiza­
tion and nominate a five-person committee to recommend a slate. Notably 
absent from the meeting were several former CCA presidents and a present 
officer. The future of Mayor J. B. Adoue, an issue that threatened to split the 
CCA, most occupied the meeting. A number of the city's leading business­
men refused to endorse any slate that included Adoue, while other CCA 
members strongly supported the volatile banker.66 
Fearing that Adoue would destroy the CCA's chances for reelection, S. J. 
Hay, chair of that body's nominating committee, asked the mayor not to 
seek reelection. Meanwhile, friends of Adoue launched a postcard cam­
paign to show his continued voter appeal. The News also requested Adoue 
not run again.67 Unwilling to act until Adoue made a decision about his 
future, the CCA put off naming a slate until February 23. By then, the ma­
yor decided that he would not run for reelection due to health problems. 
Having solved one problem, the CCA operated quickly to secure an all-
new slate of candidates for council, including former city manager Rod-
eric Thomas. In addition, it selected W. J. (Bill) Harris, president of the 
State Federation of Labor. But its ability to secure Robert L. Thornton's 
consent to run as mayor proved its greatest success. Thornton, one of city's 
most powerful and popular civic leaders, proved a brilliant choice for an 
organization trying to overcome factionalization and retain its image of 
being for Dallas as a whole. By nominating Thornton for mayor, along 
with an entirely new slate of candidates for council, the good government 
association successfully distanced itself from the previously contentious 
all-CCA council. It also heeded former CCA president R. L. Thomas's rec­
ommendation to make the CCA more representative by creating a twenty-
seven-member advisory committee to direct the CCA's campaign. Accord­
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ing to the News, that committee represented every section of the city and 
also included blacks, women, and labor leaders.68 
Marvin Williams, who worked in radio advertising, led the opposition 
ticket, named the Greater Dallas Party (GDP). It included a woman and a 
union man as candidates and stressed the failure of the current council to 
solve the city's water problem; and it endorsed its mayoralty candidate's 
proposal to secure water from Lake Texoma. GDP candidates also criticized 
the incumbent council's increase in utilities and its refusal to grant an addi­
tional taxi franchise. They also blamed the incumbent CCA council for not 
providing sewers to the city's Pleasant Mound and Pleasant Grove neighbor­
hoods. Finally, they attacked "government by monopoly" and argued that 
"the time has come when the business tycoons and financial wizards who 
have used the city government for their own ends for the past twenty years 
must come to an end."69 
To make local government more democratic, GDP council candidate 
Merl Scheffy advocated a municipal cabinet whose members would be se­
lected from each of the city's council districts. CCA candidate and former 
city manager Roderic Thomas responded that such a cabinet would hasten 
the "return of the antiquated, discredited, aldermanic form of government" 
where alderman would fight for Pork Barrel projects for their own wards "re­
gardless of the welfare of the city as whole."70 
Indeed, the CCA continually argued that it had provided and would con­
tinued to provide the city with "business-like efficient, economical and non­
partisan city government." And because the CCA had no political favors to 
dispense, "every citizen's welfare [would] receive our full consideration." In 
endorsing the CCA slate, the News echoed this view. The CCA "is not a po­
litical party in the usual sense of the word," the News contended. "It is a 
group that is active only during municipal campaigns." Moreover, "The 
welfare of Dallas is its sole objective."71 The CCA also emphasized that its 
candidates were not politicians but civic leaders asked to run for the good of 
the city. When Marvin Williams challenged Thornton to a debate, the latter 
responded, "I am not a politician and I do not engage in political debates 
with anybody. I think that a man who engages in a political debate has to 
have some elements of a politician and I have none."72 
Despite its claim of being nonpolitical, CCA leaders were quite politi­
cally astute in the way they conducted the campaign. They organized at the 
precinct level and poured huge amounts of money into an advertising cam­
paign. Fearing that the election might be close, CCA officials placed union 
man Bill Harris on the slate, the same man who had been labeled a threat to 
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the city's welfare when he ran against that group in 1949. Now with Harris 
on the slate, the Dallas Craftsman, the mouthpiece of the AFL, endorsed the 
CCA for the first time.73 The CCA's efforts to improve black housing also 
gained the endorsement of the Progressive Voters League for eight of its 
nine candidates.74 
The CCA's platform emphasized traditional themes—maintenance of a 
nonpartisan council-manager government and a pledge to "work as a team 
for the best interest of Dallas and all of its citizens." It also promised that 
Dallas citizens would never have to drink West Fork water, and committed 
itself to developing long-term water planning. In addition, the CCA plat­
form vowed to keep organized gambling out of Dallas, to support the devel­
opment of Love Field, to push the construction of a municipal auditorium, 
and continue to work to relieve the black housing shortage and improve in­
terracial relations.75 
The selection of Thornton as mayoralty candidate, and an all-new coun­
cil slate, apparently paid off, as the charter ticket swept both the GDP and 
some independents by a vote of 2—1. Thornton soundly defeated Williams, 
attracting nearly 70 percent of the vote from the 31,586 who participated. 
Only sixteen of the ninety-seven precincts voted completely or partially 
against CCA candidates. CCA opponents, as usual, received heavy support 
from northeast and northwest Dallas, while some precincts in both East 
Dallas and Oak Cliff also gave the good government group commanding 
majorities. Even three of the four new precincts in impoverished and newly 
annexed West Dallas supported the CCA.76 
Despite the city's rapid growth after World War II, the city's politics re­
mained amazingly static. The CCA continued as the dominant power and 
even though the issues changed, the political rhetoric after World War II 
sounded strikingly similar to the prewar rhetoric. The CCA's success, then, 
can be explained in part by its ability to sell itself as the party of the city at a 
time when the city remained a major issue of concern for Dallas voters. And 
even though the CCA experienced real vulnerability due to the problems 
from the troubled incumbent council, it maintained its impressive winning-
streak in Dallas after the war. It won not only because it controlled the terms 
of debate—emphasizing city wide issues and underscoring its success in pro­
viding relatively efficient and honest government for Dallas—but because it 
successfully disassociated itself from special interest groups and articulated 
a rounded agenda that emphasized economic growth and downtown devel­
opment while also addressing neighborhood problems and pressing social 
issues such as the lack of available black housing. Although not successful in 
meeting the latter need, the attention and publicity given to the matter 
An Era of Rapid Growth, 1945-1955 • 191 
seemed to reinforce the CCA's image of working for Dallas as a whole. With 
its emphasis on the comprehensive approach to urban problem solving asso­
ciated with the Ulrickson program, council-manager government and the 
Master Plan of 1943-1945, the CCA remained viable after the war. 
As we have seen, Dallas African Americans had suffered from horrible 
housing conditions throughout the early twentieth century. When Harland 
Bartholomew studied the city's black housing problem in 1944 he called it 
one of the most serious challenges facing the city and recommended the re­
development of blighted black neighborhoods and the creation of new black 
neighborhoods on the city's outskirts.77 Mayor Rodgers agreed and in De­
cember of 1944 announced that "slum clearance and minimum housing 
standards appear to be at the top of the list of all progressive cities for the 
postwar period."78 During the same month, the News ran a twelve-part se­
ries on the city's slum problem, written by reporter Allen Quinn. After docu­
menting the city's appalling black housing, Quinn went on to emphasize its 
negative impact on the city. Citing both the bad health and economic impact 
slums had on the city, he concluded, "There can be no excuse for Dallas 
keeping the slums which are cancerous growths upon the city's health." 
Quinn blamed the greed of white landlords as well as the economic condi­
tions of blacks, along with the lack of adequate housing codes and zoning 
laws, for creating slums. And because of segregation, he concluded that "vir­
tually every Dallas Negro, no matter what his economic or intellectual sta­
tus, lives under slum conditions or in slum surroundings. It isn't from choice; 
he has nowhere else to go."79 Although Quinn preferred that the private 
building industry provide the housing, he recognized that public housing 
might be necessary, a sentiment echoed by Mayor Rodgers.80 Several years 
later, a joint congressional committee came to Dallas to investigate the city's 
black housing conditions. Pointing to the cause of overcrowdedness and ap­
palling living conditions, G. F. Porter of the local NAACP repeated Quinn's 
contention that blacks were "hemmed in by the iron curtain of segregation." 
A year later, A. Maceo Smith, Dallas racial relations advisor for the FHA, 
identified the effect of such segregation when he disclosed, "It is harder to 
find homes for Negroes in Dallas than in any other city in the South."81 
Despite the claim from the local real estate and building industry that 
they could provide for black housing needs, and despite the fact they con­
structed more than 30,000 new homes between 1945 and 1949, private build­
ers erected fewer than 1,000 new dwellings for blacks, although Greater Dal-
las's black population increased by 30,000 between 1940 and 1950. Fearful 
whites thwarted efforts by private developers to build large projects for 
blacks on the city's outskirts. For instance, builder Hub Hill's plan to erect a 
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2,000 home development just south of Dallas city limits, near Cockrell Hill 
and Arcadia, ignited protests from these two suburban communities as well 
as nearby Oak Cliff. White homeowners claimed the location of an all-black 
subdivision near their neighborhoods would lower real estate values. More­
over, they alleged that such a development exploited blacks by locating them 
far away from employment opportunities. Yielding to the pressure from 
both inside and outside the city, council refused to provide water for the 
development and therefore blocked additional black housing. Such a pat­
tern repeated itself as nearby white neighborhoods prevented the erection 
of five other large-scale black developments.82 Not only did little new black 
housing appear, but completed public works projects such as the con­
struction of Central Expressway and the expansion of Love Field actually 
destroyed black housing. Symptomatic of the housing shortage, more than 
3,800 house-hungry blacks placed their names on a waiting list for public 
housing.83 
Faced with limited housing opportunities, blacks responded in several 
ways. Many either doubled- or tripled-up with relatives, friends, or others. 
A1950 survey of black housing conditions found about 7,000 African Amer­
ican families living with other families. Additional black families flooded 
into West Dallas, an unincorporated tract separated from the city's down­
town by the Trinity River. Located on the flood plain that had been "sal­
vaged" by the levees, the housing site remained susceptible to seasonal 
flooding due to drainage problems in the lowlands. A 1948 survey found 
nearly 25,000 whites, blacks, and Mexican Americans living there, more 
than four times the area's population in 1940. Before the war, 1,400 blacks 
lived in the eastern half of this nine—square mile area. By 1948, over 9,000 
blacks resided in this setting of flimsy shacks, abandoned gravel pits, gar­
bage dumps, open toilets, and shallow wells.84 Conditions in West Dallas 
were grim. Fewer than 10 percent of West Dallas dwellings contained an in­
door toilet in 1948, while only 15 percent of the houses had running water. 
Tenants drank from shallow wells often located in the same area where hu­
man waste was disposed. Problems with inadequate water and sewage help 
explain the area's disproportionally high number of typhoid, tuberculosis, 
and polio cases. The area also became a notorious center of criminal ac-
tivity.85 
More-prosperous blacks attempted to find housing in South Dallas and 
bought dwellings from working-class whites eager to flee their deteriorating 
neighborhoods. The Exline Park area, scene of the 1940 bombings, contin­
ued to attract blacks because it bordered an established African American 
neighborhood. Unfortunately for blacks, some South Dallas whites reacted 
An Era of Rapid Growth, 1945-1955 • 193 
as they had in 1940, with bombings and arson to keep blacks from ex­
panding further into their neighborhoods. On February 8, 1950, whites 
bombed Horace Bonner's home at 2515 Southland Street, near Exline Park. 
The blast destroyed the front of the house, although Bonner, his wife, and 
mother-in-law escaped injury.86 During the next one and a half years bomb­
ers attacked twelve black homes in a two—square mile neighborhood of 
South Dallas. This violence created a real challenge to Dallas leadership. It 
needed to protect black homeowners and produce alternative housing for 
blacks while at the same time quelling South Dallas fears that the city had 
decided to turn their neighborhoods over to blacks. 
The bombings intensified Dallas leaders' efforts to find additional hous­
ing for blacks. Shortly after the first bombing, Mayor Wallace Savage again 
repeated his call for additional public housing for blacks. Soon after Con­
gress passed the Housing Act of 1949, the DHA with city council's approval 
had requested 2,800 units of public housing be allocated for Dallas, approxi­
mately 10 percent of the number of substantial dwellings found in the 1940 
Housing Census. The DHA designated between 70 and 75 percent for black 
and Mexican American housing. Following the recommendations of the 
Master Plan, the city also applied for and received a preliminary loan under 
Title 1 of the Housing Act to plan for the slum clearance and urban redevel­
opment of a twenty-block slum area in the Mill Creek district. The city even­
tually applied for $25 million in federal aid for the slum clearance project 
and was one of the first five cities in the nation to develop a detailed slum 
clearance proposal. Unfortunately, the lack of state enabling legislation 
allowing the city to take land for clearance would thwart the city's efforts at 
slum redevelopment during this time. Moreover, the fierce resistance to pub­
lic housing by groups such as the Dallas Council for Free Enterprise, estab­
lished by local realtors and home builders, also stalled the public housing 
component. Chaired by D. A. Frank, the Council for Free Enterprise lobbied 
against slum clearance and public housing, arguing it would provide "temp­
tations for graft, corruption and favoritism." Frank also claimed that he had 
not "found any place in Dallas [he] would call a slum."87 
Yielding to the pressure of the Free Enterprise Council and the Dallas 
Home Builders Association, the city agreed to postpone action on public 
housing and gave home builders ninety days to provide a private solution to 
the black housing crisis. One such proposal, to turn over part of South Dal­
las exclusively to blacks, worsened the already heightened tension in that 
section among whites. Lovell Turner, Dallas realtor and member of the Dal­
las Free Enterprise Council, proposed to transfer white housing to black 
housing in an area from south Lamar and Warren Avenues northeast to the 
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Texas & Pacific railroad tracks. This only increased the paranoia of white 
South Dallas residents and made some suspect that a deal had been already 
worked out to abandon their section to black housing. More than 500 angry 
South Dallas whites attended a meeting on February 23 to protest Turner's 
proposal. There they heard councilman Roland Pelt, a builder by trade, an­
nounce an alternative for dealing with the black housing shortage. Pelt, who 
headed the builders' committee to find adequate black housing sites, pro­
posed to develop an entire "Negro city" on a 3,000-acre tract of vacant land 
in the Trinity River bottoms in northwest Dallas, between Harry Hines Bou­
levard and the Trinity East Levee. He argued that the city or Dallas business­
men could buy the land and then resell it to private builders for development 
following a city-approved plan. According to the councilman, this would be 
the logical place to house between 35,000 and 40,000 blacks. It would also 
include a central business district, churches, suburbanlike shopping centers, 
a university, three grade schools, and a high school. Pelt made it clear that 
there was no place in the master-planned community for public housing, 
noting it would be "strictly a private enterprise deal."88 
Black leaders saw the proposal differently and rejected the "river bottom 
city as unfit for residential use because of its proximity to industry and its 
flood potential." In addition, the Negro Chamber of Commerce claimed 
that "Negroes would not live there in large numbers and developers would 
suffer a financial loss."89 John W. Carpenter, president of the Dallas Cham­
ber of Commerce, agreed with the black assessment, concluding that "much 
better areas could be found for residential development." Under his leader­
ship, the chamber appointed a five-member committee that cooperated with 
a DCC committee to investigate and report on the black housing problem.90 
If ever a document represented the voice of the establishment, this one did. 
"The Report of Joint Committees of Dallas Chamber of Commerce and 
Dallas Citizens Council on Negro Housing in Dallas County" desired its 
"studies, findings and recommendations . .  . [to be] as comprehensive as 
possible in the hope that a plan could be evolved which would provide for the 
present needs of the Negro population of our city as well as for the future 
needs." It started by identifying two "fundamental factors to which any suc­
cessful and satisfactory plan should adhere." First, it emphasized that all 
housing solutions should take place within the Dallas city limits so proper 
supervision could be guaranteed. Second, it supported segregation of the 
two races and endorsed housing solutions that would embrace segregation, 
"so long as segregation . . . does not mean discrimination." 
The Joint Committee, according to John Carpenter, was made up of indi­
viduals "deeply interested in the welfare of Dallas and all of its people—not 
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just one class, but all of its people [italics mine]." According to Julius 
Schepps, one of its members, the committee "would not just spread a little 
salve and let it go at that." Committee members met with black leaders, the 
Dallas Home Builders Association, the Dallas Housing Authority, residents, 
businessmen, and ministers of South Dallas, and with city council, to under­
stand better the city's needs. It also took a five-hour bus tour examining sev­
eral black communities and inspected several prospective housing sites. 
The committee found that the "shortage of housing for Negroes is acute 
and critical." It went on to echo earlier reports that Dallas blacks lived under 
conditions "that threatened the health and welfare not only of themselves 
but also of our entire community." After reviewing not only those condi­
tions but the economic abilities of Dallas blacks, the committee made rec­
ommendations. It proposed the annexation of West Dallas and all other un­
incorporated areas contiguous to the city containing bad housing. The 
committee also wanted to locate good housing sites for blacks able to afford 
better housing. It proceeded to identify six locations for such housing. In 
addition, the committee recommended that the DHA immediately build 
1,000 units of public housing for blacks within the next twelve months and 
provide 1,500 units within the next 18 months. It also requested that city of­
ficials cooperate with the DHA in an urban redevelopment program. In ad­
dition, it suggested the creation of an Inter-Racial Committee of not less 
than fifteen outstanding citizens, in part to stop the bombings in South Dal­
las. Finally, the committee asked that all citizens assume individual respon­
sibility in meeting the black housing shortage "in a spirit of Christian help-
fulness."91 
As tension increased in South Dallas due to additional bombings that 
summer, civic leaders tried to implement parts of the Housing Committee 
recommendations. Shortly after the report, council gave the DHA the go-
ahead to produce 1,000 public housing units for blacks within a year.92 Sev­
eral months later, members of the DCC, the chamber of commerce, and the 
Dallas Council of Social Agencies appointed a committee of civic leaders to 
address the West Dallas problem. That body issued its report on October 19, 
1950. It called for a comprehensive, long-range plan for the area and warned 
that "only by intelligent and diligent effort on the part of the citizens of Dal­
las County, as a whole, can the problems of West Dallas be worked out satis­
factory." Toward this end, the report recommended that the city annex West 
Dallas and requested that the DHA establish 3,500 low-rent housing units 
there, including 1,500 for whites, 1,500 for blacks, and 500 for Mexican 
Americans. After investigating the area, committee members concluded 
that "if public housing is justified anywhere, it is justified in an area like West 
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Dallas." It also called on the county to appropriate $150,000 for road and 
drainage improvements and urged city officials to apply for federal funds to 
construct a West Dallas sanitary sewer. In addition, the report suggested 
that the city develop much of West Dallas under Title 1, the urban redevel­
opment title of the Housing Act. Finally, it proposed the preparation of a 
comprehensive and long-range plan for West Dallas.93 Both the DHA and 
city council approved these requests and initiated action on them imme­
diately. 
About the same time civic leaders started to plan for West Dallas, the 
chamber of commerce also created a new biracial Inter-Racial Committee. 
According to chamber sources, that committee grew out of activity to ease 
the black housing shortage, but it planned to deal with racial problems on 
a variety of fronts. The fifteen-member committee appointed by the Dallas 
Chamber of Commerce tried to represent many elements of Dallas. It in­
cluded two representatives from the board of directors of the Dallas Cham­
ber of Commerce; one representative from the DCC; the Oak Cliff Chamber 
of Commerce; the South and East Dallas Chamber of Commerce; the Dallas 
Federated League; the Dallas Pastors Association; the Dallas Bar; the Rotary 
Club; the Lions Club; the Salesmanship Club; the Civitan Club; the Kiwanis 
Club; and the Civic Federation. In addition, the committee included four 
black men and one black woman in its membership. It selected M. J. Norrell, 
retired labor relations expert for the Magnolia Petroleum Company, as chair 
and executive director, and Will C. Grant, retired advertising executive, as 
vice chair. Sam C. Hudson, president of the Dallas Negro Chamber of Com­
merce, served as secretary for the organization.94 
At its first meeting, held August 8, the committee set as its major objective 
the securing of additional housing for blacks but it also decided to study the 
"whole field of inter-racial relations in Dallas." The committee selected nine 
areas for attention: housing; health, hospitals, and sanitation; education 
and cultural resources; legal needs; parks, playgrounds and recreation; wel­
fare, PTA, and social services; employment and professional recognition; 
churches and religious resources; and citizen participation and interpreta­
tion. This unprecedented comprehensive treatment of the race problem in 
Dallas emphasized the need for "understanding, goodwill and cooperation 
of all people of Dallas, and of Dallas County." 
Although the committees made less than earthshaking recommendations 
by today's standards, they demonstrated an increased commitment to deal­
ing with black needs. Decrying the fact that only nineteen black doctors 
practiced in Dallas, the committee recommended recruitment of more Afri­
can American doctors. In the booster tradition, it also called for the estab­
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lishment of a Negro hospital and medical and nurses' training school in Dal­
las, not only for the city but for the entire Southwest. Until it secured this 
long-range goal, the committee recommended weekly or monthly clinics for 
black doctors to "keep them abreast of the advances in their profession." 
Committee members also requested doctors be given sufficient staff to en­
able them to treat their patients in public hospitals. In addition, the commit-
tee's report suggested that larger private hospitals offer free outpatient clin­
ics for the city's blacks. Finally, it also called for the building of a new city-
county Memorial Hospital, which would provide additional hospital beds 
for blacks. 
In the area of education, the report included as a goal the equalization of 
educational opportunities for Dallas blacks. It recommended more intensive 
use of black high schools for vocational training and also suggested "a more 
integrated and better coordinated recreation program for Negro schools as 
well as more general use of the school's buildings as community centers." Fi­
nally, it requested that adult blacks be given access to the Jim Crow Dallas 
Public Library. 
The section of the report on parks and recreation space called for an in­
crease in parks around future black neighborhoods and public housing proj­
ects. In addition, the report suggested that areas in the popular White Rock 
Lake and Bachman Lake parks be open to blacks. It also advised city officials 
to appoint an experienced Director of Negro Activities under the Direction 
of the Park Board whose job would be to coordinate the programs and work 
of all groups engaged in recreational activity for blacks. 
After reviewing the welfare and social service programs, the committee 
concluded that it would not pass judgment on whether there were adequate 
funds available for welfare and social services. It did conclude that it found 
no "discrimination or favoritism shown in the distribution of social ser­
vices." The report's only recommendation asked the president of the Negro 
Chamber of Commerce to appoint a contact committee to which black citi­
zens could refer all interracial matters of concern. 
The Subcommittee on Employment and Professional Recognition urged 
more training for adult black workers. It also wanted ability, experience, and 
training to be taken more into account when hiring blacks. Finally, it encour­
aged blacks to "pool their own resources in the establishing of Credit 
Unions, Building and Loan Associations, Insurance Associations" and retail 
centers. It concluded that "lifting the economic level of Negroes in Dallas, 
would help lift the level of ALL Dallas." Another set of recommendations 
called for better coordination between black churches, the YMCA, and 
other agencies to enlarge recreational, cultural, and religious programs for 
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Dallas blacks. The subcommittee report urged that team spirit—as opposed 
to a gang spirit—be promoted among the city's blacks. Committee mem­
bers also asked white and black churches to coordinate efforts and cooperate 
more regularly to combat potential problems leading to black criminality.95 
The report, then, stressed the interrelationship of various factors that af­
fected blacks in Dallas. However, the subcommittee on housing, chaired by 
Jerome Crossman, made the most important recommendation in regard to 
the pressing housing shortage. First, it encouraged private builders to de­
velop immediately 2,000 units for sale and rent to blacks. It also recom­
mended that public housing be carried through "with as little delay as con­
ditions make possible." The report specifically endorsed the proposed 
program for West Dallas and pledged to cooperate with the ambitious pro­
gram of public housing and urban redevelopment. Finally, the committee 
suggested that business and financial interests of Dallas join together in or­
ganizing a nonprofit corporation "to purchase land for and develop a mod­
ern Negro community." That program ultimately resulted in the develop­
ment of Hamilton Park in North Dallas.96 
White civic leaders and the local government, then, responded to the vio­
lence in South Dallas not only by pushing for more housing for blacks, but 
by approaching the problem in a very comprehensive fashion. The 1943-45 
Master Plan had treated the city's physical needs comprehensively and now 
civic leaders treated the city's racial problems in a similar manner. They 
clearly understood that racial violence and inadequate housing threatened 
the welfare of the entire city—their greatest object of concern. As a result, 
their effort to discourage blacks from moving into disputed areas, another 
recommendation of the Inter-Racial Committee, should not be interpreted 
as a lack of interest in remedying the larger problem.97 It rather suggests the 
high priority civic leaders placed on preventing massive civil unrest, some­
thing deemed unhealthy for a growing metropolis. 
Despite strong resistance, then, from certain sections, local officials and 
civic leaders embraced both public housing and urban redevelopment as 
ways to resolve the South Dallas trouble. Convinced that the housing short­
age resulted in deplorable black housing conditions that truly threatened the 
welfare of the city as a whole, they made additional black housing one of the 
city's top priorities. As a result, not only did Dallas participate in one of the 
largest public housing programs in the nation in the early 1950s,98 but prom­
inent members of the chamber of commerce and the DCC underwrote the 
development of the middle-class black community of Hamilton Park. 
Still, civic leaders seemed unable to stop the continued bombings in 
South Dallas and to secure protection for black homeowners in that section. 
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As early as May 1950, black leaders reported, "It has been publicly attrib­
uted to the Mayor and city officials that they are afraid to give protection to 
Negro residents of South Dallas lest the very act of protecting them be 
understood as encouragement to them to purchase homes in the area." Civic 
leaders at this time clearly understood the degree of white resistance to 
black's expanding their presence in South Dallas and desperately attempted 
to find alternative solutions to the black housing problem to preserve public 
order. Meanwhile, black leaders wanted protection and justice for fellow 
blacks and voiced displeasure when the Dallas police failed to provide 
needed protection. Rev. B. R. Riley, pastor of Salem Baptist Church and 
president of the local NAACP, filed a petition with council asking the city to 
stop the bombings. The News observed that the petition, by implication, 
charged officials with apathetic unwillingness to do anything about the 
bombings. A month later, forty blacks warned council that Dallas could face 
serious race trouble if the bombings did not end. Such threats seemed to have 
little effect on the police. Despite his announcement in August that he knew 
who was doing the bombings, the police chief claimed no arrests could be 
made before some "circumstances" happened. That did not occur for ten 
months." 
Matters were not helped when Rev. John G. Moore, pastor of the Colo­
nial Baptist Church and head of the newly formed South Dallas Adjustment 
League, reported that his group planned to buy out all blacks living between 
Southland and Pennsylvania Avenues. Claiming that the black influx threat­
ened the area's fourteen white churches, the pastor promised that his group 
would retake the neighborhood for whites not by bombs but by dollars. Few 
blacks accepted his offer.100 As a result, tensions continued and the bomb­
ings escalated during the early part of the summer of 1951. And Dallas 
blacks showed a growing outrage at the city's inability to stop the terror­
ism. The Dallas Express editorialized that summer, "We are concerned at 
the destruction of the faith that Negroes must keep in the white leadership 
of Dallas." It went on to accuse Dallas leaders of "sitting on their hands" 
and wondered why the eighteen to twenty white businessmen "who really 
run Dallas" did not order the police to stop those bombings. The editorial 
also criticized some of the city's black leadership for not speaking out more 
forcefully against the bombings. A Council of Negro Organizations met 
July 2 and scheduled a mass meeting on the South Dallas bombings after 
demanding a special grand jury to investigate those blasts. Several weeks 
later, the Inter-Racial Committee appointed by the chamber of commerce 
seconded the request for a special grand jury to probe the South Dallas 
bombings.101 
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The growing impatience, then, of the black community and the increased 
threat of retaliation, as well as the white community's growing embar­
rassment over episodes that were, in the words of Mayor Adoue, "black­
ening the name of the Dallas all over the nation," ultimately resulted in the 
formation of a special grand jury made up of some of the city's civic leaders. 
On the very day that the grand jury met, Dallas police with the help of the 
Texas Rangers arrested Claude Thomas Wright while sheriff deputies in 
Hunt County arrested his half brother, Arthur Eugen, for the June 25 bomb­
ing of a black house in South Dallas. Few believed that these men had mas­
terminded the bombings, and rumors spread that two South Dallas neigh­
borhood associations had been responsible for them. That rumor gained 
credence when police brought in South Dallas community activist Charles 
Goff, labor leader and chairman of the Exline Improvement League. Goff 
had been one of the major opponents of the CCA and had fielded a slate 
against the good government association in the late 1940s. Eight additional 
indictments came from the special grand jury as well as a subpoena for the 
South Dallas Bank and Trust Company to produce bank statements and 
canceled checks from two South Dallas neighborhood organizations.102 
The final report of the blue-ribbon grand jury claimed that the "plot 
reached into unbelievable places." It said that many had been implicated, in­
cluding people who were highly regarded in their communities. In addition, 
the report admitted that "there was evidence that lay and religious and com­
munity groups, through misguided leadership, entered an action, perhaps 
unwittingly, that resulted in violence and destruction." The grand jury also 
recognized that several who "apparently participated in the planning and 
preparation of the bombs were not indicted" because the young district at­
torney, Henry Wade, had thought that not enough evidence existed for con­
viction. The grand jury closed its report by urging that the investigation con-
tinue.103 Only one of those indicted went to trial and even that case failed to 
bring a conviction.104 But for Dallas civic leaders, the grand jury investiga­
tion had the desired results. The bombings stopped. 
White leaders, then, responded to the South Dallas violence much like 
they dealt with other problems, with an eye to solving the problem in a 
way that looked out for what they perceived to be the best solution for the 
city as a whole, rather than the needs or requirements of one group. Had 
they been most concerned about justice for blacks, rather than peace for 
the city, they might well have responded to the South Dallas problem much 
differently. Convictions would have been secured and the workings of all 
involved exposed. But this would not be the case, since citywide interests 
dictated a different response. The city's involvement in Love Field develop­
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ment was another example of the dominance of the city-as-a-whole ethos 
rather than one emphasizing the needs of neighborhoods. 
As we have seen, during World War II Dallas made a commitment to keep 
Love Field as its central airport, and citizens had approved a $5 million bond 
issue in 1945 to assure that would happen. Despite this commitment, lack of 
a definite airport plan and conflict over lines of authority and responsibility 
stalled development of the airport and led Dudley M. Steele of the American 
Association of Airport Executives in 1947 to charge that Love Field was the 
second-worst airport in the nation.105 
While Dallas floundered, Fort Worth made a surprising decision in Octo­
ber of 1947 to cooperate with the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) 
and develop the abandoned Midway Airfield as the city's municipal airport. 
Although that city had originally planned to build a new airport six miles 
south of downtown, the CAA's assurance that it would provide $11.5 million 
helped to convince Fort Worth civic leaders to develop the airport midway 
between Dallas and their city.106 Dallas leaders at first reacted cautiously to 
Fort Worth's decision, but they became infuriated when the CAA released its 
National Airport Plan for 1948. As part of the Federal Airport Act of 1946, 
Congress required the CAA to develop a plan to promote an efficient public 
airport system. The 1948 plan proposed that Midway be developed as a re­
gional airport to serve the Dallas—Fort Worth area as the primary airport 
and reduced Love Field to secondary status.107 
To see its hated rival, Fort Worth, gain support from the Federal Govern­
ment was too much for some Dallas leaders. They attempted to kill the 
CAA's appropriation for the Midway Airport and actually took out a full-
page ad in the Washington Post toward that end. That advertisement 
charged that the Fort Worth Regional Office of the CAA had "arbitrarily, 
unreasonably and secretly" planned Midway Airport nineteen miles from 
Dallas.108 Despite the protest of their congressman, J. Frank Wilson, that the 
CAA was attempting to "kick Dallas in the teeth" by making Midway the de 
facto regional airport, the Fort Worth appropriation passed. Dallas also lost 
its appeal to the CAA and heard one of its examiners scold the city. "Dallas 
protest," he observed, "was nothing more than one city's rapacious desire to 
deprive its neighbor of its inalienable right to prosper." Midway Airport 
would be developed, according to the CAA official, because that agency 
wanted the airfield "for defense purposes." Efforts to overturn the appropri­
ations in the federal court proved just as futile.109 
Dallas took such steps because it did not believe Fort Worth's claim that 
the expanded Midway Airport, to be renamed the Greater Fort Worth In­
ternational Airport-Carter Field, was strictly a Fort Worth field. Dallas 
202 D CHAPTER SEVEN 
officials thought otherwise because the airport's nineteen-mile distance 
from downtown Fort Worth was about the same distance from downtown 
Dallas. Civic leaders in Dallas also remembered how the CAA had been pro­
moting a regional airport since 1940. And in 1948, the Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce confirmed Dallas's suspicions when he urged the city to join in 
Carter Field's development. Faced with this new pressure to cooperate with 
Fort Worth, Dallas officials and civic leaders reevaluated Love Field's 
future.110 
Despite the almost hysterical refusal to cooperate with Fort Worth by 
Mayor J. Woodall Rodgers and the city's two largest newspapers, some Dal­
las leaders took their neighboring city's offer seriously as it became clear 
that Fort Worth would proceed to construct the new airport. For instance, 
the powerful DCC met in April 1951 and decided to investigate the possibil­
ity of joining Fort Worth to make Carter a true regional airport. After Amon 
Carter personally offered Dallas an opportunity to co-sponsor the midway 
airport, one Dallas newspaper reported, "It is no secret that some of the 
city's most influential businessmen have changed their thinking about the 19 
mile airport [Carter Field] and are ready to negotiate with Fort Worth on 
any basis."111 
John W. Carpenter, a member of the DCC and president of the Dallas 
Chamber of Commerce, appeared to be the most vocal supporter of j oint de­
velopment of Carter Field. "If you disregard personalities and disregard pol­
itics," Carpenter advised, "you cannot fail to see that Dallas should support 
the Midway Airport as it originally did." Carpenter, who had been a key 
player in the Dallas and Fort Worth effort to canalize the Trinity River since 
1930, called for the establishment of a Dallas-Tarrant County airport au­
thority to control the development of all airport facilities in both counties. 
Just as the two cities understood the need to work together to secure ade­
quate river transportation, Carpenter thought the cities needed a similar co­
operative effort for their aviation needs. Civic leader Stanley Marcus, presi­
dent of Neiman-Marcus department store, also had reservations about the 
future of Love Field. He reluctantly agreed to chair a chamber of commerce 
committee on the city's future airport development only after the chamber 
convinced city council to engage an outside consultant to evaluate Love 
Field's future."112 
Council employed James C. Buckley on November 21, 1951. That act 
proved an important turning point in the history of Love Field. Buckley, a 
terminal and transportation consultant from New York City, had been di­
rector of airport development for the Port Authority of New York. In that 
position he had served as the chief architect of regional airport development 
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for Greater New York. In Dallas, his main charge was to evaluate the future 
of Love Field, with the opening of Carter Field only a year away. His thor­
ough study not only predicted Love Field's continued importance due to its 
convenient location to downtown fliers, but for the first time provided a 
well-documented overview of the tremendous economic value of the Dallas 
airport. Not only did Love Field provide more than 3,600 jobs and a payroll 
of over $74.5 million, but its passenger and freight cargo played a critical role 
in promoting the broader economic development of the city. Love Field's fu­
ture appeared promising, according to the report, but Buckley warned that 
it could only be secured with substantial and expensive expansion.113 
Although Buckley recommended cooperating with Fort Worth to plan a 
long-range program of regional airport development, his report gave a ring­
ing endorsement to the value of Love Field, and that conclusion shaped the 
city's aviation policy for the next ten years. Because of its location near 
downtown, he advised the city to maintain Love Field as its primary air-
port.114 The report outlining the best approach to aviation development for 
the city created a new enthusiasm for Love Field. The report rallied civic 
leaders and helped them pass an airport bond issue in one of the bitterest 
and most controversial local elections in Dallas history. 
In order to improve Love Field as Buckley recommended, the city needed 
to expand runways into the built-up areas surrounding Love Field. The pro­
vision to extend one of the field's runways from 6,200 to 8,500 feet and build 
a parallel runway the same size required additional funds and resulted in a 
$10 million bond issue. Bond money would also build a larger terminal 
building and fund a new general airport in Oak Cliff.115 
The bond election proved controversial not only because of the unprece­
dented financial commitment it asked Dallas voters to make to aviation, but 
because neighborhoods near Love Field waged a ferocious campaign to de­
feat it. Supporters of the bond issue, bankrolled by the wealthy and powerful 
DCC, fought back and poured more than $50,000 into the campaign. They 
insisted that Dallas needed airport improvement to continue its rapid 
growth. Banker Robert L. Thornton, probably the city's most influential cit­
izen, warned that Dallas was at the crossroads. "We must go forward," he 
cautioned, "or be like some of the towns that the railroad passed up. If we 
don't follow the word of experts who say we must expand Love Field, what 
word are we to follow?" Disparate groups such as the Dallas Building Trades 
Council, the Negro Chamber of Commerce, the Dallas Home Builders As­
sociation, and the Oak Cliff Chamber of Commerce supported the bond 
issue.116 
The opposition to Love Field, however, proved loud and persistent. More 
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than 700 blacks who lived in nearby Elm Thicket jammed the North Temple 
Baptist Church on January 19 and urged defeat of the bond. Much of their 
neighborhood would be wiped out by the airport expansion; conservative 
estimates suggested that airport expansion would uproot at least 300 black 
families. This truly angered some protesters, since they had earlier been re­
located by the city's development of Central Expressway. Led by black op­
tometrist J. O. Chisum, Love Field area blacks protested that the city already 
suffered from an acute black housing shortage, which just two years earlier 
had resulted in the city's most intense racial tension. Since no present black 
community could possibly accommodate even half of the people to be dislo­
cated, the uprooting of such a large number of blacks would push these un­
fortunate citizens into "unfriendly [white] communities."117 Given the city's 
recent experience with the bombings in South Dallas due to the black hous­
ing shortage, it may seem incredible that city officials and civic leaders, who 
had real alternatives to Love Field, supported activity that would further the 
housing crisis. Because those leaders now viewed Love Field as an essential 
element of urban growth and development, however, their commitment to 
its expansion and improvement overwhelmed any concern for the plight of 
a small minority neighborhood. And civic leaders may have soothed their 
consciences by claiming that the Hamilton Park development north of Dal­
las, under the Inter-Racial Committee, would somehow take care of the 
Love Field relocatees, even though it had been developed in response to the 
already very obvious overcrowding that had caused racial problems in South 
Dallas. Even certain black groups such as the Negro Chamber of Com­
merce, composed of the city's leading black businessmen, supported the 
bond issue, because it would provide more jobs for blacks as it benefited the 
economic base of the whole city.118 
White neighborhoods to the north and east of Love Field also opposed 
the airport bond issue. Although these people would not be displaced by 
construction, they feared that expanding the airport in this congested area 
posed a safety hazard, particularly for nearby schools. These opponents 
formed the Air Safety Committee, and called for the abandonment of Love 
Field. They cited the recently completed federal study on air safety, popu­
larly known as the Doolittle Report, to question Love Field expansion, since 
it would be unable to provide the necessary safe zones or runway lengths rec­
ommended by the report. But just as city officials dismissed black protests as 
being the work of short-sighted special interest groups unable to see the 
larger picture, they treated white dissenters similarly. Indeed, the News, 
which strongly supported Love Field, made sure to emphasize that most of 
the bond's opposition came from the neighborhoods around the airport, 
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again suggesting a concern with selfish priorities rather than commitment to 
improve the city as a whole. Most Dallasites apparently agreed with the civic 
leadership's interpretation of the bond program. In what was the largest 
turnout ever for any local election, supporters of airport development won, 
19,481 to 15,194.119 
The Dallas-Fort Worth airport controversy did not disappear with the 
Love Field vote. After Carter Field opened on April 24, 1953, Fort Worth 
leaders undertook an aggressive campaign to secure more commercial air­
port traffic, and gained some immediate success when American Airlines 
moved six of its flights to Fort Worth. In addition, whenever an airline ap­
plied for new flights to the Dallas-Fort Worth region, Fort Worth leaders 
pushed Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) officials to make Fort Worth the ter­
minus for the entire area. That city's first success in this regard sent shock-
waves through Dallas. When Central Airlines requested permission to fly 
into the Dallas-Fort Worth area from Oklahoma, the CAB designated Car­
ter as the sole terminus for the flight. The decision horrified Dallas leaders, 
since they understood that the CAB's power to designate airline travel to a 
single airport in a region could thwart any future development of Love Field 
and make Carter Field, without Dallas input, the regional field for the area. 
For the next several months following the CAB edict, civic leaders worked 
to have the decision reversed. Lobbying efforts with the CAB, protests to 
Congress, and eventually judicial action all failed to overturn the CAB's de­
cision, creating outrage about what Love Field advocates identified as undue 
outside governmental interference. The Times Herald, for instance, ran an 
article under the headline "Chamber Says New CAB Edict Violates the City 
Rights of Dallas." And an embittered chair of the chamber of commerce's 
aviation committee, Angus Wynne, Jr., complained that "no board sitting in 
Washington should be able to dictate to Dallas which airport they [sic] 
should use."120 
Controversy increased even more in November of 1954 when, under the 
prodding of CAB chair Char Guerney, Fort Worth offered to sell half interest 
in Carter Field to Dallas. Angered by Guerney's action, Dallas Chamber of 
Commerce president and DCC member Jerome K. Crossman attacked the 
idea and charged the CAB chair with injecting himself "extra-legally into 
the affairs of [the] community."121 Consultant James Buckley also advised 
the city to reject the offer because of its adverse impact on the city's economic 
well-being. After meeting with council, Mayor Thornton did just that, de­
spite threats from the assistant secretary of commerce, John R. Allison, that 
he would push Carter Field as the transcontinental route terminal for both 
Dallas and Fort Worth.122 
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Although the Times Herald predicted that Love Field would loom as the 
major issue in the 1955 municipal election—since some still believed that 
Dallas needed to cooperate with Fort Worth—no such issue appeared. In­
deed, opponents to Love Field even failed to nominate a slate, and for the 
first time in Dallas history during peacetime, no opposition appeared 
against the CCA. As a result, voters in 1955 reelected Thornton and the eight 
incumbents. Much of that slate's electoral success had to do with its ability 
to work in harmony and get things done. During it first two years, Thorn-
ton's council put more public improvements under way—including the civic 
auditorium—than ever before in the city's history. Even the Oak Cliff Tri­
bune and the White Rocker, neighborhood newspapers often critical of the 
CCA, had good things to say about Thornton's administration. The Oak 
Cliff Tribune's editor called this council "the most progressive; most tal­
ented; squarest shooting; most farsighted; most successful" since he arrived 
in Dallas eleven years earlier.123 
This undoubtedly was true, but the city's fight with the federal govern­
ment also seemed to rally support for the CCA. Now more than ever, the city 
apparently needed strong civic leadership to combat a threatening federal 
government. Despite the CCA's success and the conflict with the federal gov­
ernment, the Oak Cliff Tribune wondered if there was "too much power in 
too few hands."124 Other Dallasites might have thought the same way, but 
happy with the results, they continued to support the business-dominated 
slate. But as changing definitions of the city emerged in the late 1950s, the 
CCA's emphasis on and interpretation of the good of the city became in­
creasingly challenged. 
• III

The New Provincialism: 
From City as System to City as Setting 

Dallas in 1960 seemed a very different place than the Dallas that planning 
and political activists sought to tame in 1930. Then, the city's population 
stood at 260,734 in little more than a 45-square mile area. By 1960,679,684 
Dallasites lived in a city of 282 square miles (see map 7).1 The automobile, 
now established as the dominant mode of transportation in Dallas, helped 
reshape spatial relationships throughout the city and between city and sub­
urb. The postwar central business district's building boom also completely 
refashioned the downtown area, as significant population shifts in the city's 
residential sections altered the social geography of the city. The city's eco­
nomic base, tied closely to banking, insurance, and commerce in the 1930s, 
now expanded to include significant manufacturing. The city's thriving 
economy and easy access by both rail and air helped explain its growing im­
portance as a center for regional branches of national companies. 
Although larger than the Dallas of 1950, ten years later Dallas was not a 
fundamentally different place than it had been at midcentury. No depression 
or world war had occurred during those ten years, nor any other cataclysmic 
event. True, the city experienced a 56 percent increase in population during 
the 1950s, a rate 9 percent greater than the city's growth in the 1940s, but 
that remained well short of the city's 73 percent growth rate during the 
1920s.2 Probably World War II brought more fundamental change to the city 
than any single event in the 1950s. Despite the paucity of outside events dur­
ing the decade, however, Dallas experienced such significant shifts in the 
way its leaders perceived and responded to urban problems by the late 1950s 
that civic leaders' approach to urban problems in 1950 shared more in com­
mon with approaches of the 1930s than those of the 1960s. The 1960s' ap­
proach to urban problems seemed tied to new ideas about the nature of the 
city and the public interest and would be the foundation for the new public 
discourse about the city still shaping Dallas today. 
Despite the rapid success and development of Dallas after the war, a suc­
cess closely associated with comprehensive planning and council-manager 
government, the popularity of those strategies of city management weak­
ened. Changes in the Dallas Citizens Council and the Citizens Charter Asso­
ciation also suggest that some fundamental transformation in urban prob­
lem solving took place in the late 1950s. This did not happen overnight, but 
a shifting emphasis from the city as a whole to one that prioritized the rights 
and needs of its citizens would help radically transform notions of good gov­
ernment and good planning. The city as a setting for individuals to pursue 
their wants and aspirations replaced the city as a social system to be coordi­
nated and improved. 
The Dallas experience with government and planning was not unique at 
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Map 7 Urban Area of Dallas in 1960. From U.S. Census, 1960. 
this time. Academics, writing in the 1950s and 1960s, no longer defined the 
city as a territorial community that molded the desires, values, aspirations, 
and personalities of its inhabitants. Sociologists such as Herbert Gans chal­
lenged the assumptions behind the Chicago School of Sociology, which had 
emphasized the behavioral shaping role of cities and concluded that it was 
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individual choices and demands—based on the characteristics of the people 
involved—and not the "city" that best explained the behavior of urban resi-
dents.3 Nor did the comprehensive plan developed by an expert for the city 
or metropolis, nor a centralized government run by "experts" and nonpol­
iticians, seem the best way of tackling the city's needs and problems. Indeed, 
the very nature of those needs and problems became reconfigured so that the 
new definition of good planning or good government included a commit­
ment to maximum feasible participation of all parties concerned in planning 
and governing. Advocacy planning and the neighborhood revolt emerged as 
just two manifestations of this new conceptualization of the city. One conse­
quence of this change would be a new emphasis on the particular rather than 
the whole, a political discourse of confrontation to secure (or protect) one's 
rights rather than a discourse seeking consensus for the good of the city. Such 
rhetoric, then, promoted a new fragmentation that would threaten the city 
more readily than the city-as-a-whole rhetoric of the 1930s.4 

8

The Decline of the 
City-as-a-Whole Strategy 
(changes in the way Dallasites approached planning and politics after 1955 
suggested a rethinking about the nature of the city that would ultimately 
lead to the abandonment of the city-as-a-whole discourse and approach to 
urban problem solving. Comprehensive physical planning for the whole city 
by outside hired experts gave way first to a new type of downtown-oriented, 
laymen-based planning and eventually to a planning emphasis that focused 
on the needs of various citizen groups rather than the city. The same type of 
changes also took place in local politics as the city-as-a-whole discourse 
gave way to a new particularism, one both emphasizing needs of individual 
groups and protecting the rights of individuals. By the late 1950s subtle but 
significant changes had taken place not only in the Citizens Charter Associa­
tion (CCA) but also in the discourse of local politics. In both planning and 
politics, then, the interests of individuals and groups began taking prece­
dence over the needs of the city, and the public interest soon became the vari­
ous publics' interest. Probably the clearest example of this was the city's 
planning movements in the fifties and sixties. 
As early as 1950, City Plan Engineer Marvin R. Springer suggested that 
Dallas revise the Bartholomew plan, already out-of-date because of the 
city's rapid growth and development. Springer, who had worked for planner 
Harland Bartholomew before coming to Dallas, thought the updated plan 
should take into account the city's rapid population growth, changing land 
use, and increasing traffic needs. The latter had received attention after the 
city and county united for an intensive nine-month study of the area's traffic 
patterns that year. He also believed that the new plan should take up the is­
sue of future annexation, zoning, housing and neighborhoods, schools, 
parks, and public buildings. If his proposal had been followed, Dallas would 
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have revised the entire comprehensive plan of 1943-1945.1 Council took no 
action on this proposal because the city's rapid growth gave the overbur­
dened, small planning staff little opportunity to do anything but subdivi­
sion control.2 
Only after Robert L. Thornton, who in the 1920s served on the City Plan 
Commission, became mayor did Springer's proposal become reality. On 
September 6, 1955, council authorized the appointment of a committee of 
citizens selected by the mayor to draw up a new master plan. Thornton in­
sisted that a committee of laymen citizens initially develop this master plan. 
According to the mayor, a group of civic leaders representing various Dallas 
organizations interested in planning, aided by the city plan department, 
would help develop a preliminary plan. Toward that end, he appointed a 
nine-member committee to work out a "comprehensive new blueprint for 
the city's future growth." The master plan, according to city officials, would 
guide all development from about 1960 to 1980.3 
Thornton appointed D. A. Hulcy, president of Lone Star Gas Company, 
to head the Dallas Master Plan Committee. Hulcy presided over the Dallas 
Chamber of Commerce between 1947 and 1949, and had served as president 
of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 1951-1952. In addition, he headed the 
powerful DCC at this time.4 Other members of this citizen committee, 
which would work closely with the City Plan Commission, included Roland 
L. Pelt, home builder and president of the Oak Cliff Chamber of Commerce; 
former city manager James Aston, now vice president of First National 
Bank; industrialist John E. Mitchell, who also served as vice president of the 
Greater Dallas Planning Council; Dr. Edwin L. Rippy, president of the Dal­
las Board of Education; Frank W. Cawthon, Dallas district engineer for the 
State Highway Department; T. Carr Forrest, Jr., consulting engineer who 
had many contracts with the city, including one for long-term water devel­
opment; Howell H. Watson, realtor and chair of the City Plan Commission; 
and Marvin Springer, city plan engineer.5 In addition, council proposed a 
charter amendment that gave charter status to the plan commission, now 
under the public works department, and allowed the city to adopt legally its 
next master plan for the city. Until this time, none of the city's plans had been 
officially approved, including Bartholomew's massive master plan of 
1943-1945.6 
At the beginning, this planning effort seemed consistent with earlier ones. 
City Plan Engineer Marvin Springer, who oversaw the work, proposed a 
sixteen-phase plan that included not only transportation, parks, and plans 
for future public buildings, but also recommendations for housing and 
neighborhood improvement. Springer not only stressed the need to provide 
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a comprehensive plan for the city, but also observed that "the complex ar­
rangement of school districts, utility districts and municipal boundaries . . . 
emphasizes the need for a broad metropolitan approach to the municipal 
planning for the area for Dallas."" This plan would focus on Greater Dallas, 
underscoring more than ever the interconnection of city and suburb. 
This planning process, however, also differed from earlier ones. Citizen 
input received more attention than ever before. Laymen rather than profes­
sional planners comprised most of the Dallas Area Master Plan Committee, 
or Hulcy Committee, as it was popular known. Initially, Mayor Thornton 
predicted that "when this local group gets its work in shape as it is needed, 
then we will employ some national expert—as we have in the past—to 
come in and go over all of these plans with the local committee in the hope 
we can bring forth a master plan for the future development of our city that 
will have enough dreaming as well as a lot of realistic thinking."8 
The product of this committee, however, differed substantially from ear­
lier planning strategies. First, the mayor never did call in a national expert, 
although Springer, who clearly had a national reputation, played a critical 
role in developing the plan. Springer resigned as city plan engineer in 1958 
to pursue private consulting opportunities, but the city retained him as a 
consultant for the plan. In addition, this plan seemed more interested in so­
liciting citizen input. The plan's authors promised that "numerous groups 
and agencies throughout the city will be requested to help in the new master 
plan." In preparing one volume of the plan, the committee consulted down­
town building managers and property owners, along with the Dallas Transit 
Company and other key players.9 Nor did the plan address all of the phases 
outlined by Springer. 
By the time council dismissed the Hulcy Committee in 1961, it had pro­
duced five reports. The first appeared in 1956. A Look at Fast Planning for 
the City of Dallas provided a brief overview of earlier planning efforts. It 
evaluated the Kessler Plan of 1911, the Ulrickson Plan of 1927, and the Bar­
tholomew Plan of 1943—45. The document concluded that where the city 
had followed planners' proposals it had benefited, and it also uncovered 
problems associated with neglecting parts of each plan.10 
The second report, Urbanization—Dallas Metropolitan Area, examined 
the growth trends of Dallas County, the city's metropolitan region, and pro­
jected the future development of the 900-square mile metropolitan area. It 
started by reviewing the current population trends in the area and then 
predicted the county's estimated size to 1980. It also projected future pop­
ulation figures for each Dallas County community, explaining that the 
"encirclement of Dallas by suburban municipalities will create numerous 
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problems relating to planning and development of highways, utility systems 
and other major municipal facilities." As a result, it continued, "the coordi­
nation of the physical expansion of the twenty-nine incorporated munici­
palities of Dallas County is essential to the welfare of the entire metropoli­
tan area." The planners also recognized that the population increase of Fort 
Worth's Tarrant County was resulting "in the amalgamation of the two 
counties into one large metropolitan area." Such growth, according to the 
plan, made "apparent the need for overall coordination and planning of 
their development in the interest of the whole region."11 This report, then, 
suggests planners were still viewing the city and metropolitan region as the 
proper unit to deal with, and it underscored the concern with planning for 
the region as a whole. 
The committee never delivered a comprehensive plan for the metropoli­
tan region, however. Rather, it issued three substantial reports dealing with 
important problems, while at the same time it ignored a variety of compo­
nents usually associated with comprehensive planning. For instance, it took 
on the city's traffic problem in Thoroughfares—Dallas Metropolitan Area 
(1957), a report that provided a new thoroughfare plan for Dallas County. 
The planners argued that this topic deserved the committee's priority be­
cause "the streets and highways of a community are the basic framework 
about which all other development is built." They also emphasized how the 
increased use of the automobile depreciated the value of the county's ex­
isting highway system, as did its "haphazard and uncoordinated develop­
ment," resulting in a "lack of balance in the present system." After analyz­
ing the city's street system, the plan proposed "an integrated system of 
freeways, expressways, major thoroughfares and secondary streets designed 
to meet the needs of the rapidly growing metropolitan area and to be a guide 
for growth." Indeed, the report promised that if planners developed a com­
prehensive thoroughfare plan, and government officials enforced it, Dallas 
County would have more orderly and efficient communities.12 
Two years later, in 1959, the committee issued another report, Parks 
and Open Spaces—Dallas Metropolitan Area. As did the thoroughfare 
plan, this one used the county as the basic unit and offered a new plan for 
future park development and open space preservation. It criticized the 
area's suburban communities for not having adequate play and park space 
and called for a comprehensive park program to help remedy that prob­
lem. In addition, it recommended that the Dallas park system increase 
by over 5,100 acres and suggested that a playground be located in every 
one of the city's neighborhoods. Finally, it called for a "co-ordinated stand 
for the use of fences, walls, street trees and plantings on both public and 
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private open spaces." This report, as had the thoroughfare report, at­
tacked a single problem in a comprehensive fashion.13 
The final report, Dallas Central District, spent its first 116 pages analyz­
ing the city's urban core in an attempt "to assure the Central District re­
mains a vigorous and competitive factor in the overall development of Dal­
las." It paid much attention to the significant impact of the automobile and 
the congestion that it caused to the central business district (CBD), noting 
that streets and offstreet parking occupied more than half of the downtown 
area. The report clearly recognized that the outward movement of the city's 
population threatened some of the CBD's functions and proposed the devel­
opment of high-rise apartment buildings to counteract this tendency. The 
plan also suggested a significant expansion in offstreet parking and offered 
other methods such as street widenings in the downtown area to allow bet­
ter accommodation of the automobile. Other proposals to improve down­
town included the development of beautified pedestrian ways, a single 
public transportation complex around Union Station, and a system of un­
derground walkways to manage the anticipated increase in downtown pe­
destrian traffic.14 
A volume focusing solely on the downtown clearly differentiated the 
Hulcy plan from the Bartholomew plan. This could be explained by the 
changing relationship of downtown to the metropolitan area, particularly 
in regard to its retail and entertainment functions. Although the downtown 
area experienced a spectacular building boom after the war, including the 
erection of twenty-four multistory buildings between 1945 and 1957, retail 
sales there declined 1.7 percent while the rest of the city, with the help of 
newly developed shopping center strips, experienced an 80.9 percent in­
crease. Dallas observers usually blamed traffic congestion for this relative 
decline (downtown still contained 75 percent of the city's retail business). 
The number of people entering the core area by car increased by 70 percent 
between 1949 and 1961. In addition, the growing blight in the areas border­
ing downtown, as well as an obvious deterioration in the older western half 
of the CBD, troubled civic leaders.15 
There is no doubt that downtown Dallas faced challenges and problems 
after the war, but so had downtown Dallas at the turn of the century and 
after World War I. The formation of new downtown organizations and the 
development of a downtown plan in the 1950s should be viewed not only as 
a response to those real problems, but also as mirroring changing notions 
about the metropolitan region and the nature and goals of planning. The 
city's failure to complete this "comprehensive" plan also suggests a growing 
tendency to focus on specific problems, or problem areas, and spend less 
218 • CHAPTER EIGHT 
time emphasizing the inextricable linkages between the whole. It is ironic 
that when this plan started it promised a comprehensive approach unprece­
dented in the history of Dallas because of its emphasis on the city and 
county. But a project that projected such ambitious goals ended up empha­
sizing a strategy to better one part of metropolitan Dallas, the downtown. 
And this underscored a growing concern by some that rather than being 
part of a whole, the downtown and suburbs were competitors. 
Indeed, one of the chief characteristics of the postwar discourse about 
metropolitan America was its emphasis on the threat of suburban develop­
ment to urban well-being. Rather than cheering the decentralization of 
business, which offered some remedy to the traffic congestion downtowns 
suffered at this time, urban boosters rallied to the defense of downtown and 
adopted an adversarial posture. Downtown businessmen as well as govern­
ment leaders, of course, had good reason to fear the migration of people and 
commerce away from the central city and to the suburbs. They saw the 
growth of suburban shopping centers as a threat to the CBD's tax base and 
feared that postwar blight would spread if they failed to take corrective mea­
sures. Although the planning discourse continued to include the need to 
plan for the metropolitan region, the emphasis and attention by the mid­
1950s clearly centered on the downtown.16 
Even before the city's downtown plan had been released a variety of orga­
nizations had developed strategies to treat the downtown. As early as 1950, 
local civic and planning groups invited one of the Urban Land Institute's 
Central City Panels to analyze how the city should cope with its surge of 
traffic and pedestrians flooding its streets. It also addressed issues such as 
parking, hotel accommodations, and blight eradication. Two years later cit­
izens formed The Committee of Twenty-One to help beautify downtown 
Dallas. When members decided to expand that committee, it became 
known as The Committee for the Central Business District. That body in­
vestigated some downtown problems and, among other things, recom­
mended the formation of a Main Street Association to control and improve 
the area on Main Street between Akard and Ervay.17 
The Greater Dallas Planning Council, the Chamber of Commerce, and 
the Dallas Citizens Council also had committees studying approaches to 
revitalizing the urban core. The Dallas Retail Merchant's Association 
launched Dallas Unlimited, Inc., a huge promotional program for the city's 
CBD. In addition, it initiated a massive advertising campaign to "emphasize 
the natural advantages and attractions for shopping the central business 
district."1" 
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In late 1957, a new organization appeared that focused on the CBD as a 
discrete problem requiring special planning. The Greater Dallas Planning 
Council (GDPC) spearheaded a movement to create the Central Business 
District Association (CBDA). Sixty business leaders participated in the or­
ganizational meeting to formulate programs to help "rejuvenate Down­
town Dallas." The organization particularly focused on maintaining and 
protecting property values in downtown and doing whatever necessary to 
keep the area attractive to the public. During its first year, the CBD A under­
took a long-range study of methods for expanding downtown Dallas's com­
mercial importance. Its managing director promised that the CBDA would 
be a clearinghouse of information to promote the redevelopment of run­
down sections of the urban core.19 
Although the founding of the CBDA and the Hulcy Plan's emphasis on 
the downtown are not in themselves ample evidence to suggest that a funda­
mental transformation in the way civic leaders thought about and re­
sponded to the city occurred in the mid-1950s, other developments do sug­
gest such a change. The fate of the city's urban renewal program and the 
changing nature of local politics seem to suggest a lessened importance be­
ing placed on "the city as a whole" as the basis for urban problem solving. 
When the state legislature finally passed a bill in 1957 authorizing urban 
renewal, many civic leaders saw the realization of new opportunities to im­
prove Dallas. Not only did the Dallas Citizens Council continue to push for 
the urban renewal of West Dallas but the CBDA became a strong advocate 
of Dallas participation in the federal program for parts of downtown.20 
Shortly after the state legislature passed its enabling legislation, a DCC 
committee on West Dallas unanimously concluded that "the Urban Rede­
velopment plan offers the most practical means for slum eradication." Their 
published report urged government officials to "study the provisions of the 
new act" and initiate "suitable action" as "soon as practical." It wanted "no 
delay in making and adopting plans for getting rid of slums and other 
blighted areas under the provisions of the Urban Renewal Act."21 Less than 
a year later the board of directors of the DCC voted unanimously to urge 
city council to hold the required public hearings for urban renewal.22 
Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 authorized the federal government to 
fund two-thirds of the net cost of buying and clearing slum property. After 
clearance, the land then would be sold to private developers for much less 
than they could have purchased the land under normal circumstances. The 
1949 law had a predominantly residential clause that required 90 percent of 
the project to be dwellings before clearance, or as a result of clearance. The 
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urban renewal law passed later as part of the Housing Act of 1954 contained 
less stringent requirements on the nature of land to be cleared or on the final 
redevelopment project. 
Urban renewal advocates had not sat idly by, waiting for the enabling leg­
islation. They formed a rehabilitation committee in 1953 to enforce housing 
codes and upgrade deteriorating neighborhoods. Led by developer Tram­
mell Crow, the group selected a twenty-eight-block area just northeast of 
the downtown business district to fight blight and slum conditions. First, 
they surveyed the area to identify substandard conditions and to develop 
ways of eliminating or correcting those conditions.23 
After Congress established urban renewal, the Citizens Joint Rehabilita­
tion and Slum Clearance Committee participated in that law's rehabilita­
tion program. It selected Little Mexico for its pilot rehab project, an area 
whose 1,800 persons lived in 450 dwellings. This project, which stressed code 
enforcement, was one of the earliest in the country to get FHA Section 220 
modernization loan approval. According to a chamber of commerce report, 
it marked the first time that the city government, private property owners, 
and the federal government had worked together to arrest blight. Pleased 
with the results of the initial effort, the city's rehabilitation committee 
planned projects for an Oak Cliff neighborhood and for a Pleasant Grove 
community.24 
After the state passed its enabling legislation for urban renewal, Dallas 
leaders still faced several obstacles. First, the enabling legislation allowed 
cities to participate in the federal program only after they held a public hear­
ing on urban renewal. Even more important, it required that a majority of 
voters approve urban renewal in a public referendum before the city could 
start a federal slum clearance program. Third, it prohibited cities from par­
ticipating in urban renewal unless they developed a general or master plan. 
This differed from the federal requirement that a plan needed only to be in 
preparation. Fourth, the enabling legislation gave former property owners 
of land acquired through the use of eminent domain the first right to re­
purchase the cleared land. Finally, Texas law forbade any public housing 
from being erected on land acquired by the city under urban renewal laws.25 
Almost immediately after legislators passed the enabling legislation, the 
Dallas Citizens Council Committee on West Dallas joined with the rest of 
the DCC and asked city council to apply for federal funds to improve an 800­
acre area in West Dallas, approximately one-half mile from the CBD. On 
November 20,1957, federal officials approved a $36,690 advance for a feasi­
bility study of the area.26 As we have seen, the earlier effort to revitalize West 
Dallas, the plan of both the DCC and the chamber, had stalled after the 
The Decline of the City-as-a-Whole Strategy D 221 
completion of the massive housing project, since lack of enabling legislation 
had thwarted further progress. Now the possibility of federal funds for ur­
ban redevelopment reenergized the commitment for bettering West Dallas. 
Using part of the federal grant, the city hired the consulting firm of De-
Leuw, Cather and Company of Chicago to study a site in West Dallas bor­
dered by Hampton, Singleton, and the Trinity River levees. In addition, civic 
leaders formed the Citizens Committee for Urban Renewal to push the city's 
participation in the federal program. That committee's nine-man steering 
committee included Milton F. Brown, president of Mercantile Bank; W. W. 
Overton, Jr., chair of the board of Texas Bank and Trust Company; Ben 
Wooten, president of the First National Bank; lawyer and former mayor 
J. Woodall Rodgers; and real estate developer Avery Mays.27 By April of 
1958, the chamber of commerce and the Greater Dallas Planning Council 
joined with the DCC in its request for a public referendum, as required by 
state law, to allow the city to accept federal urban renewal funds. The CBD A 
also strongly endorsed federal urban renewal and proposed to redevelop 
blighted areas on the edges of downtown with federal money. And a 1958 
News poll found that 60 percent of those interviewed favored the use of fed­
eral funds for urban renewal.28 
Despite the endorsement of many civic leaders, the proposal to use fed­
eral urban renewal moneys ran into fierce opposition, too. Congressman 
Bruce Alger led the fight against federal urban renewal, arguing, "It just isn't 
the Dallas pattern of doing business." Alger attacked the use of eminent do­
main for private development, warned that the program would result in 
much red tape, and reminded voters that "Federal regulation follows use of 
federal funds, which means accepted forced integration in public housing, 
and wage rates on urban renewal land clearance set by the Secretary of La­
bor, not by the local people and local economy." Alger overwhelmed the city 
manager, the mayor, and council members with documentation supporting 
his view when he mailed a two-pound, five-ounce package containing fifty-
two separate exhibits to each of them.29 
Bruce Alger, the first Republican ever sent to Congress from Dallas 
County, scored what the News described as "a shocking upset" in 1954. 
That year he defeated former Dallas mayor Wallace Savage for the post. 
The young Alger, who described himself "as probably an ultraconserva­
tive," won in part because Savage had alienated the liberal arm of the Dem­
ocratic party.30 The development of the Republican Party in Dallas ap­
peared both a symptom and a cause of the changing political climate in the 
city during the 1950s. Although local elections officially remained nonpar­
tisan, a growing partisanship entered municipal politics as never before. 
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This type of "politics," which was new to the era, ultimately disrupted the 
DCC's ability to work harmoniously on social issues. 
One of the first consequences of this new type of partisanship surfaced 
when Alger attacked urban renewal. The Congressman's opposition to fed­
eral programs that might specifically benefit Dallas, such as the new federal 
highway act and the Rivers and Harbors Authorization Bill for a Trinity 
River survey, had already alienated him from much of the city's leadership.31 
Yet capturing the strong support of North Dallas women's clubs with his 
anticommunist rhetoric and constant warning about the expansion of the 
federal government, the ex-realtor successfully won reelection in 1956 
against District Attorney Henry Wade, despite the latter's attempt to por­
tray Alger as a gradualist when it came to race relations. Indeed, Alger was 
one of the few southern congressmen who refused to sign the Southern Man­
ifesto, which pledged to use every legal means possible to maintain segrega­
tion in the public schools. But his constant and strong opposition to feder­
ally sponsored urban renewal played a major role in that program's plight 
in Dallas.32 
Other strong voices of opposition spoke at a two-and-a-half-hour public 
hearing held by city council on June 23. More than 150 residents packed 
council chambers and debated the merits of urban renewal. Some, like the 
Dallas Women's Chamber of Commerce, opposed urban renewal as social­
istic. Others, like Ben Carpenter of Oak Cliff, worried about the abuse of 
eminent domain and wanted the CBD excluded from urban renewal funds. 
Joe F. Maberry, representative of the Home Builders Association of Dallas 
County, thought urban renewal should be used only as a last resort. W. P. 
Vaughin, a black builder, cautioned that urban renewal would be "the mak­
ing or breaking of Dallas." We need urban renewal, certainly, "but we need 
it in the right way." Vaughin reminded council that blacks had no place to go 
after being removed from West Dallas slum areas, since other black neigh­
borhoods were already overcrowded. Former mayors Jimmie Temple and 
J. Woodall Rodgers strongly supported urban renewal, as did John E. Mitch­
ell, Jr., a veteran of West Dallas slum study committees. According to Mitch­
ell, West Dallas needed "a bulldozer—not a coat of paint or a pot of pansies 
on the window."33 
Several days after the hearing, Mayor Thornton announced that council 
would postpone the vote on urban renewal until after the November con­
gressional elections. The Citizens Committee for Urban Renewal also 
cooled its efforts around election time in an attempt to avoid making urban 
renewal a campaign issue.34 That election saw Barefoot Sanders—sup-
ported by labor, many of the city's bankers (now dubbed the Main Street 
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crowd), and the Dallas Times Herald—run against Alger. The Oak Cliff 
Tribune, the city's third-largest newspaper, charged that the Upper Main 
Street crowd supported Sanders because he favored urban renewal. Al­
though Sanders had great financial backing from key civic leaders, Alger 
benefited from the support of multimillionaire oilman H. L. Hunt and de­
feated Sanders by a 7,000-vote margin.35 
After the election, supporters of urban renewal continued their crusade 
for the program in Dallas. At a debate on urban renewal at a Dallas Real Es­
tate Board (DREB), Henry S. Miller, Jr., former DREB president and cur­
rent chair of the Dallas Citizens Committee for Urban Renewal, charged, 
"Foes of urban renewal are chiefly slum owners and persons fearful that re­
developed property would compete with their own."36 Had that been true, 
civic leaders would have been able to proceed with urban renewal. But this 
did not happen. The News reported on January 18,1959, that council would 
not hold the referendum on urban renewal until after the April council elec­
tions because the topic drew "stiffer than expected opposition."37 And when 
it became a major campaign issue in that local election and threatened to de­
feat the CCA, council backed away from the issue.38 Indeed, a month before 
the election, Mayor Robert L. Thornton announced what he characterized 
as a revolutionary West Dallas revitalization program that did not need 
federal moneys. "Operation Bootstrap," as it was called, depended on pri­
vate lending institutions to provide moneys necessary to repair West Dallas's 
bad housing. No use of the controversial eminent domain would be 
needed.39 
The response to urban renewal in Dallas, then, marks a significant shift 
in local politics. Other issues more important than Dallas's welfare became 
central to the debate over urban renewal. Those opposing urban renewal 
particularly objected to the use of eminent domain. To them, the individu-
al's rights to private property clearly outdistanced the needs of the city. In ad­
dition, the controversy over urban renewal underscored a strong dislike of 
many citizens to the growing involvement of the federal government in their 
lives, a growth that many blamed for higher taxes and outside control of tra­
ditional local concerns. Place this in the context of the cold war and an al­
most hysterical fear of communism and socialism, and add several influen­
tial political figures who assumed a populist guise, and you have the 
makings for the defeat of urban renewal in the late 1950s. A changing dis­
course about the nature of the city and its leadership helps explain the defeat 
of urban renewal in the city and can be found not only in the discussion of 
that issue but also in the council elections of 1959 and 1961. 
Robert L. Thornton and the entire CCA slate had been reelected in 1957, 
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although not without a fight. That year two opponents challenged Thorn­
ton for the mayoralty—Frank Cusack, Oak Cliff resident and leader of the 
People's Candidate slate, and George F. Fox, independent candidate. The 
rhetoric of this campaign generally mirrored other ones. The CCA ran on its 
record of public works, good law enforcement, and efficient government, 
while opponents challenged the CCA candidates for being out of touch with 
the people and favoring the downtown interests. In this campaign, however, 
Laurence R. Melton, president of the CCA, also became an issue. The 
printer had headed the CCA since 1948, and as one of three members of the 
executive committee functioning between elections, he clearly had a major 
say in candidate selections and CCA platforms. As a result, opponents ac­
cused him of bossism and charged that he had turned the CCA into a ruth­
lessly efficient political machine.40 
Despite such accusations, Thornton and the CCA slate swept to victory 
in an election that saw more than 62,000 ballots cast. Only one CCA nomi­
nee needed a runoff to win—Ruth Collins, the first woman candidate nomi­
nated by the charter group. She beat Harold C. Abramson in the runoff by a 
little more than 700 votes, thanks to strong support in North and East Dal-
las.41 But two years later some of that support would waver as partisanship 
and the politics of fear would replace politics for Dallas as a whole as a major 
campaign theme. 
New patterns, then, in politics paralleled patterns of planning in the late 
1950s, as reflected in the Hulcy Plan. The fear that the Dallas public really 
perceived the CCA as an elite-dominated organization helps explain Mel-
ton's effort to restructure it. During the summer of 1957, the CCA president 
announced the decision to reorganize the good government association as a 
year-round, full-fledged political party. CCA leaders would replace the 
three-member executive committee with one made up of between thirty-five 
and forty members representing all parts of the city. In addition, the CCA es­
tablished formal membership and organized on a precinct level. Finally, 
CCA leadership decided to establish permanent headquarters with a paid 
executive secretary. These changes, according to Melton, would draw the 
CCA closer to the people and regain grassroots support. "Because of the 
rapid expansion of the city," Melton remarked, "we have been getting out of 
touch with the people." As a result, the CCA head warned, "We must get 
closer. We must inform the people about the CCA and good government be­
tween elections."42 
Despite these modifications, the CCA ran into trouble during the 1959 
election when seventy-seven-year-old Robert L. Thornton decided to run for 
a fourth term as mayor. Dairy store owner Earle Cabell, son and grandson 
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of Dallas mayors, had expected the CCA nomination for mayor in 1959, but 
a last-minute decision by Thornton to seek reelection changed all that. Ca-
bell opted to run against his old friend anyway, particularly after Republican 
leaders from North and East Dallas urged him to by arguing that the CCA 
had become too liberal and dominated by Democrats.43 
In addition to the injection of partisan politics into local elections, now 
that Alger and the cold war had helped strengthen the Republican party in 
Dallas, another actor emerged as a key player in this election—neighbor-
hood political organizations. Groups with specific neighborhood goals, 
such as the North Dallas-Walnut Hills Improvement League and the White 
Rock Committee for Conservative Legislation, challenged the previously 
dominant "for Dallas as a whole" rhetoric and rallied support around 
neighborhood quality-of-life issues rather than city wide growth concerns.44 
Furthermore, the 1959 election reflected a growing unhappiness in the city 
about the distribution of services, federal-urban relations, and the whole 
concept that a select few knew what was best for the city. 
Cabell, who himself had been a member of both the CCA and the DCC, 
focused his campaign rhetoric not on Thornton but on the CCA. He charged 
that its leaders had abdicated their responsibilities to Dallas as a whole and 
had created "a ward heeling type of political machine. The early patriotic 
and unselfish leaders of that group," according to Cabell, had "given way to 
an handful of would be king makers, under the longtime domination of a full 
time Political Boss." The Dallas machine, according to Cabell, was "nothing 
more than a syndicate of downtown landlords, bankers and millionaires, 
who pick the candidates, tell them what to say and after elected, tell them 
what to do."45 
Cabell not only challenged the structure of the CCA's organization, but 
he also questioned its campaign rhetoric emphasizing that only a unified, 
all-CCA administration producing a harmonious and efficient council 
could best serve Dallas. The dairyman countered that "a mixed council 
would be in the finest tradition of representative democracy." Even more im­
portant, Cabell questioned the very notion that individuals should sacrifice 
their particular concerns for Dallas as a whole. For instance, Cabell opposed 
the fluoridation of Dallas water out of a concern for the few. "Regardless of 
the alleged benefits of such mass-medication," he observed, "it is wrong in 
principle. Where matters of vital public health are concerned," Cabell 
warned, "the wishes of any group, even though a minority, should not be 
subordinated to the arbitrary will of any other group [italics mine]."46 Gov­
ernment, then, according to this vision, owed its first commitment to the in­
dividual rather than to the city as a whole. 
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Cabell resisted federally subsidized urban renewal in Dallas for some of 
the same reasons. Because it confiscated property and sold it to other busi­
ness interests for improvement, Cabell called urban renewal "the most so­
cialistic measure to be passed onto the citizens of Dallas." In another policy 
statement he proclaimed, "1 will not advocate any expensive, grandiose 
project that completely disregards the rights and wishes of one segment of 
the city just to provide conveniences to the residences of any other section 
[italics mine]."47 According to the mayoral candidate, "Leaders who are 
anti-Socialistic in their belief should not have to think twice before con­
demning this monstrosity. If passed, the city could bankrupt itself for the 
benefit of a few big-time real-estate promoters, and the security of home-
ownership as we have known it would be destroyed under the proposed 
changes in the law of eminent domain. I shall fight the submission of such an 
act, and if submitted I shall fight its passage."48 
The growing anti-federal government posture of the Morning News 
(now run by the late George Dealey's son, E. M. [Ted] Dealey), fueled not 
only by the court's ruling on school segregation in 1954 but by perceived in­
terference of the federal government in the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport con­
troversy, helped promote a new parochialism in a city that had historically 
turned to Washington for help, acknowledging it was part of a system of cit­
ies affected by forces beyond its borders. Not only had the Dallas Chamber 
of Commerce sent a lobbyist to Washington in 1941, the first to do so in 
Texas, but it worked closely with Texas congressmen to guarantee that it 
would secure its fair share of federal help. Indeed, Sam Rayburn claimed 
Dallas leaders asked him for more favors than did civic leaders from his own 
district.49 Now, however, the most important issue in Dallas was not the eco­
nomic welfare of the city, but the threat of an expanding federal government 
and creeping socialism. Some of Cabell's most outspoken supporters voiced 
such concerns. For instance, Cabell backer Ed C. Schwille, chair of the White 
Rock Committee for Conservative Legislation, had been a vocal opponent of 
urban renewal before Cabell's candidacy, claiming it was "pure commu-
nism."50 At the same time, Cabell attracted the approval of South Dallas and 
Oak Cliff because he challenged the powerful CCA, now portrayed as a 
group dominated by greedy downtown businessmen unconcerned with 
neighborhood needs. 
Other candidates for council raised similar and familiar themes. All inde­
pendent council candidates but one opposed the city's participation in the 
federal urban renewal program. They also accused CCA officials of being 
preoccupied with improving downtown at the expense of neighborhoods 
and the city's thoroughfare system. Some charged that the CCA did not ably 
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represent the various interests within the city and accused Melton of "ma­
chine boss rule."51 According to one council candidate, Lucian Holmes, Jr., 
Melton selected candidates before a council-nominating committee even 
met. He continued, "Many of us one time Charter supporters know that 
there is no semblance between the ideals of which the CCA was founded and 
the political machine of today to which it has degenerated."52 
The CCA countered its opponents' accusations by emphasizing the city's 
progress under its control. For instance, a CCA advertisement bragged that 
the city's growth under that organization's leadership meant "jobs and pay­
rolls for working people and helps bring about prosperity for all."53 In a 
campaign speech, former CCA president S. J. Hay challenged Cabell's ef­
forts to discredit the CCA and warned that "the business climate of Dallas 
is due for a rapid change should a bunch of independent candidates, full of 
pet schemes and hatred take office."54 Even the staunchly anti-CCA Oak 
Cliff Tribune acknowledged that "city progress under [Thornton's] regime 
has probably been the greatest in Dallas history" and has "been infinitely 
fair to Oak Cliff."55 
It is ironic, then, that the administration that came closest to achieving 
the goals of the CCA—economic growth and development for the city as a 
whole—experienced some of its severest criticism during the 1959 election. 
But such a focus no longer had the same impact as earlier, because a new 
concern about neighborhood rights more forcefully entered the campaign 
discourse. The Oak Cliff Tribune, after praising the public works record of 
Thornton's administration, went on to attack the CCA for consistently pre­
venting "top notch opposition from developing" through economic coer­
cion. It concluded by noting, "One party government is not indigenous to 
the American system no matter how benevolent."56 
Others must have agreed. Even with a substantial campaign chest, the 
good government party saw only five of its nine candidates elected outright 
for office. Rival office seekers forced Thornton, as well as three council can­
didates, into runoff elections. Despite his sterling record, Thornton beat 
Cabell by less than 1,800 votes, and since the third candidate, George Fox, 
secured a little more than 2,100 votes, he deprived Thornton of a majority.57 
The CCA won with the endorsement of the Times Herald and numerous 
black leaders even after an African American, C. B Brinkley, Jr., entered the 
race as an independent. But it failed to gain the support of the News, which 
remained neutral in the election. Thornton did not pile up the normal big-
vote totals in North Dallas because of the strong opposition from the North 
Dallas-Walnut Hill Improvement League. That group formed after the city 
announced its intent to develop a six-lane highway through the Walnut Hill 
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neighborhood.58 Thornton also lost votes to North and East Dallas conser­
vatives who feared the banker was too liberal in regard to federal help for 
the city. 
During the runoff, Thornton picked up the endorsement of the Dallas 
AFL-CIO, but the CCA continued to struggle against charges of bossism. 
The good government association mounted a massive newspaper, radio, 
and television blitz during the last few days of the campaign, not just to re­
elect Thornton but to help its other three candidates secure office. The strat­
egy worked fairly well: Thornton beat Cabell by almost 3,000 votes in an 
election that saw more than 71,000 people vote. CCA candidates won two 
of the three council seats, too, although independent Joe Geary, who secured 
almost 3,000 more votes than Thornton, defeated his CCA opponent by 
over 11,000 votes. 
Even with Thornton's narrow victory, Cabell's supporters apparently got 
their way in regard to federal urban renewal. Afraid of igniting a full-scale 
controversy that threatened to split the city's civic leadership, including the 
DCC, and further weaken the CCA, the mayor opted for revitalization in 
West Dallas that would use FHA moneys but avoid the federal government's 
urban renewal program. No referendum was ever held in Dallas over ur­
ban renewal. 
Although they won the election, CCA officials, stung by the criticism of 
independent candidates and the more than 34,000 votes against Thornton, 
instigated changes in their organization after the election.59 Shortly follow­
ing the mayor's reelection, Melton announced that the CCA would launch a 
massive educational program to clarify its goals: the preservation of council-
manager government and the promotion of efficient government. If the 
CCA resembled a "machine" at all, Melton observed, it was "a machine in­
terested only in perpetuating good government." Melton, a controversial 
figure and a growing liability to the CCA, also declared that he would not 
serve beyond his current term, ending in January of 1961.60 
Education, according to some CCA supporters, would not be enough. 
They called for still another reorganization of their association to develop a 
greater groundswell of support. In a critique of the CCA, lawyer Robert L. 
Clark proposed that body should combat what he viewed as a "loss of pres­
tige." Local politics was changing, according to Clark, as novice political 
workers were "breathing new life into city politics and shifting the domina­
tion from Main Street to suburbia." Clark concluded that the CCA, which 
faced charges of bossism, had to respond to this trend. Although the good 
government group had always encouraged widespread public support for its 
candidates, its rank-and-file members had played little part in candidate 
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nomination and association decisions. By the late 1950s, such action had be­
come a liability, the lawyer observed, because "citizens are just plain tired of 
being told who is going to run for what." Local politics should no longer be 
a spectator sport, Clark contended, but rather should encourage participa­
tion and the power that goes with it.61 
Toward this end, the lawyer recommended that CCA leadership reorga­
nize their body to include meaningful participation by the city's various 
neighborhoods. Observing that the "newly asserted strength of self-starting 
neighborhood groups" had proved an important factor in the opposition's 
strength during the last election. Clark called for the CCA to provide more 
opportunities for this "newstyle voter worker." Not only would such action 
provide fresh faces and new ideas, but it might permit the CCA to educate 
the public about its good-government goals. Going to the voter for advice 
and involvement was a must, Clark warned, because times had changed. For 
too long, the CCA had "closed [its] eyes and ears to changing political 
moods, behavior and actions in the city's elections." Now was the time to ac­
knowledge new conditions, according to Clark, "since the city's political ge­
ography, its political environment and its political community had all 
changed." Others agreed with this analysis. The News, for example, argued 
that the Charter Association needed new blood and a new program to "dis­
pel the public notion that it is run by a hand-picked few of the city's big 
shots."62 
The CCA responded to such recommendations by naming a twenty-two-
member committee to study reorganization. It echoed Clark's sentiments 
and concluded that the "structure [of the CCAJ was adequate for the 1930's 
and 1940's, but it has not kept pace with the changing political climate of the 
1950's."63 Developer W. H. Cothrum chaired the committee, which con­
ducted a series of "grass roots neighborhood meetings throughout the city 
to hear what the city's residents thought the CCA should do." From those 
meetings it recommended a district-based organization. The CCA would 
create a twenty-one-member committee representing the different geo­
graphic parts of the city. Committee members would propose candidates for 
CCA office and suggest names for council and mayor to the good govern­
ment organization's nominating committee, composed of the CCA presi­
dent and six district vice presidents. That group, then, would make its final 
choices only from the nominations submitted by the district groups. The 
new CCA plan also required council candidates to hold neighborhood 
meetings to allow more participation in drafting the CCA platform. These 
changes marked a significant departure from traditional CCA practices. 
Unlike the 1940s and early 1950s when a select group of civic leaders tightly 
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controlled the good government organization, the new CCA relied more on 
citizen input for both platform and candidate selection, following the tone if 
not the specifics of Clark's recommendations.64 
Despite its new emphasis on grassroots participation, the CCA never re­
gained the kind of support it had experienced in the 1940s. Not only did it 
face opposition in Oak Cliff and South Dallas, but its popularity declined in 
North Dallas as residents placed neighborhood issues above the CCA's city-
as-a-whole agenda.65 Nor was everyone convinced the CCA had really 
changed as its new structure might suggest. Despite the new neighborhood 
initiative, executive committee members still retained veto power over all 
decisions made by the community groups. And during the 1961 election, the 
Chamber of Commerce Development Fund actually collected contributions 
for the CCA.66 
Controversy over the 1961 selection of the mayoralty candidate also lost 
the good government organization some support. Initially, it appeared that 
the CCA planned to nominate current mayor pro tem Elgin Robertson as its 
candidate for mayor. Robertson, former head of the Oak Cliff Chamber of 
Commerce, was well respected and well liked in that area, but not a familiar 
name in fast-growing North Dallas, where forty-two percent of the elector­
ate now resided. Others wanted Joe Geary nominated as the CCA mayor­
alty candidate. Geary had been active in the CCA prior to 1959, managing 
Thornton's first campaign for mayor, but as we have seen, he ran as an inde­
pendent for council in 1959 and secured a larger vote than Thornton. He had 
also avoided attacking the CCA with the ferocity that Cabell had and 
seemed bent on running for mayor in 1961 with or without CCA support. 
His North Dallas residence and more dynamic personality also appeared to 
work in his favor. As a result, the CCA nominating committee selected him 
"unanimously" for the top post, much to the chagrin of some Robertson 
supporters. Geary launched his campaign with the theme of "unity without 
uniformity."67 He explained that in 1959 he had opposed the CCA because 
it had "grown stale" and "no longer represented the people." That had 
changed, according to Geary, with the "new grass-roots movement within 
the CCA."68 
Despite these changes, the News refused to endorse Geary and threw its 
support to Earle Cabell. Although it applauded the CCA for its "sincere ef­
fort to broaden its base" through scores of grassroots meetings, it also re­
minded its readers that "it does not have a monopoly on civic virtue or com­
petence." Publisher Ted Dealey's close relationship with the Cabell family 
certainly helps explain the endorsement by the city's most influential news­
paper, but so was Cabell's pledge "to fight dictation from Washington."6* At 
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a time when a growing number of Dallasites were focusing on the threats 
from Washington rather than the needs of the city as a whole, the CCA's 
agenda became a liability. Meanwhile, more-liberal groups also endorsed 
Cabell and the slate running against the CCA because of that group's past 
history. For example, the Dallas County Committee on Political Education 
(COPE), the voice of local labor, endorsed Cabell and six independent coun­
cil candidates. "In the past campaigns," a COPE statement explained, we 
have "on occasion supported candidates of the CCA"; however, "we have 
found out the hard way that once a candidate is elected they [sic] become a 
member of a controlled council, and they seem to function as a part of a ma­
chine rather than as individuals."70 
Finally, the CCA's posture as an organization promoting the best interests 
of the city as a whole seemed to deteriorate during the 1960s as constant 
charges of favoritism and special interest permeated the campaign rhetoric. 
These developments help explain why CCA candidate Joe Geary lost to 
Earle Cabell by more than 2,500 votes in an election that saw 82,308 votes 
cast. Two other non-CCA candidates won council seats in the most crushing 
setback the good government organization had experienced since 1937.71 
Although the election of conservative Earle Cabell, as well as the dis­
bandment of the Citizens Committee for Urban Renewal, which had led the 
fight in 1958, suggests that opponents had killed federal urban renewal in 
Dallas, the issue gained new life after the election thanks to a report by the 
Build America Better Committee. The Dallas Real Estate Board, the Dallas 
Chamber of Commerce, the Mortgage Bankers Association, and city coun­
cil had invited that group to survey the city's slums. The four-man commit­
tee included Guy T. O. Hollydale of Baltimore, chair of the committee; 
R. Gordon Tarr of Cincinnati; Lloyd D. Hanford of San Francisco; and John 
Haeus of Columbus, Ohio. They spent five days visiting Dallas's slums.72 
Their report contained twenty recommendations, including the use of 
eminent domain and participation in the federal urban renewal program. 
Such action was necessary, according to the committee, because "we found 
in this city housing conditions among the most grievous we have seen." It 
also observed that "the city's pilot project in conservation and rehabilita­
tion, appears to have run out of gas. Weeds and rubble conceal past good in­
tentions." Indeed, the report took special aim at the city's "Operation Boot­
strap" project under way in West Dallas, suggesting it "is too slow in pace, 
too limited in extent, too light in impact."73 
Following closely on the heals of that report, the Dallas News printed its 
own investigation of the city's slums, focusing on West Dallas. It too con­
cluded that the city's West Dallas Revitalization Project had not adequately 
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cleared the slum conditions in that district. The thirteen-part series empha­
sized the drastic shortage of decent, low-cost housing and the deplorable 
conditions in which many of the city's poor were forced to live. Immediately 
after the series, the News ran a series of interviews with civic leaders to keep 
the issue before the public. In response to the efforts of the Build America 
Better Committee report and the News series, council created a new com­
mittee to "chart a course in slum improvement."74 
The new push for federal urban renewal and the use of eminent domain 
pressured Cabell to act. Unwilling to embrace either, the mayor nevertheless 
responded to the call to clear the city's slums with his own "dramatic and 
sweeping program." On March 25,1962, Cabell announced a plan to build 
3,000 additional units of public housing, including 750 for aged whites, 750 
for aged blacks, and 1,500 more units for younger blacks. These units would 
be scattered throughout the city, according to the mayor, and erected on va­
cant land. After builders developed these units, Cabell promised to enforce 
vigorously the city's building codes. Unlike the federal urban renewal pro­
gram that displaced the poor without providing adequate housing, the Ca-
bell plan offered housing first. In addition, slum clearance could be under­
taken without resort to the use of eminent domain for urban renewal, 
something strongly opposed by the mayor. Those units demolished would 
be leveled because they failed to meet proper housing codes. Cabell also re­
quested improved zoning laws, better paving, and adequate city services for 
areas now designated slums. 
The mayor's proposals created a stir and won enthusiastic support from 
both the city's daily newspapers. However, city council responded cau­
tiously to the public housing recommendation, although initial reports had 
five of its members supporting this proposal. CCA councilman George M. 
Underwood, who had headed the council's new slum committee, com­
mented in a council session, "We are, as a council, in complete agreement 
with the exception of housing." Later, he suggested that council might sup­
port a public housing program if it were truly for the indigent and poor un­
able to pay more than $25 a month for rent.75 Others, like the Dallas Real Es­
tate Board, voiced even stronger objections. That group's former president, 
Lyn Davis, became the leading spokesman against public housing and 
launched a petition drive to get a public referendum on public housing after 
the Dallas County Homebuilders, another public housing opponent, an­
nounced it would not.76 
Cabell did not sit idly by in the face of growing opposition. He lobbied 
with a variety of groups including the staunchly conservative organizations 
such as the Women's Council of Dallas County, who strongly opposed pub­
The Decline of the City-as-a-Whole Strategy D 233 
lie housing. Cabell, who himself had very respectable conservative creden­
tials, told the women not to be so "dogmatic" in their opposition to public 
housing. He also visited the city's influential Dallas Citizens Council. How­
ever, unlike earlier times when the forceful DCC actually had initiated pub­
lic housing, now, badly divided by the conflicting views of Democratic and 
Republican members, it refused to endorse the mayor's plan.77 
Others voiced their disapproval at a public hearing held in the council's 
chamber on a sweltering August afternoon. About 250 people jammed the 
chambers and heard 75 speakers criticize the mayor's plan. About 20 blacks 
joined the protest. White realtor Lyn Davis called public housing the "Tro­
jan horse of creeping socialism." After the meeting, he wrote to Bruce Alger, 
"The people of Dallas are incensed by the Mayor's dictatorial attitude." Op­
ponents of public housing also secured more than 7,100 signatures on a peti­
tion demanding a referendum on public housing.78 
A little less than two months before the November referendum, Con­
gressman Bruce Alger again intervened in the local debate. He sent Cabell 
and the council a three-page letter with addenda challenging the need for 
public housing. Not only did he want public housing defeated in the referen­
dum, but he urged "the liquidation of public housing in Dallas by disposing 
of the [other DHA] properties into private hands." Several days after the let­
ter the Times Herald ran front-page headlines that announced "Alger Might 
Quit if Public Housing Wins, He Asserts." According to the story, Alger ap­
parently threatened that if Dallas acted hypocritically enough to accept 
public housing and return him to Congress, he would seriously consider re-
signing.79 
As the November 6 referendum neared, opponents to public housing 
launched a major advertising campaign against it.80 A pamphlet titled "Do 
You Want a Public Housing Project in Your Backyard?" argued that "public 
housing is political housing and is the greatest step toward socialism." Ca-
bell responded to such charges by suggesting that realtors and housing de­
velopers opposed public housing primarily because of "their own personal 
greed."81 
In a curious move, all council members of the Citizens Charter Associa­
tion went on record as opposing Cabell's public housing plan while the three 
independents supported it. This is strange because the CCA had historically 
supported public housing. Even in this election, its grand old man, Robert L. 
Thornton, endorsed it.82 But these CCA council members seemed more in­
tent on posturing for the next council election instead of looking out for the 
city's welfare. If Cabell's most important program soundly lost at the polls, 
the theory went, his own credibility and electability might well be hurt too. 
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When given a chance to voice their opinion, voters soundly defeated pub­
lic housing 41,272 to 26,272. Not only did conservative North and East Dal­
las defeat it overwhelmingly, but even a West Dallas precinct voted against 
the mayor's plan, despite the desperate need for better housing in that deteri­
orated area.83 Cabell clearly suffered a major setback, but it did not mark the 
end of his political career. 
Dallas voters' rejection of public housing proved just one example of a 
growing reaction against anything that smacked of socialism or commu­
nism during the postwar era. While many cities had exhibited anticommun­
ism hysteria during the early 1950s, Dallas's concern with communism ap­
peared to accelerate in the late 1950s. For example, Dallas conservatives 
protested communist art in the Dallas Art Museum during the mid-1950s. 
At a March 14,1955, meeting, the Public Affairs Luncheon Club, a woman's 
organization interested in civic affairs, accused the Dallas Art Museum of 
having "a tendency to over-emphasize all phases of futuristic, modernistic 
and non objective paintings and statuary and to exhibit, promote and ac­
quire the works of artists who have known communistic affiliations." Soon, 
several other organizations including the local post of the American Legion 
joined in the crusade to purge the art museum of communist paintings. Un­
der the growing pressure, the Museum's Board of Trustees agreed to bar art 
that promoted communist propaganda and also promised not to acquire 
works from communists or members of Communist-affiliated organiza­
tions. Under pressure from patrons, however, the board reversed itself about 
seven weeks later, promising to acquire art on the basis of its worth as art. 
Trouble resurfaced the next year when anticommunists protested the show­
ing of a traveling exhibition called "Sport in Art." Because the House Com­
mittee on Un-American Activities suspected four of the artists involved in 
this collection of communist tendencies, local anticommunists believed the 
exhibit subversive. Although the well-organized protest failed, and the mu­
seum showed the exhibit, it helped promote Dallas's image as a reaction­
84 
ary city. 
The attack on Lyndon Johnson on November 4, 1960, four days before 
the presidential election, furthered the city's reputation as a hotbed of reac­
tionary activity. Although like much of Johnson's life, the specific incident is 
clouded by different interpretations, the most common one is that a group 
made up primarily of angry Republican women mobbed vice presidential 
candidate Lyndon Johnson and his wife as they left a luncheon at the 
Adolphus Hotel.85 Johnson, whom many viewed as having betrayed the con­
servative cause by agreeing to run as vice president on the Kennedy ticket, 
happened to be in downtown Dallas during Republican Tag Day, a time 
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when Republican women solicited contributions for their party. They con­
stituted the core of the group that mobbed Johnson. Congressman Bruce Al­
ger, a participant in the mobbing, explained that it was a "hubbub of a large 
gathering fighting for a society free from federal control." Ladybird Johnson 
offered a different view. "We were hissed at and spat upon," she complained, 
"in a mob scene that looked like some other country."86 
Although the News apologized to the Johnsons for the incident, it seemed 
much more concerned about an advertisement placed in the evening Times 
Herald welcoming the vice presidential candidate and his wife to Dallas. 
The advertisement, according to the News, had included names of promi­
nent citizens who had not granted permission for their names to appear in 
the newspaper. The News, a vocal supporter of the Nixon and Lodge ticket, 
spent much more print criticizing the Times Herald than the mobbing of the 
Sexiate majority leader.87 Indeed, the News had become increasingly shrill in 
its conservatism since the early 1950s. As we have seen, Ted Dealey now 
served as publisher and seemed much more concerned with growing federal 
control and the threat on internal communist conspiracy than with the fate 
of the city as a whole. Dallas's continued fight with the federal government 
over the plight of Love Field, as well as the federal court's attack on segrega­
tion, certainly help explain the News's position, but so does the weakening 
of the public discourse on the city as a whole.88 
Dallasites had always been suspicious of the federal government, but 
found that during the 1930s and 1940s it was quite useful in helping the city 
secure some of its economic and social goals, thanks in part to the prodding 
of the National Municipal League. PWA and WPA projects not only pro­
vided relief for the city's unemployed, but considerably helped the city im­
prove its underdeveloped infrastructure. In addition, public housing for 
low-income residents furnished critically needed dwelling units for the poor 
and thus helped ease growing racial tensions in the Dallas. City officials also 
lobbied constantly with Washington to help in developing a Trinity River 
canal. And during the 1940s, the government's commitment to Love Field 
played a pivotal role in the city's aviation development. Even more impor­
tant, wartime construction of airplane factories and the establishment of 
federally financed training schools for them provided an important stimulus 
for the city's economy. 
By the 1950s, federal government activity, which had apparently helped 
Dallas, seemed to be giving way to policy adversely affecting the city's eco­
nomic and social well-being. As we have seen, in aviation the government's 
interest in promoting air safety and efficiency prompted its commitment to 
a metropolitan regional airport to be shared by Dallas and Fort Worth. Its 
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decision to promote Carter Field, located midway between Dallas and Fort 
Worth but controlled by the latter city, resulted in massive protest and acri­
monious assaults on the federal government by locals. Indeed, the conflict­
ing goals of federal policy discussed above, and Dallas policy—which 
stressed economic development for the city and dominance over the re-
gion—promoted an era of federal government baiting by the city's civic 
leadership unprecedented in Dallas's history. 
Although tensions between the federal government and the city seemed 
to ease by 1956 when the CAA allocated $375,000 for Love Field improve­
ments and reclassified the Dallas airport from continental to intercontinen­
tal status, the detente was short-lived. The development of commercial jet 
travel in the late fifties made congested Love Field vulnerable once again and 
gave new life to the regional airport concept.89 Not only did jets intensify the 
noise problem for surrounding neighborhoods, but they required longer 
runways. As a result, the FAA Airport Plan for 1959 called for Love Field to 
develop parallel runways of 9,200 feet. In response to this demand, local of­
ficials, who had just completed a $7.5 million terminal in 1957, proceeded to 
initiate a $9 million airport expansion program. In November of that year, 
plans met a snag when the FAA rejected a local request for funds because the 
city's Love Field plan did not provide an adequate safety zone at the end of 
the runway to satisfy FAA officials.90 
Fearful that Fort Worth and the federal government might launch an­
other offensive to force Dallas to cooperate in the development of Carter 
Field as the regional airport, the city accelerated its airport expansion with­
out federal aid. However, a lawsuit filed by forty-three Love Field—area 
homeowners seeking to halt expansion plans delayed construction for 
nearly two years and helped refocus attention on the area's need for a larger, 
more regionally based airport.91 Indeed, the early 1960s proved difficult for 
Dallas as the FAA refused to funnel additional moneys into Love Field, 
while at the same time granting federal dollars to Carter Field. Even more 
disconcerting for Dallas leaders, in 1961 a joint FAA/CAB committee spe­
cifically endorsed the idea of promoting regional airports.92 
Matters only worsened when Najeeb E. Halaby, head of the FAA, testi­
fied before a senate subcommittee in 1962 that the FAA would "not put an­
other nickel in Love Field." Congestion at the Dallas airport, and its inabil­
ity to handle future aircraft, made new appropriations unthinkable, 
according to the FAA chief. Halaby also chastised the city for not developing 
a regional airport with Fort Worth and called Dallas's commitment to Love 
Field nothing more than a "pure, unadulterated case of childish civic 
pride."1'1 Twelve days later the CAB ordered an investigation to determine if 
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there should be a regional airport in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. Halaby's 
remarks and the CAB's action created a new uproar in Dallas.94 
To city leaders who were justifiably proud of their airport, built mostly 
with Dallas money, Halaby's remarks seemed a declaration of war. Local of­
ficials feared federal action undermined the city's $32 million investment in 
Love Field and threatened its $35 million payroll. The federal government's 
action struck them as particularly unfair since local tax money had played 
such a critical role in Love Field's development. According to one estimate, 
Carter Field received $4.70 in federal aid for each passenger while Love Field 
saw only 43 cents per passenger in federal aid. 
Moreover, Dallas was already feeling the economic impact of the subur­
ban migration of people and businesses, and suspected that a truly regional 
airport located beyond the corporate limits would further encourage the 
suburban trend. This context helps explain why conservative mayor Earle 
Cabell promised to fight the federal government "with every weapon at my 
command." Chamber of Commerce Aviation Committee chair H. L. Nich­
ols also protested what he called the "deliberate and massive attack upon 
Dallas and its a i rpor t . .  . by two agencies of the federal government." Nich­
ols charged that such action "marked a misuse of Federal Power in an effort 
to dictate to Dallas a course of action contrary to Dallas's own interests."95 
These criticisms, however, did not stop the CAB from holding hearings 
during the summer of 1963 to determine whether a single airport should be 
designated to serve the Dallas—Fort Worth area. After meeting for more than 
two months, CAB examiner Ross Newman ruled that "it would not be in the 
public interest to designate either Greater Southwest [Carter Field] or Love 
Field a regional airport at this time."96 The Dallas victory proved short-
lived, however, because the CAB decided to review Newman's decision. Af­
ter that review, the CAB announced on September 30,1964, that both cities 
must be served by a single facility and gave Dallas and Fort Worth 180 days 
to find a suitable location for a regional airport. If they failed to agree on a 
site, the CAB threatened that it would locate one.97 The highly successful 
Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport eventually resulted from that pro­
nouncement, but to Dallas leaders at the time it served to underscore the fed­
eral government's apparent adversarial role to their own goals for the city's 
economic growth and development. 
Washington's involvement in race relations during the 1950s did not 
bring the same type of condemnation from the city's top civic leaders as did 
the airport controversy, but it seemed another example to many Dallas citi­
zens of the federal government's efforts to undermine social relations in the 
Texas metropolis. When the United States Supreme Court ruled against 
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segregation on May 17,1954, in the famous Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka decision, the Dallas News responded in a mild editorial entitled 
"Segregation Ruling Ends an Era." It conceded that "constitutionally the 
News does not believe the Court to be wrong," but then warned this was the 
first step in the NAACP's effort to promote social intercourse between 
blacks and unwilling whites, something the News did not like.98 Civic lead­
ers responded with similar caution. When local school officials refused to 
allow twenty-eight African American students into white schools in 1955, 
the Dallas chapter of the NAACP sued. For the first several years, the school 
board asked the court to allow it to complete twelve studies on the best way 
to approach integration. In August 1957, the state legislature passed a law 
that permitted school districts to integrate only if citizens approved a refer­
endum supporting integration. This encouraged more delay. And when of­
ficials held the vote in 1960, Dallasites clearly registered their opinion of the 
1954 federal court decision, voting 4 to 1 against integrating the city's pub­
lic schools." 
Despite the vote, a reluctant Judge T. Whitfield Davidson, Jr., of the 
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, ordered Dallas, the nation's 
largest city still segregated, to integrate in September of 1961. Fearful of the 
violence that had occurred in some southern cities such as Little Rock and 
New Orleans, the DCC worked out a plan to promote peaceful integra-
tion.100 That group immediately formed a Committee of Fourteen including 
seven blacks to develop plans for the peaceful integration of Dallas schools. 
The committee also promoted strategies to integrate public places in the 
same way. Fearful that black-initiated efforts to integrate downtown Dallas 
might lead to violence and thwart efforts by the chamber to recruit more 
business, civic leaders formulated a program of managed integration, al­
though not before certain blacks started picketing downtown stores that 
would not serve them. Under this growing pressure, the Committee of Four­
teen arranged for blacks to walk into forty-nine downtown restaurants and 
be served on July 26, 1961, without incident. Merchants also removed 
whites-only signs throughout downtown.101 The action brought the city 
good national publicity. For instance, the New York Times observed that 
"there seems to be today a dominant spirit of moderation and goodwill [in 
Dallas]."102 
That fall, under the guidance of the Committee of 14, eighteen black chil­
dren entered first grade at eight previously all white elementary schools. No 
violence or protest occurred, in part because of the DCC's campaign to sell 
integration to the city. It hired Sam Bloom, a public relations man, and pro­
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duced a twenty-minute movie called Dallas at the Crossroads, and showed 
it all over the city. Narrated by Walter Cronkite, the film stressed the impor­
tance of avoiding the conflict that had typified school integration in Little 
Rock and New Orleans.103 
Despite the reluctant but peaceful compliance with the court ruling, the 
federal court's decree helped fuel the already strident anti-federal govern­
ment feeling in Dallas. And while the News carefully restrained from pro­
moting racial tensions, it did not use the same restraint in its attack on the 
federal government in foreign policy and other domestic areas.104 Its con­
stant assaults on Kennedy, the United Nations, and Big Government seemed 
to help legitimize the ravings of the city's well-organized extreme right wing 
led by political reactionaries such as Dan H. Smoot, front man for ultracon­
servative oil tycoon H. L. Hunt; Frank McGehee, founder of the National 
Indignation Convention; and retired General Edwin A. Walker, who while 
active had supplied ultraconservative John Birch Society material to his 
troops.105 
Indeed, it was Walker, along with the John Birch Society, who organized 
a demonstration against U. N. delegate Adlai E. Stevenson, speaker for the 
city's observance of United Nations Day, held on October 26,1963. Not only 
did protesters harass and interrupt Stevenson during his speech to 5,000 at 
the city's Memorial Auditorium, but about eighty demonstrators outside the 
auditorium booed the ambassador, and several shoved, hit, and spat upon 
him as he left the building.106 Civic leaders, deeply embarrassed by the inci­
dent and troubled by the bad publicity it gave the city, sent a telegram apolo­
gizing for the incident to Stevenson, noting the city was "outraged and ab­
jectly ashamed of the disgraceful discourtesies you suffered at the hands of 
a small group of extremists."107 
Two days after the incident, Mayor Earle Cabell criticized the city's reac­
tionaries as a "cancer on the body politic" and pled with Dallas citizens to 
"help us restore sanity to our city." He then proceeded to identify the larger 
malaise that permitted such incidents to occur. "The constructive thinker 
and civic builder," Cabell stated, "although in the majority has become en­
grossed in his own affairs and has permitted a small but highly vocal minor­
ity to project the image of our city to the world at large."108 The key here was 
his allusion to being engrossed in one's own affairs, suggesting that the de­
sire to work for the city as a whole had declined since the city-building days 
of the 1930s or 1940s. Some outside critics suggested that the major problem 
in Dallas stemmed from the control of the city by the oligarchy of business 
leaders associated with the DCC, rather than the highly vocal minority of 
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the reactionaries Cabell referred to in his speech. For by the 1960s, a time 
that emphasized individual rights rather than corporate needs, this apparent 
lack of democracy seemed particularly offensive. 
The assassination of John F. Kennedy on the streets of Dallas on Novem­
ber 22,1963, proved a major event in the life of the city because of the micro­
scopic examination it brought to Dallas, along with the nation's widespread 
revulsion and hate. Even more important, it helped extend the life and 
power of the business elite in Dallas politics and civic leadership when mas­
sive changes occurred elsewhere, including the Southwest, due in part to a 
new notion about the relationship between the city and its citizens. During 
the 1930s and 1940s, the public discourse had emphasized the city or the me­
tropolis as the key object of concern. By the 1960s, the citizen, as represented 
by different ethnic, racial, class, or neighborhood groups, now became the 
principal unit of concern.109 In city politics, democracy replaced efficiency 
as the chief goal of city government. This change had already started to oc­
cur in Dallas before the Kennedy assassination and had helped explain Cab-
ell's 1961 victory, along with the two independents. Understanding the im­
pact of the changing discourse provides some insight as to why so much 
criticism was directed to a city that by National Municipal Review stan­
dards was incredibly well run. But the national attack on the city after the 
Kennedy assassination rallied citizens to defend the city's reputation and 
civic leadership, and thus stall a process of change that had started in Dallas 
during the late 1950s. 
Kennedy's assassination in Dallas made the entire city turn inward and 
evaluate its soul. For instance, the chamber of commerce altered its regular 
annual meeting program scheduled for December of 1963 to invite three 
leading citizens to discuss the responsibilities of citizenship.110 In the fol­
lowing November election Dallas voters ousted their incumbent congress­
man, the ultraconservative Bruce Alger, by what the News called a "substan­
tial margin."111 Alger had become an embarrassment to the city for his 
extremism, so vehemently attacked after the Kennedy assassination, but to 
many he also had proven a liability to the city. Civic leaders wearied of his 
refusal to support the request for federal money to canalize the Trinity River 
and became angry when his government bashing in Congress cost the city 
several federal agencies. They supported popular (and conservative) mayor 
Earle Cabell to run against Alger—a move that helped defeat the con­
gressman. 
With the election of Cabell to Congress, the CCA-dominated city council 
chose Texas Instrument head Jon Erik Jonsson as the new mayor. Born in 
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Brooklyn, New York, in 1901, Jonsson came to Dallas in 1934 with the Geo­
physical Service, a company that did seismographic surveys for major oil 
companies. From these beginnings, he helped build Texas Instruments, an 
important high-tech industry characteristic of those established in the sun­
belt after World War II. This leading civic figure had headed the DCC at the 
time of his selection as mayor.112 
Jonsson found a city devastated by the Kennedy and Oswald assassina­
tions. He recounted later that he confronted an atmosphere of "tragedy, 
grief, confusion, and uncertainty." Dallas had become known as "the city of 
hate," and for several years civic leaders worried that top industrialists and 
financiers around the country might avoid it because they viewed it as domi­
nated by extremists.113 Such fear did not paralyze the mayor, however. He 
believed that the tragic events of 1963 could rally Dallas citizens together for 
the good of the city. "I realized that if any good could come from disaster," 
Jonsson later recounted, "it might well be because we cast aside petty differ­
ences to join in [a] more closely knit, cohesive effort to create a city of . . . ex-
cellence."114 
Toward this end, Jonsson in 1964 promoted still another planning initia­
tive. Called Goals for Dallas, and roughly modeled after President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower's Goals for America program, this planning effort differed 
substantially from the Kessler and Bartholomew plans. Earlier efforts had 
been focused on shaping the physical city, and assumed that such action 
could benefit Dallas's economic and social development. Although occa­
sionally consulting laymen, these plans, along with the goals they were 
drawn to fulfill, were developed or guided by professional planning experts 
viewed as the only ones qualified to understand the needs of a complex city. 
Goals for Dallas, however, expanded both the objects and the means of 
planning. Unlike earlier efforts, the new planning program emphasized the 
necessity of establishing community goals as much as planning for them. In 
addition, it called for maximum feasible participation of the city's residents 
and from the start relied on laymen rather than professional planners. Only 
after Dallas's citizens set goals would civic leaders attempt to translate them 
into concrete plans. Unlike earlier plans, which assumed that the city was 
more than the sum of its parts (and people) and that city goals might be dif­
ferent than the goals of some of its citizens, the new "plan" appeared to view 
the city merely as the sum of its populations, and sought to transform a con­
sensus of their belief in what the city should do into a plan for that city. Man­
aging the city's diversity for the benefit of Dallas as a whole gave way to re­
sponding to the needs of individuals and groups. 
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According to Jonsson, the first stage of his program would be the set­
ting of goals—the ideals, aims, objectives for the city. The mayor thought 
this process would allow the people of Dallas to determine the type and 
character of the city they wanted.115 A twenty-seven-member planning 
committee composed of business, political, and religious leaders headed 
the privately financed effort. Dr. Bryghte D. Goldbold, on leave as vice presi­
dent of the Graduate Research Center of the Southwest, and a small staff 
headed that committee. It acted as a board of directors that oversaw the 
entire Goals for Dallas undertaking. Initially, planning committee mem­
bers wrote thirteen essays on different city topics and identified problems 
in areas such as government, design, health, welfare, transportation, pub­
lic safety, education, recreation and entertainment, cultural activities and 
economy. 
Following the completion of these essays, eighty-seven men and women 
representing a variety of "backgrounds, creeds, races, viewpoints, interests 
and occupations" attended a conference held in June 1966 at the Stagecoach 
Inn in Salado, Texas. They read the thirteen essays written the previous 
spring. According to a later report, "These papers did not propose goals" 
but rather were "statements of the problems." In preparation for this gather­
ing, the participants had also studied other reference material and attended 
a seminar conducted by a panel of international experts. At Salado, the as­
sembly drafted a set of proposed goals after much discussion and compro­
mise. According to one account, "The Salado group looked beyond them­
selves. Several likened the conference to a religious experience."116 
Following the meeting, city officials published the thirteen essays, along 
with the Salado goals, in paperback-book form and distributed it to the pub­
lic libraries. The Goals Planning Committee asked churches, PTAs, civic 
clubs, chambers of commerce, and other organizations to encourage their 
members to read the essays and study the proposed goals. In November, the 
committee held thirty-three neighborhood meetings throughout the Dallas 
area to allow citizens to review the Salado goals and give their reactions, and 
offer revisions to the document. Nearly 6,400 people attended those meet­
ings and provided their input on the ninety-eight proposals. The goals com­
mittee then summarized the thousands of suggestions gleaned from neigh­
borhood meetings and from the more than 1,200 comment cards and letters 
received. It held another meeting, this time in Arlington, Texas. Those 
neighborhood meetings and mail-in replies helped modify 60 percent of the 
goals and add twelve new ones. The resulting document from this planning 
movement differed greatly from the earlier plans of Dallas. Physical devel­
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opment, although discussed under the headings of City Design and Trans­
portation and Communications, competed with new planning categories 
focusing on individual and societal needs such as government, health, wel­
fare, public safety, and higher education. For instance, the general goal for 
health was found on page 8: "The physical and mental well-being of its citi­
zens is a major Dallas goal." This was followed by ten specific goals, such as 
the provision of the very best in hospital facilities and staffs.117 Under public 
safety Goals for Dallas made the following statement: "Each citizen must be 
assured the opportunity to enjoy life in our community in peace and free of 
fear from criminal acts and preventable disasters." A specific proposal to 
help realize the general goals was to "make careers in law enforcement and 
other public safety services more attractive."118 Even the general goal for the 
design of the city—"a city of beauty and functional fitness that enhances the 
quality of life for all its peoples"—emphasized the needs of people rather 
than the city as a unit.119 
Later, during 1968 in another series of neighborhood meetings, citizens 
helped prioritize the goals, resulting in another publication, entitled Propos­
als for Achieving the Goals for Dallas.120 It too emphasized the new orien­
tation toward the citizen as opposed to city needs. For instance, one of the 
proposals about improving the city's physical design called for a plan for 
each district and neighborhood in the city. "Neighborhood plans require 
deep insights into economic and sociological conditions and the needs of 
citizens," the plan observed, "as well as a physical plan for streets, parks, 
schools and such."121 
The commitment to fuller citizen participation in urban affairs, first re­
flected in changes in the Citizens Charter Association in the late 1950s and 
in the Hulcy Plan, completed in 1961, manifested itself even more fully in the 
Goals for Dallas Program. And with it came changing priorities, turning 
from the city to the city's citizens. This change did not mark the termination 
of business leadership dominance in civic affairs, nor did it signal an end to 
civic boosterism for Dallas. But it clearly represented a turning away from 
the type of city-as-a-whole discourse that had dominated the rhetoric and 
influenced the actions of civic leaders since the 1920s. And as the new dis­
course became more prominent, it would help explain the decline in the 
dominance of the Dallas Citizens Council as the guiding force for Dallas, 
and provide a context for understanding the growing impatience from cer­
tain sectors of Dallas for justice and economic opportunity even as these 
were occurring. Finally, it not only would better clarify reasons for the 
decline of the traditional planning that had guided Dallas development 
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throughout the twentieth century, but it would also help explain the rejec­
tion of at-large council election for Dallas by a federal judge in 1975, and the 
subsequent destruction of the CCA.122 
•

Although the Dallas experience is different from other cities in particulars, 
and because its stage in development manifests the consequences of the city-
as-a-whole discourse more clearly than older cities, the assumptions about 
the nature of the city that appeared in Dallas between 1920 and 1950 repre­
sent national trends and assumptions. For Dallas leaders were civic boosters 
before they were southerners, or southwesterners, and they constantly 
looked beyond the parameters of their region for guidance in how to run and 
promote their city. Clearly the regional setting of Dallas influenced civic 
leadership, but ultimately the determining factor shaping their efforts had 
more to do with an urban rather than a regional ethos. Undoubtedly civic 
leaders in the 1920s sympathized with many of the goals of the Ku Klux 
Klan. Yet because that vigilante group threatened the city's reputation, pro­
duced disunity, and proved a detriment to its welfare, prominent civic lead­
ers joined hands to oppose it. Thirty years later, many civic leaders, un­
doubtedly racist and committed to educational segregation, placed the 
welfare of the city above their own notions about race and promoted peace­
ful integration in response to court rulings. 
Dallas leaders in the 1950s and 1960s also reflect changes that took place 
nationally—changes that resulted in abandonment of or deemphasis on the 
primacy of traditional physical planning by experts, and an overly central­
ized city government preoccupied with efficiency. Because of the strong 
manifestations of the earlier city-as-a-whole approach, Dallas did not ex­
hibit these changes as spectacularly as some cities. Still, this chapter has sug­
gested that changes nevertheless occurred. Local government that had gar­
nered so much praise now suffered under an avalanche of criticism, because 
the definition of what government should do changed with new notions 
about the city. If the city was not a real unit capable of shaping individual be­
havior, but rather a setting for groups and individuals to pursue their own 
needs and agendas, then government and planning that primarily focused 
on the larger unit no longer seemed as important as it once had been.123 Plan­
ning in the 1950s and 1960s also became increasingly preoccupied with 
meeting the needs of individuals and groups rather than the city as a whole. 
Epilogue 
Dallas in the 1990s still maintained council-manager government and em­
braced comprehensive planning. But the characteristics of both planning 
and government had changed significantly, as had the political discourse of 
the city. Council-manager government now included fourteen council mem­
bers elected by districts, with only the mayor elected at large. And the pro­
moters of the council-manager system of government, the Citizens Charter 
Association (CCA), had disappeared. Traditional histories of Dallas blame 
the destruction of this good government organization on the ruling of U.S. 
District Judge Elden Mahon in 1975, which voided the city's at-large system 
of selecting councilmen, but it was more than that.1 Even though Dallas had 
prospered greatly under the CCA-dominated council-manager government 
and had even shown "spectacular improvement" in its responsiveness to mi­
nority concerns, according to Judge Mahon, the good government organiza­
tion saw its popularity decline in the early 1970s. By 1975 the CCA had be­
come increasingly perceived not as an organization for good government but 
as a body dominated by downtown interests, unresponsive to the needs of 
the people. Erik Jonsson's reelection victory in 1969 proved to be the last 
CCA victory in the mayoralty race. In 1971, forty-two-year-old Wes Wise, a 
popular broadcaster, beat out CCA nominee Avery Mays in a runoff elec­
tion for mayor in a campaign where he emphasized he was for "all the 
people" rather than "the city as a whole." Wise, along with four other inde­
pendents, won again in 1975, in the city's first election after the court ruling 
that resulted in district rather than at-large elections. Under the new system 
developed by council, voters from eight districts would select their own rep­
resentatives while three other councilmen (including the mayor) would still 
be elected at large. In that contest Wise defeated former CCA head John 
Schoellkopf by a huge margin, the loser only receiving 36 percent of the votes 
cast.2 Not only did several districts elect CCA opponents, but all three 
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at-large victors were CCA rivals. In explaining the CCA's defeat the News 
cited its "image problem" and the turmoil and bitter feuding associated 
with that organization. Even within the group, political factions and 
fighting had replaced the consensus characteristic of the earlier CCA.3 
The court ruling did not end federal involvement in local elections, nor 
did it satisfy everyone. African Americans and Mexican Americans called 
for further changes, including a larger number of districts. One spokesman 
even wanted a twenty-two-member district council. In 1988, during a time 
of growing racial tension in the city due to confrontations between police 
and minorities, two blacks, Marvin Crenshaw and Roy Williams, filed suit 
against the 8-3 council system. At the same time, Dallas mayor Annette 
Strauss, concerned about the growing racial discord, formed Dallas To­
gether in an attempt to improve the city's tense racial setting after the Dallas 
Alliance, another civic organization, issued a report concluding that Dallas 
presented a complicated and "troubling picture of a community divided 
along racial, economic and educational lines."4 According to the mayor, 
Dallas Together—a seventy-six-member interracial body of civic leaders— 
would "study underlying causes of racial tension threatening to further po­
larize the city." Its report, issued in January of 1989, called for multicultural 
education and offered specific plans for increasing minority representation 
in business management positions within the city. In addition, the thirty-
page report recommended changes in the city's political structure. "Our city 
council districts," the report concluded, "do not provide sufficient opportu­
nity for all our citizens to be properly and fairly represented [italics mine] in 
a system that is designed to meet the needs of contemporary Dallas."5 As a 
result, it advised the mayor to form a committee to recommend possible 
changes to the city's governmental structure. 
Mayor Strauss did just that and appointed a Charter Review Committee 
chaired by white Dallas lawyer Ray Hutchison. Instead of bringing peace to 
the racially troubled city, that committee's decision to alter the 8-3 system to 
a unique 10-district and 4-quadrant arrangement resulted in further contro­
versy and division within Dallas. Under the plan, the new charter would di­
vide the city into ten ward districts, with each electing its own council repre­
sentative. In addition, the new plan carved Dallas into four quadrants based 
on population rather than defined neighborhoods. Only residents of those 
quadrants would vote for that council representative. In addition, the char­
ter committee proposed an amendment that allowed most city boards and 
commissions with fewer than fifteen members to be expanded to that num­
ber so each council member could make at least one appointment to each 
committee, thus making them more representative of the city's diverse pop­
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ulation.6 Although the city's blacks and Hispanics applauded the appoint­
ment amendment as a welcome attempt at diversity, they strongly opposed 
the 10-4-1 system, despite the support of the city's newspapers and the estab­
lishment. 
The News applauded the proposal, calling it "the best of both election 
worlds." It concluded by noting, "No plan offers a better opportunity to 
elect a balanced city council that reflects the make-up of the community."7 
Black and Hispanic leaders disagreed and demanded a 12-1 or 14-1 system 
where all council candidates would be elected from districts. Indeed, the 
committee's announcement of its support of the 10-4-1 plan scheduled for 
voter approval in August set off civil rights demonstrations unprecedented in 
the city's history. The results of the August 12 election did little to quell that 
unrest. Although the new charter passed by more than 66 percent of the total 
vote, African American and Mexican American neighborhoods soundly de­
feated it. Several months after the election, one magazine concluded that 
"the city stands today more divided along social, ethnic, and economic lines 
than, perhaps, ever before in its history."8 
Before Dallas started functioning under the plan, U.S. District Judge Jerry 
Buchmeyer ruled on a lawsuit by Marvin Crenshaw and Roy Williams chal­
lenging the constitutionality of the city's older 8-3 system. They contended 
that racially polarized voting and appeals to Anglo-voters along with biased 
media coverage prevented African Americans from winning at-large elec-
tions.9 On March 28,1990, the judge agreed and declared that the 8-3 system 
violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because it "hindered [minorities'] 
participation in the political process." He also expressed his unhappiness 
with the city's newly confirmed charter and eventually called for the city to 
approve a 14-1 system to give minorities new opportunity to get elected. 
Dallas voters defeated the 14-1 proposal by 372 votes in an election that saw 
98 percent of blacks voting for it, 87 percent of Hispanics endorsing it, but 
more than 70 percent of the city's white Anglos rejecting it. Despite this de­
feat, the city eventually complied with the judge's order without a popular 
mandate. Council districts were carefully drawn to allow more minority 
candidates to get elected to council, an action that resulted in the city's most 
diverse council in its history. 
What is most important about this development in Dallas history is how 
thoroughly the discourse of representative government had replaced the ear­
lier theme of efficient and comprehensive government as the dominant issue 
in the city. Even the establishment, through the Dallas Alliance, Dallas To­
gether, and the Charter Review Committee, agreed that representativeness 
of government was the most important goal. Representation itself, rather 
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than its end product, became the overwhelming objective in the Dallas polit­
ical discourse of the 1980s and 1990s. The debate was over how best to 
achieve this diversity rather than whether it was an acceptable goal. Al­
though Dallas retained the council-manager government, the spirit behind 
that government had drastically altered and reflected the new vision of Dal­
las as a setting for individuals and groups to pursue their own agendas. The 
city-as-a-whole philosophy was dead. 
On one level, the new planning movement in Dallas that resulted in the 
Dallas Plan seems to contradict the notion that the city-as-a-whole ap­
proach has basically faded away, but a careful look at this plan too will sug­
gest that new assumptions about planning, first noticeable in the 1950s, 
helped shape even this latest comprehensive effort. 
The Dallas Plan, initiated by the Dallas Citizens Council and taken up by 
city council in August of 1992, provided the city's most ambitious city-
planning effort since the Bartholomew Plan of 1943-1945. Indeed, the News 
called it "the boldest planning effort in the city's history."10 This new plan, 
funded by private business but commissioned by city council, would offer a 
blueprint through the year 2025. When completed in the fall of 1994 it called 
for a $6.6 billion building program for the city, including a Kennedy Center-
type arts center for downtown, a blockbuster city aquarium for Fair Park, 
and a satellite airport for depressed South Dallas. It also recommended the 
development of a Center City, including a more dynamic central business 
district and healthier surrounding neighborhoods, to reestablish the urban 
core as the heart of the city.11 
The Plan was originally directed by Richard T. Anderson, past president 
of the Regional Plan Association. He promised a plan "equitable to all citi­
zens of the city regardless of where they live and what their needs are."12 Vet­
eran city planner Karen S. Walz replaced Anderson in May of 1994. Walz, 
according to the News, specialized "in hammering out agreements among 
divided urban factions." She especially had a strong reputation for 
"consensus-based community planning," according to the News. Indeed, 
the planning process of the 1990s relied heavily on securing input from the 
city's various residents. From the beginning, civic leaders sought planning 
"built on widespread consultation and public involvement for community 
leadership to carefully weigh and carefully implement, expeditiously."13 
Planners promised to make the process "open and inclusive." In the spring 
of 1993, members of the Dallas Plan effort went to the public with a program 
entitled "Listening to the City." They held 160 meetings throughout the mu­
nicipality, where they solicited citizen input. Based in part on this effort, Dal­
las Plan team members developed a framework for the work of the Dallas 
Epilogue • 249 
Plan. After the News published a draft of the plan, team members held out­
reach meetings in each of the city's forty-three statistical communities. Team 
members also met with neighborhood associations, religious groups, pro­
fessional organizations, business groups, representatives of higher educa­
tion, and many civic groups. During the last three months of 1993, Dallas 
Plan proponents conducted 125 meetings involving 3,500 participants. 
Backers of the plan bragged that the Dallas Plan was "not based upon the 
ideas of a small number of planners, but rather an approach based upon the 
views, hopes and dreams of citizens of Dallas."14 
Even after the report was released in 1994, public participation contin­
ued, since the plan not only projected long-term projects but also empha­
sized short-term needs, including a decaying infrastructure. All city neigh­
borhoods were consulted as the city set the annual agenda. Moreover, 
twenty-one Dallas Plan Workshops were held in 1995 to educate citizens 
about the plan and to solicit their views about immediate urban priorities.15 
The Dallas Plan also sought input by mail, fax, and E-mail.16 Such activity 
led the News to conclude that the "plan is a result of extensive community 
comment."17 
The new plan, then, differed greatly from other plans, both in the way it 
was constructed and in focus. The new approach of soliciting ideas from the 
city's residents and centering on the needs and desires of Dallas's diverse 
population differed significantly from the earlier Kessler Plan and the Bar­
tholomew Plan. Those plans started with the city rather than its citizens. 
The News reflected this focus when it concluded that "rather than dis­
playing artists' renderings of grand boulevards, glowing new office parks 
and downtown walk-ups, Dallas plan consultants say they'll be empha­
sizing policies aimed at equalizing city services, levying money from other 
government agencies and linking new development to community needs."18 
Both government and planning in the 1990s, then, suggests how differ­
ently civic leaders perceived their city in the 1990s than they had before 1955. 
Earlier planners and government reformers worked under the assumption 
that the city was a complex system of systems needing expert guidance and 
civic leadership closely associated with the city's best citizens. The needs of 
the city as a whole took precedence over the needs of individual groups or 
neighborhoods, and efficiency became the chief goal of government. Good 
citizenship meant promoting the welfare of the city as a whole. 
By the 1990s the needs and aspirations of the city's citizens, rather than 
the city as a whole, had emerged as the priority of the day. The city became 
much more of a setting for individuals and groups to pursue their dreams 
and goals. "Good government" now became government that promoted the 
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most access to power for the city's citizens, rather than efficiency for the city. 
And planning became a community undertaking rather than a process dom­
inated by experts. 
As this book has suggested, the old city-as-a-whole approach clearly had 
severe problems. Too few, no matter how well-meaning, had too much 
power and control of the city's development. The emphasis on the city as a 
whole also made it too easy to neglect the needs of the city's poorest groups 
and neighborhoods. But as recent developments in the city's history suggest, 
the correctives to these problems and the political discourse that legitimizes 
them have created a new set of problems just as threatening to the city's fu­
ture. The rabid parochialism of today's political factions and special interest 
groups has neglected an important fact—that the lives of all are intertwined 
within the larger setting of different neighborhoods, racial and ethnic 
groups, and classes. The emphasis on citizenship solely as rights for individ­
uals rather than responsibilities to the whole has also created a dangerous 
imbalance and threatened the city's health. 
The future of Dallas, and urban America, depends in large part on adopt­
ing a new public discourse that emphasizes the interdependence of the larger 
metropolitan area, while not losing sight of the needs of the particular. Such 
an approach to the city would combine the best of the city-as-a-whole ap­
proach with sensitivity to the rights and needs of individuals, neighbor­
hoods, and racial and ethnic groups. For Big D, the Dallas Plan may be a be­
ginning in that direction. If such a path is not taken, however, the future for 
Dallas, as well as other American cities, is bleak. 
Appendix 
Charter Members of the 
Dallas Citizens Council, 1937 
Nathan Adams, President, First National Bank 
J. B. Adoue, Jr., President, National Bank of Commerce 
A. H. Bailey, President and General Manager, Higgenbotham-Bailey-
Logan Co. 
Louis W. Bailey, President and Editor, Dallas Dispatch 
Fenton Baker, President, Baker Hotel 
A. C. Bigger, President, Metropolitan Building and Loan Association 
E. H. Blum, Vice President, Atlantic Refining Co. 
F. A. Brown, President, Graham-Brown Shoe Co. 
William J. Brown, President, Titche-Goetlinger Co. 
Murrell L. Buckner, Vice President and General Manager, Union 
Terminal Co. 
F. W. Burford, President, East Texas Refining Co. 
Jack P. Burrus, President, Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co. 
F. O. Burns, President, Safeway Stores of Texas 
W. R. Burns, Vice President and General Manager, Dallas Railway 
Terminal Co. 
D. Harold Byrd, President, Byrd-Frost, Inc. 
E. R. Callier, President, Trinity Cotton Oil Co. 
John W. Carpenter, President, Texas Power and Light Company 
J. H. Cassidy, President, Egan Co. 
William Collier, Vice President, Better Business Bureau 
R. H. Crocker, General Manager, A6cP Food Services 
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T. M. Cullum, President, Cullum and Boren Co. 
C. W. Davis, President, Dallas Power and Light Co. 
E. M. (Ted) Dealey, Vice President, Dallas Morning News 
L. B. Denning, President, Lone Star Gas Company 
Sol Dreyfuss, President, Dreyfuss and Son 
A. Morgan Duke, President, Gulf States Life Insurance 
Arthur A. Everts, President, Arthur A. Everts Company 
W. D. Felder, President, W. D. Felder and Co. 
Lewis R. Ferguson, Lone Star Cement Corporation 
Edgar L. Flippen, President, Gulf Insurance Co. 
Fred F. Florence, President, Republic Bank 
J. J. Foley, General Manager, International Harvester Co. 
Eugene B. Germany, President, C&G Oil Co. 
Tom Gooch, Vice President, Daily Times Herald 
W. A. Green, Jr., President, W. A. Green Co. 
E. P. Greenwood, President, Great Southern Life Insurance Co. 
Jake L. Harmon, President, Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Co. 
Edward T. Harrison, President, Trinity Universal Insurance Co. 
S. J. Hay, President, Great National Life Insurance Co. 
Otto Herold, President, Oriental Laundry Co. 
Karl Hoblitzelle, President, Interstate Circuit Inc. 
F. P. Holland, Jr., President, Texas Farm and Ranch Publishing Co. 
T. E. Jackson, Southwestern Manager, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 
Luther Jordan, General Manager, Sears, Roebuck and Co. 
Laurence S. Kahn, President, E. M. Kahn and Co. 
Arthur L. Kramer, President, A. Harris and Co. 
J. L. Lancaster, President, Texas &c Pacific Railroad 
Joe E. Lawther, President, Liberty State Bank 
W. M. Lingo, President, Lingo Lumber Co. 
Albert Linz, President, Linz Brothers 
D. Alva Little, President, Magnolia Petroleum Co. 
J. F. Lucey, Lucey Petroleum Co. 
Herbert Marcus, President, Neiman-Marcus 
W. B. Marsh, President, Harris-Lipsetz Lumber Co. 
Z. E. Marvin, Sr., Chairman of the Board, Marvin Drug Co. 
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A. M. Matson, Managing Director, Butler Brothers 
Robert Mayer, President, J. Kahn and Co. 
J. Kirby McDonough, President, Murray Co. 
R. S. McFarland, Vice President, Seaboard Oil Company of Delaware 
B. F. McClain, General Manager, Hart Furniture Co. 
Frank L. McNeny, McNeny and McNeny Real Estate 
David Metzger, Metzger Dairies 
Henry S. Miller, Real Estate 
Homer P. Mitchell, President and General Manager, Texas Employees 
Insurance Association 
Charles R. Moore, President, Austin Bridge Co. 
Edward T. Moore, Chair, Simms Petroleum Co. 
W. J. Morris, President, Continental Supply Co. 
H. S. Moss, President, Moss Petroleum Co. 
Harris Neil, General Manager, Coca-Cola Bottling Company 
C. F. O'Donnell, President, Southwestern Life Insurance Co. 
J. B. O'Hara, President, Dr. Pepper Co. 
H. A. Olmsted, President, Olmsted Kirk Co. 
J. S. Ownby, President, Ship jar Warehouse Co. 
D. H. Pace, General Manager, John Deere Plow Co. 
J. Durrell Padgitt, Secretary-Treasurer, Padgitt Brothers Co. 
J. F. Parks, President/General Manager, Dallas Coffin Co. 
Hyman Pearlstone, President, Higgenbotham-Pearlstone Hardware Co. 
Julius H. Pearlstone, President, Pearlstone Mill and Elevator 
W F. Pendleton, President, Southern Gin Co. 
J. M. Penland, President, Southwestern Drug Corporation 
S. B. Perkins, President, Perkins Dry Goods Co. 
John G. Pew, Assistant Vice President, Sun Oil Company 
A. F. Pillett, President, Republic Insurance Corporation 
Lawrence S. Pollock, President, Pollock Paper and Box Company 
Walter Prehn, General Manager, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 
Ted W. Robinson, General Manager, The Borden Co. 
Julius Schepps, General Manager, Schepps Wholesale Liquors 
Hugo W. Schoellkopf, Vice President, The Schoellkopf Co. 
Otto Schubert, Jr., General Manager, The Adolphus Hotel 
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Harry L. Seay, President, Southland Life Insurance Company 
E. E. Shelton, President, Dallas Building and Loan Association 
E. P. Simmons, President, Sanger Brothers 
Rae E. Skillern, President, Skillern Drug Co. 
Orval A. Slater, Secretary, Fishburn-Oriental Dyeing and Dry Cleaning 
Co. 
E. L. Smith, Oil Operator 
Earl B. Smyth, President, Fidelity Union Life Insurance Company 
H. E. Spalti, President, Olive and Myers Manufacturing Co. 
Ernest R. Tennant, President, Dallas National Bank 
J. R. Thomson, General Manager, Coca-Cola Bottling Works 
R. L. Thornton, President, Mercantile National Bank 
Harold F. Volk, President, Volk Brothers Company, Inc. 
D. Easley Waggoner, Vice President and General Manager, United 
Fidelity Life Insurance Co. 
Lindsley Waters, President, Tennessee Dairies, Inc. 
F. Z. Williams, Vice President and General Manager, McKesson and 
Robbins, Inc. 
Jas. K. Wilson, President and General Manager, Jas. K. Wilson Co. 
J. E. Ziegelmeyer, President, Huey and Philip Hardware Company, Inc. 
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newal during those years. The Carl B. Callaway Collection documents the early devel­
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civic and political leaders. 
The Special Collections of the UTA Library also houses several useful archival 
sources. It contains extensive holdings on the area's labor movement and includes the 
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ganizations, including the minutes of the executive committee of the DCC. This collec­
tion is simply the richest we have on business leadership in Dallas between the 1920s 
and 1960s and is destined to play a major role in shaping the writing of this city's 
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information on the city's public housing movement and included not only annual re­
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ports of that body but also minutes of its meetings. A collection of documents housed 
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ture, provided insight into not only this important black civic leader, but a host of racial 
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at the Amon Carter Museum in Fort Worth, likewise offered a different perspective of 
Dallas not found in that city's newspapers. It gave balance to my understanding of the 
nature of the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport rivalry. 
Although fewer in number, some good secondary sources on the city's twentieth-
century history do exist. I especially benefited from two dissertations. William Neil 
Black's "Empire of Consensus: City Planning, Zoning, and Annexation In Dallas, 
1900-1960" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1982) provides groundbreaking cover­
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mented urban population. Although I do not always agree with his conclusions, his dis­
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Dallas" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Dallas, 1989) looks at alternative visions of 
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revised dissertation has recently been published as Dallas: The Making of a Modern 
City (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996). Another dissertation that discusses a dif­
ferent city but describes a similar story is Robert Burnham, "Pulling Together for Plu­
ralism: Politics, Planning and Government in Cincinnati, 1924-1959" (Ph.D. diss., Uni­
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Dallas-Tarrant County airport 
authority, 202
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Dallas Times Herald (DTH): on Alger, 
233; on CCA, 119,175; on civic 
unity, 112; and commission 
government, 21; on DCC, 111; 
endorsement of CCA ticket (1939), 
121; on hiring black police, 148-50; 
on labor violence, 167; and LBJ visit, 
235; on levee/reclamation 
controversy, 66, 84, 86-87; on Love

Field, 205-6; support of CCA, 177,

227; support of charter amendment, 
182; support of Sanders, 223

Dallas Together, 246-47
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Dallas Voters Association (DVA), 179­
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Dallas Women's Chamber of 
Commerce, 222

Dallas zoning: Bartholomew's 
proposals, 131-32,174; compre­
hensive zoning ordinance, 45­

47; piecemeal zoning, 29,46—47; 
racial zoning, 29-30,152,159 
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Daniels, Howard, Jr., 179

Davidson, T. Whitfield, 238

Davis, C.W., 113-14,156 
Davis, Lyn, 232—33 
Dayton, Ohio, 59

Dealey, E. M. (Ted), 226,230,235, 
294 n. 88,295 n. 104

Dealey, George B., 226; background, 
24-25; and city planning, 24,26,31, 
124,260 n. 68; conflict with Edy, 83,

88,96; and the DPO A, 47; and 
government, 30; support of levee/ 
reclamation, 85,268 n. 45
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Deere Park Improvement League, 29

Defense Plant Corporation, 138,140 
DeGolyer, E., 187

DeLeuw, Cather, and Company, 221

Democrats, 57

Denning, L. B., 102,113-14 
Denver, Colo., 44

depression. See Great Depression 
Director of Negro Activities, 197

discourse about cities, 1-5,7-8,23,40, 
43,213,218,223,240 
Dominquez, Adolfo G., 162

Doolittle Report, 204,289 n. 119

drought, 176,186 
East Dallas: blacks in, 150; compo­
sition of population, 39—40; 
drainage needs, 85; location of 
(map), 12; as site for public housing, 
163; tensions with levee district, 84— 
85,87 
East Dallas Improvement Association, 
East Grand, 118

East Texas, 172

Ebie,A.C.,45 
Edwards, George Clifton, 17,21 
Edy, John N.: administrative style, 90-

91,101; background, 76-77; as a 
campaign issue, 81-82,97-98,100; 
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government downsizing, 79-81; and 
levee/reclamation controversy, 86­

88; opposition to, 81-82,94; 
replaced, 100; and sewer plan 
engineer, 86; war against vice, 80-81

8-3 system, 246-47

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 241

Elkin, Stephen L., 5

Elliot, J., 81

Elm Street, 27,40 
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157,204 
eminent domain, 221,232 
Empire Building and Loan Company, 
66

Erhard, John, 67,70-71,74,97 
Evertt, W. C  , 66

Exline Improvement League, 200

Exline Park, 159,192-93 
FAA Airport Plan for 1959,236 
Fair Park, 91,117-18,140,248 
Federal Airport Act of 1946,201 
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FHA, 191,228; Section 220,220 
Field Street, 102,107,271 n. 22
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Fifth Ferrying Group, Air Transit 
Command, 141
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Fitzgerald, Grace, 74,76 
Flint, Mich., 77

Florence, Fred, 91,93,113,115-16,139 
fluoridation of Dallas water, 225

Ford, Charles, 183-84

Ford Motor Company, 37,139; anti­
union activity, 165-66

Forrest, T. Carr, Jr., 186,214 
Fort Worth: airport development in, 
201; as competitor to Dallas, 55,138, 
171,180; council-manager charter, 
61; and Dallas water crisis, 186; and 
Frontier Centennial, 104; and joint 
airport development, 142-44,203, 
205,236; and WWII, 140

24 
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CAA, 201

Forward Dallas!, 51-54. See also 
Ulrickson Report 
Forward Dallas (political slate): on 
council, 107-9; in 1937 election, 103,

105-6,160; promises to blacks, 148; 
ticket, 103-6,120 
14-1 system, 247

Fouts, John, 67

Fox, George E, 224,227 
Frank, D. A., 193

Frank, Graham, 104,185 
Freight Bureau, 110

Fretz Park, 166-67

Frontier Centennial, 104

Galveston, Tex., 17,21,150 
Galveston News, 25

Gans, Herbert, 210

garbage fee, as election issue, 174,176 
Garland, Tex., 140

Garretson, T. R., 80
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Geary, Joe, 228,230-31 
Geophysical Service, 241

G. I. Transportation Company, 176

Gilks, W. G., 104
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Goals for America, 241

Goals for Dallas, 241^3 
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Goff, C. O., 159,200 
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Good Government Association, 31

Good Government League, 101,104 
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Gordon, Harry, 120,275 n. 33

Graduate Research Center of the 
Southwest, 242

Grady, Hugh S., 60,76,104; and 
centennial, 98; head of CCA, 70-71,
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Graham, D. R., 95

Graham, Frank G., 183

Grand Prairie, Tex., 139

Grant, Will C  , 196

Grapevine Lake, 186

Graves, Virgil, 183

Graves, W. C. (Bill), 62,67,68 
Great Depression, 83, 87,90,150,153 
Greater Dallas, 127,136,139,171,215 
Greater Dallas Association (GDA), 65— 
67,175-76 
Greater Dallas Citizens Commission, 
136

Greater Dallas Democratic Associ­
ation, 175

Greater Dallas Party (GDP), 189-90

Greater Dallas Planning Council 
(GDPC), 214,218-19,121 
Greater Fort Worth International 
Airport—Carter Field. See Carter 
Field 
Greater Texas and Pan American 
Exposition, 108,112-13,168 
Green, William, 168-69

Guerney, Char, 205

Guiberson Company, 140

Gunn, J. Willis, 98,103,107,156 
Haeus, John, 231

Hahn, Max, 107-8; 262 n. 65

Halaby, Najeeb E., 236-37

Hall, Lenore, 70,74,175,181 
Hall Aluminum Aircraft, 139,278 n. 98

Hall Street, 40

Hall Street-Thomas Avenue 
neighborhood, 150,153-54,157-58 
Hamilton, R. T , 148

Hamilton Park, 198,204 
Hampton Terrace, 62

Hanna, Catherine, 154

Hare, S. Herbert, 125-26

Harlem Home Journal, 105

Harrell,C.A.,76 
Harris, Bill, 144,179-80,188-90 
Harris, Camille, 114

Harris, John C  , 66,85 
Harry Hines Boulevard, 194

Harvard University, 58

Hay, S.J., 175,188,227 
Head, Louis, 57,59,70 
Hensley Field, 138-39,141 
Hexter, Victor H., 74 
Hiegel,L.L.,175,179 
Higginbotham, Will, 158 
Highland Park: and Dallas 
government, 68; influence on city 
government, 122,176; and merger 
movement, 125,134-36; and UDA, 
67; and Ulrickson committee, 55; as 
upper-class suburb, 39 
Hill, Herbert, 166 
Hill, Hub, 191 
Hispanics. See Mexican Americans 
Hoblitzelle, Karl: in DDC, 113-14, 
117; and planning, 124; protest 
against levee/reclamation project, 
83-85 
Holliday, Frank, 97 
Hollydale,GuyT.O.,231 
Holmes, Lucian, Jr., 227 
Home Builders Association of Dallas 
County, 222 
Home Government Association 
(HGA), 81-82,94 
homestead provision of Texas State 
Constitution, 18 
Hooper, K. K., 30-31,58 
Horner, W. W., 86-87,97 
House Committee on Un-American 
Activities, 234 
Housing Act: of 1937,155,162; of 
1949,193; of 1954,220 
housing conditions, 157; in Little 
Mexico, 161-62. See also black 
housing 
Housing Division of the Public Works 
Administration (PWA): limited 
dividend housing 153; and Mexican 
Americans, 162; public housing 
program, 153-55 
Houston, Sam, 65,97 
Houston: bid for centennial exposition, 
92; and black police, 150; and 
commission government, 20-21; as 
competitor to Dallas, 55,93,138 
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Howell Street, 159 
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Hulcy Committee, 214-17,219 
Hulcy Plan, 214-17,224,243 
Hunt, H. L., 223,239,292 n. 35 
Hutchison, Ray, 246 
Independent Voters Alliance, 62 
"Industrial Dallas" campaign, 39,72 
Industrial Properties Corporation, 65 
Interdenominational Ministerial 
Alliance, 105-6,148 
International Association of City 
Managers, 77, 81-82,100 
International Ladies Garment Workers 
strike, 99,164 
Inter-Racial Committee (biracial), 
195-99,204 
Interracial Committee (all-white), 158 
Jackson, Maynard H., Sr., 105 
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Jackson, Thomas E., 113—14 
Jacoby, W. R, 144 
Je£fers,P.L.A.,81 
Jewish Federation of Social Services, 74 
John Birch Society, 239 
Johnson, George, 159 
Johnson, Ladybird, 235 
Johnson, Lyndon B., 234—35 
Jones, Robert L., 101,148,167 
Jones, W. D, 96 
Jonsson, Jon Erik, 240-42,245 
Journal of Housing, 155 
Kansas City, Mo., 26,55,59-60,125-
26,165,180 
Kennedy, John E, 239; assassination of, 
1,240^1,295 n. 114 
Kessler, George: background, 26; and 
Dallas history, 49-50; death of, 124; 
hired by DMDA, 45; invited to 
Dallas, 25-26; and plan, 13,26-27, 
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Kessler, George (continued) 
124 (see also Kessler Plan); and 
zoning, 46-47

Kessler Park, 39

Kessler Plan: and boosterism, 72; 
compared with Bartholomew Plan, 
126; compared with Dallas Plan, 
249; compared with Goals for 
Dallas, 241; compared with 
Ulrickson Program, 56; as a 
"comprehensive" document, 27,32; 
contents of, 13,26-27; and DMDA, 
45; and the DMN, 44; evaluation 
of, 215; and Field Street, 102; 
improvements for uptown, 32; 
limitations of, 30—31,56; links to 
Ulrickson Report, 51; out of date, 
124; purpose, 50; revival, 35; stalled 
31,47; on zoning, 260 n. 61

Kessler Plan Association (KPA): board 
of directors, 48; establishment of, 43; 
focus and purpose, 47-50; levee/ 
reclamation project, protest against, 
83—84; promotion of Ulrickson 
Program, 63,65 
Kessler Plan Salesman, 63

Kettle, John J., 76

Kiest, Edwin J., 275 n. 32

Kimball, Justin R, 49,151-52,154 
Kingsley, E. A., 51
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Ku Klux Klan (KKK), 6,169,244,262-
63 n. 20; and black police, 148-52; 
and Dallas politics, 57,62,94 
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Lake Bridgeport, 186
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Landing Areas for National Defense 
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Lane, E. M., 174
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Latin America, 113,126 
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Lawther, Joe E., 102,113,154; as 
organizer of Catfish Club, 94; and 
planning, 44,55,90 
League of Women Voters, 181

Ledbetter, Jack, 187

Legion of Honor, 103^  , 107,120 
Leopold, Joseph E, 107,144 
levee/reclamation project. See Trinity 
River levee/reclamation project 
Lincoln High School, 158-60
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Lindsley, Henry, 17,22,24 
Literary Digest, 37

Little, D.Alva, 113-14

Little Mexico, 40,157,161-63 
Little Mexico Village, 163

Little Rock, Ark., 238-39

Lockheed Aircraft Modification plant, 
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Lock ward and Andrews, 187

Lockwood, Greene and Co., 37

Long, A. A., 69

Look at Past Planning for the City of 
Dallas, A, 215
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165

Los Angeles, Calif., 39,49 
Louisville, Ky., 11,30,126 
Love Airport. See Love Field 
Love Field, 8,40,107,140,157,235; 
as central airport, 201; criticism 
of, 201; economic impact, 203; 
expansion of, 141^2,144,190, 
192,236-37; and federal aid, 
237; opposition to expansion of, 
203-5,236; origins and develop­
ment of, 142-44,200; study on, 
202-3

Loving, J. S., 156

Lubove, Roy, 2

Maberry, Joe E., 222
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Magnolia Petroleum Company, 74

Mahon, Elden, 245

Main Street, 11,27 
Main Street Association, 218

Marcus, Herbert, 96,113-14 
Marcus, Stanley, 181,202 
Marvin, Z.E., Jr., 139

Matson,A.M., 113,115 
maximum feasible participation, 211

Mays, Avery, 221,245 
McBride, T. S., 96

McFarland, J. Horace, 25-26

McGehee, Frank, 239

McKinney Avenue, 161

McVey, Robert E., 124,156 
Melton, Laurence R., 180-81,224, 
227-28

Memphis, Tenn., 5,25,126 
Mexican Americans, 7,153,161—64, 
195,246-47 
Mexican Revolution, 161

Mexicans, 4,40,161 
Midway Airfield, 142-44,201-2 
Mill Creek area, 157,163,193 
Miller, Dale, 292 n. 49

Miller, Henry S., 139,223 
Miller, Lantz, 70,72 
Millinery Workers Union, 166

Mitchell, John E., 214,222 
Moore, Arthur, 74

Moore, John G., 158,199 
Moore, Sarah C  , 154

Morgan, Charles G., 17—19 
Morrow, Temple, 65-67

Morten-Davis Manufacturing 
Company, 165

Mortgage Bankers Association, 231

Mosely, Hal, 95,167; appointed city 
manager, 100; and black police, 148,

160; conflict with Catfish Club, 101,

103-4,107-8; replaced as city 
manager, 123-24

Moss, S. E., 62

Moss-Tate Investment Company, 62

Munger Avenue Church, 158

Munger Place, 84,150 
municipal bonds elections: of 1927,51, 
54-56,60,63; of 1934,91-93; of 
1938,117; of 1945,137-38,173,184; 
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85; of May 1952,185-86; of 1953,

203-55

Municipal Government, 59

Munro, William Bennett, 58-59,264 n. 
59; good-government criteria, 58

Nashville, Tenn., 25

National Airport Plan for 1948,201 
National City Managers Association. 
See International Association of City 
Managers 
National Conference for Good City 
Government, 16

National Conference on City Planning, 
40

National Fire Protection Association, 
39

National Indignation Convention, 239

National Labor Relations Board, 166

National Municipal League, 16,40,59, 
61,97,181,235,240 
National Municipal Review, 255 n. 2

Nation's Business, 37

Navy Reserve Aviation Squadron, 141
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Negro Business League in the South, 
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"Negro City," 194
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ations, 21,24, 87

neighborhood revolt, 211

Neiman, A. L., 114

Newman, Ross, 237

New Orleans, La., 5,11,138,238-39 
New York City, 11,26,32,46,125,180, 
202

New York Times, 238

Nichols, H. L., 237
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Nolen, John, 24

Nonpartisan Association (1927), 57,59 
Non Partisan Association (1951), 183

Non-Partisan League (1939), 169

Norrell,M.J.,96,100,196 
North American Aviation (NAA), 
138-41

North Dallas, 52,72,154,158,230; 
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bombing in, 151-52; development 
of, 39^  0 
North Dallas-Walnut Hills 
Improvement League, 225,227 
North Dallas women's clubs, 222

North Temple Baptist Church, 204

NRA codes, 164

Oak Cliff: annexation of, 11-12,19; 
benefits from Ulrickson Plan, 63; 
blacks in, 150-51,172; Chamber of 
Commerce, 196,203,214,230; city 
commission government, 67; and 
Forward Dallas!, 52; general airport 
for, 203; and Kessler Plan, 28; 
Kiwanis Club, 74; library, 53; police 
station, 39; protests against black 
housing developments, 192; 
representation on Ulrickson 
committee, 55; Section 220 funds, 
220; support of Cabell, 226; support 
of Catfish Club, 95; vote for council-
manager amendments, 72

Oak Cliff-Dallas Commercial 
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Oak Cliff Tribune, 206,223,227 
O'Donnell, Charles E, 93,113,115, 
117,123,136,158 
O'Hara,J.B.,113 
oil, effects on Dallas, 172
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Olmsted,H.A.,113,115 
150,000 Club, 110
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"Operation Bootstrap," 223,231 
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Oswald, Lee Harvey, assassination of, 
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Civics, 49,151 
Overton,W.W.,Jr.,221 
Owens, George W., 118,122,149 
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Park,J.W.,55 
park board scandal, 107,120 
Park Cities, 125-26,134,136 
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People's Party, 175
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Pew, Jack, 113-14

Philadelphia, Pa., 16
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politics: as a problem in city gov­
ernment, 74; shift of emphasis in, 
223. See also Citizens Charter 
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poor whites, 153
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Progressive Voters League (PVL) 
(black organization), 7; and black 
housing, 155; and CCA, 122,160, 
177,190; establishment of, 105-6; 
requests for black police, 147-48

Progressive Voters League (PVL), 82

Proposals for Achieving the Goals for 
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and city council, 158; for Mexican 
Americans, 161-63; opposition to, 
193-94; post-WWII program, 193; 
PWA program, 153-55; for whites, 
155-56,163. See also black housing 
Public Works Department, 108

Quinn, Allen, 191

racial covenants, 152

Railton, E. J., 101-3,108,120,275 n. 33
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Reach, Cleve, 95,97,100,107-8 
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Republic of Texas, 91

Right to Vote Committee, 181-82
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Riley, W. A., 81

Ripley, George, 120

Ripply, Edwin L., 214

Rivers and Harbors Authorization Bill, 
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Robertson, Elgin, 230

Robinson, Katherine, 181

Rodgers, J. Woodall, 173-74; defense 
of Love Field, 202; elected mayor, 
122—23; endorsement of slum 
clearance, 191,221-22; feud with 
Carter, 143; planning promoter, 
125-27,136-37; response to 
bombings, 158; tensions with 
Adoue, 175,181 
Rollins, A. P., 108
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Roosevelt, Franklin D., 138

Roseland Homes, 157-58

Rotary Club (Dallas), 196

Rutland, Rudolph, 165
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Salt Lake City, Utah, 44

Salvation Army, 104

San Antonio, Tex., 55,92,138,141, 
150

Sanders, Barefoot, 222-23

Saner, R. E. L., 44

San Francisco, Calif., 162

Sanger, Alex, 32,47 
Sanger, Charles L., 32,48 
Saturday Evening Post, 37

Savage, Wallace, 181,193,221,291 n. 
30
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Scheffy, Merl, 189

Schenewerk, George, 187

Schoellkopf, John, 245

Schultz, C. E., 76

Schwille, Ed C  , 226

segregation, effects on Dallas, 191

Sergeant, George, 95,162; and the 
CCA, 103-4,107-9; elected mayor, 
100-101

sewer tax, 92,98,101 
"shotgun" houses, 150-51,162. See 
also black housing 
Simmons, John J., 44,63,65, 83, 87,

265 n. 78

Slater, Mattie A., 71

Slaughter, A. L., 136

Smith, A. Maceo, 105,191 
Smithan,V.R.,173,177 
Smoot, Dan H., 239

Socialists, 82,167 
South and East Dallas Chamber of 
Commerce, 196

South Dallas, 48; and airport, 248; 
blacks in, 151,158-59,172,193-94; 
Central Expressway, 179; drain­
age needs, 85; and elite, 39-40; 
formation of Greater Dallas 
Association, 176; neglected by CCA, 
98; opposition to council-manager 
government, 72; support of Cabell, 
226; support of Catfish Club, 94,

169; support of Commission 
Government Association, 118; 
tensions with levee district, 87; 
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192-93,198-200,204 
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Company, 200
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Southern Aircraft Corporation, 140

Southern Manifesto, 222

Southern Methodist University (SMU), 
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Southland Life Building, 37
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Southwest, 127,141,168,172,197,240 
Southwestern Life Insurance Company, 
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Southwestern Loan Association, 63

Spann v. the City of Dallas, 29,47 
Sprague, George, 97,121,125; 
appointment of housing authority, 
156; elected mayor, 107; and labor 
unrest 167-68; opposition to black 
police, 150

Springer, Marvin R., 213—15 
Square Deal Association, 183
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state enabling legislation, 155,230 
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Steele, Dudley M., 201

Steele, E. W., 187

Stemmons, Leslie A., 63,65, 87—88 
Stenor, Moses, 152

Stephenson, James L., 156

Stevens, C. S., 187

Stevens, Jay W., 79

Stevenson, Adlai E., 239

St. Louis, Mo., 26,37,44,46,49,55,86, 
126; World's Fair, 26,114 
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Stone, Kathryn, 108-9

Storey, R. G., 175
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Plan, 216-17; need for, 18-19,24,27, 
47; in Ulrickson Report, 51-52

Stubbs, G. C  , Sr., 177
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Surratt, John, 63-64,84-85,87,265 n. 
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Tarr, R. Gordon, 231

Tarrant County, 216

Tate, J. Worthington (Waddy): 
background, 61—62; and "blue shirt 
boys," 62; campaign for mayor, in 
1929,62,65,67; —, in 1933, 82;

critic of Ulrickson Report, 55— 
56; demand for resignation of 
nonresidents from city govern­
ment, 68; and levee/reclamation 
controversy, 83-85; opposition to 
council-manager government, 68­

70; and park board, 94,108,120; and 
proposed tax hike, 84—85; and sewer 
plan engineer, 85-86

tax cap,173,178 
Taylor, John H., 19

Temple, J. R. (Jimmie), 177-78,222 
10-4-1 system, 246

Tennant, Ernest R., 113

Tennison, Edward O., 47

Texas A&M University, 95

Texas and Pacific Railroad, 32, 85

Texas Centennial Exposition, 7; 
attendance, 102; awarded to Dallas, 
92; bonds approved for, 93; as 
booster tool, 93-94,102; and Civic 
Association, 101; goals of, 93-94; 
help in creation of DCC, 112; 
movement for, 91-94,161; as a 
problem, 90-91; threatened by CCA 
defeat, 99; and vice, 104
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115—16; campaign for mayor, 173, 
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